
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

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LIVES OF LORD CASTLEREAGH

AND

SIR CHARLES STEWART

THE

SECOND AND THIRD MARQUESSES OF LONDONDERRY

WITH ANNALS OF CONTEMPORARY EVENTS IN WHICH THEY BORE A PART

FROM THE ORIGINAL PAPERS OF THE FAMILY

BY

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IN THREE VOLUMES

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LIVES OF LORD CASTLEREAGH

AND

SIR CHARLES STEWART.

CHAPTER XV.

LORD CASTLEREAGH, FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA IN NOVEMBER 1815, TO THE CLOSE OF THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE IN DECEMBER 1818.

1. Change in the objects of Lord Castlereagh's life after the peace, and conclusion of the Congress of Vienna.

THE termination of the war, and the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna, made an important change in the objects to which Lord Castlereagh's life was devoted, and to which this memoir should be directed. Though he continued Foreign Secretary, and held that office till his death, seven years afterwards, and various matters of importance in that capacity fell under his administration, yet the external relations of the country during that period were far from presenting objects of the paramount importance which they had done during the war. Conferences of an interesting and important kind took place in that interval at Aix-la-Chapelle, Laybach, Troppau, and Verona; but they were far from presenting objects of the same weight for discussion which those of Pleswitz, Chatillon, and Vienna had done. But another duty which devolved upon him during this period brought Lord Castlereagh in contact with all the important internal

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and social questions which then, to an unprecedented degree, agitated the public mind. As leader of the House of Commons during the whole time, he was at once the organ by which all the chief measures of the Government were brought forward to the country, and the party by whom they were to be defended against the attacks of opposition. This period, therefore, exhibits him not so much in the light of a war leader or foreign minister, as in that of a pacific statesman and parliamentary orator; and the monuments of his ability are to be found less in his diplomatic despatches or external treaties than in his domestic measures and conduct as leader of the House of Commons.

2. Extreme difficulties in the internal government of the country during this period.

If ever there was a time when talent of the highest, prudence of the wisest, experience of the most extensive, and eloquence of the most persuasive kind, were required in such a minister, it was the seven years which immediately followed the glorious termination of the war. Mentally, socially, and physically, the reaction was of the most dangerous kind; the recoil was only the more violent from the bow having been so long and so forcibly bent in the opposite direction. The minds of men, strung up for a long course of years to the highest state of excitement from the dangers, the vicissitudes, and latterly the glories of the war, could not return at once to the monotony of pacific interests. Something more than sedentary occupations or obscure toil was required for those who had lived through the last years of the struggle, who had illuminated for the taking of Paris, and whose hearts had throbbed at the cannon of Waterloo. By a very natural and, in such circumstances, usual transition, the change was to the entirely opposite set of ideas; the general mind obeyed the general law of action and reaction, which seems universal in the moral world; and liberal principles never spread so rapidly throughout all ranks of the community as at the close of the period which had witnessed the greatest triumph of conservatism.

3. Material and social evils of this period.

Unhappily, at that time too material changes crowded together of so serious a kind, and attended with such widespread suffering, as of necessity generated ill-humour of the most aggravated kind, and induced a feverish desire for change to remedy, as it was hoped, general and intolerable evils. Many causes, some on the surface and apparent to all, others hidden, and as yet hardly suspected, in the interior of society, contributed to produce this distressing result, and increased to a most alarming degree the difficulty of domestic government. The termination of the war, and with it of the war expenditure, not only of the British but of all the Continental states, inevitably induced an almost entire cessation in the demand, not only for rude produce, but for many important branches of manufactures, required for its prosecution, both in the British Islands and in all the adjoining states. While pacific employment was thus contracting, the sudden disbanding of the armed force, of whom above 200,000 in the army and navy were at once thrown back upon society in Great Britain and Ireland, increased, in a most distressing degree, the number of persons out of employment, and occasioned a proportionate diminution in the wages of labour. There was no possibility of absorbing this mass of idle labourers in pacific employments, for the distress abroad was as great, from the same cause, as at home, and the foreign markets were everywhere declining as rapidly as the domestic. The whole class of traders, all who lived by buying and selling, and who had been so much enriched by the vast and steady rise of prices during the latter years of the war, were experiencing a corresponding reverse; the value of every article of commerce was constantly falling, and the purchasers of articles, so far from making a profit by their sale, were hardly ever able to avoid a loss. The working classes experienced no relief, but rather the reverse, from this inauspicious state of things. Their wages sank in even a greater proportion

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than the price of the articles which they required to purchase, and while the farmer was ruined by the fall of the price of his produce to the extent of a half in two years, the labourer and artisan found themselves worse off than before. In despair at the state of the home market, our merchants sent immense consignments abroad; but there matters were, from the same cause and the general exhaustion produced by the war, even worse; and the consigned goods seldom brought the half of the price at which they had been purchased. The exports and imports, in consequence, fell in the most alarming way; the former, which in 1815 had been £49,658,000, declared value, sank in 1816 to £40,328,000; the latter declined in the same period from £31,820,000 official value to £26,374,000. In two years after the peace, not only had great part of the profits made during the latter years of the war disappeared, but a large portion of the mercantile world were either in the *Gazette*, or with difficulty averting impending insolvency. Add to this that Heaven itself seemed to have declared against the labouring state. The summer of 1816 was beyond all example cold and wet, not only in the British Islands, but over the whole Continent; the rains during the whole of autumn were heavy and incessant, and prices in consequence rapidly rose; but there was no corresponding change in the depressed wages of labour, and the working classes were reduced to the severest distress by the combined effect of high prices of food and low remuneration for toil.

4. Pernicious effect of the contraction of the currency.

Then, too, in consequence, was felt for the first time that evil incident to a high state of commercial enterprise and prosperity, so often and sorely experienced in later days, arising from the contraction of the currency and consequent shortening of credit, stoppage of accommodation, and general distress in the trading classes. This went to such a length that the total paper circulation in Great Britain, which in 1814 had been £47,500,000, sank in 1816 to £42,109,000. This sudden diminution,

though much less than what it was after cash payments were renewed in 1819, when they sank to £26,588,000, was sufficient when it came to aggravate in a most serious degree the embarrassment which so many concurring causes had contributed to induce. This arose from two causes. In the first place, the existing law which declared that cash payments should be resumed within six months after the conclusion of a general peace, though suspended by temporary acts from year to year, was still impending over society, and the knowledge of this rendered all bankers extremely chary of their issues, lest they should be involved when the cash payments began in a run for gold which they had no means of meeting. In the next place, the bad harvest of 1816 necessarily induced a very great increase in the importation of grain of all sorts to meet the wants of the people. The wheat imported rose accordingly from nothing at all in 1815 to 1,020,000 quarters in 1817.[1] This, of course, induced a corresponding increase in the export of gold; the corn-growing countries being then, as now, indifferent to the greater part of our manufactures, but willing to accept any amount of gold in exchange for their rude produce. To those who, enlightened by subsequent experience, consider these circumstances, so far from its appearing surprising that great distress and discontent prevailed through the latter part of 1815 and whole of 1816, the only wonderful thing will be to discover how the nation contrived to struggle through such an unparalleled accumulation of difficulties.

[1] Porter's Progress of the Nation, 139, 3d edition.

5. Which was all ascribed by the Liberal party and the Radicals to the taxes and expenditure of Government.

But how clearly soever we may now see what were the real causes of the distress and turbulence of this disastrous period, it appeared in a very different light to the liberals of those days, or at least was presented by them in a very different light to the people. According to them, the whole distress was owing to a very plain cause, and by its removal was susceptible of a very easy remedy. Neither the bad harvest, nor the contraction of the currency, nor

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the diminution of government expenditure, nor the decline of foreign commerce, had anything to do with it. It was the *weight of taxes* which occasioned the whole, imposed in the unjust attempt to crush the cause of freedom in every country, and force upon France a government odious to its inhabitants, and blind to the lights of the age. These doctrines, so agreeable to the numerous class in Great Britain who are inclined to liberal principles and zealous for the cause of freedom throughout the world, met with a ready reception from that still more numerous multitude which was suffering under the combined effect of diminished wages and enhanced price of provisions. The cause of their distress was evident, and admitted to a great extent of immediate remedy. All that was required was, to force down by parliamentary votes the expenditure of government, especially in the army and navy, which no longer required to be kept up on a large scale, now that peace had happily been restored, and thereby render possible that great remission of the heavy burdens under which the country had so long groaned. It was the sole cause of the distress which had now become so poignant and general as to be no longer bearable; and no remedy was to be looked for but in its immediate and wholesale reduction.

6. Effect of this on Lord Castlereagh's future life.

These ideas, studiously inculcated by the liberal leaders in Parliament with all that force and eloquence for which the opposition at that period stood remarkable, were loudly re-echoed on the hustings, the platform, and the press, and soon obtained very general credit. Reduction of taxation was the universal cry; the abolition of sinecures and emoluments of all sorts to public servants who had deserved well of their country, the general object of effort. To effect the abolition of a sinecure of £1500 a-year, or the reduction of the salary of a working secretary from £1200 a-year to £800, was deemed a matter of so much importance that the whole strength of the contending parties was arrayed upon it, and the result looked

to with nearly as much anxiety as that of the battle of Leipsic or Waterloo. One deplorable effect of these minute points of retrenchment being made the *chevaux de bataille* between the contending parties was, that the attention of men was entirely drawn aside from the real cause of the general suffering, and year after year rolled on amidst acute and all but universal distress, not only without any remedy being applied to the causes of the evil, but without any consciousness even of what they were. The origin of the distress was thought to be political, when in fact it was social! The remedy was sought in a change of men, not a change of measures. The Opposition bent their whole efforts to effect a reduction of the national expenditure, and sung Io-pæans when they could get Government into a minority on some sinecure of £2000 or £3000 a-year, without paying the slightest regard to the circumstance that at the same time the notes in circulation in England had been reduced in consequence of legislative measures from £47,000,000 in 1814 to £26,000,000 in 1822, and the price of every article of commerce, as a necessary consequence, reduced one half, and all the trading classes ruined or severely straitened, and the wages of labour depressed in a similar proportion.* It was this strange concatenation of circumstances which weighed upon Lord

* Table showing the total notes in circulation, exports, imports, revenue, prices of wheat, and criminal commitments from 1814 to 1822.

	Notes.	Exports, declared Value.	Imports, official Value.	Revenue.	Prices of Wheat.	Commitments.
					s.	
1814	£47,501,086	£43,447,373	£32,622,771	£71,134,503	85	6,390
1815	46,272,650	49,653,245	31,822,053	72,210,512	76	7,818
1816	42,109,620	40,328,940	26,374,921	62,264,546	82	9,091
1817	43,291,900	40.349,235	29,910,502	52,055,913	116	13,932
1818	48,278,076	45,180,150	35,845,340	57,747,795	98	13,567
1819	40,928,428	34,252,251	29,681,640	52,648,847	78	14,254
1820	34,145,395	35,569,077	31,515,222	54,282,958	76	13,710
1821	30,727,630	35,828,127	29,769,122	55,834,192	71	13,115
1822	26,588,600	36,176,897	29,432,376	55,663,650	53	12,201

—*Parliamentary Returns*, PORTER'S *Tables*, v. 9.

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Castlereagh during the whole remainder of his career, and at length occasioned that pressure of labour and anxiety on his brain which brought it to an abrupt termination. He had to combat a coalition of domestic and social evils more formidable than the array of external enemies whom he vanquished at Leipsic, and in resisting which he was far from receiving the general internal support which he had done in conducting that great foreign contest.

7. These difficulties first appear in the debates on the income-tax.

The first occasion on which this formidable contest with domestic difficulties began, was in the discussions on the income-tax in the early months of 1816; and there it must be admitted Lord Castlereagh took his stand on a ground at that period untenable. Forcibly struck with the financial difficulties of the country, which in the preceding year had been involved in an expenditure of £114,000,000, of which no less than £72,000,000 had been raised by taxes, he saw no means of extricating matters but by continuing, at least for a year or two more, the war income-tax, at least at a reduced rate. In this opinion the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose peculiar province it was to propose financial measures, entirely concurred, and the Cabinet were unanimous on the subject. But although the duty devolved on Mr Vansittart of proposing the obnoxious measure in the House of Commons, yet there fell on Lord Castlereagh, as its leader, the still more onerous task of sustaining it against a most formidable opposition, led with great ability by Mr Brougham, and supported by the almost unanimous voice of the country. So great was the public anxiety on the subject, and so general the wish to have the burden removed, that the question came long before the night fixed for its decision to engross almost exclusively the attention of the House. Petitions innumerable were presented against the tax, and on most occasions of their being brought forward, a vehement debate ensued on the subject, which was in truth entirely exhausted, at least on the popular side, before it came on regularly for discussion

in the course of the debate on the Budget. No one need be told what were the arguments used against the obnoxious impost. The solemn engagement of the Legislature, engrossed in the act when it was imposed, that it should continue till a general peace, "*and no longer;*" the flagrant injustice of taxing professional and perishable incomes at the same rate as that derived from land, bonds, the funds, or other durable investments; the extreme severity of a tax of two shillings in the pound coming down to all incomes, and at the same rate, above £50 a-year, furnished obvious and, unfortunately, too just grounds of objection. An imperious sense of public duty, however, compelled Lord Castlereagh to contend strenuously for the continuance of the burden, at one half of its former amount, or 5 per cent, and on 18th March 1816, when the division was expected, he thus expressed himself.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 412, 446.

8. Lord Castlereagh's argument for the continuance of the tax.

"Nothing but an imperious sense of duty could have induced his Majesty's ministers to persevere in their endeavour to obtain the sanction of Parliament for the renewal of the property-tax in opposition to that national reluctance which the people might be supposed to feel at the continuance of that heavy burden, after the termination of the war; more especially when there was in addition a heavy pressure occasioned by distresses arising from particular but temporary causes. But I am sure at the same time, that Government would be turning its back on those distresses, if it were to shrink from the discharge of that duty which the necessity of the case has imposed upon it. I speak with all due deference to the petitions which have been presented to the House on the subject; but in considering what is the influence due to these petitions, no one can say that the deliberative faculties of Parliament ought to be so limited or paralysed by them, that the Legislature of the country was to look to the sentiments entertained beyond the walls of the House, for the rule and guide of what they ought to

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pursue. If we shrink from the present effort, we shall unquestionably renounce that profound and salutary policy to which we are indebted for the means of so gloriously continuing the late struggle to its final and memorable issue.

9. Continued.

"I am very far indeed from disparaging the petitions generally, many of which are of a most respectable description. But when I look at them in the aggregate, and ask myself whether they can be considered as conveying the sentiments of the people of England, I am compelled to give a negative to any such proposition. There are only nineteen petitions from counties, out of ninety of which Great Britain is composed; and there is great diversity of opinion even in those from which petitions have come. The opinion of the commercial towns is for the most part against the measure, but that opinion will be much modified when it is known what modifications are intended to be introduced into it. One third of the whole petitions presented, which are in all 400, have come from the two counties of Devon and Middlesex. Manchester, Liverpool, and the other great commercial towns are, it is well known, divided on the subject; and when it is recollected how favourably every proposal for a repeal of taxes is sure to be received in the country, I put it to the House whether the petitions are fairly to be considered as speaking the sense of the people of England. Above all, when it is recollected that this has been made a party question by the gentlemen opposite, and that all their influence has been exerted to procure petitions against the Government proposal, and that they have been accused of a deliberate breach of faith in urging the continuance of the tax, so far from being surprised at the number of petitions, my only astonishment is that there are so few.

10. Continued.

"With regard to this important question of the public faith being pledged to a removal of the tax, I do not mean to assert that a strong expectation has not pervaded the country, that on the return of peace the tax would

be removed; and if the Government could have remitted it consistently with the public faith and the public security, unquestionably they would have done so. But I confidently maintain that it was never in the contemplation of any parliament when they sanctioned the imposition of that tax, that it should never under *any circumstances* be renewed, or continued after peace. To assert that its continuance would be a breach of faith on the part of the Legislature, is an attempt at delusion unexampled in the history of the country. My right honourable friend, now no more (Mr Pitt), had actually mortgaged the property-tax, during time of peace, for *nine years;* and if Lord Sidmouth did not continue that mortgage, it was because the small loans which were required in the beginning of the war rendered it unnecessary. It was part of Lord Henry Petty's (Landsdowne) plan of finance to mortgage the tax in time of peace, and he published finance tables to show in what particular year that precise effect was to take place. Would any man of common sense have done this, if the continuance of the tax would be a breach of national faith? And what were the assignable means for releasing that mortgage? An encroachment on the sinking fund. And what was the alternative, if there were no excesses of the sinking fund applicable to such an object? To have only six millions of clear revenue with which to commence a peace establishment.*

"The charges for the present year (exclusive of those of the debt) are calculated at about thirty millions sterling. The country, however, has good reason to hope that next year that expenditure will be diminished a third, reducing it, exclusive of the charges of the debt, to twenty millions. It is scarcely possible to effect any further reduction consistently with the national faith and security. If every

* In stating the disposable funds for the current expenses of the year, the whole charges of the debt, including the sinking fund, were at this period *always deducted* by the speakers on both sides.

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plan of reduction pressed by the gentlemen opposite were carried into effect, it would not make the difference of two millions a-year. Whether, therefore, we take the peace establishment at eighteen or twenty millions, it makes little difference in the great principle which ought to regulate our financial operations. Now, what is the clear revenue of the country, after deducting what must be set aside for the charges of the debt? The amount of peace taxes, with the surplus of the consolidated fund, does not exceed six millions. With the property-tax, and the war taxes, this surplus, applicable to present expenditure, will be twenty-eight millions. How, then, is a revenue of twenty-eight millions to meet, if so great a reduction as the whole property-tax is made, an expenditure this year of thirty millions, and next year of twenty millions? It is proposed to reduce this war taxation this year by eight millions,—viz. seven millions by reducing the property-tax one half, and one million by reduction of taxes peculiarly affecting the agricultural interest. I put it to the House whether it is either wise or expedient at this time, and in these circumstances, to attempt a more extensive reduction. If the property tax is entirely given up, the country must this year *borrow twelve millions in lieu* of it; and next year a loan of nine millions will be necessary. If the country can ever so far forget its best interests as to place a peace establishment of eighteen millions upon a revenue of only nine, all the great principles of finance which have hitherto been considered essential to the safety of the state will be abandoned. *Our debt will remain stationary,* if not *increase, even during peace;* and we shall inevitably be precipitated into all the dangers consequent on a short-sighted and illusory system of finance. Gentlemen talk of the sinking fund as if it had already arrived at such a magnitude that all fears regarding it may be dismissed, and we may lay our hands without scruple on that sacred deposit. That fund, as it has during the last three years been encroached upon to a certain extent, is now £11,200,000;

and if any application of this sum is made to the current exigencies of Government, the country will be in the situation of having a debt of above seven hundred millions, towards the reduction of which no progress can be made in time of peace.

"I most solemnly entreat and conjure the House, that before they resolve to give relief to the country they will recollect the great principles of finance upon which the grandeur and prosperity of the empire rests, and that they will not press the adoption of a system which, however specious and alluring at the moment, is pregnant with future disaster, and for which they will be regarded with anything but gratitude by future times. I feel it a sacred public duty to myself, to Parliament, and the nation, to press the present measure, not merely as expedient, but as absolutely necessary for the safety and wellbeing of the state. Unless a stimulus is given to the public funds, it will be impossible to prevent every branch of industry throughout the country from languishing. But how are the public funds to be maintained at a high level if we are obliged to borrow twelve millions this year, eight or nine the next, and so on during peace, instead of making any step towards the reduction of the public debt? I put it to the good sense of the country, to the truly British spirit which animated the people, whether they would now shrink from the exertion which is necessary for their own preservation—that they would, in fact, be so infatuated as to turn their backs upon themselves. I trust our ultimate decision will be in favour of those great principles of financial policy which have hitherto enabled the country to surmount all its difficulties. And though such conduct may for a moment leave an unfavourable impression upon the people, yet I have no doubt that they will ultimately do justice to a line of policy dictated by a sacred sense of duty; and that they will co-operate in a measure necessary to secure the stability, the safety, and the future prosperity of the whole empire."[1]

12. Concluded.

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 442, 450.

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13. Result of the debate. March 18.

This powerful and manly appeal produced a great impression on the House, and was loudly cheered from all sides; but the impatience of the constituencies at what undoubtedly was a grievous burden, was all-powerful with their *votes*. Mr Wilberforce asked, in reply, "Under what circumstances is a renewal of the tax proposed, when it was rather expected that a bonus would have been given to the people? My noble friend has given a tremendous view of the subject. If I understand him rightly he has shown that at the end of two years the necessity for the continuance of the tax will be as strong as it is now said to be. He has, therefore, proved too much. He has proved that this country would never, under the present system, obtain the relief which it ought to receive, and therefore that the only means of gaining it is by the curtailment of her expenditure. The question is, shall the people or the money market be relieved? When the people of England know the amount of the burden thus imposed upon them, they will think that the House has been led away by speculation on general principles, and has not felt, but contemned those distresses which have been great indeed, but have been aggravated, instead of being relieved, from a wish to relieve the money-market." Here the shouts became so loud, and the tumult so great, that nothing more was audible; and the House divided amidst an indescribable scene of excitement, when there appeared for continuing the tax, 201; against it, 238; so that Ministers were defeated, and the tax repealed, by a majority of 37.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 450, 451.

14. Vast importance of this vote.

This decision of the House of Commons was the most momentous that occurred from that time to the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832. It inaugurated, and for the first time gave the sanction of the House of Commons to the new system of finance, which consisted in ignoring and shutting out of view the future, and seeking only to tide over present difficulties by measures calculated to win present applause. *Ultimus Romanorum;* Lord Castlereagh

raised his powerful voice against this change of system, and solemnly adjured the House, by every consideration which could speak to the hearts of true patriots, to adhere, even at the price of present unpopularity, to the only system which could ultimately insure the financial security, and with it the internal welfare and external independence of the country. That Lord Castlereagh was perfectly right in his argument as to the necessity of upholding the property tax at the reduced rate of 5 per cent, has now been decisively proved by the fact that the nation, which then so unanimously rose to shake off the impost, has since been obliged to put it on at that very rate; and that the successors of the very men who then so loudly condemned it, have been under the necessity, though 30 per cent has since been added to the number, and 100 per cent to the wealth of the country for twenty years, to propose its adoption. And that Lord Castlereagh nowise exaggerated the vital importance of the vote then taken upon the future financial prospects of the country and the upholding of the sinking fund, is not less demonstrated by the fact that, under the new financial system then introduced, scarce any progress has been made during nearly half a century of almost unbroken peace in the reduction of the public debt; while, under the former system, in thirty years of almost constant war, the amount paid off had been £230,000,000; and if the same system had been continued, beyond all doubt the whole debt would at this moment (1861) have been extinguished.

15. Proof which subsequent events have afforded of the truth of these principles.

This extraordinary fact becomes the more surprising when it is recollected how all-powerful the moneyed and commercial interests have been rendered in the House of Commons by the operation of the Reform Bill, and how dependent they both are upon the preservation of public credit, and the progressive diminution of the public debt. The truth is, these interests have now become so strong that they are altogether paramount in the Lower House, and render any system of government impossible

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which is not directed by their wishes, and subservient to their *present* interests. Accordingly, they have repealed £40,000,000 a-year of indirect taxes to cheapen commodities and encourage commerce, and thereby destroyed the sinking fund, and rendered the debt immortal; while, at the same time, they have imposed a grinding direct tax on incomes which the mercantile class can easily evade, but the landed find it impossible to escape. But while all must see and lament these consequences, and admire the sagacity with which Lord Castlereagh foresaw, and the courage with which he stated them, yet it is more than doubtful whether he did right, *at that particular time*, in contending for the retention of any part of the property-tax. That burden was so grinding and oppressive, especially descending, as it then did, to incomes of £50 a-year, that it could be borne only under a sense of public danger as instant and menacing as that which leads persons threatened with shipwreck to consent to their goods being thrown overboard to lighten the vessel, and save their lives. To expect that they would submit to it when the danger was past, and suffering from other causes all but universal, was impossible, and the attempt, as Parliament then was constituted, hopeless. It is the strongest proof how much the influence of the moneyed classes in the Legislature has since been increased by the Reform Bill, that the impost is now submitted to under the pressure of no such necessity, but when it is merely an exchange for indirect taxes to a much larger amount repealed. When Mr Wilberforce said that the real question at issue in the debate on the income-tax was, whether the people of England should be sacrificed to the money-market, the cheers became so loud that the remainder of his speech was inaudible. Probably, if they ventured to give vent to their wishes, the shouts would now be as loud if the question was put whether the moneyed interest should be sacrificed to that of the people of England.

Contrary to general expectation, the Ministry did not

resign on this defeat; and still more surprise was excited by their next measure, which was the proposal to repeal the war malt-tax, which was cordially agreed to. As this tax produced above two millions a-year, its voluntary surrender by the Government excited not a little surprise, and called forth some animadversion. It was generally supposed, and probably not without reason, that it was a measure of expedience intended to conciliate the country gentlemen after the rude shock which Government had sustained by the repeal of the property-tax. Though this reason, however, in all probability, had some weight, yet it was not by any means the only one which pressed upon the Government in proposing this reduction. The agricultural interest was in such a state of depression, from the extraordinary fall which had taken place in the price of every species of farm-produce, that some special relief applicable to them had become indispensable, and the result proved that the remedy proposed was both judicious and by no means beyond what the necessities of the case required.[1]

16. Repeal of war malt-tax.

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 946-948.

A measure of far more general importance, and calculated to afford infinitely greater general relief, was soon after brought in by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 8th of April. He proposed to continue the restriction on cash payments by the Bank for two years longer. He stated that in consequence of the war occasioned by the return of Napoleon from Elba, so far from gold returning into the country, as had been hoped would be the case on the restoration of peace, no less than £21,000,000 had been sent out of the country in the last year. The measure, though strongly opposed by Mr Ponsonby, Lord Folkestone, and the Whigs, excited very little attention, so little was the vital importance of the subject understood at that period in the country. It was ultimately passed by a large majority. On leave being moved to bring in the bill, Lord Castlereagh observed, "The gold currency of the country, at the time when we had a mixed circula-

17. Continuance of Bank Restriction Act for two years more.

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tion, was stated by Lord Liverpool, at the period of passing the restriction, to amount to thirty-two millions. If we required thirty-two millions then, a much larger gold currency is required *now, when the wealth and industry of the country have so much increased.* It would need a considerable time to accumulate such a treasure; and, though the exchanges are now favourable to us, this would not continue if the bank restriction were taken off, and public credit with individual enterprise in consequence shaken." There is probably no practical man acquainted with commercial transactions, and not under the influence of an adverse interest, who will hesitate in admitting that the principle here announced by Lord Castlereagh—viz., that the currency of the country must be augmented in proportion to the increase in its population and industry —is the true one on the subject. It sounds strange, however, in the ears of a generation which, for above a quarter of a century, has been taught to believe that the currency should be *contracted,* instead of being expanded, with the increase in the number and transactions of the people; and that, seeing a safe and equable circulation is indispensable to the health of a commercial community, the wisest course is to have it founded mainly on the retention of gold—the very thing which, in an artificial state of society, it is utterly impossible for any length of time to retain, or draw back when gone, but by the most acute and widespread public suffering.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 1055, 1056, and xxxiv. 405-407.

18. Lord Castlereagh's observations on the army reductions.

The general passion for a great reduction of the public expenditure, and especially the army, on the return of peace, which has so often amounted to a perfect mania, and involved the country on the first breaking out of hostilities in the most serious disasters, appeared in a striking manner in this session of Parliament. The army estimates in particular were the object of attack, and in an especial manner the staff, of all departments the most essential to a successful prosecution of hostilities on the first breaking out of a war. A great reduction was made in the esti-

mates as originally brought forward, and a still larger when the repeal of the income-tax rendered a yet further reduction indispensable. On the last occasion Lord Castlereagh observed, "Nothing has so much changed the character and discipline of our military force since 1792 as the office of commander-in-chief and the staff at head-quarters, now the object of such general obloquy. Before that time, a British army assembled under the same general had no more uniformity of movements, of discipline, and appearance, in its different regiments, than one composed of the troops of different nations. Let any one contrast this with its present state—the facility with which it could perform all its operations in concert, the perfect uniformity of tactics that it possessed; and he would acknowledge how much had been done, and how necessary it was to continue an establishment on which the preservation of this state of things depended. Without a full and efficient staff, an army, however well disciplined and adapted for garrison or merely regimental duties, would be totally unfit for operations in the field; and *so it would be found, if ever called on to act against a powerful enemy in such a mutilated state.** The gentlemen opposite, I am sure, would not wish to see a body of officers abolished who have done such things for the public service, even setting aside the high character at its head, to whom the nation and the army are under so many obligations.

"As to the difference, said to be so alarming, between the estimates for this year and those of 1792 and 1802, it must be recollected how much the nation has grown, and how widely its arms have extended, since even the last of those periods. No one thinks that the measure which suits a youth just emerging from adolescence will answer for a full-grown man. It is the same, and even more so, with a nation, and especially Great Britain; for

19. Concluded.

* How completely to the letter was this verified on the breaking out of the Crimean war!

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by its extension into various and remote quarters of the globe, it has been brought in contact with new and fierce nations, whose hostility, if not duly guarded against, might involve us in serious dangers. We have now nearly thirty colonies; and taking the expenses of the staff at £100,000, there would only be a little more than £3000 for each. Can this be said to be an extravagant establishment for an army of 130,000 men, scattered over thirty different establishments? The army proposed to be kept up at home is only 28,000 men, including the reliefs; and is this too much for a country in close proximity to nations having ten times that amount? England had never been accustomed to keep up a large standing army in time of peace, and the Government have no intention of now doing so." But they do think it important to keep up a sufficient force in our colonial possessions to repel any sudden attack, to which they are the more exposed, owing to their distance from the mother country. It has been said that that which made England a great and energetic nation is the principle heretofore acted upon, of maintaining a very low peace establishment, while the corresponding establishments on the Continent are uniformly high. I do not agree in this view of the subject. On the contrary, I believe much of our financial embarrassment has been caused by our former low peace establishments, and that it is to that circumstance that the failure of many of our military operations may with certainty be traced. The evils of a low peace establishment had been severely felt at the commencement of the late war. It would have been well for this country had a different principle been acted upon in the peace which preceded it, and which was now recommended by the gentlemen opposite."[1]*

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 998, 999, 1203.

On the great and all-important subject of agricultural distress, Lord Castlereagh said, in answer to a most able

* The two or three last sentences are Lord Palmerston's, then Secretary at War, who thus summed up Lord Castlereagh's arguments on previous occasions during the session.

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20. Lord Castlereagh's speech on agricultural distress.

speech of Mr Brougham's, "The honourable gentleman (Mr Brougham) has so far argued the case fairly and temperately, that he has admitted that the restrictions on payments in cash by the Bank, which enters so deeply into this question, has a tendency, if properly regulated, to produce great prosperity. There is one practical view of this question which should never be forgotten, and that is, that whatever minor inconvenience the suspension of cash payments may have produced, it has enabled the country to do all that it has done during the war, and brought it triumphantly through the various difficulties with which it was threatened. No man can deny that but for it the country must have sunk under the weight of the power opposed to it, and that it never could have made the efforts which it actually did during the course of the contest had it not possessed a circulating medium of such a nature that it was not exposed to the danger to which *every metallic currency is necessarily exposed, that of being drawn away to foreign states at the very time when its support is most required.* That such a circulation may sometimes lead to overtrading, I do not deny; but what is that inconvenience compared to those which it eschews? No man at all acquainted with the history of the country during the last fifteen years can deny that it is by the suspension of cash payments that the country has been saved.

21. Continued.

"The immediate cause of the distresses of the last two years may be traced to the simple fact, that during the last two years, and particularly during the last year, the great and necessary articles of human consumption *have depreciated in value to the extent of at least a half.* This great fall affected the class whose labour contributed so large a proportion to the general wealth of the community, and of course its effects have been proportionally great. This depreciation commenced in 1813, when the harvest was unusually abundant; and the opening of the Baltic ports, and those of the north of Germany, in con-

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sequence of the victories of the Allies, in addition, occasioned a great and immediate fall in the price of grain of every sort. This went to such a length as occasioned the most severe distress among the agricultural interest, whose contracts and undertakings had been based on a widely different scale, for the fall was from 120s. to 56s.! The greatest evil arising from so extraordinary and unprecedented a fall was the antagonism which it induced among classes, each trying to throw the loss off itself upon some other class. The honourable member for Essex (Mr Western) had stated that this prodigious fall was mainly owing to this, that under cover of the exclusion of foreign grain, produced by the war and the Continental blockade, the agriculture of the country had made such a start, that we were *not merely self-supporting, but producing a redundance of grain*, and that was the main cause of the low prices. If true at all, however, this was only true of a particular year, and arose from a combination of causes not likely to recur, and it would speedily be remedied by a diminution in the quantity of corn sown. There seems no reason to suppose that, if the supply of foreign corn were practically shut out from the country, the price of wheat would fall permanently below 80s.; and although, even at that price, great distress would be experienced among those who had adventured their capital on the idea of prices remaining as high as 120s., yet it did by no means follow from that, that upon the whole, wheat could not be grown in the country at a profit at the price of 80s.

22. Continued.

"Coincident with the great alteration in the price of corn has been an alteration even more important in the currency of the country. That must be steadily kept in view in all arguments relative to the price of agricultural produce. A large part of the circulating medium has been withdrawn and disappeared, and with it, what was far more serious, has vanished the confidence with which bankers had made advances to the public. In dread of the restoration of cash payments within six months after

the conclusion of a general peace, they have shortened their credits, and withheld those advances by which the industry of the country has so long been supported. But there seems no reason to suppose that this diminution of the circulating medium is to be of a permanent nature. It is of our own creating, and it admits of remedy by ourselves. There is no reason to suppose it is beyond the reach of remedy. The return of peace, and the postponing the period of cash payments, will lead to the return to old measures—to the return of those common principles on which the circulation of every country ought to be regulated. All the banks in the country, from the great national bank to the smallest private bank that exists must feel that the period is rapidly approaching when the nation must again possess a larger circulating medium. It would be a most dangerous experiment to throw open the coffers of the Bank of England until the commerce of the country had brought back a quantity of the precious metals in aid of their operations. Unless due caution was adopted on this subject, a shock or convulsion would be occasioned far more dangerous than any evil that could possibly arise from the substitution of a currency of another description. One word as to the Sinking Fund, already alluded to by the honourable mover, and which is more or less mixed up with all questions of the currency and agricultural distress. It has been proposed to take whatever sum may be required for the public service from that fund. I do not say that application is not to be made to it under *any* circumstances; but I trust Parliament will never consent to take from that fund unless they are satisfied that its amount, as compared with the debt, is sufficient to sustain the credit of the country, and enable it to make those exertions which hereafter may become necessary. *The Sinking Fund has saved the country;* and I trust Parliament will never approach it without a lively recollection of the benefits it had dispensed.[1] Let the magnitude of the debt be considered, and reflect on

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 1119-1127.

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the little progress which a sinking fund, now reduced to six millions, can make on a debt of seven hundred and fifty millions."

23. Lord Castlereagh's circular recommending a pacific policy to all the embassies, Dec. 28, 1815.

The conclusion of a general peace and the termination of the Congress of Vienna necessarily deprive the foreign correspondence of Lord Castlereagh of much of the interest which belongs to it at the time when the fate of nations was foreshadowed in his sentences. But still there were several momentous foreign questions which remained to be adjusted, and which called forth letters on his part, which are of value as indicating what in his view should be the foreign policy in pacification of Great Britain. And it will be found that from the very first, from the earliest enunciation of his views on foreign affairs, after the stilling of the waves of the revolutionary tempest, his voice was for peace, and a cautious abstinence from whatever might tend to its interruption. In a circular to all the foreign missions in the close of 1815, this policy was equally clearly and emphatically announced.* Nor was

* "I perceive in more than one quarter a tendency to alarm as to the designs of particular Powers, but especially of Russia, for which I have no reason to suppose there is the smallest foundation, but of the prudence of which I should equally doubt, were I apprehensive (which I am not) that the Emperor of Russia, after making such stupendous sacrifices for a peace which, in its provisions, has met his cordial concurrence, was stupid enough to meditate new convulsions to pull his own work to pieces. His language, his engagements, and his proceedings, as far as they are known to me, are in direct opposition to such a conclusion; and it must be my duty to discourage a line of conduct which, although unauthorised, may produce distrust and alienation between two Courts, whose counsels being in unison is perhaps more essential than any other circumstance that can be stated to the preservation of that state of relations in Europe which is best calculated to preclude any serious interruption of peace.

"When I thus express myself with respect to the views of Russia, or indeed of any Court, I must be understood as not indulging that species of blind confidence which does not belong to the politics of any foreign State. But I wish to guard our missions abroad against the danger of accelerating, if not producing, a conflict for influence between the two States. The existing state of European relations may possibly not endure beyond the danger which originally gave them birth, and which has recently confirmed them. But it is our duty, as well as interest, to retard, if we cannot avert, the return of a more contentious order of things; and our insular situation places us sufficiently out of the reach of danger to admit of our pursuing a more generous and confiding policy.

"In the present state of Europe, it is the province of Great Britain *to turn the*

this declaration either premature or uncalled-for; on the contrary, there was considerable danger that an ember left, almost from necessity, in the heart of Germany, at the Congress of Vienna, might again involve Europe in conflagration. The cause of this was that there were disputed claims which Bavaria had against Baden, which,

confidence she has inspired to the account of peace by exercising a conciliatory influence between the Powers, rather than put herself at the head of any combinations of Courts to keep others in check. The necessity for such a system of connection may recur, but this necessity should be no longer problematical when it is acted upon. The immediate object to be kept in view is to inspire the States of Europe as long as we can with a sense of the dangers which they have surmounted by their union, of the hazards they will incur by a relaxation of vigilance, to make them feel that the existing concert is their only perfect security against the revolutionary embers more or less existing in every State of Europe; and that their true wisdom is to keep down the petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in support of the established principles of social order.

"I have every reason to hope that the advantage of this course of policy is justly appreciated by the Allied Cabinets. The negotiations at Paris were terminated with the utmost cordiality—whatever differences of opinion had existed either at Vienna or in the early stage of our discussions at Paris, had ceased to disturb the general harmony; and there appeared a general satisfaction in the results of our labours. I should say that the relations between Austria and Russia had become much more amicable; those of Russia with Prussia perhaps proportionably less intimate; but this I attribute not to any essential relaxation of friendly feeling, but to the manner in which the Prussian counsels were conducted at Paris, being less congenial to the Emperor of Russia's feelings than the more moderate tone of the Austrian Cabinet. All, however, appeared to separate deeply impressed with the value of their common connection to themselves and to the world, and I trust nothing may arise to shake this impression.

"With respect to the particular Court to which you are accredited (Berlin), every consideration of common interest must make me partial to the conservation of its preponderance as a great Power, inasmuch as Prussia must be *the basis of every system in the north of Europe to preserve Holland as an independent State and to keep France in check.* But with all that partiality and a grateful admiration of the conduct of that nation and its armies in the war, I fairly own that I look with considerable anxiety to the tendency of their politics. There certainly at this moment seems a great fermentation in all orders of the State; very free notions of government, if not principles actually revolutionary, are prevalent; and the army is by no means subordinate to the civil authorities. It is impossible to say where these impulses may stop when they find a representative system in which they may develop themselves."—LORD CASTLEREAGH'S *Circular to the Foreign Missions, December* 28, 1815; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 104-106.

The following letter of Lord Cathcart proves these apprehensions to have been not altogether without foundation:—"I continue to believe the Emperor to be perfectly sincere in all the professions he has made of a pacific disposition, and that he is firm in his intention to co-operate fairly and fully with his allies in the execution of all his engagements; and I do not at present see any reason

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as a matter of detail, and likely to lead to a tedious negotiation, had been remitted to the great Powers for adjustment. It was this which threatened to produce the discord. Russia supported the claims of the Grand-duke of Baden, with whom the Czar was connected by marriage. Great Britain and Austria favoured the claims of Bavaria. The matter went such a length, that Lord Castlereagh instructed his minister at Munich to support the Austrian negotiation by every means short of war." *

to apprehend a change of system. Incidents may occur to create alarm, and I think it may be useful to state some observations upon what appears to be the present disposition of the Emperor's mind. His Imperial Majesty is certainly fully aware of the power which the extent of his military preparations place in his hand. He is fond of his army, and proud of it. He considers it as brought to its present perfection by its own exertions. He would have pleasure in the task of adding to it, and *consequently is tenacious of it*, and averse to set about that reduction and consequent diminution of expense, which his discernment and good sense demonstrate to be absolutely necessary for the interest of his empire. He is equally sensible of the important place which Russia now holds in the counsels of Europe. He is surrounded by people of all sorts who continually paint this power and these advantages in the most flattering colours, and excite him to show it by partial interferences. He has not, as far as *I* know, any minister who would venture to persist in opposing cool reflections to his declared will; and I do not know any to whom he would allow opportunities of giving such opposition. It is generally observed that his Imperial Majesty has acquired within these last years much more confidence in himself, and that he is much more inclined to act from his own judgment."—LORD CATHCART *to* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *St Petersburg, July* 1 (13), 1816; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 263.

* "I shall again instruct Mr Lamb to support the Austrian negotiation at Munich *by every means short of the measure of war*. To such a proceeding the British Government cannot be a party, because in their judgment Bavaria was left by the treaty of Ried a free agent to accept or refuse the proposed exchange. It is my opinion that the Bavarian negotiation has been discreditably conducted; and that, were she even to succeed in defeating the exchange contrary to the wishes of the great Powers of Europe, she would have acted upon the whole unwisely in keeping alive a point of controversy with her natural ally. . . . I certainly should regret that it had been found necessary to complicate this question by imposing sacrifices upon a third Power, and should be extremely desirous that the arrangement could be managed upon the principle of exchange between Austria and Bavaria; but I consider that, according to the state of the treaties existing with the respective Powers, it is more competent in good faith for the Allies to impose some sacrifice of territory upon Baden, with a view to secure the free consent of Bavaria, than it is to *force* the latter to submit to what the mediating Powers may deem a fair equivalent. I think, however, after the part Baden has taken with the Allies, that the demand on her for cessions ought to be framed upon a very moderate scale."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD (SIR CHARLES) STEWART, *January* 29, 1816; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 163, 164.

The negotiation was protracted for a considerable time, chiefly in consequence of a want of temper on the part of those by whom it was originally conducted. Sir Charles (now Lord) Stewart, the English ambassador at Vienna, made the greatest efforts to conduct things to an amicable issue, which he easily saw could be effected only by forcing a small sacrifice on Baden.* By his combined temper and judgment in carrying out the instructions of Lord Castlereagh, this delicate affair was at length brought to a termination, and the exchange effected on fair and equitable terms.[1]

[1] Lord Castlereagh to Lords Stewart and Clancarty, Aug. 7, 1816; Cast. Cor. xi. 272, 273.

24. Difficulty regarding garrisons of Mayence and Landau adjusted by Lords Castlereagh and Stewart.

Another point which required still more address to manage, as it involved the vexed question of Austrian or Prussian supremacy in Northern Germany, was that regarding the garrison of the great frontier fortress of Mayence. It had been settled at the Congress of Vienna that its garrison, which was to consist of 13,000 men, should be composed of troops of the German Confederation; but the delicate question—In what proportions was it to be apportioned between the troops of the rival Powers of the North and South?—was left undecided. Both the Courts of Vienna and Berlin and their respective armies attached great weight to the decision of this question, which was not the less interesting on either side that, like precedence at Court, it involved a point of honour or superiority in rank rather than a matter of real importance. Austria first proposed that the garrison should consist of the troops of Austria, Prussia, and Hesse-Darmstadt, and that the governor should be Austrian, and

* "The only practicable mode of settling the question is for Baden to make a sacrifice with a view to secure the free consent of Bavaria; this to be limited to a district, and embracing the desirable object of approximation. To this there is surely less objection than for Austria or Bavaria to recede. Nothing but force could effect the latter alternative. If the four Allied Courts can press measures upon Bavaria *a fortiori*, they may urge certain cessions from Baden. What Power has not made sacrifices for the general peace we now enjoy? And I am strongly of opinion those miserable princes of the old Confederation of the Rhine require a little discipline, and it will do them much good to be kept in order by their superiors." — LORD STEWART *to* LORD CLANCARTY, *Milan, February* 16, 1816; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 186.

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the commandant Prussian, the number of troops of the two Powers the same, and those of Darmstadt chosen by common consent. This proposal, as involving the precedence of Austria in the matter of the governor, was rejected by the Cabinet of Berlin, who proposed, as a modification, that the Prussian commandant should enjoy the same rank and power as the Austrian governor; and that as Austria agreed to cede Landau to Bavaria, to be kept up as a frontier fortress of the Confederacy, she should reserve the right to send an equal number of troops with Bavaria to compose its garrison. There was great difficulty in getting this delicate point adjusted, but at length it was settled by the Austrian Cabinet agreeing that the Prussian commandant should have the same rank and power as the Austrian governor. Another point of difficulty occurred in regard to a suitable provision for Prince Eugene, whose honourable and straightforward conduct at the close of the war entitled his claims to a favourable reception from the Allied Powers. Lord Castlereagh concurred with the other diplomatists in thinking that the provisions in the treaty of Fontainebleau in favour of the Napoleon family had been annulled by Napoleon's breach of that treaty and return to France; but still he advocated the claims of Prince Eugene, not to an independent sovereignty, but to an *établissement convenable*, consisting of an income of £35,000 or £40,000 a-year, derived from the estates confirmed to him in Italy, and £200,000, to be provided by the Allied Powers, to buy a residence near Munich, where he was desirous of settling.[1] *

[1] Lord Stewart to Lord Clancarty, Feb. 16, 1816; and Proposition de l'Autriche, Ibid. 193.

* "With respect to Prince Eugene's claims, I send you my correspondence with Mr à Court. I agree with you that the stipulation to Prince Eugene is *un établissement convenable*, and not a sovereignty. I object to any territorial concession in Italy; but I think the character of the Alliance is interested in something being done for him. Perhaps it is too much to throw the whole on Naples. My motive is that he should have a round sum, suppose £200,000, to provide a suitable residence for him near Munich, which, together with his estates in Italy, restored to him by the Emperor, and valued at £35,000 or £40,000 a-year, would make him *un très grand seigneur*. Half of this sum might be charged on Naples, as having spent little on the war; the other half

Mr Brougham's motion for production of the treaty of the Holy Alliance.

A point of much more general importance in foreign policy was early in the session of 1816 brought under the notice of Parliament by Mr Brougham, who moved for a copy of the treaty concluded at Paris on 25th September 1815, entitled "The Holy Alliance." This celebrated treaty he stigmatised as nothing but a convention for the purpose of enslaving mankind, veiled under the cloak of a zeal for the interests of the Christian religion and universal philanthropy. This treaty, which emanated from the warm heart and inexperienced zeal of the Emperor Alexander, was nothing but an adoption by the despotic sovereigns of Europe of those principles for the preservation of general peace and the adjustment of all differences between independent States by pacific means without an appeal to the sword, which afterwards, in the hands of Mr Cobden and Mr Bright, obtained such general concurrence in the British nation, and, by forcing Government to starve down our establishments by sea and land for a quarter of a century, left us no protection against foreign aggression but the memory of former greatness.*

on the other Powers, in the ratio of the French contributions. The charge would scarcely be felt; and as the treaty of Fontainebleau, whether wise or unwise, was made with a view to a supposed general interest, it seems not unreasonable out of a general fund to rid Naples of this encumbrance, which the negotiations at Vienna threw upon her, but against which the Austrian treaty of guarantee has furnished her with a tolerable defence."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD CLANCARTY, *January* 31, 1816; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 164, 165.

* "Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia, solemnly declare that the present act has no other object than to publish, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective states and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of the Christian religion—namely, the precepts of justice, Christian charity, and peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the counsels of princes and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human constitutions, and remedying their imperfections. In consequence, their Majesties have agreed on the following articles:—

"1. Conformity to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command all men to regard each other as brethren. The three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity; and considering each other as fellow-countrymen, they will on all occasions, and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance; and regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them in

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Now, however, when the same principles were promulgated by the despotic monarchs, they were stigmatised as a dangerous conspiracy against the liberties of mankind. Such as it was, however, Great Britain was no party to this treaty, which was signed only by the sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, who did it in person. Lord Castlereagh, while concurring in the object of the treaty, which was to avert the dire alternative of war in cases of national disputes, was too experienced in human affairs to believe such a mode of adjustment of national differences practicable in serious cases, and too well aware of the duties and responsibility of a constitutional sovereign to become involved in a treaty of this sort with Powers over whom we could have no control, and which might in future times be perverted to purposes widely different from those contemplated by its original authors. He contented himself, therefore, with simply observing that it was contrary to Parliamentary usage to produce a treaty to which Great Britain was not a party,[1] and that while he admired the principles on which the

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxii. 359, 363.

the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated to protect religion, peace, and justice.

"2. In consequence, the sole principle in force, whether between the said Governments or between their subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of testifying, by unutterable goodwill, the mutual affection with which they ought to be animated, and to consider themselves as all members of one and the same Christian nation—the three Allied sovereigns looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern these branches of the one family—namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia; thus confessing that the Christian nation of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other sovereign but Him to whom alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom—that is to say, God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties consequently recommend to their people, with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercises of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.

"3. All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present act, and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that those truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance.
—FRANCIS, FREDERICK WILLIAM, ALEXANDER. *Paris, September* 25, 1815."

treaty was founded, he must oppose its production, as involving the affairs of foreign nations with which this country had no concern.* In this view the House concurred, and the motion was negatived by a majority of 104 to 30.

26. Lord Castlereagh's argument for the detention of Napoleon.

Another subject, interesting as forming part of the biography of two such men as Napoleon and Lord Castlereagh, was brought before Parliament in the same session. This was a bill for the purpose of effectually detaining the ex-Emperor in St Helena. On this occasion Lord Castlereagh said: "Doubts have been entertained as to whether the detention of Napoleon Buonaparte in St Helena was justifiable by the law of nations; and although I do not share in these doubts, the bill proposed has been deemed necessary to remove those doubts. As to the justice and policy of detaining Napoleon Buonaparte in custody, no doubt can exist; and as to the legality of the proceeding with reference to the law of nations, as little hesitation

* Lord Castlereagh said on this occasion, "The treaty in question is signed by the sovereigns themselves, instead of their ministers; and though the forms of this country do not admit of such a procedure, it is by no means an uncommon transaction on the Continent. The honourable member seems to think that the treaty in question had some reference to other projects, and that it was to be considered as the forerunner of some undefined crusade against some nation or other not a party to it. I can assure him that my persuasion of the understanding between the Powers who signed that treaty is very different, and that no such intention existed in the breast of any of these sovereigns. It would not be too much to infer such a conclusion from the character and actions of the sovereigns themselves. Whether the instrument was necessary or not is another question; but I must say, that if the spirit which it breathes was really that which animated the Emperor of Russia—and I have not a doubt on the subject—there is nothing upon which I more sincerely congratulate Europe and the world. If the Emperor of Russia desires to found his glory upon such a basis, posterity will do justice to the noble determination. Having already done so much for mankind by his arms, to what better purpose can he apply his great influence in the counsels of the sovereigns of Europe than by securing for it a long and beneficial peace? It is the only glory now left him to acquire after the great personal fame with which he is already environed. I oppose production of the document itself upon no other ground but this, that Great Britain is not a party to it, and that it is contrary to Parliamentary usage to call for production of treaties to which this country has not acceded. But I must say that I never recollect a more uncalled-for motion made in this House, or one more dangerous, if the Confederacy, so essential to the peace of the world, could be shaken by such an attempt."—*Parliamentary Debates*, xxxii. 361, 362.

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need be felt. As a sovereign prince, we were justified in detaining him in consequence of his breach of treaty and incapacity to offer any guarantee for the performance of any other treaty. We had this additional ground to warrant our proceedings, that he was a prisoner of war, who, as a native of Corsica, was a subject of France, which Power had declined to claim his restoration. Therefore, independent of his general character, this country was justified in detaining him in custody according to the law of nations. When his return from Elba, and overthrow of the Government of France, are, in addition to this, taken into consideration, no doubt can exist on the subject; for by so doing he broke a solemn treaty, and, being unable to offer any guarantee he would not do so again, his removal to a distance became justifiable on the imperious law of necessity. With regard to the treatment of Buonaparte, it was proposed to extend to him every indulgence that was consistent with his safe custody, and that he should experience the most liberal treatment as a prisoner of war." In these sentiments Mr Brougham concurred, observing, "Whether we consider Buonaparte as a prisoner of war not claimed by his own Government, or in any other light, we had, under the circumstances which had occurred, an unquestionable right to detain him, even by the law of nations, independent of any Act of Parliament. I cannot conceive any difficulty on this subject, coupled with all possible lenity, and the prospect of return at a period, however remote, when it may seem safe to allow it." The bill passed without opposition.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 214.

27. Extreme distress of the winter 1816-17.

But in the next session of Parliament Lord Castlereagh was called to duties more momentous than any, with reference to internal affairs, in which he had hitherto been engaged, and from which has arisen nearly all the obloquy with which, from that time forward, the Liberal party, till very lately, have never ceased to load his memory. To understand how this came about, it must be premised that the extreme wetness of the summer and autumn of

1816 produced so great a deficiency in the harvest, that wheat, which, as already noticed, had been in the spring of that year so low as 57s., reached before the middle of 1817 no less than 116s. the quarter. The harvest of 1817, though not so bad as that of 1816, was still much below an average, in consequence of which high prices continued through the whole year. So extraordinary a change in prices would under any circumstances, even the most favourable, have been attended by great distress among the working classes; but at this time it was accompanied by another circumstance of fearful importance, which, at the very time when provisions were so dear, halved the means the classes in the urban districts had of paying for them. The general suffering of the working classes, especially in towns, was strikingly evinced in the falling off of the imports, which in 1817 amounted only to £29,910,000 (official value), while in 1810 they had been £37,613,000, and in 1814 £32,620,000. The deficiency indicated painfully the straitened means of the working classes, the great consumers of imported articles. It was remarkable that the general distress was not owing to any failure in the foreign markets for our manufactured goods. On the contrary, they were above an average, those of Great Britain and Ireland having reached in 1817 £40,011,000, and including colonial produce £50,404,111 (official value). The real cause of the universal distress was the bad harvest of 1816, and the consequent increase in the exportation of gold to pay for it. The wheat imported this year (1817) reached the amount, then unprecedented, of 1,020,449 quarters, while the average of the six preceding years had been 302,000, and in 1815 there was *none at all.*[1] These causes, coupled with the certainty that cash payments would be resumed in two years, produced such a panic among the bankers, that the country banker's notes in England, which in 1814 had been £22,700,000, sank in 1817 to £15,894,000; and the commercial paper under

[1] Porter's Progress of the Nation, 3d edit.

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discount at the Bank of England, which in 1810 had been £20,700,000, and in 1815 £14,970,000, fell to £3,960,000! So prodigious a contraction of the currency, coupled with the reduction of the Government expenditure to a half, occasioned a general fall in all sorts of manufactured articles, while the price of provisions was doubled. No one need be told that distress, acute and widespread, must have resulted in the whole manufacturing population.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1817, p. 2-5; Parl. Papers; Porter, 139.

28. Aggravation of these evils by the declamations of the Whigs and Radicals.

Great part of this suffering was unavoidable, and could not have been averted by any, even the wisest, measures on the part of the Legislature. When the nation was suffering under the combined effects of a bad harvest, a fearfully contracted currency, and a reduction of expenditure by the great paymaster, Government, to the extent of a half, great and widely extended distress, especially in the manufacturing districts, was unavoidable for a very considerable time. Unfortunately the Whig leaders and Radical chiefs, mistaking, or affecting to mistake, the real cause of the distress, by their declamations, and the ideas which they spread among the people, did all that human interposition could effect to *augment* it. They represented its causes as not being, as they really were, social but political; and held out as remedies for it, not remedies adapted to the real cause of the malady under which the nation was labouring, but an entire change in the institutions and government of the country. Thus they strenuously advocated an *immediate* return to cash payments by the Bank of England, when the *prospect* even of such a return at the expiration of two years was the main cause of the distress, and loudly called for a vast reduction of expenditure by Government, when the great reduction already made was, next to the contraction of the currency, the chief reason of the general suffering. Meanwhile, as might have been expected when such were the remedies proposed alike by the learned and eloquent chiefs of the Opposition and the leaders of the distressed

multitude, the general suffering increased instead of abating; intinerant orators sprang up, who everywhere harangued half-starved multitudes in the manufacturing districts on the only remedies likely to be efficacious, according to their views, under the circumstances. These were, annual parliaments, universal suffrage, vote by ballot, abolition of all property qualifications for members of Parliament, and paid representatives of the people in the House of Commons. These ideas were speedily embodied in a regular form, styled the *Six Points of the Charter*, by the Radical leaders, and thence the revolutionists acquired the name of *Chartists*, which they have ever since borne.

29. Treasonable designs of the Chartists.

The designs of the Chartists were soon matured, and acquired from their numbers and union a most formidable consistency. A vast conspiracy was formed, having its centre in the metropolis, but its ramifications through the whole manufacturing and mining districts of the north of England and Scotland, and having for its object the overthrow of the monarchy, and the establishment of a republic, based on universal suffrage, in its stead. Mr Hunt, the avowed leader, commenced a tour through the northern counties, and harangued large bodies of men in all the chief towns, strenuously recommending the most violent measures, first by universal and menacing meetings and petitions, and, if they failed in intimidating the Government, by open insurrection. The identity of the language used on these occasions by the popular orators, and of the objects petitioned for, revealed the simultaneous agency of one directing body over the immense multitude of petitioners. Meanwhile the most alarming intelligence reached Government from all quarters as to the extent and objects of the conspiracy, and the period, not far distant, when it was to break out simultaneously in all the principal places in the north of England and Scotland. The 2d December, on which day a great meeting of the disaffected was held in Spafields, near London, was first fixed upon for the commencement of the insurrection, and

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it was only adjourned from a desire to render it more formidable by taking place when Parliament itself was sitting. The Houses met on the 29th January, and the Chartists gave a foretaste of their intentions by surrounding the carriage in which the Prince Regent was returning from delivering the royal speech in the House of Lords, and, in addition to the most contumelious expressions, breaking the windows by a shower of stones.[1]*

[1] Ann. Reg. 1817, 1, 3; Commons' Report, Parl. Deb. xxxv. 411, 438.

30. Appointment of a Parliamentary committee on the subject, and its report.

In the opening speech from the throne, the Ministry, through the Prince Regent, communicated to both Houses the alarming intelligence that a secret and widespread conspiracy existed in the country, the object of which was the entire overthrow of the Government. A long debate ensued, in which the Opposition in both Houses inveighed fiercely against the weight of taxation and prodigality of Government, which they represented as the sole cause of the public distress, and urged the most unflinching economy in all departments as the only possible remedy for it. Committees, however, were appointed by both Houses to take the message into consideration, and collect evidence; and they speedily examined witnesses and brought forward such a report as left not a shadow of a doubt in any reasonable mind that a widespread insurrection was in contemplation, and that if not checked by the most vigorous measures, a revolution would ensue.† Fortified by this important document,

* "The lower orders are everywhere meeting in large bodies, and are very clamorous. Delegates from all quarters are moving about among them as they were before the late disturbances; and they talk of a general union of the lower orders throughout the kingdom."—MR NADIN *to* LORD SIDMOUTH, *Manchester, January* 3, 1817. "A very widespread conspiracy and plan of insurrection has been formed, and which might probably have been acted upon before this time but for the proper precautions used to prevent it."—DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND *to* LORD SIDMOUTH, *March* 21, 1817; *Life of Sidmouth*, iii. 165, 177.

† "The attention of the Committee was in the first instance directed to the metropolis; and the papers communicated leave no doubt in the minds of the Committee that a traitorous conspiracy has been formed in the metropolis for the purpose of overthrowing, by means of a general insurrection, the established government, laws, and constitution of this kingdom, and of effecting *a general plunder and division of property.*

"In the last autumn various consultations were held by persons in the metropolis engaged in this conspiracy. Different measures of the most extensive and dangerous nature were resolved upon, partial preparations were made for

the most important parts of which are given below, the Government brought in a bill which immediately met with the most violent and impassioned resistance from the whole strength of the Whig and Radical parties in both Houses of Parliament. The object of the bill was to arm

their execution, and various plans were discussed for collecting a force sufficient for that purpose. But at a subsequent consultation another plan was adopted, which was, to get a great number of men together to see what force could be raised; and it was agreed that the best way to get them together would be to call a public meeting. Spafields was fixed upon as the place affording the greatest facilities for entering the town and attacking the most important points in the city. In pursuance of this design, and in order to assemble in the neighbourhood of London a great number of the poorer classes of the community, and, in particular, of those in whose minds the pressure of the times might be supposed to have excited disaffection and discontent, advertisements were inserted in the newspapers, and hand-bills were industriously circulated, inviting the distressed manufacturers, mariners, and others to assemble at that place on the 15th November. A large body of people accordingly assembled at the time and place prescribed. The most inflammatory language was there held to the multitude, having a direct tendency to excite them to outrage and violence; and the meeting was in fact followed by some acts of plunder and violence. A petition to the Prince Regent was agreed to at that meeting, and an adjournment to Palace Yard on the first day after the meeting of Parliament was proposed, but the 2d December was subsequently fixed on for another meeting in Spafields, and that day appears to have been fixed upon for the execution of their designs.

"Various schemes were formed for this purpose. Amongst them was a general and forcible liberation of all persons confined in the several prisons in the metropolis, into some of which, in order to facilitate its execution, an address to the prisoners was introduced, assuring them that their liberty would be restored under the new government, announcing the intended attack upon all the prisons for that day, apprising the prisoners that arms would be ready for them, and exhorting them to be prepared with the national tricolor and cockade, and to co-operate by the most violent and sanguinary means to insure success. It was also proposed to set fire to various barracks, and steps were taken to ascertain and prepare the means of effecting this purpose. An attack upon the Tower and the Bank, and other points of importance, was, after previous consultations, finally determined upon. Pikes and arms, to a certain extent, were actually provided, and leaders were named, among whom the points of attack were distributed. The interval between the two meetings was employed with the most unremitting assiduity by some of the most accomplished agitators in making regular circuits through different quarters of the town. In these they either resorted to the established clubs or societies, or laboured in conversation, apparently casual, at public-houses to work up the minds of those with whom they conversed into such a state of ferment and irritation as to render them, when assembled in sufficient numbers for whatever ostensible purpose, the fit and ready instruments of any projects, however rash and desperate. In the course of these circuits, one of their chief objects appears to have been to take every opportunity of attempting to seduce from their allegiance the soldiers of the different guards and at the barracks. The principal persons concerned in this plan actually proceeded to Spafields on the 2d December, some of them with concealed arms, and with ammunition previously prepared; and they had also provided themselves with tricolor flags,

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the magistrates with extraordinary powers for the suppression of tumultuous public meetings and seditious assemblies, as well as corresponding societies, which had been struck at, though not, as it appeared, sufficiently strongly, by the 39 Geo. III. c. 37, and the 35 Geo. III.

and with a standard bearing the following inscription—'The brave soldiers are our brothers, treat them kindly.' They were also provided with tricolor cockades, evidently adopted as the signal of revolution. After much inflammatory language, a direct invitation was by one of those persons addressed to the multitude to proceed immediately to actual insurrection. And it appears quite certain that the acts of plunder which were perpetrated for the purpose of procuring arms, and the other measures of open insurrection which followed, were not accidental and unpremeditated, but had been deliberately preconcerted as parts of a general plan of rebellion and revolution. There appears also strong reason to believe that the execution of these projects at that particular time was expected by some of the associations in distant parts of the country. The conspirators seem to have had the fullest confidence of success; and a persuasion has subsequently been expressed among them that their plans could have been defeated only by casual and unexpected circumstances. Even after the failure of this attempt, the same plans appear not to have been abandoned.

"Your Committee are deeply concerned to be compelled, in further execution of their duty, to report their full conviction that designs of this nature have not been confined to the capital, but have been extended, and are extending, to many other parts of Great Britain, particularly in some of the most populous and manufacturing districts.

"At the meeting of the 2d December in Spafields, that part of the assembly which had not engaged in the acts of plunder and insurrection before mentioned came to a resolution to adjourn the meeting till the second Monday after the meeting of Parliament—namely, the 10th February; and it appears by the papers referred to the Committee that meetings in various parts of the country, conformably to a plan settled by the leading persons in London at an early period, were intended to be held on the same day. It appears manifest that the persons engaged in various parts both of England and Scotland in forwarding the plans of revolution have constantly waited for the example of the metropolis. Intelligence of the event of the meeting there on the 2d December was anxiously expected; and as the first report of the beginning of the disturbance excited in a high degree the spirits of the disaffected, so its speedy suppression produced the expression of strong feelings of disappointment. Had it even partially succeeded, there seems reason to believe it would have been the signal for a more general rising in other parts of the kingdom. Since that time it seems to be the prevailing impression among the leading malcontents in the country that it is expedient for them to wait till the whole kingdom shall, according to their expression, be more completely organised, and more ripe for action.

"What is meant by more completely organising the country is but too evident from the papers before the Committee. It appears clearly that the object is, by means of societies or clubs established or to be established in all parts of Great Britain under pretence of Parliamentary reform, to infect the minds of all classes of the community, and particularly of those whose situation most exposes them to such impressions, with a spirit of discontent and disaffection, of insubordination and contempt of all law, religion, or morality, and to hold out to them *the plunder and division of all property* as the main object of their

c. 127. The bills as amended in committee declared these offences in aggravated cases punishable by transportation, in conformity with the common law of Scotland on the subject, instead of fine and imprisonment, which alone had hitherto been competent by the English. A clause originally proposed, declaring it a capital offence for a meeting summoned by a magistrate to disperse and not doing so, was properly abandoned in committee, and transportation for seven years substituted in its room. A suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* Act was also introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Sidmouth, and the Commons by Lord Castlereagh. Both bills were fiercely assailed from the very first in both Houses, and denounced as founded on perjury, error, and timidity, alike uncalled for and tyrannical. On moving for their introduction, Lord Castlereagh said in the Lower House :— Feb. 24.

"In the whole course of my life I have never had to perform a more painful duty than I am now called upon to discharge. It is peculiarly painful to find that after having passed through all the dangers and pressure of war, it has become necessary, notwithstanding the return of peace abroad, to require the adoption of proceedings that might insure the continuance of tranquillity at home. I had fondly hoped that after the dreadful record of the sufferings of mankind which the French Revolution had afforded—after the proofs which the annals of the last twenty-five years had presented, that those who engaged

31. Lord Castlereagh's speech in support of the bill. Feb. 24.

efforts, and the restoration of their natural rights; and no endeavours are spared to prepare them to take up arms on the first signal for accomplishing their designs.

"The societies under various names are so numerous and various that it is difficult to obtain any general description of them. The country societies are principally to be found in the neighbourhood of Leicester, Loughborough, Nottingham, Mansfield, Derby, Chesterfield, Sheffield, Blackburn, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, and its vicinity. But they extend and are spreading in some parts of the country to every village. In addition to all the acts of seduction, resort is also had to a system of intimidation, and threats are held out to those who refuse to join. Their combinations are artfully contrived to secure secrecy in their proceedings, and to give to the leading members undisputed authority over the rest. Oaths of secrecy have been frequently administered, some of which are of the most atrocious and dreadful import."—*Report of the Secret Committee, February* 18, 1817; *Parl. Deb.* xxxv. 411-417.

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in such hazardous enterprises brought not only destruction on their own heads, but ruin on their country—it would be impossible to find any individuals so dead to all feeling of public or private duty as to attempt to lead others on to similar undertakings. But, however I or others may have flattered ourselves on this subject, it is not perhaps surprising that there are men who, looking to the native spirit and course of the Revolution to which I have alluded, without any natural pretensions or qualifications, had pride and audacity to think themselves fit to fill the first offices in the state, and make themselves masters of the destinies of their country. This spirit is characteristic of the times in which it is our unfortunate lot to live; and our best consolation is, that if we have not surmounted the whole dangers to which it has given rise, we have at least passed its acme. If it be true that a treasonable disposition exists, and is largely spread in society, we have at least the consolation of knowing that it is now confined to the inferior orders of society. The revolutionary spirit in this country, beginning with many of the first in rank, the first in station, and the first in learning, has been gradually descending from those first and better informed ranks in which it first betrayed itself, to those larger but less educated classes in which it is now principally to be found. The poison now operates chiefly on those classes among whom an antidote can more easily be discovered, and more effectually be applied.

32. Continued.

"Some of the doctrines now taught with so much diligence by the leaders of the movement are so absurd, that with men of education and intelligence they need no refutation. The doctrines of the Ludhites, the Spenceans, the Philanthropists, the Hampden Clubs, which recommend an equal division of property, may safely be left with such classes to work out their own cure. But it is otherwise with the uninformed ignorant multitude to whom they are now addressed. With them they are only the more attractive, that, like fairy tales, they are new, and propose the establishment of a state of society

in which novelty forms the basis and hope gilds the superstructure. We should widely err if we deemed the talents or acquirements of the men who disseminate their doctrines inconsiderable. Their writings and speeches are evidently the work of very able men. And though the Committee have reported, and I doubt not truly, that they had discovered no trace of men of superior station and rank belonging to such associations, yet there are many of that class who have conducted themselves in such a manner by their conduct and language, that they have given decided encouragement to their principles and proceedings, and they have already been designated familiarly amongst the conspirators as likely to compose, under a new state of things, their committees of public safety. Though these individuals have not as yet so far committed themselves that they can be charged at the bar of their country, yet, in the eyes of God and man, they stand responsible for the calamities which may fall upon the land, and for the lives which deluded individuals may forfeit for the treason which they have thus encouraged.

"The report on which the measures I have to propose are founded is before the House, and it is well worthy of consideration. It is the report of a secret committee, composed not of one class of men or party, but of all classes and parties; and what is very remarkable, it is *unanimous*. It does not exaggerate or overstate the case; and when a committee so composed unanimously declares that a conspiracy exists which endangers the existence of the constitution and the dearest interests of the country, it may well be credited that it did not go beyond the evidence laid before it. The report reveals the existence of a conspiracy, having for its object not only the subversion of the Government, but the destruction of every moral and social principle, and meant to be carried into execution, not at some future or remote time, but at the very moment when I am now speaking, or even at an earlier period. The amount of proof which Government

33. Continued.

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possesses as to the object of these conspirators is greater than on any former occasion when similar defensive measures were proposed, except perhaps the great conspiracy of the Irish rebels. It would be a dangerous narrowing of the case to suppose that the proof of the conspiracy relates only to the meeting of 2d December alone, which proved abortive, or to separate it from others, at which Parliamentary reform is the object ostensibly held out. I do not deny that there are many individuals with whom this is the main or even the only object; but it is far otherwise with the great body. They look on reform as a half measure, or a veil to carrying out their ulterior designs. All the various societies into which the disaffected are divided, by whatever name they may be called, are intended to co-operate together, in order to control or overawe the constituted authorities of the State, and impose upon the nation, by physical force, that change, whatever it may be, which they considered necessary. The greater part of these clubs, and, in particular, those styled the 'Hampden,' served only as vehicles to communicate revolutionary principles. A strong effort has already been made in arms to attain the object in view; and it was clearly established in evidence that the individuals who had been most active in getting up meetings ostensibly in favour of Parliamentary reform, were precisely those who were most deeply implicated in the crime of treason.

34. Continued.

"If there is any one part of the country, or any class in society, to whom these doctrines are in an especial manner perilous, and which ought to dread them more than another, it is the inhabitants of the manufacturing and mining districts. Unlike the agriculturists, who depend on their own hands and their fields, and can always extract from them a subsistence at least for themselves, they rest almost entirely on credit and the sale of their produce, not only for the comforts and luxuries, but the bare necessaries of life. As credit and the sale of luxuries is instantly stopped, not only by the actual advent,

but the prospect of the near approach of revolution, there is no class of society nearly so much interested in its prevention as that class. But, unfortunately, the close proximity in which these classes live to each other, give evil-disposed persons the means of easily instilling poison into their minds; and such are the talents of the agitators, and the proneness to delusion of their followers, that no sooner is the poisoned chalice put to their lips, than they drink it off without hesitation.

35. Continued.

"It will appear the less surprising that this should be the case, when the objects held out and the promises made to them by these agitators are taken into consideration. There is no temptation which has not now been applied, no extremity which has not either been held out as feasible or actually resorted to. All the artifices, all the preparations, all the precautions which could make these crimes the more dangerous, had in this instance been appealed to. Their cupidity had been inflamed, their basest passions appealed to, gratification to their most lawless appetites held out, and these agitators watched in the countenances of the deluded rabble the effects of their harangues, till they had wrought them up to the perpetration of the most horrid crimes. All this had been done—the very means of effecting these atrocities prepared and promulgated; and were Parliament to sit inert and inactive until the means of perpetrating them had been brought to maturity?

36. Concluded.

"The societies to which I have alluded under different names, are all founded on the same principle, and it is that principle which renders them so attractive to the lower orders. They are all founded on the principle of plunder and spoliation of property; it is by the prospect of plunder that they work on the minds of the poor deluded tradesmen. They are all rested on the same principle—the equal division of property, the simultaneous rising of the parishes, the hunting down of the landholder, who, in exchange for his estates, was to be made a pensioner on the public. I could produce the creed of this

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society, not written in the style of illiterate low-bred mischief-makers, but with an air of eloquence that would astonish the House. The doctrines resembled those which Buonaparte held out to his soldiers as a stimulus to their efforts on entering a foreign country, of which they were promised the spoil. They had taken fine names for their societies—Spencean Club, Union Club, Hampden Clubs; but the Legislature would be drivelling if they were led away by fine names. The whole system is the same, and directed to the same objects; and these objects are the destruction of what they call the privileged orders, and these orders are the landholders and those 'monsters,' as they are called, the fundholders." [1] *

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxv. 590-602.

37. The bills pass, and are immediately put in force.

The bills experienced at every stage the most determined opposition from the whole strength of the Whigs and Radicals, headed by Mr Ponsonby, Mr Brougham, and Sir F. Burdett, on the ground that the danger was elusory or exaggerated, that such absurd doctrines would, if left to themselves, die a natural death, and that the laws already in force were perfectly adequate to the repression of the evils which really existed. So strongly, however, was Parliament impressed with the peril, which was fearfully aggravated by the general distress which existed, that the bills passed both Houses by very large majorities—that in the Commons being 265 to 103, and in the Lords 113 to 30. Armed with these new and extensive powers, the Government were not slow in com-

* The measures proposed were,—1st, The temporary suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* Act; 2d, To extend the Act 1795 for the security of the King's person to the Prince Regent; 3d, To embody into one Act the provisions of the Act 1795, regarding tumultuous meetings and debating societies, and the provisions of the 39th Geo. III., which declared illegal all societies bound together by secret oaths, or which extended by fraternised branches over the whole kingdom; 4th, To enact that the nomination of delegates or commissioners, under any pretext, to other societies of the same kind, should be deemed sufficient proof of the illegality of such societies or associations; 5th, To declare illegal, and punish with rigour, any attempts to gain over soldiers or sailors, to act with any association or set of men, from their allegiance. These Acts were for the most part merely temporary, and have long since expired. That against seditious meetings and debating societies was to be in force only till the commencement of the next session of Parliament, the object being to tide over a difficulty which it was hoped would be only temporary. —*Parliamentary Debates*, xxxv. 603.

bating the gigantic evil which had grown up with the public suffering in society. Information of a general rising being in contemplation was received simultaneously from Manchester, Glasgow, Birmingham, and all the chief manufacturing towns; and the evidence being deemed sufficient, the Government proceeded to act. Eight persons were apprehended at Leicester, all of whom were convicted of high treason, and six were executed. Severe as this example was, it had not the effect at once of checking the insurrection, and the information received from the manufacturing districts was so alarming, that Government laid the evidence before the same select committee which had formerly reported, and they issued a second report on 3d June.* This report stated that a general insurrection had been organised, which was to have broken out in the first instance at Manchester on Sunday, 30th March, and to have been immediately followed by risings at York, Leicester, Nottingham, Chester, Stafford, and Glasgow. It was calculated that 50,000 persons would be up and stirring in Manchester alone by break of day, and the insurgents were to march to the barracks and jails, seduce the military, liberate the prisoners, seize all the arms in the gunsmiths' shops, establish a provisional government, liberate the people from their oaths of allegiance, and proclaim a republic. Extravagant as these projects, and incredible as they were deemed by many at the time, they soon received a melancholy confirmation from the events which followed. The insurrection, owing to preparations for it not being complete, did not break out, as at first intended, on 30th March; but it did so on 9th June, in Derbyshire. On that day an armed mob, headed by a man of the name of Branduth, assembled at the Batterby ironworks,

June 3.

June 9.

* "I cannot conclude without recalling to your recollection that all this tumultuous assembly, rioting, and so forth, is *not* the consequence of want of employment, scarcity or dearness of provisions, but *is the offspring of a revolutionary spirit;* and nothing short of a complete change in the established institutions of the country is in the contemplation of their leaders and agitators."—EARL FITZWILLIAM *to* LORD SIDMOUTH, *December* 17, 1817; *Sidmouth's Life*, iii. 214.

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near Nottingham, from whence they marched in military array towards that town. Being met on the road by Mr Rollerton, an intrepid magistrate of the county, with eighteen of the 15th Hussars, under Captain Phillips, they were instantly attacked, and put to flight. Branduth escaped at the time, but was soon after taken; and a special commission having been sent down to Derby in autumn, he was convicted of high treason, with his two associates, Turner and Ludlam, and all three suffered death on the scaffold. Eleven others were transported for life, and eight imprisoned for various periods.[1]

[1] State Trials, xxxii. 327; Sidmouth's Life, iii. 179-182; Second Report, June 3, 1817; Parl. Deb. xxxvi. 1198-1252.

38. Rapid improvement in the state of the country.

The effect of these vigorous measures was great and decisive. The Chartists came to see that they were not supported by the middle class of society, that the military were firm, and that their tumultuary arrays were wholly unequal to the encounter of the regular soldiers or yeomanry of the country. In proportion to the depression and despair of the disaffected, confidence returned to the other classes of society, the bankers extended their issues, and trade, delivered from the fetters which the contraction of the currency had occasioned, began to revive.* These auspicious circumstances were much enhanced by the favourable harvest of 1817, which, although by no means a good one, generally speaking, was greatly better than the wretched one of 1816, and led to a fall in the average price of wheat, especially in the latter months of the year, which, from 116s. the quarter, which it had at one time been in the beginning of that year, sunk to 82s. The consequences were gratifying in the very highest degree. From all quarters, Government, in the autumn of this year (1817), received the most gratifying assurances of the improved prospects and temper of the people.†

* Bank of England Notes.	Country Banks.	Total.	Exports. Official Value.	Imports. Official Value.
1816.....£27,013,620	£15,096,000	£42,109,620	£49,197,830	£27,431,600
1817.....27,397,900	15,894,000	43,291,900	50,404,111	30,834,299
1818.....27,771,070	20,507,000	48,278,070	53,500,333	36,889,182

—PORTER, 3d edition, 356.

† "In Devonshire every article of life is falling, the panic among farmers wearing away, and, above all, that hitherto marketable article, discontent, is everywhere disappearing. I have every reason to unite my voice with my

The comparatively favourable harvest was, without doubt, one great cause of this auspicious change, and the extinction of political danger by the vigorous measures of Government, another. But a material effect on the public property was also produced by a bill introduced in the session of 1818, for continuing beyond the 5th July 1818, the period fixed for the resumption of cash payments by the Act of 1816, the suspension of cash payments by the Bank of England, to the 5th July 1819. This important measure was violently resisted by the whole Opposition, but carried, after a long debate, by a majority of 65, the numbers being 164 to 99. It is remarkable that the whole Whig and Liberal party, the friends of the people, voted on this occasion against a measure which was indispensable in the existing circumstances of the country, and without which the distress of 1816 would instantly and infallibly have returned.[1] *

May 1, 1818.

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxviii. 490-494.

neighbours, to say we owe our present peaceful and happy prospects to your firmness and prompt exertions in keeping down the democrats."—LORD EXMOUTH *to* LORD SIDMOUTH, *September* 10, 1817.

"We cannot, indeed, be sufficiently thankful for an improvement in our situation and prospects, in every respect exceeding our most sanguine, and even the most presumptuous hopes. A public and general expression of gratitude must be required in due season, by an order in council."—LORD SIDMOUTH *to* LORD KENYON, *Sept.* 30, 1817; *Sidmouth's Life*, iii. 198, 199.

* On this occasion Mr Huskisson said: "The internal state of the country had never been so distressed as it was in 1816, and it had never revived so rapidly as it did during the last half of 1817 and first months of 1818. *The issues of country bankers had increased at least £6,000,000 during that period;* but why had they increased? Simply because the great impulse communicated to the agriculture, trade, and manufactures of the country during that period called for an enlargement of the issue to carry it on. The difference between the market and mint price of gold was erroneously considered as a test of the superabundance of paper in the home market; but it in reality arose from a very different cause—viz., *the gold sent out of the country to meet foreign loans, pay for foreign grain*, or meet the expenses of foreign travellers. Great and astonishing has been the effect produced, not only upon this country, but the continent of Europe, by the facility enjoyed by this country of extending her paper circulation. It was like the effect that had been found to arise from the discovery of the mines of America, for, by increasing the circulating medium over the world to the amount of forty millions, it proportionally facilitated the means of barter, and gave a stimulus to industry. In proportion, however, as the Bank of England had found it necessary to purchase gold on the Continent to meet its engagements with the public here, the circulating medium of the Continent was diminished; and as the Continental states did not enjoy the credit possessed by this country, and were thereby debarred from increasing their paper currency, the result was discernible in the great confusion and

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39. Commencement of Lord Castlereagh's great unpopularity.

From this time is to be dated the commencement of a new era in the life of Lord Castlereagh, which continued unchanged till the time of his death, and from the influence of the opinions formed in which, his memory is only now beginning to recover. This was the era of his extreme unpopularity with the great body of the inferior orders in the country. The democratic party never forgive one who has defeated their projects and counteracted their machinations; and the greater the courage and ability which has been exerted in doing so, the more widespread and intense is the hatred which it inspires. Upon Lord Sidmouth, as the Home Secretary, there devolved the care of the internal peace of the country, and the preparation of the measures deemed necessary to avert the dangers with which it might be threatened; and never were these duties intrusted to a more courageous and upright minister, than the nobleman who then held the Home Office. But Lord Sidmouth sat in the House of Peers, the debates in which, on this subject, excited very little

deterioration of property which had taken place on the Continent during the last two years. Indeed, I have no hesitation in saying that much of the distress which has prevailed upon the Continent during that time is attributable to the purchase of gold by the Bank of England. The increase of the circulating medium in this country has given a vast stimulus to the arts and industry of the country; but while the general appearance of the country has been improved, and its prosperity promoted, it is to be lamented that the comforts and rewards of the labourer had been much reduced. . . . Nothing has tended to create more alarm in the country than the clamour which has been raised on the subject of cash payments by the Bank. In Scotland, even previous to the resumption of cash payments by the Bank, the principal currency was in paper; and even in the year 1793 to 1796, no inconvenience was felt in that country from the want of a metallic currency, when the pressure was so sensibly distressing in England."—*Parl. Deb.* xxxviii. 490, 491.

Lord Castlereagh said: "The Bank might have resumed cash payments in 1816 if they had chosen, by simply serving a notice on the Speaker; but they judged the exchanges too unfavourable then to do so, and that they judged wisely has been proved by the result of the partial resumption which has since taken place. What has become of the sovereigns which were but lately issued from the Bank? Why, they were melted down and sent out of the country for profit, as must always be the case when the rate of exchange is against us. When the loans contracted by foreign Powers should begin to operate, the Bank would have to purchase gold at an extravagant price abroad, and, after coining it here, would see it melted and carried back again to the Continent. Upon what ground, then, can any reasoning man justify the sudden resumption of cash payments, when such resumption must obviously lead to the most mischievous consequences?"—*Parliamentary Debates*, xxxviii. 496.

attention. Lord Castlereagh brought them forward in the House of Commons, and fronted the whole Whig and Radical opposition in the popular assembly. He was not the man to shun the danger, or shirk the responsibility of doing so; he acted under a solemn sense of duty, and he willingly undertook the whole consequences. He stated his case, as leader of the House of Commons, fully and manfully; he extenuated nothing, and set down nought in malice. His measures were entirely successful; he faced democracy "when 'twas strongest, and ruled it when 'twas wildest." He became, in consequence, from the very first, the object of the most envenomed and persevering hostility to the lower portion of the Liberal, and the whole Radical party; the democratic press everywhere and unceasingly assailed him with the most inveterate and malignant hostility. It was well known that he possessed the influence in the Cabinet which, in periods of difficulty, his intrepid and powerful mind never failed to acquire, and in consequence they concluded, not without reason, that if they could discredit or oust him from office, the principal obstacle to the attainment of the objects of their desire would be removed. To effect this became their main object during the whole remainder of his public career. No one need be told how powerfully such a determination, perseveringly acted upon by a strong party, having the whole Liberal press at their command, can come to influence the general reputation during life, and estimation, *in the first instance*, of posterity, of any prominent public man. It is the strongest proof of the integrity and spotless nature of Lord Castlereagh's character, that, assailed with such weapons and such dispositions, no blot could be discovered in his escutcheon but his public conduct, and democratic hostility could find nothing to assail but the alleged tyranny of his state measures.

Nor is there any foundation for the observation often made, that the cause which he resisted has been ulti-

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mately successful, and that he hanged and transported men for advocating that reform which was afterwards introduced by Lord John Russell, and has since become the law of the land. The answer to this is twofold and decisive. In the first place, the change introduced by the Reform Bill, and which has become the law of the land, was *not* the same as that for which Brandreth and Ludlam contended, but widely different. They strove for universal suffrage, vote by ballot, a republican government, the abolition of the monarchy, and the division of property: no one can pretend that any of these were the objects for which Lord John Russell contended. In the next place, even if the objects on the two occasions had been as identical as in reality they were different, the modes of trying to establish them were utterly at variance. The Reform Bill was brought forward by the noble mover in the House of Commons, and only received the royal assent after eighteen months of a protracted debate in both Houses of Parliament, and after the sense of the nation had been taken upon it by a dissolution of Parliament; the Chartists proposed to effect their object at once, by means of a general rising in arms, the formation of a national convention, the abrogation of Parliament, and dethronement of the sovereign. No one can doubt that in resisting these nefarious attempts, and averting the unutterable misery consequent on them, Lord Castlereagh did his duty as a true patriot, as much as when he withstood the dismemberment of the empire by the Irish Rebellion, or combated Napoleon on the fields of Germany or France. And yet it is for doing so that the Radical party has incessantly laboured ever since to load his memory with obloquy.

40. It was Revolution, not Reform, which he combated.

41. Grant of £1,000,000 for new churches.

The Chartist insurrection of 1817, however, had one good effect in drawing the attention of Government and the affluent classes to the deplorable state of destitution in regard to the means of religious instruction afforded in many, it may be said all, the thickly-peopled districts of the country, to the great body of the working classes.

The facts elicited by an inquiry set on foot by Government on this subject were so appalling as almost to exceed belief, and amply explained the ready ear which, in periods of destitution and suffering, the inferior orders in the manufacturing and mining districts had lent to the orations, often able and eloquent, of the demagogues. It appeared that in London, the number of persons for whom there were no sittings in churches or chapels of any description was 997,915; in the diocese of York, 720,091; in that of Chester, 1,040,000. In all England, there were only 10,421 benefices for above 10,000,000 people; and the real evil was much greater than these figures would indicate, for it arose from the *displacing* more than the absolute increase of the population, which caused many churches to be deserted in some places, while the greatest want of them was experienced in others. Struck with these facts, Government, in the session of 1818, though the finances of the country were still labouring under the effects of the woeful depression of the two preceding years, proposed a grant of £1,000,000 for building new churches, chiefly in the manufacturing districts, which was agreed to by Parliament, and subsequently aided to the extent of a third more by private subscriptions.

42. Lord Castlereagh's extreme anxiety and liberal measures regarding it. May 1, 1818.

So anxious was Lord Castlereagh for the success of this measure, that he agreed to a clause, which was strongly opposed by the High Church party, giving the right of *nominating the minister* to any twelve or more persons who might concur in building a church or chapel, subject only to the bishop's approval. On this subject he said: "I doubt much, in the present growing state of the population of the country, whether the amazing void in the means of religious instruction can be supplied without some collateral aid. I believe it will benefit the common cause if the people are invested with the choice of their ministers; this will accelerate the establishment of the new churches, and the control of the bishop will prevent improper appointments. I shall, therefore, vote for the clauses giving them this power." Such were Lord Castlereagh's opinions; and the

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system he introduced in regard to these new churches was much the same as has now been established after so much contention in the Free Kirk of Scotland. It no doubt is the best method of enlisting, in the first instance, the sympathy and support of the affluent classes in behalf of an establishment which has experienced the necessity of enlargement in particular districts. The only evil is one common to it with all voluntary churches, that, as it makes no provision for the *endowment* of the new churches, it becomes necessary either to put them down in localities where the rich abound, and their aid is less required than in the poorer districts, or to fill them with ministers who may secure their being filled by the fervour and violence of their opinions and language.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxvii. 419-422, xxxviii. 431; Parl. Papers, 1818, No. 79.

43. Debate on Lord Castlereagh's Irish administration.

An incident occurred in the close of the session of 1817 which strikingly illustrated at once the admirable temper with which Lord Castlereagh conducted the most angry debates in Parliament, and the malignant and persevering acrimony with which he was made the object of false and libellous accusations. In the debate on the state of the nation, on the 11th July 1817, Mr Brougham, in his opening speech on the subject of the treatment of the prisoners apprehended under the suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* Act, recently introduced, charged Lord Castlereagh with some of the atrocious acts of cruelty practised in the suppression of the Rebellion in 1798, in Ireland. "If all this," said he, "took place, and the noble Lord remained in ignorance of it, although in its immediate vicinity, how was he sitting in Downing Street to prevent similar barbarities in Cornwall and in Yorkshire?" Lord Castlereagh said in reply, "At that eventful period the loyal were a persecuted party, and they struggled with such arms as nature and resentment gave them to save themselves from destruction. It was not to be wondered at that, in the heat of self-defence and justly-excited anger, they should be carried beyond the strict bounds of discretion and mercy, and in the violence of the struggle Government had no power to repress their loyal indignation. But it was most invi-

dious and unmanly, at this distance of time, when every individual who had then conducted himself ill might so long since have been brought to punishment if he deserved it, to stand up as the advocate of those whom Government, if it chose, might long ago have consigned to the lash of the law. How could any man who had sat silent during the last twenty years now rise up and expatiate upon that which, if true, ought to have been, and would have been, long since the subject of impeachment? It was unmanly thus to countenance that spirit of calumny out of doors which had long prevailed on this subject, though without any just foundation."[1] Sir Francis Burdett and Mr Bennett followed on the same side as Mr Brougham, the latter of whom said, "I do not accuse the noble Lord and the Irish Government of having personally inflicted torture, or having flogged their miserable victims with their own hands; but I accuse them of not only not having punished those who were guilty of these enormities, but of having singled them out as fit objects of reward. I have in my hand a number of affidavits, one of which, sworn on 31st October 1810, stated that, in the memorable year 1798, a number of floggings, half-hangings, &c., took place at the Royal Exchange, immediately adjoining the Castle gates, at the Lower Castle Yard, at the Barracks, at Essex Bridge, &c., all of which must have been known to the noble Lord."[2]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxvi. 1408.

[2] Ibid. 1416.

Lord Castlereagh said in reply: "I have been charged with having been present at the infliction of torture; but though I cannot consider the military punishment of flogging a torture, yet, if that punishment had not been inflicted, death must have been inflicted; recourse must have been had to that which would have wasted a great part of the population. I go along with the honourable gentleman in considering the use of flogging to extract evidence from men as most wicked and unjustifiable. I can only say, that I have never seen any man punished in this way in my life, except a soldier in my own militia regiment. These are the only charges known to me, because they are the

44. Lord Castlereagh's reply.

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only ones which were dragged out of a bundle which Mr Finnesty had thought proper to get up, because I would not compromise the prosecution against him." Mr Canning said on this occasion, in a generous spirit, regarding his old antagonist, and with his usual felicity: "What is the situation of the noble Lord compared with that of his unnamed accusers? Men who have shared in repeated pardons, and hid their degraded heads under a general amnesty, now advance to revile an individual to whom they owe their despicable lives. A pardoned traitor—a forgotten incendiary—a wretch who has escaped the gallows, and screened himself in humble safety only by the clemency of the noble Lord—is now to be adduced as the chief witness for his conviction! If the Legislature has consented to bury in darkness the crimes of rebellion, is it too much that rebels, after twenty years, should forgive the source of having been forgiven? On this part of the subject, there is one circumstance which the personal delicacy of my noble friend, particularly in regard to one individual, had prevented his mentioning. My noble friend, on the change of government from Lord Camden to Lord Cornwallis, had made strenuous and successful exertions to screen one convicted libeller from the punishment he had merited; and the House has this night witnessed the reward of these exertions."[1]—(*Loud cheers.*)

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxvi. 1421, 1426, 1427.

45. His treaties with Spain and the Netherlands for the suppression of the slave trade. Sept. 23, 1817.

Another subject about the same time engaged the anxious attention of Lord Castlereagh in foreign diplomacy, and was brought by him to a happy conclusion, though unfortunately without the beneficial effects, hitherto at least, which might reasonably have been expected from it. This was the suppression of the foreign slave trade. It will be recollected that it had been agreed to by the great Powers at Paris, and expressly stipulated in the treaty, that the slave trade should everywhere cease within five years after signing the treaty of Paris, which was signed in July 1814. Great difficulty was experienced by the British Government in getting the lesser Powers, and especially Spain, Portugal, and Belgium, who were

chiefly interested in keeping up the traffic, to abide by this agreement, or taking any steps to forward its accomplishment; and, by the declaration signed at Vienna the year after, these Powers only agreed to stop the traffic in *eight* years from February 1815. Lord Castlereagh, who took a warm interest in this subject, was indefatigable in his endeavours to achieve this object, and get a final period *really* and in fact put to this detestable traffic. But he found every possible obstacle thrown in his way by the Peninsular Powers, and but a lukewarm support afforded by France itself. Knowing, from the benevolent feelings of the Emperor Alexander, and his zeal for the establishment of Christian principles in the affairs of nations, that his heart was equally set upon this object, Lord Castlereagh addressed to him, on the 30th September 1816, through Count Capo d'Istrias, a long and able letter, accompanied with a draft of the proposed treaty with Spain and Portugal, providing in an effectual manner for its entire abolition.*

* "I address myself to your Excellency in the full confidence that on this, as on so many other occasions, the counsels of the two states will be unanimous in rendering the proposed work of humanity and civilisation consistent and effectual in all its provisions. I am confident the Emperor will approve of the broad and simple basis given to the treaty. In laying down the maxims of Christianity as to the rule of conduct in Europe between state and state, it would have been unworthy to have assumed a less benevolent principle towards Africa. As the preamble stands, we may defy moral criticism, if our execution shall correspond to the principles we profess.

"In strictness, no state carrying on the slave trade can, or ought to be, admitted into a league formed for the suppression of the piratical carrying away human beings, whether white or black, from their friends and country, for the purpose of using them as slaves. But as this construction of the treaty might impede its own object, I wish you to bring under the Emperor's consideration what it might be reasonable to consider on the part of Spain and Portugal, as such a satisfaction of the principle laid down in the treaty as might bring those states within this purview without rendering the alliance nugatory to one of its most essential objects.

"I presume his Imperial Majesty will at once feel that, to admit the accession of Powers professing an intention of continuing this traffic during the whole period for which the alliance is to endure, would be rendering the league, upon the face of it, inconsistent with itself. Yet such would nearly be the case, if these Powers were to accede under their declaration made at Vienna, of continuing to their subjects the permission to trade in slaves for *eight years*, to be computed from February 1815.

"You will observe, upon perusing the protocols of the deliberations held upon this subject at that time, that the period then fixed by France for final abolition

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46. Favourable reception of it by the Emperor Alexander; and conclusion of the treaty with Spain.

The Emperor of Russia gave the project his most cordial support, and the Court of Spain professed its readiness to abolish the traffic altogether for an adequate pecuniary consideration. Much difficulty, and considerable delay, however, was experienced in settling the amount of the sum to be paid by Great Britain, as the Spanish Government declared it was to be fixed according to the damages sustained by the persons engaged in the traffic by its abolition, which could only be ascertained by personal inquiries. At length the sum was fixed on at £400,000, to be paid by Great Britain on the 20th February 1818, and a treaty was

Sept. 23. signed on the 23d September 1817, by which the Court of Madrid engaged, from and after the 30th May 1820, that "the slave trade shall be *absolutely abolished*, and that, from that date, "it shall not be lawful for any of the subjects of the Crown of Spain to purchase slaves, or to carry on the slave trade *on any part of the coast of Africa*, upon any pretext, or in any manner whatever." It was, however, declared lawful, from the date of the treaty to the 30th May 1820, for Spanish ships to carry on the slave trade on any part of the coast of Africa to the north of the equator, and a reciprocal right of search on the part of ships of war of both countries was provided for.

A similar treaty for the entire suppression of the slave trade was concluded, under Lord Castlereagh's auspices,

—viz., May 1819 (five years from the peace of 1814)—was declared by the plenipotentiaries of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain to be the utmost period which their respective sovereigns could possibly be induced to recognise as justifiable or necessary for the trade to endure; and it was in contemplation of this period as an *extreme limit*, that they reserved to themselves to exclude from their dominions, upon a principle of moral obligation, the colonial produce of states continuing to trade in slaves beyond that period.

"I therefore request you will submit to his Imperial Majesty, whether the parties of this alliance, reserving to themselves to bring Spain and Portugal, if possible, to an earlier abolition, should not consider the period above alluded to—viz., May 1819—as the period *sine qua non* of abolition, by states desiring to accede to the proposed alliance. The Allies having already pledged themselves to this principle, neither state can either complain or be surprised at this condition. Spain can the less complain, as you will see her Indian Council has advised immediate abolition; and she has offered, within the last three months, to this Government to abolish in three years for a pecuniary consideration."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* COUNT CAPO D'ISTRIAS, *September* 30, 1816; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 301, 302.

with the King of the Netherlands, in the following year, and tribunals, composed of judges from both countries, appointed to adjudicate on the seized vessels. Portugal also acceded to the abolition, and similar mixed tribunals were appointed for the discharge of the same duties in regard to vessels bearing her flag. It is foreign to the object of this work to detail the concurrence of events which have rendered these treaties in subsequent times little better than a dead letter, and caused the slave trade to this day to be largely carried on, especially under the American flag. But it must ever be regarded as a glorious circumstance in the history of Great Britain, and an honourable one to the memory of Lord Castlereagh, that the first treaty for the entire abolition of the slave trade by a foreign state was concluded by her Government and that statesman, and that too at the expense of a considerable pecuniary sacrifice, which the nation, from the distressed state of its finances, was at the period little able to bear.[1]

47. Similar treaties with Belgium. May 11, 1818.

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxvii. 67, xxxviii. 996, 1039.

One very important matter still remained for foreign diplomacy to settle at this time, and that was the duration of the occupation of the frontier fortresses of France by the Allied armies. The treaty of Vienna, November 20, 1815, had provided that if the Allied Powers saw cause to grant it, "the military occupation of France might cease at the end of three years." This period was now approaching, and the French Government, as may well be believed, were most urgent to get the evacuation fixed at as early a period as possible, as while in France the whole army was maintained entirely at the expense of that country. By way of experiment, 30,000 men, chiefly Russians, had been withdrawn, with Lord Castlereagh's and the Duke of Wellington's consent, in the preceding autumn, which was felt as a sensible relief by the French Government, and without having induced any bad consequences. It was known that the Emperor Alexander, far removed himself from danger, and covetous of popularity especially with the French people, had advocated the entire removal of the army of occupation

48. Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle regarding the prolonged occupation of the French fortresses by the Allies.

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without delay. The great obstacles to this step being taken was the large amount of the claims of the Allied Powers upon France, which were still unliquidated, and which, from a paper preserved in the *Castlereagh Correspondence*, amounted, in April 1817, to 824,565,000 francs (£33,000,000), besides 400,000,000 (£16,000,000) from Spain, of which only 79,956,000 (£3,200,000) had been liquidated.[1] * In addition to this there was a very serious difference between Spain and Portugal, regarding the frontier near Elvas, which at one period threatened hostilities which had only been averted by the earnest interposition of Lord Castlereagh, who thought both parties were in the wrong,† and with no small difficulty

[1] Lord Munster to Lord Castlereagh, Aug. 18, 1817; Cast. Cor. xi. 371.

* This very curious document gives an official statement of the sums claimed by the different European states from the French Government, under the *treaty of Paris in* 1814, as an indemnity for the contributions extorted by the Imperial troops from their inhabitants; and is *altogether independent* of the great war contribution exacted from France by the *subsequent treaty of* 20th *November* 1815, which amounted to 700,000,000 francs (£28,000,000):—

	Affaires presentées.		Affaires liquidées, ou terminées avant le 30 Avril 1817.	
	Francs.	Cents.	Francs.	Cents.
Autriche,	189,383,506	67	2,293,848	44
Prusse,	132,411,914	57	17,896,773	44
Pays Bas,	119,875,359	79	27,242,489	23
Sardaigne,	79,776,595	2	6,068,088	52
Grand-duché de Toscane,	9,264,876	30	4,508,370	16
Duchés de Parme,	3,032,103	0	735,957	0
Ville de Hambourg,	77,693,196	35	6,685,336	60
„ Brème,	3,683,491	28	540,439	68
„ Lubeck,	5,319,621	56	817,954	22
Grand-duché de Bade,	1,444,559	41	117,007	40
Hanovre,	32,484,715	72	7,144,584	62
Hesse-Cassel,	1,756,213	28	85,118	18
Mecklenbourg-Strelitz, &c.,	21,135,818	5	943,810	73
Mecklenbourg-Schwerin,	1,200,000	0	86,969	11
Dannemark,	19,120,719	55	2,707,941	85
Les Etats de Rome,	30,098,568	99	940,237	59
La Bavière,	72,311,000	0	575,000	0
Francfort-sur-Main,	3,323,947	2	...	
Saxe,	15,624,653	0	563,478	4
Saxe et Prusse,	5,624,945	0	...	
Totaux,	824,565,404	56	79,956,604	81

Independent of 400,000,000 livres claimed by Spain.—*Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 372.

† "I feel, with you, the question between Spain and Portugal to be a very embarrassing one, especially to us; I also incline to think that, as a line of

persuaded them to refer the matter in dispute to the joint mediation of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and France.* Another difficulty arose from the state of the Netherlands, which offered grave subjects of uneasiness, the more alarming to the British Government from the close proximity of that country to the British Islands, and its being the great battle-field on which for centuries the contest for European freedom had been fought. The press of Belgium had become the great platform from which the Revolutionary party directed their fire against all the established Governments of Europe, and especially of this country, which Lord Castlereagh wisely made no attempt to disturb.† But latterly more serious

absolute neutrality or indifference would in the long-run be hardly practicable, the most prudent mode of interfering will be by considering the whole as a species of *infraction of the treaty of Vienna*, and that on this ground we should invite the five other Allied Powers who signed that settlement to concur with us in offering a joint mediation to arrange all differences in such manner as may be consistent with the preservation of general pacification there concluded. This will mix France and Sweden in the question. The latter Power will be no embarrassment; the former Power it is essential to carry along with us. . . . . The conduct of Portugal *is odious and indefensible;* and yet that of Spain to Portugal about Olivenza *is little better.* The *two Cabinets are well matched in dishonesty and shabbiness.*"—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD BATHURST, *October* 26, 1816; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 307-309.

* "It is peculiarly gratifying to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to have been invited to undertake this task in concert with those Powers to whom his Catholic Majesty has, with so much prudence and wisdom, thought fit to address himself on this important occasion. His Royal Highness, animated by the warmest sentiments of zeal to contribute to so just and laudable a purpose, has desired the undersigned to declare to the Count Fernan Nuñez that he accepts without hesitation the invitation of the Court of Madrid to interpose his good offices, in concert with the Courts of Vienna, Versailles, and St Petersburg, on this occasion, and he is persuaded he shall find in their tried wisdom, zeal, and justice, the surest means of conducting their joint intervention to a happy issue. If his Royal Highness might form an additional wish upon the subject, it would be that the Court of Berlin should be united with the Courts named in the same honourable responsibility."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* COUNT FERNAN NUÑEZ (Spanish Nuncio), *December* 1816; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 333.

† "With respect to your suggestion of calling upon the Netherlands Government to institute prosecutions against the libellous publications which are daily levelled in the Belgic newspapers against this country, we think it upon the whole inexpedient, considering our own helplessness in protecting other states against the abuses of the daily press of this country. In truth, our whole interference with his Majesty is made with rather a bad grace, in matters of libel, when the inefficiency of our own laws to repress the evil is considered; and nothing could justify us, in point of consistency, in so interfering, but a sincere conviction that, whilst the licence of the press embarrasses Govern-

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steps were taken; from words the Revolutionists proceeded to actions. In October 1817, a placard was openly posted at Dunkirk, calling on the French of all grades to rise against their oppressors, and at once exterminate the army of occupation. And on 11th February 1818, as the Duke of Wellington was returning, in Paris, from dining with Sir Charles Stuart * (not Stewart), the British ambassador, he was fired at by an assassin, and the ball passed through both windows of his carriage.[1]

[1] Brial. and Gleig, iii. 61, 62.

49. Meeting of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Sept. 28.

There was ample employment therefore for the European diplomatists, and no lack of subjects on which their talents were to be exerted, and it was accordingly agreed that a congress should be held in the autumn of 1818 to deliberate on the important matters which awaited them. Aix-la-Chapelle was selected as the place of meeting, as being nearest the districts of France in which the fortresses were still held by the Allied troops; and the representatives of the five great Powers, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Great Britain, and France, alone were admitted to the deliberations. Prince Metternich arrived, on the part of Austria on the 20th September; and he was soon followed by Count Capo d'Istrias, Prince Lievin, Count Pozzo di Borgo, and Count Nesselrode, with Generals Chernicheff, Woronzow, Jomini, and several others, on the part of Russia. Baron Hardenberg, Baron Bernstorff, and Baron Alexander de Humboldt, appeared on behalf of Prussia; and Lord Castlereagh, the Duke of Wellington, and Mr Canning,† represented Great Britain. The Duke de Richelieu, Prime Minister of Louis XVIII.,

ment in this country, it may bring upon his Majesty's kingdom actual hostilities from some of his powerful neighbours; and this is a distinction between the situation and policy of the two countries of which the Sovereign of the Netherlands should in prudence never lose sight. With respect to the libellers in question, perhaps it may be more expedient to oppose them a little with their own weapons, if you can find any intelligent writer who can now and then fight our battle."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD CLANCARTY, *August 7*, 1817; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi. 369.

* Afterwards Lord Stuart de Rothsay, an able and experienced diplomatist.

† He had some time before been reinstated in the Cabinet, with the entire concurrence of Lord Castlereagh, as President of the Council.

attended on the part of France, furnished with the most pressing instructions from that monarch at all hazards to get quit of the army of occupation.* The King of Prussia, the sovereign of the territory within which Aix-la-Chapelle is situated, arrived on the 26th, and the Emperors of Russia and Austria on the 28th. The Congress was extremely brilliant, though not so much so as that of Vienna had been three years before; for as it was not expected to be of such long duration, the concourse of strangers of eminence was not so considerable. The Princess Lievin and Lady Castlereagh did the honours of the drawing-rooms, and were the objects of marked attention; the latter attracted universal homage from her beauty, her commanding figure, and the splendour of her diamonds; and the chief beauties of the Opera at Paris added their dramatic talents to the august circle. Nor were ladies awanting who laid themselves out to captivate the warm but inconstant heart of the Emperor Alexander by an appeal to his superstitious feelings; and Mademoiselle Le Normand, in the dress and with the pretensions of a sibyl, endeavoured to play the part which Madame Krudener had done with so much success in bringing about the Holy Alliance.[1]

[1] Cap. v. 365.

50. Alexander's conversations with M. de Richelieu.

It was the first care of the Czar to make himself master, from the best sources of information, of the real state of public feeling in France, and the degree of stability which the Government of the King had actually acquired. For this purpose he had several private interviews with the

* "M. de Richelieu, make every sacrifice to obtain the evacuation of the territory; it is the first condition of our independence; no flag but our own should wave in France. Explain to my Allies how difficult my Government will be, so long as it can be reproached with the calamities of the country, and the occupation of its territory; and yet you well know it was not I, but Buonaparte, that brought the Allies upon us. These are my whole instructions. Repeat to the Emperor Alexander that he has it in his power to render a greater service to my House than he has done in 1814 and 1815; for after having restored legitimacy, it remains for him to reap the glory of having restored the national independence. Obtain the best conditions possible, *but at any sacrifice get quit of the stranger.*"—*Words of* LOUIS XVIII., *September* 20, 1818; CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de la Restauration*, v. 366, 367.

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Duc de Richelieu, who had formerly held an important command in Southern Russia, and owed his present elevation to the Emperor Alexander, with whom he was on the most intimate terms. "Your nation," said the Czar to him on one of these occasions, "is brave and loyal, and has supported its misfortunes with a patience which is truly heroic; tell me with sincerity, do you think it is prepared for the evacuation; do you consider the Government sufficiently established to be able to stand without foreign support? You know I am the friend of your nation, and I desire nothing but your word on the subject." "Never," replied the Duc de Richelieu, "was a nation more worthy and better prepared to receive the great act which the magnanimity of your Majesty is preparing for it. Your Majesty has seen with what fidelity it has discharged all its engagements, and I will answer for the results of its political system." "My dear Richelieu," rejoined the Emperor, "you are loyalty itself: I do not fear in France the development of liberal institutions; *I am liberal myself—very liberal.* I should even wish that your sovereign should do some act which should conciliate; if that is possible, the holders of the national domains. But I fear the Jacobins; I hate them: beware of throwing yourself into their arms. Europe will have nothing to do with Jacobinism. There is but one Holy Alliance of kings, founded on morality and Christianity, which can save the social order. It is for us to show the first example." "You may rely," rejoined Richelieu, "on the King of France doing everything in his power to extinguish Jacobinism, and the recent law of elections* has produced satisfactory results." "I know it," replied the Emperor; "but we must wait the next returns till we form a decided opinion. In the name of heaven, M. de Richelieu, let us save the social order. The indemnities are the only difficulty. Prussia is very urgent for

* Of 5th February 1816, which largely increased the popular influence in the elections.

money; Austria is the same; and I should not object to receiving the sums due to me as King of Poland. Come to an understanding with the great capitalist, M. Baring; it is there that the keystone to the arch of European safety is to be found."[1]

[1] Cap. v. 369, 370.

51. Noble conduct of the Duke of Wellington on this occasion.

But how much inclined soever the Emperor Alexander, whose generous heart leant to liberal measures, while his facile vanity was covetous of applause, might be, to withdraw the Allied troops from the French territory, it was not with him, powerful as he was, that the decision of the question really rested. Prussia, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, were the Powers, as nearest to France, which were really most interested, in the first instance at least, in the matter; as it was on one or other of them that the tempest would undoubtedly fall if that state resumed its projects of aggrandisement. It was with Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington that the determination in truth rested; and the former of these very properly deferred to the judgment of the latter, as the person in existence best qualified to pronounce a sound and authoritative decision on the subject. The Duke of Wellington acted a noble and disinterested part on this occasion. He was requested to state in writing his opinion, "Whether the army of occupation might, without danger to France herself and to the peace of Europe, be withdrawn;" and he decided that it might. One word from him adverse to this view of the case would have saddled France for two years more with the burden of maintaining, from the produce of her own soil, 120,000 foreign troops. He did not pronounce that word; on the contrary, he did the reverse. He conscientiously believed that the Government of Louis XVIII. was by this time strong enough to stand alone, and that France, weaned to a great extent from her love of conquest, would leave Europe unmolested. So believing, he gave it as his opinion that the great Powers should, with as little delay as possible, withdraw their respective contingents.[2] The dis-

[2] Brial. iii. 66.

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interestedness of this conduct will not be duly appreciated, unless it is recollected that the position which the Duke of Wellington thus voluntarily relinquished, when the means of retaining it were in his hands, was one of the very highest dignity and importance; that it put him at the head of the armies of Europe, and held the rival power he had so long combated in subjection; that it was attended by large emoluments, which would soon put him in possession of a princely fortune; and that he voluntarily laid it down in favour of a country in which his life had been recently attempted by the hand of an assassin, and the press of which never lost an opportunity of vomiting upon him the most violent abuse.*

52. Convention for the evacuation of the French territories by the Allied troops. Oct. 1.

Fortified by this opinion, which, though it did not entirely coincide with his own view of the subject, Lord Castlereagh was not inclined to dispute, the latter was not long of concluding an arrangement for the evacuation of the French territories. The preliminaries were signed on 1st October, and the moment the signatures were attached a courier was despatched to the King of France with the joyful intelligence. The terms obtained were eminently favourable to that Power, and withal extremely advanta-

* It is pleasing to find that the disinterested conduct of the Duke of Wellington on this occasion is duly estimated by such of the Continental historians as view the subject with impartial eyes. "On n'a point," says M. Capefigue, "en général rendu assez de justice au Duc de Wellington pour la manière large et loyale dont il protégea les intérêts de la France dans toutes les négociations avec l'étranger. Je ne parle pas d'abord de l'immense service rendu par S. S. dans la fixation des créances étrangères. Le Duc de Wellington se montra arbitre désintéressé, et la postérité doit reconnaître à l'honneur de M. de Richelieu qu'il sortit pauvre d'une operation où l'oubli de quelques devoirs austères de la conscience aurait pu créer pour lui la plus colossale des fortunes. Le Duc de Wellington fut très favorable à la France dans tout ce qui touchait l'évacuation de son territoire. Sa position de généralissime de l'armée de l'occupation donnait un grand poids à son avis sur cette question: il fut chaque fois consulté, et chaque fois également il repondait par des paroles élevées qui faisaient honneur à son caractère. Le Duc de Wellington, par la cessation de l'occupation armée, avait à perdre une grande position en France—celle de Généralissime des Alliés, ce qui le faisait en quelque sorte membre du Gouvernement: il avait à sacrifier un traitement immense; et plus le noble lord connaissait l'opinion personnelle de Lord Castlereagh sur la nécessité de l'occupation armée. Tous ces intérêts ne l'arrêtaient point."—CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de la Restauration*, v. 354-357.

geous to the rest of Europe. The fortresses held by the Allied troops were to be all evacuated by the 30th November ensuing, down to which time their food, pay, and clothing were to be at the expense of France, as regulated by the existing convention, which had been in force since the 1st December 1817; and in consideration of the Allies evacuating the French territory two years sooner than had been provided in the treaty of 1815, France agreed to pay the sum of 265,000,000 francs (£10,600,000), of which 100,000 were to be made good by being inscribed on the Grand Livre of French debt, and the remaining settled by drafts on the houses of Hope and Baring, in nine monthly payments, of equal amount each. These stipulations were faithfully observed on both sides; and by the beginning of December the whole of the French territory was evacuated by the Allied troops.[1]

[1] Treaty, Oct. 9, 1818; Moniteur, Oct. 11; Ann. Hist. i. 432.

This was a great step in advance towards the pacification of Europe, for it removed one standing cause of irritation towards the French people, till the termination of which the public tranquillity, and with it the Bourbon dynasty, could not be said to rest on a secure foundation. Lord Castlereagh, encouraged by his success in this delicate matter, went a step further; and, at his suggestion, a note was addressed by the ministers of the four great Powers to the Cabinet of the French king, acknowledging the fidelity with which he had discharged his obligations, and inviting him, now that the evacuation of his territory was rapidly approaching, to concur with them in their deliberations, present and to come, for securing the peace of Europe, and the mutual guarantee of the rights of nations. It may readily be conceived with what satisfaction this proposal was received by the Duc de Richelieu and the Cabinet of Louis XVIII., tending, as it did, to take the ban off France, and restore its sovereign to his proper place in the councils of Europe. He hastened, accordingly, to return an answer, couched in the most gracious terms, cordially assenting to the proposal, and suggesting

53. Secret convention between France and the four Allied Powers.

Nov. 12.

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the immediate conclusion of a treaty in terms of it.* This was accordingly done in a few days after, and a secret protocol was drawn up and signed by the ministers of the *five* Powers, providing, though in general terms, for the arrangement of their rights and interests in a pacific way, without recourse to the dire alternative of arms.†

But whatever confidence the Allied sovereigns might profess, and possibly feel, in the maintenance of peace by the French *Government*, they were far from having equal

* "His Majesty the King of France has received, with the most lively satisfaction, this fresh proof of the confidence and friendship of the sovereigns who have taken part in the deliberations of Aix-la-Chapelle. In casting his regards on the past, and being convinced that at no other period no other nation could have discharged with equal fidelity the engagements which France has contracted, the King has felt that this new species of glory has to be ascribed to the force of the institutions which rule it; and he perceives with joy that the consolidation of these institutions is regarded as not less advantageous to the repose of Europe than essential to its prosperity. Convinced that his first duty is to perpetuate, by every means in his power, the peace now happily established among the nations—that the intimate union of their governments is the surest pledge of its durability—and that France cannot remain a stranger to a system, the force of which arises from an entire identity of principles and actions,—his Majesty has received with cordiality the propositions made to him, and has in consequence authorised the undersigned to take part in all the deliberations of the ministers and plenipotentiaries, in the view of maintaining the treaties, and guaranteeing the mutual rights which they have established."—*Reponse de* M. DE RICHELIEU, *November* 12, 1818; CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de la Restauration*, v. 379, 380.

† The protocol of this convention bore—"1. The sovereigns, whose ministers are undersigned, are determined never to deviate, neither in their mutual relations, nor in those which unite them to other States, from the principles which have hitherto united them, and which form a bond of Christian fraternity, which the sovereigns have formed among each other. 2. That this union, which is only the more close and durable that it is founded on no separate interests or momentary combination, can have no other object but the maintenance of the treaties, and the support of the rights established by them. 3. That *France, associated with the other Powers* by the restoration of a government at once legitimate and constitutional, engages henceforth to concur in the maintenance and support of a system which has given peace to Europe, and can alone secure its duration. 4. That if to attain these ends the Powers which have concurred in the present act should deem it necessary to establish different reunions, either among the sovereigns themselves or their ministers, to treat of subjects in which they have a common interest, the time and place of such assemblages shall be previously arranged by diplomatic communications; and in the event of such reunions having for their object the condition of other States in Europe, they shall not take place except in pursuance of a formal invitation to those by whom these States are directed, and under an express reservation of their right to participate in it directly or by their representatives. — METTERNICH, NESSELRODE, CASTLEREAGH, ALEX. DE HUMBOLDT, RICHELIEU."—*Protocol, November* 15, 1818; *Annuaire Historique*, i. 436.

trust in the pacific dispositions of the French *people;* and a step was taken before they separated at Aix-la-Chapelle, which indicated anything rather than a belief in the long continuance of peace with that ambitious nation. On 20th November 1818, the representatives of the *four* great Powers—namely, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain—met in secret conclave, without the knowledge or concurrence of the French minister, and concluded a fresh arrangement, based on the treaty of Chaumont, which provided for the defence of Europe in the event of a fresh outbreak of revolution in France, and the overthrow of its existing government. By this it was provided, "1st, that the whole engagements stipulated by the quadruple alliance in the treaty of 20th November 1815, are reserved in their full force and effect, with reference to the *casus fœderis et belli*, as therein more particularly stipulated; 2d, that for the *casus fœderis*, such as was provided for by the second paragraph of article 3d of that treaty, the high contracting parties to the present protocol, in their existing arrangements, agree to concert in such an event, in particular reunions, either among the monarchs themselves, or the four Cabinets, on the most effectual means of arresting the fatal effects of *a new revolutionary convulsion with which France may be threatened;* recollecting always that the progress of the evils which have so long desolated Europe has only been arrested by the intimacy of the union and the purity of the sentiments which unite the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world." This protocol provided for this, fixed the points of rendezvous for the armies of the four Powers to assemble in the event of the *casus belli* arising, and recommended that in that event the fortresses of Ostend, Newport, Ypres, and on the Scheldt, with the exception of the citadels of Antwerp and Tournay, should be occupied by the forces of Great Britain.[1] *

54. Secret defensive treaty between the four great Powers. Nov. 20.

[1] Prot. Nov. 19, 1818; Cap. v. 386, 387.

It was not without reason that at the very moment

* In pursuance of this agreement, it was further provided that the *corps d'armée*, stipulated for by the treaty of Chaumont, should enter upon the cam-

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55. Secret reasons of these precautions.

when signing a treaty for the evacuation of France by the Allied troops, and admitting its sovereign by a formal act into the courts of European sovereigns, their ministers were in secret making extensive preparations to meet a renewal of hostilities on the part of that Power. They had every confidence in the pacific intentions of the Government of France, but very little in those of its inhabitants, and still less in its stability amidst the revolutionary surges with which it was surrounded. The change in the electoral law of France, by the royal ordinance of 5th September 1816, which reduced the number of deputies from 394 to 260, in a manner prejudicial to the rural districts, and gave a vast addition to the influence of the towns, had made a very great change on the composition of the Chamber of Deputies, and spread grave apprehensions that in the course of a few years the annual change of a fifth of its numbers by a new election might give the Revolutionary party a decided majority in the Legislature. Their apprehensions were shared, not merely

paign the day that the Allied sovereigns declared that the *casus fœderis* had arisen. "The British corps was to assemble at Brussels, the Prussians at Cologne, the Austrians at Stuttgardt, the Russians, after the lapse of three months, on account of their great distance, at Mayence. The Duke of Wellington, who had been specially directed by the Government of Great Britain and that of the Netherlands, to survey and report upon the fortifications of the Low Countries, has reported that he can certify that the quantity of works erected has been immense; and that a powerful defensive attitude would be taken in the next year, should circumstances demand it. The plenipotentiaries of the other Powers have in like manner declared that they can give satisfactory assurances of the progress of the defensive preparations on the other countries adjoining the French frontier. In these circumstances the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers have considered the best means of providing for the garrisons of these fortresses, in the event of a war breaking out and hostilities commencing in the Low Countries. These fortresses have not been constructed for the defence of any single country, but for the general protection of Europe, and there are several in the second line which require to be occupied on the Dutch frontier. It has, therefore, been agreed to recommend to his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, in the event of the *casus fœderis* being declared, that the fortresses of Ostend, Newport, Ypres, and those on the Scheldt, with the exception of the citadels of Antwerp and Tournay, should be occupied by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, and the citadels of Huy, Namur, and Dinant, as well as the strong places of Charleroi, Marienburg, and Philipville, by those of his Prussian Majesty."—*Secret Protocol, November* 20, 1818; CAPEFIGUE, v. 387-389.

by the old noblesse, who, of course, viewed the new order of things with undisguised aversion, but by many of the wisest even of the Liberal party; and the saying was common, that by subscribing the royal ordinance for that great change in the mode of representation, Louis XVIII. had signed the death-warrant of his dynasty. A very strong memoir, ably drawn, was transmitted by the Royalists at Paris to the sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle, and produced a great impression.* Lord Castlereagh was too well informed by Sir Charles Stuart, his ambassador at Paris, of the real state of that capital, not to share in some degree these apprehensions; but he was not the less resolved in his determination to act on the defensive merely, and, while making every preparation in secret for possible war, to observe scrupulous good faith in all respects, and act in public as if unlimited confidence was reposed in the continuance of peace for an indefinite time. On the day appointed, accordingly—the 30th November 1818—the Allied troops everywhere evacuated the French fortresses, which were immediately taken possession of by the national soldiery, and with speechless delight the people beheld the national standards again hoisted on their ancient and time-honoured battlements.[1] †

[1] Lav. ii. 229, 230; Cap. v. 348, 349, 353.

* "La Révolution occupe tout jusqu'aux dernières classes de la nation qu'elle agite partout avec violence; les principes destructeurs de notre monarchie *sont professés à la tribun par les ministres du Roi*, et l'on ne veut pour exemple que le discours du ministre de la guerre sur la loi du recrutement, et celui du ministre de la police sur la liberté de la presse. Des écrits audacieux sapent tous les fondemens de l'ordre social, et les lois répressives ne font obstacle qu'aux écrivains qui soutiennent la monarchie et la légitimité. Tous les liens de l'état social sont relachés; le Gouvernement ne parait marcher que par l'impulsion d'un pouvoir que ne n'existe plus et par la presence des forces étrangères; enfin tout se prépare à faire la guerre à l'Europe. Par quels moyens peut on empêcher que la France et par elle Europe entière ne deviennent encore la proie des Révolutionaires? Changer le système du gouvernement par le changement du ministère que le dirige. Le changement complet du ministère est le seul moyen efficace, en même temps qu'il est le seul loyal et admissible pour empêcher que la France ne redevienne encore un foyer de révolution qui ne tarderait pas à embracer l'Europe entière."—*Mémoire Secret présenté aux Souverains à Aix-la-Chapelle, par* M. LE BARON VERNEUIL; *Castlereagh Correspondence, MS.*, and given in CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de la Restauration*, v. 348-353.

† On leaving the command which he had so honourably held during three

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56. Universal pacific appearance of Europe.

To all appearance, the Revolutionary contest, with its unspeakable suffering and devastation, had now come to an end. Everything, on the surface at least, wore a pacific aspect. Not only had the power of revolutionary France been conquered, but its overbearing and ambitious spirit had been for the time at least quelled. Its Government had faithfully and honourably discharged its obligations, and the commanders-in-chief of the Allied army of occupation had declared that the danger had so much passed away that the territory of the Great Nation might be entirely evacuated by the Allied troops. This accordingly had been done: the strangers had everywhere withdrawn, and no standard but that of France waved on the French territory. The most cordial union subsisted between the sovereigns and their ministers; and Lord Castlereagh, in particular, had so entirely won the confidence of the Emperor Alexander, that he had obtained from that monarch the privilege of corresponding directly with him, without the intervention of his ministers—a privilege rarely accorded, but of which it will appear in the sequel the British minister availed himself on some important occasions. The differences between Spain and Portugal had been adjusted by the interposition of the three great Powers. Everything wore a pacific aspect—the Russian and Austrian armies

years, the Duke of Wellington addressed an order of the day to his troops of so many nations, in which he said,—"Le Field-Maréchal Duc de Wellington ne peut prendre congé des troupes qu'il a eu l'honneur de commander, sans leur exprimer sa gratitude pour la bonne conduite qui les a fait distingués pendant le temps qu'elles ont été sous ses ordres. Il y a pres de trois ans que les souverains Alliés ont confié au Field-Maréchal le commandement en chef de cette partie de leurs forces que les circonstances avaient rendu nécessaire de laisser en France. Si les mesures que leurs MM. avaient été commandées ont été executées à leur satisfaction, le résultat doit être entièrement attribué à la conduite prudente et eclairée tenue dans les circonstances par leurs excellences. les généraux en chef, au bon exemple qu'ils ont donné aux autres généraux et officiers, leurs subordonnés, aussi bien qu'aux efforts de ceux-ci pour les seconder, et enfin à l'excellente discipline qu'a été constamment observée dans les contingences. C'est à regret qu'il a vu arriver le moment où la dislocation de cette armée allait mettre fin à ses rapports publics et privés avec les commandants et autres officiers des divers corps."—G. MURRAY, *Général-en-Chef de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée Allié; Annuaire Historique*, i. 437, 438.

were wending their way towards their distant homes; the French were joyfully taking possession of their hereditary strongholds; the British were almost entirely disarmed by sea and land; the Peninsular and Waterloo heroes had nearly all returned to pacific employment, and the Government were making preparations to dismiss the last vestige of war, the *war currency*, and revert to that exchange in the precious metals, or their representatives, which is only practicable during a period of profound and general peace. To all human appearance, when Lord Castlereagh returned to England from Aix-la-Chapelle, in the beginning of December 1818, his mission as War Minister was closed, and the doors of the temple of Janus might be shut, not to be opened again during the lifetime of the present generation.

CHAPTER XVI.

LORD CASTLEREAGH, FROM THE TERMINATION OF THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE IN DECEMBER 1818, TO HIS DEATH IN JULY 1822.

1818.

1. Remote causes of a fresh European contest.

If the European sovereigns and statesmen deemed that it was time to shut the temple of Janus, that all danger from the Revolutionary hydra was at an end, and that a long era of peace was commencing, when they separated at Aix-la-Chapelle in the beginning of December 1818, never were men more deceived, and never did human affairs exhibit more clearly that continual oscillation from good to evil, and from evil to good, which has in every age been their characteristic. At that very moment the seeds of fresh disturbances were sown in different parts of Europe, and a new conflict was commencing, which is not yet closed, and will perhaps only be terminated by a flow of blood as great, and the endurance of suffering as intense, as that which was occasioned by the first great convulsion. The danger began now in a different quarter from that in which it had at first appeared; and the precautions taken in the secret defensive treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle against an apprehended outbreak in France were, in the outset at least, unavailing. What is very remarkable, the peril arose in the two countries which had been most closely united in the strife, and whose union in the end had been crowned with the most triumphant success. It was in Spain and England that the strife commenced, though, in its ultimate effects, it has extended to France, and rendered nugatory all the precautions adopted by

Lord Castlereagh and the Allied sovereigns for the independence of nations, and to secure for Europe the blessings of general peace.

2. Remote cause of this new revolution in the constitution of 1812 proclaimed at Cadiz.

To understand how this came about in the Spanish peninsula we must go back to the disastrous year of 1812, before either the Salamanca or the Moscow campaign, when nine-tenths of Spain were overrun by, and in the possession of, the French armies. At that period a band of intrepid patriots, aided by a powerful British garrison, maintained with mournful resolution the contest within the walls of Cadiz, the seat of government; and as if in mockery of the alleged conquest of the country by the invading troops, solemnly invited representatives from all parts of the country, including the colonies of South America, to assemble in the Isle of Leon to deliberate on the new constitution they were to frame for their country. The elections of course could take place only in such parts of the country as were not occupied by the French forces, who would permit no movement in favour of a rival government, and these at that period were only Cadiz, Alicante, Gallicia, and Asturias. The deputies from these districts, with a few from South America, accordingly alone assembled; but, though the representatives only of a fragment of the Spanish empire, and that one which was imbued with feelings and actuated by interests the very reverse of the greater part of the country, they took the high-sounding title of the Cortes of Spain and the Indies, and proceeded to form a constitution according to the views of the majority of the members. They caused to be elected what they called "supplementary members," to come in place of those who should have been returned from the provinces occupied by the enemy. These were the delegates of the mob of Cadiz, Alicante, Corunna, and Ferrol; and from their meetings being held in the first of these towns, and the most active and eloquent of the members being their representatives, they soon acquired the entire direction of the whole body.

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The result was the formation of a constitution upon a highly democratic basis—the famous constitution of 1812—which soon became the watchword of the Revolutionists in the whole south of Europe. It bore no more resemblance to the ancient Spanish constitution than it did to the institutions of Japan or China. By it the Legislature consisted of a single Chamber, elected by universal suffrage, on the principle of one member for every seventy thousand inhabitants. This Chamber had alone the exclusive privilege of making laws and laying on taxes. The sovereign, to whom the shadow merely of power was left, could not refuse his concurrence to any laws presented to him by the Cortes more than twice; if brought up a third time he was forced to give his concurrence. He made peace or declared war; but his acts in these respects were not valid till ratified by the Cortes. He nominated the public functionaries, including bishops and judges, but only from a list of three for each vacancy furnished him by the same body. The chief powers of Government, when the Cortes was not sitting, were delegated to a Council of forty members of that body, the consent of which was essential to any act forming properly part of the royal functions, as declaring war or concluding treaties.[1]

[1] Toreno, Hist. d'Espagne, iv. 341, 342; Constn. 1812, Feb. 2, 3; Martignac, 97.

3. Which is overturned on the return of Ferdinand VII. on the peace.

This constitution was nothing but a democracy, thinly veiled under the forms of a constitutional monarchy, and as such it could not exist three months in the British Islands. It would within that time either tear society in pieces, or be torn in pieces itself. It may readily be conceived that a system of government so absurd, and so utterly unsuited to any European society, could not deceive the vigilant eye and sagacious mind of the Duke of Wellington. He accordingly, from the very first, expressed in the strongest manner his sense of its perilous and unjustifiable nature.* He was too wise, however, to

* "The Cortes are unpopular everywhere, and in my opinion deservedly so. Nothing can be more cruel, unjust, and impolitic than this decree respecting the persons who have served the enemy. It is extraordinary that the Revolution of Spain has not produced one man with any knowledge of the real situa-

make any attempt to coerce or restrain the Spaniards in the formation of their internal institutions, and entirely followed out Lord Castlereagh's instructions, which were, "abstaining cautiously from all interference with the internal affairs of the Peninsula, to bend the whole force of his mind to expel the enemy from its bounds." This was

tion of the country. It appears as if they were all drunk, thinking and speaking of any other subject than Spain."—WELLINGTON *to* H. WELLESLEY, *November* 1, 1812; GURWOOD, ix. 524.

"It is impossible to describe the state of confusion in which things are at Cadiz. The Cortes have framed a constitution very much on the principle that a painter paints a picture—viz., to be looked at; and I have not met one of its members, or any person of any description, either at Cadiz or elsewhere, who considers the constitution as embodying a system according to which Spain can be governed. The Cortes have in form divested themselves of the executive power, and appointed a regency for that purpose; *but the regency are in fact the slaves of the Cortes,* and neither have any communication in a constitutional way with each other, or any authority beyond the walls of Cadiz. I wish that some of our reformers would go to Cadiz to see the benefit of a sovereign popular assembly calling itself 'Majesty,' and of a written constitution. In truth, there is no authority in the State except the libellous newspapers, and they certainly ride over both Cortes and regency without mercy."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *Cadiz, January* 27, 1813; GURWOOD, x. 54.

"The greatest objection which I have to the new constitution is, that in a country in which almost all property consists in land, and there are the largest landed proprietors that exist in Europe, no measure should have been adopted, and no barrier provided, to guard landed property from the encroachments, injustice, and violence, to which it is at all times liable, but especially during the progress of revolutions. The Council of State affords no such guard—it has no influence in the legislature—it can have no influence on the public mind. Such a guard can only be afforded by the establishment of an assembly of the great landed proprietors, such as our House of Lords, having concurrent power with the Cortes; and you may depend upon it there is no man in Spain, be his property ever so small, who is not interested in the establishment of such an assembly. Unhappily legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals: when unchecked they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, it frequently happens *that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular.* Those measures are peculiarly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties, under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which there is *no barrier for the preservation of private property except the justice of a legislative assembly* possessing supreme power. It is impossible to calculate upon the plans of such an assembly; they have no check whatever, and they are governed by the most ignorant and licentious of all presses, that of Cadiz. I believe they mean to attack the royal feudal tenths and the tithes of the church, under pretence of encouraging agriculture; and finding the contributions from other sources not so extensive as they expected, they will seize the estates of the grandees. Our character is involved in a greater degree than we are aware of in the democratical proceedings of the Cortes in the opinion of all moderate and well-thinking Spaniards, and I am afraid with the rest of Europe. It is quite impossible such a system can last; what I regret is, that I am the person who maintains

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at length accomplished, notwithstanding every obstacle thrown in his way by the Cadiz democrats, who were envious of his fame, and jealous of his authority. And when Ferdinand VII. returned and resumed the reins of power, the democratic Cortes had fallen into such general contempt, and been found so entirely unfit for the country, that it was dismissed by the sovereign, and disappeared from the country without either an arm or a voice being raised in its behalf.

4. Unpopular government of Ferdinand VII., and revolution in consequence.

Unfortunately the new monarch had none of the qualities requisite to guide the state in the difficult circumstances in which it was placed before his resumption of power. Of all governments that of a *Restoration* is the most difficult to conduct to any prosperous issue; for it has the insatiable expectations of its friends to gratify, and the boundless heartburnings of its opponents to appease. Ferdinand had neither the disposition nor the means of accomplishing either of these things. Vain, frivolous, and tyrannical, his system of government was founded on the developement of that cruel and oppressive policy which had been reared in the cloisters of the Escurial. Many unworthy acts of severity signalised the first years of his reign, and effectually dispelled the illusion which, on his first restoration, had caused him to be hailed as "Ferdinand the Beloved." The consequence was a very great amount of discontent in the chief towns and seaports of Spain, especially in the learned professions and educated classes. But as they were few in number, and the rural population, forming nine-tenths of the inhabitants, were firm in their support of "*El Re Assoluto*," this state of things might have gone on for long without inducing any important practical result, had it not been for an accidental circumstance, which at once led to a change of

it. If the King should return he will overturn the whole fabric, if he has any spirit; but the gentlemen at Cadiz are so completely masters, that I fear there must be another convulsion."—WELLINGTON *to* DON DIEGO DE LA VEGA, *January* 29, 1813, *and to* EARL BATHURST, *April* 21, 1813; GURWOOD, x. 64, 65, 247, and xi. 91.

government and restoration of the highly democratic constitution of 1812. This was the revolt of the troops in the Isle of Leon, which took place in the autumn of 1819, and was attended by the most important effects in both hemispheres. It is not foreign to the subject of this biography, for it was the remote cause of Lord Castlereagh's death.

5. Cause of the revolt in the Isle of Leon, and consequent return to the constitution of 1812.

To understand how this came about, it must be premised that, during the Peninsular war, when the territories of old Spain in possession of the native authorities were reduced to Cadiz and a few fortresses on the sea-coast, the great colonies of South America belonging to that Power had taken the opportunity to revolt, and declare themselves independent. This was a cruel blow, not merely to Castilian pride, but, what was far more serious, to Castilian finance; for prior to the South American Revolution more than half of the revenue of the Spanish crown (£8,000,000) had been drawn from the produce of the mines in Peru and Mexico. The Government of Madrid, in consequence, ever since the Restoration, had been in the utmost straits for money: its credit was gone, and the delay in the payment of the troops in the provinces from the penury of the exchequer, led to several military insurrections in them, which occasioned lamentable and frequent executions. Government for long found it impossible, from want of money, to equip an expedition capable of restoring the authority of old Spain in the revolted colonies; but at length, having succeeded on very high terms in effecting a loan, and got £400,000 from the British Government, as already mentioned, as the price of abandoning the slave trade, they succeeded in collecting a large body of troops in the Isle of Leon destined for South America. They exceeded 20,000; but various causes for long prevented their proceeding to their destination. An epidemic of the most virulent kind, which proved to be the yellow fever, first broke out among them in August 1819, which rendered

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1819. the embarkation impossible; and even if it had been otherwise, the penury of the exchequer left the Government absolutely without the means of transporting so large a body. Meanwhile, the soldiers remained encamped in the Isle of Leon, exposed to the whole seductive arts of the Revolutionists of Cadiz, who spared no pains to win them over to their side, and with their imaginations inflamed by the recitals by the maimed veterans of Murillo's army, of the sufferings they had undergone in the terrible transatlantic warfare for which they were destined. The consequence was, that a revolt broke out among them, for the double purpose of stopping the expedition to South America, and forwarding the views of the Revolutionists at Cadiz; a bold man named RIEGO was at the head of the movement; the Government had no force on which they could rely to resist it; the Conde d'Abisbal, who was intrusted with the command of the troops who could be drawn together, proved a traitor and joined the insurgents; and at length the King, deserted by all, was obliged to issue a decree convoking a new Cortes and proclaiming again the constitution of 1812.[1]

March 7, 1820.

[1] Mem. del Gen. Mina, ii. 273, 279; Ann. Hist. iii. 406, 409.

6. Revolutions in Portugal, Naples, and Piedmont.

The example of a regular government being overturned, and a highly democratic constitution established by a well-concerted military revolt, which at once rescued the soldiers from an irksome and dangerous service, and paved the way for their leaders to power and affluence, was too seductive not to be attended with very momentous consequences, especially among the excitable inhabitants of the southern states of the European commonwealth. The consequences, accordingly, were that the example was speedily followed in Portugal, in which the soldiers and democrats jointly effected a revolt at Oporto, which speedily overturned the Government, and testified the national gratitude to their British allies by sending out of the country Marshal Beresford and the whole British officers who had led them to victory under Wellington in the war of liberation. The contagion soon spread to the

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Italian peninsula; and the triumph of Riego in Andalusia convulsed Europe from one end to another, as that of Garibaldi in Sicily did forty years afterwards. Naples first yielded to a military revolt as Spain had done; the cry for the constitution of 1812 proved irresistible; the soldiers all rose against the Government, and in such a hurry were the people to secure the great democratic triumph that they swore fealty to the Spanish constitution *before they had even seen a copy of it*, which was sent for from Spain after it had been promulgated and generally accepted. Piedmont was not long of following the seductive example. In March following a revolution was effected in Turin, amidst cries of "Viva la Constituzioné!" "Morte a Tedeschi!" The society of the *carbonari*, the centre of all these convulsions, spread its ramifications over the whole Southern Peninsula. These affiliated associations extended over all Germany and great part of France. Alarming symptoms of agitation commenced in Poland and Hungary; and a moral earthquake, as violent as that which afterwards overturned so many thrones in 1848, seemed rapidly spreading over Europe.[1]*

July 6, 1820.

March 12, 1821.

[1] Ann. Hist. iii. 426-429; Colletta, Storia di Napoli, ii. 368, 371, 380, 461; Rev. Piedmontain, par Rosa, 19, 24.

"M. Saldanha at Madrid has obtained possession of the *statuts* of the secret societies in Spain, and particularly those of the club which had given to M. Pardo, the Spanish chargé d'affaires at Lisbon, the instructions mentioned in my despatch, No. 15, and also, as M. Saldanha now states, instructions to M. de Onis at Naples.

"M. Saldanha informs M. de Lassa that it appears by these *statuts* that the object of these societies is *to establish republics in every country in Europe*, and that for this end they have agents in *every quarter*, but that the powerful central societies are established at *Paris, Venice, Genoa, Leghorn, in Prussia, and in Poland*. M. Saldanha proceeds to state that, if necessary, he will furnish M. de Lassa with copies of all the documents which have fallen into his hands. In the mean time, he insists that the affair is so serious that it requires the immediate interference of the Powers of Europe, and he declares the state of Spain to be such, that an explosion must take place there before the expiration of two months."—SIR CHARLES BAGOT *to* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *September* 4 (16), 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 301.

"The infection from Naples has reached Milan, and reports of all sorts are in circulation; the coffee-rooms are more crowded than usual, and the subjects of conversation more assuming and desperate—Constitution and insurrection are in every one's mouth. The Liberals here are loud in their celebration of the Spaniards and Neapolitans. *They are ripe for anything;* but the fine garrison of Hungarian grenadiers in this city, who are the most anti-constitutional characters possible, keep everything quiet."—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL

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7. Line which Lord Castlereagh took on this crisis.

There was enough in this state of Continental politics to attract the universal and anxious attention of the Continental sovereigns, and furnish ample matter for reflection to Lord Castlereagh, who had become the sole director, as well as officially intrusted with the guidance, of the foreign affairs of Great Britain. He took, accordingly, as might have been expected from his energetic character and high moral courage, a decided part in these transactions; but it was one the very reverse of what both his Continental friends and enemies anticipated from him. It is, however, peculiarly interesting to his biographer as indicating the *real principles* by which he had throughout been governed, and which explains at once what might at first sight appear irreconcilable or contradictory in his career. He entirely coincided with the Duke of Wellington in his opinion of the absurd and perilous nature of the Spanish constitution, based on universal suffrage, a single legislature, and a powerless sovereign; and had he needed any other monitor, he had enough in the state of his own country at this juncture to open his eyes to its consequences. He agreed not less cordially with Prince Hardenberg and Count Nesselrode as to the extreme danger arising from a *military* revolt attended with such

BROWNE *to* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Milan, July* 29, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 284.

"1. Que l'association connu sous le nom de Carbonari, malgré les efforts des Gouvernemens pour la dissoudre et la détruire, est très nombreuse et très répandue dans toutes les parties de l'Italie, et dans toutes les classes de la société, surtout dans les armées.

"2. Que, dans les provinces du royaume de Naples, les chefs de cette association sècrete ont convoqué dans les mois de Mars et d'Avril sur différens points, les Carbonari, et que ceux-ci ont exactement répondu à l'appel.

"3. Que l'impulsion paroissant donnée par la haute Italie, il en résulteroit que les troupe qui seroient envoyées par Autriche au secours du Roi de Naples pourroient bien se trouver placées entre deux soulèvemens.

"4. Que les troupes réunies au camp de Sessa ont eu une occasion facile de se concerter, et qu'en effet elles ont arrêté là leur plan, dont, chose extraordinaire, rien n'a transpiré jusqu'au moment de l'explosion.

"5. Que le mouvement devoit éclater le 31 Mai, et qu'il a été différé pour une cause que j'ignore."—*Secret Memoir transmitted to* LORD CASTLEREAGH *by the* HONOURABLE F. LAMB, *August* 27, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 298, 299.

consequences,* and he appreciated the necessity under which the Continental statesmen felt they lay of forming a congress, and taking joint measures to arrest the progress of the danger. But while he fully acknowledged these principles when things were considered from a Continental point of view, he hesitated as to involving his own country in any joint measures for the suppression of the revolutionary governments in the southern states of Europe, where they had been forcibly established. The reason of that was not that he had come to regard revolutions with a more favourable eye than he had formerly done, or ceased to consider them as the most terrible maladies which can affect the body politic; but that, when they occurred in states of the second or third order, they were not attended with the dangers to *other* states which threatened when they broke out in monarchies of the first. And in such a case the risk to *national independence* and general freedom was greater from the success of an armed intervention of sovereigns to put them down, than from the triumph of an armed revolution of the people to establish them. This observation furnishes the key to his whole conduct from first to last, and explains its seeming contradiction. But before entering on the congresses of Troppau, Laybach, and Verona, where it was decidedly acted upon, it is necessary to advert to several important domestic transactions in Great Britain, which, not less than foreign affairs, occupied the last years of his life.

* "Les évènemens arrivés en Espagne peuvent amener de grands dangers pour le repos de l'Europe. *L'exemple d'une armée faisant une révolution est infiniment funeste.* La Cour de Pétersbourg, quoiqu'ignorant, encore l'effet de l'insurrection, a cru nécessaire qu'on se concertât sur les mesures qui pourraient être prises d'un commun accord, en y faisant concourir la France, qui, sans doute, y est doublement intéressée. Elle propose de faire servir à cet effet les conférences subsistant toujours à Paris, pour la médiation entre l'Espagne et le Portugal. Je crois cette idée fort sage. Nous serons prêts à nous concerter sur toute mesure utile. . . . Nous avons toujours l'espoir de voir les affaires de France prendre une bonne tournure, pourvu que l'exemple de l'Espagne n'y influe pas en mal. Louis XIV. disoit, il n'y a plus des Pyrénées. Il seroit à desirer qu'elles fussent maintenant une barrière impassable."—*Le* PRINCE HARDENBERG *à* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Berlin, Mars* 31, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 224.

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8. Great prosperity in Great Britain in end of 1818 and beginning of 1819.

These transactions, which were for the most part of an untoward kind, arose from a very singular cause—viz., the great prosperity by which they had been preceded. The harvest of 1818 was uncommonly fine, which led to a great diminution in the imports of grain and export of gold. Thence arose unwonted ease of the money markets. The extension of the restriction on cash payments by the Act of 1817, already noticed, had provided a currency adequate to the wants and commensurate to the necessities of the country, and that worst of all famines, a *money famine*, had disappeared. The total notes in circulation in England, which in 1816 had been so low as £42,109,000, rose in 1818 to £48,278,000; a rise accompanied, of course, with a corresponding addition to prices, and vivifying of industry in all its branches. This continuance of the restriction had alone enabled the nation to tide over the vast loans to the Continental Powers, contracted for the most part in London, in 1817 and 1818, which amounted to the enormous sum of £38,600,000, of which £27,500,000 was to France. The prices of food in the year 1818 were high, but not alarmingly so; the average of the year was 84s., a very different sum from 116s., to which it had attained in the spring of 1817. In a word, the prosperity of the country in the end of 1818, and first six months of 1819, was great and unprecedented, and furnished just matter of congratulation both to the Prince Regent in his speech on opening Parliament, and to the Cabinet Ministers in correspondence with each other.*

* "The Prince Regent has the greatest pleasure in being able to inform you that the trade, commerce, and manufactures of the country are in a most flourishing condition. The favourable change which has so rapidly taken place in the internal circumstances of the United Kingdom affords the strongest proof of the solidity of its resources. To cultivate and improve the advantages of our present situation will be the object of your deliberations."—PRINCE REGENT'S *Speech, January* 21, 1819; *Parliamentary Debates*, xxxix. 21.

"Both trade and manufactures are in a flourishing condition, and likely to improve still further. There appears to be little speculation beyond the regular demands of the different markets, men without capital finding it almost

9. State of the country and parties at the passing of the Currency Bill of 1819.

Unfortunately situated as the political parties were, this transient gleam of prosperity, instead of being the precursor of good, became the harbinger of evil. The opinion became general that this sunshine, instead of being, as it really was, the result of the expansion of the currency by the Act of 1817, was independent of it, and might be expected to continue, *though the currency was contracted to any extent;* and, therefore, that this was a favourable time for removing the restriction on cash payments, and reimposing the obligation on the Bank to pay in gold. The Opposition early resolved to make this the *cheval de bataille* of the session. On 2d February 1819, five days after Parliament met, Mr Tierney introduced the subject by moving for a select committee to inquire into the effect of the Bank Restriction Act, which was carried by 277 to 168. The committee was chosen by ballot, and Mr, afterwards SIR ROBERT PEEL, its chairman, brought up the report on 5th April, which recommended that cash payments should be resumed on 1st February 1820, or in ten months from the date of the report, at the rate of £4, 1s. per ounce; and from 1st October 1820 to May 1821, at £3, 19s. 6d., and thereafter at £3, 17s. 10½d. Unhappily, when this all-important subject came on for discussion in Parliament, the Opposition were beyond any former example strong, and the Government proportionally weak.* The former, in addition to the whole Liberals of every shade, was strengthened on this question by the *entire body of the political economists,* led by Mr Peel, Mr Huskisson, and Mr Ricardo,

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impossible to procure credit; so that there is now no disposition to force a trade, and no injurious competition to procure orders, and consequently wages are fair and reasonable."—LORD SHEFFIELD *to* LORD SIDMOUTH, *December* 17, 1818; *Sidmouth's Life*, iii. 242.

* "After the defeats we have already experienced during this session, our remaining in office is a positive evil. It confounds all the ideas of government in the minds of men. It disgraces us personally, and renders us less capable every day of being of any real service to the country now. If, therefore, things are to remain as they are, I am quite clear that there is no advantage in any way of our being the persons to carry on the public service."—LORD LIVERPOOL *to* LORD ELDON, *May* 10, 1819; *Eldon's Life*, ii. 329.

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who formed at that period a very important section, constituting a sort of *imperium in imperio* in the House of Commons. The latter were proportionally, and to a still greater degree, weak. They had recently sustained several damaging defeats, particularly one, on the amendment of the criminal law, in the House of Commons; and in the Cabinet itself there was a great division on the subject, the majority being in favour of adopting the report of the committee. Lord Eldon strongly opposed it, in which he was joined by Lord Castlereagh, but they stood nearly alone. It did not pass, however, without resistance out of doors.* The Bank of England presented a petition, in which they stated the case, and unfolded the consequences of so early a return to cash payments, with a precision and force which nothing could exceed; and this was accompanied by two petitions, one from the bankers and merchants of the city of London, and another from those of Bristol, which predicted the consequences of the proposed measure in a way which the event has too faithfully verified.† To us, enlightened as the nation

* Twiss's *Life of Eldon*, ii. 329.

† The petition of the Bank Directors stated: "When the Bank Directors are now to be called on, in the new situation in which they are placed by the Bank Restriction Act, to procure a fund for supporting the whole national currency, either in bullion or coin, and when it is proposed that they should effect this measure within a given period, by regulating the market price of gold by a limitation of the amount of the issue of bank-notes, *with whatever distress such limitation may be attended to individuals or the community at large*, they feel it their bounden and imperious duty to state their sentiments explicitly to his Majesty's Ministers. They cannot advise an unrelenting continuance *of pecuniary pressure upon the commercial world*, of which it is impossible for them either to foresee or estimate the consequences. The Directors have already submitted to the House of Lords the expedience of the Bank paying its notes *in bullion, at the market price of the day*, with a view of seeing how far favourable commercial balances may operate in restoring the former order of things, of which they might take advantage; and with a similar view they have proposed to the Government to repay the Bank a considerable part of the sum that has been advanced upon exchequer bills. . . . The Directors, therefore, feel that they have no right whatever to invest themselves, of their own accord, with the responsibility of countenancing a measure in which the *whole* community is so deeply involved, and possibly to compromise the universal interests of the empire, *in all the relations of agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and revenue*, by a seeming acquiescence or declared approbation of

has been by repeated and dear-bought experience, the only surprising thing is, how the principles announced in these very remarkable documents did not command universal assent. So it was, however, that the case fell out quite otherwise. With truth did Mr Ward (Lord Dudley)

the proposed measures by the Bank of England."—*Petition of the Bank of England, May* 20, 1819; *Parliamentary Debates*, xii. 601, 604.

The petition of the merchants and bankers of the city of London stated: "Your petitioners have reason to apprehend that measures are in contemplation, with reference to the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of England, which, in the humble opinion of the petitioners, will tend to a *forced, precipitate, and highly injurious contraction of the currency of the country.* That the consequences of such a contraction will be, as your petitioners humbly conceive, to add to the burden of the public debt, greatly to increase the pressure of the taxes, to lower the value of all landed and commercial property, seriously to affect and embarrass both public and private credit, to embarrass and reduce all the operations *of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce*, and to throw out of employment, as in the calamitous year 1816, a great proportion of the industrious and labouring classes of the community. That your petitioners are fortified in the opinion thus expressed by the distresses experienced by commercial, trading, manufacturing, and agricultural interests of the kingdom, from the partial reduction of the Bank issues, which it appears has recently taken place. Neither the manner nor the time which, your petitioners have reason to apprehend, is intended to be proposed for the resumption of cash payments, is suited to avoid the evils they anticipate. The petitioners, therefore, humbly crave that the time, as at present fixed by law, for the termination of the restrictions on cash payments by the Bank of England, may be extended to a period which shall not tend to a forced and precipitate contraction of the circulating medium of the country, or to embarrass trade, or to injure public credit, agriculture, manufactures, and commerce."—*Petition of Bankers and Merchants of London, May* 21, 1819; *Parliamentary Debates*, xii. 599, 600.

The petition of the bankers and merchants of Bristol was still more remarkable. It set forth: "Your petitioners have heard with much apprehension that the design is entertained of proposing in Parliament the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of England. The petitioners have the utmost confidence in the resources of the national Bank, and that its issues are fully warranted by the property it holds in deposit; and they are firmly persuaded that if this measure shall be forced upon the country before it shall, by a favourable state of its foreign exchanges, be fully prepared for its reception, not only the finances and revenue of the State must suffer, but even the stability of the Bank itself be endangered, by the exportation of its bullion, and the depreciation of the property which it holds as a security for its issues. The petitioners also conceive that the present is a period peculiarly hazardous for an experiment of so important a nature, when loans of an unprecedented amount are in progress of payment in Europe, and when the exchange with both the continents is greatly against this country. The petitioners confidently anticipate that, as the present state of our foreign exchanges may be justly attributed to causes which, although quite adequate to the effects, are not in themselves necessarily permanent, the period may reasonably be expected to arrive, at which a resumption of cash payments may be made with safety and without inconvenience. Awaiting, then, this period, the situation of the country can only be

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say, "Those that are near the scene of action are not less surprised than you are at the turn the bullion question has taken; Canning says it is the greatest wonder he has witnessed in the political world."[1] Well might Mr Canning declare "*it was the greatest wonder of the age.*" The bill passed *without a dissenting voice* in the House of Commons, Alderman Heygate, who had moved an amendment, having withdrawn it.[2]

[1] Earl of Dudley's Letters, 229.

[2] Parl. Deb. xl. 800.

10. Rapid increase of general distress from the resumption of cash payments.

It is no wonder Mr Canning used these remarkable and strong expressions in regard to this all-important bill. It was in truth "the greatest wonder of the age," though in a very different sense from that in which he regarded it. The exchanges both with Europe and America were much against this country; the great French loan of £27,500,000, contracted to pay off the last instalments due to the Allied Powers as the condition of their removal, was, and would continue for nine months to be, in a course of payment, and the drain of gold thence arising to this country was excessive. Revolutionary movements were commencing in Spain which threatened general war at no distant period, and a great consequent increase in the demand for the precious metals. The supply of bullion for the use of the globe had sunk to less than a fifth of its former and average amount, in consequence of the South American Revolution. It was at that moment that the House of Commons, without one dissenting voice, decreed the entire resumption of cash-payments by the Bank of England on the 1st February following! The effects were soon apparent. "The industry of the nation was speedily congealed, as a flowing stream by the severity of an arctic winter." The alarm became universal,—as widespread as the previous confidence and trust had been. The Bank of England, terrified at the

rendered alarming by a premature recurrence to measures which the petitioners are satisfied must cramp the commercial intercourse of England with foreign countries, contract its trade and manufactures, and be injurious to its best interests."—*Bristol Petition, February* 3, 1819; *Parliamentary Debates*, xxxix. 276, 277.

prospect of being compelled to resume cash payments in February following, rapidly contracted their discounts. The paper under discount at that establishment, which in 1815 had been £20,660,000, was reduced in 1819 to £6,321,000, and in 1821 sank to £2,722,000![1] The Bank of England notes in circulation, which in 1818 had been £27,771,000, had sunk in 1822 to £18,172,000: the country bankers, during the same period, from £20,507,000 to £8,416,000. The total circulation sank, during the three years immediately following the return to cash payments, from £48,278,000 to £26,588,000, or very nearly a half. It was a poor compensation to this prodigious contraction of the currency in so short a time, that, in 1819 and 1820, £1,270,000 and £1,797,000 were coined and issued from the Mint! In truth, such was the confusion in South America in those years, owing to the terrible revolutionary war raging there, that bullion was not to be got for the purpose of coining; and this augmented in the most serious degree the distress arising from the sudden and vast reduction in the paper.*

[1] Tooke on Prices, ii. 381, 383.

* Years.	Bank of England Notes in Circulation.	Country Banks.	Total.	Gold coined and issued.
1818	£27,771,000	£20,507,000	£48,278,000	£3,438,000
1819	25,227,000	15,701,000	40,928,000	1,270,000
1820	23,509,000	10,576,000	34,145,000	1,797,000
1821	22,471,000	8,256,000	30,727,000	9,594,000
1822	18,172,000	8,416,000	26,588,000	5,388,000

—*Parlimentary Papers, quoted in* ALISON'S *Europe* (First Series), vol. xiv. chap. xcvi., Appendix.

Years.	British & Irish Exports. Declared Value.	Foreign & Colonial Imports. Official Value.	Price of Wheat per Qr.	Iron per Ton.	Wool per lb.	Cotton per lb.
			s. d.	£ s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
1818	£46,603,249	£36,885,182	83 8	9 0 0	6 0	2 0
1819	35,208,321	30,776,810	72 3	8 10 0	6 0	1 11
1820	36,424,652	32,438,650	65 10	9 0 0	6 0	1 5
1821	36,659,630	30,792,760	54 5	7 10 0	3 3	1 1
1822	36,968,964	30,500,094	43 3	6 10 0	3 6	1 0

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, third edition, pp. 148, 356; and TOOKE *On Prices*, ii. 401, 406, 420.

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The effects soon appeared, and were disastrous in the extreme—far more so than the most determined opponents of the currency measure had ventured to predict. The 3 per cents, which had been 79 in January 1819, gradually fell, after the return to cash payments was declared to take effect on 1st February following, to 65 in December; and the bankruptcies in England, which had been 86 in January 1819, rose in May to 178; the total in the year was 1499, being an increase of 531 over those of the preceding year![1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1819, 301, 309; App. to Chron.

11. Rapid growth of discontent in the country.

The Radicals were not slow in taking advantage of this extraordinary and unlooked-for turn of affairs in their favour. The distress was in reality entirely owing to the sudden and unprepared return to cash payments at a time when the supply of the precious metals from South America was so much diminished, and the stock in the country was so much reduced by the prodigious loans undertaken by its capitalists to the Continental sovereigns. They held out to the people, however, either in ignorance of, or wilfully concealing, the real cause of the distress, that it was entirely due to the enormous expenses of the war, the intolerable load of taxes, and the profligate farming out of the State for behoof of the pampered aristocrats who were maintained in idleness at the expense of the sweat and blood of the people. The only remedy for it was to be found in an entire change of the frame of government, and the substitution of annual parliaments, universal suffrage, vote by ballot, and paid representatives in Parliament, for the selfish and wasteful rule of the borough-mongers. These representations, loudly repeated on every platform and hustings, re-echoed by the Chartist press over the whole country, and rendered more persuasive by their coincidence with the real suffering and widespread distresses of the people, soon obtained universal credit with the working classes in the great commercial towns and mining and manufacturing districts. The whole obloquy was,

as it had been in 1816, heaped on the head of Lord Castlereagh, because he was the leader of the House of Commons, and the representative of Government in that assembly, although his duties as Foreign Minister rendered him no further responsible for the public distress than as a member of the Cabinet; and so far from forwarding, he had been the strongest opponent of the monetary measures which were the real causes of it.

12. Finance resolutions of Mr Vansittart and Lord Castlereagh. June 3.

Disregarding these unfounded clamours, Lord Castlereagh fixed his attention on those great measures of finance which were calculated to relieve the necessities of the country, and put the Government on a secure footing in future times. On 3d June 1819, Mr Vansittart brought forward a series of finance resolutions which met with the cordial support of Lord Castlereagh, and which are eminently descriptive of the financial state of the country. It would be well for the nation if they had been acted upon in subsequent times; had they been so, the whole financial difficulties under which the empire is now labouring would have been removed. He stated that the sinking fund at that time produced £15,000,000 a-year, and the loan to keep it up was £13,000,000, leaving only £2,000,000 really available to the reduction of debt. He proposed to lay on additional taxes to make up a real surplus of £5,000,000, which should be kept as a reserve fund, to be religiously and inviolably applied to the reduction of debt. These resolutions were all adopted by Parliament, and the new taxes imposed were on foreign wool, tea, coffee, cocoa-nuts, and tobacco.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xl. 914, 923.

13. Lord Castlereagh's argument in support of the finance resolutions.

On this momentous occasion Lord Castlereagh said: "There are three questions before the House — first, whether the country under its present circumstances was necessitated to make any financial efforts at all; second, the extent of those efforts; and, thirdly, the time when they ought to be made, if they are judged necessary. In arguing on the first of these points in support of the resolutions, nothing is farther from our intention

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than to destroy the sinking fund, as it was first established by Mr Pitt, and then modified by Parliament. Nothing like an invasion of the sinking fund is contemplated; on the contrary, the object is *to establish and confirm it*, by providing a clear unalienable fund from which it is to be maintained. The resolution now proposed is nothing more than putting into operation the clause which Mr Fox himself had introduced. It is proposed to begin with a clear sinking fund of £5,000,000—a fund five times the amount of that to which Mr Pitt raised it when he introduced the system in 1786. It is true this fund is not a third of what the sinking fund would have amounted to, if its process of accumulation had not been impeded by loans taken from it to a great extent in consequence of the necessities of the country since 1813. But that only makes it the more indispensable to prevent such deviations from the system in future times, and to establish a real sinking fund, not to be touched on any occasion or under any pretence, to which the country may with just confidence look forward for the removal of its difficulties; and it is the precise object of the resolutions proposed to establish such a fund.

14. Continued.

"The first question which the country ought to look to in a fearless and manly way is, whether it ought to be satisfied with its financial situation *in time of peace;* or whether some effort should not be made to enable it to meet the burdens of a new war, should such a calamity unfortunately visit it. This is a question of immense magnitude, a subject independent of all parties and of all party interests; and I conjure you not to allow any feeling of respect for the Government, if such exist, to divert you from the strict discharge of your duty. I conjure gentlemen not to tamper or trifle with this mighty question; let them put Government wholly out of view, and decide it upon its broad and substantial merits, not upon any consideration of who may be placed or continued in power by its decision. The question is not

between Ministers and their antagonists—it is between Parliament and the country; and it would be disgraceful to the House if at such a time and on such a question it could be influenced by party or political motives. We claim to be armed with weapons to meet the difficulties and dangers of the State; and if we are not to be intrusted with them, we are willing to resign to more favoured, perhaps more able, but not more zealous champions.* We maintain that a saving of £2,000,000 annually, which is all that can now be realised, is not a fund sufficient to enable the country to meet with firmness the shock of a future war. It is a clear proposition in finance that no country can be considered as safe which does not, in time of peace, make such a reduction of its debt as might enable it to meet the hazard of a future war. The burdens of one war should not be allowed to accumulate on those of another, until the vessel of the State became as it were water-logged, without a chance of reaching port, and dreading destruction from every approaching wave. It is the duty of the House, without the slightest delay, to take such steps as might reduce the debt to such limits as might, under all the circumstances, be deemed expedient. The proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is intended not merely to favour the stockholder, but to benefit the nation at large, which never can be secure till the debt is reduced. This process ought to begin with a sinking fund of £5,000,000, gradually rising till it reaches £8,000,000; and when it has reached that amount, it will be for the wisdom of Parliament to determine whether the process of accumulation should be allowed to go farther, or the still growing surplus should be applied to a remission of taxation in favour of the people.†

* This was received with loud shouts of applause.

† Mr Pitt, in introducing the sinking fund in 1786, said, "When it amounted to £4,000,000 it would be for Parliament to consider whether the accumulation should go farther;" how then can it be said that contemplating a pause when it reaches £8,000,000 is a deviation from his principles?

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"Doubts are expressed by some gentlemen whether £5,000,000 is enough for a real sinking fund; others think that the country is not in a situation to withstand the additional taxation of £3,000,000 required to bring it up to that amount. Some go so far as to assert that Ministers should be turned out of their places if they propose less than £10,000,000. In this diversity of opinion, Ministers thought that a real sinking fund of £5,000,000, gradually rising to £8,000,000, is a safe medium between the demands of the fundholders on the one hand, and the necessities of the people on the other. There is a peculiar claim upon the House to impose taxes so as to raise the real sinking fund to £5,000,000 at this time, for never had the consolidated fund stood in a situation like the present. When the gentlemen opposite speak of breaches of faith, it may truly be answered that Parliament would be guilty of a breach of faith if it had not taken some steps to sustain it; for at present there are not assignable ways and means to pay the public creditor, and to provide for the sinking fund out of it, without some extraneous assistance. I should consider the country in a proud situation in point of finance, if, with a real sinking fund of £8,000,000, it had an almost inexhaustible resource, in the shape of a property-tax, to fall back upon in the event of a daring enemy threatening our shores, and Parliament being called upon to have recourse to that mighty reserve. It is upon these grounds that I put the case to the House; I wish it to rest upon general grounds, and its decision to be a turning-point in our future annals. But if it were otherwise, and the question were looked upon as one of party, I have no fear of the result; for the House have shown by a late vote that they place more confidence on the measures of Ministers than the speeches of their antagonists.—(*Loud cheers.*)"[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xl. 939, 947.

Upon this debate the House of Commons supported Ministers by a majority of 197, the numbers being 329 to 132. By so great a majority was the principle of a

real sinking fund, formed of the excess of income over expenditure, beginning at £5,000,000, established by the legislature. It is not the least markworthy part of this memorable resolution, that Government had the courage to propose to the House of Commons the resolution to sanction the imposition of £3,000,000 additional taxes to obtain this prospective benefit, at a time when the country was just recovering from a grievous state of commercial depression, and a still more alarming and disastrous crisis arising from monetary changes was already looming in the distance. Lord Castlereagh had now adopted the true principle in finance, which was to have a real sinking fund of moderate dimensions, measured by the excess of income above expenditure, *established out of the indirect taxes.* To attempt to rest it, as he had done in 1816, on the basis of a direct war property-tax, was out of the question. And if the sinking fund had been maintained by indirect taxes at the amount for which he contended, and which he established in 1819, the debt already paid off would have been above *£400,000,000,* and the whole armaments requisite for the national defence might have been maintained without either contracting loans or adding to the burdens of the people.

16. Result of this debate.

Another subject which has led over the world to effects still more widespread and disastrous occupied the serious attention of Government, and in particular of Lord Castlereagh, at this period, and that was the succours so long and effectively, though covertly, furnished by the inhabitants of Great Britain to the insurgents in South America. This assistance, which had been on so large and efficient a scale that it may be said to have been the real cause of that great convulsion, had hitherto consisted chiefly, if not entirely, in loans to the insurgent Governments, and in numbers of Peninsular veterans of all ranks, who went singly, or in small bodies, to South America, and brought to the insurgents of that country the benefit of their experience and the lustre of their name. Government, impelled

17. Lord Castlereagh's bill to establish a real neutrality between Spain and South America.

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by the passion for all rebels *but their own*, which seems to spring universally from the love of freedom which is so strongly implanted in the Anglo-Saxon character, long winked at the proceedings, though the embarkations took place at the port of London, under their very eyes. At length, however, matters went such a length that some interference became indispensable. Sir Gregor M'Gregor, a Scotch adventurer, having collected a body of similar characters in the West Indies, made a descent on the Spanish Main, and, under the British flag, took possession of Porto-Bello, a considerable seaport belonging to Spain. This violent and unauthorised aggression led, as well it might, to strong remonstrances on the part of the Spanish Government, a country at that time in peace and amity with Great Britain. Lord Castlereagh was as well aware as any man of the advantages which might accrue to Great Britain from a free commercial intercourse with these vast regions. Indeed he had, as already mentioned, matured a powerful expedition in 1808, the command of which he had intrusted to Sir Arthur Wellesley, to wrest some of them from the Spanish crown, when the Peninsular war broke out, and diverted the expedition to the shores of Portugal. But it is one thing to assail an open enemy in fair fight, and as a measure of authorised hostilities; it is another, and a very different thing, to attack it insidiously, while still at peace, under the cover of private adventurers, and the pretence of the proceedings being unauthorised by the Government. A determined and energetic open enemy, Lord Castlereagh was no friend to these insidious and filibustering hostilities; and accordingly, although there was considerable difference in the Cabinet on the subject, and Mr Canning strongly supported the popular side, he at once admitted the justice of the Spanish complaints, and brought a bill, styled "The Foreign Enlistment Bill," into Parliament, to put a stop to the practice.[1] It was vehemently opposed at every stage by the Whigs and Liberals; numerous petitions were presented against

[1] Parl. Deb. xl. 856, 908.

it during its progress through Parliament; and it required all the weight of Government to carry it successfully on. So strong on every occasion is the sympathy of the people of Great Britain for any *other* people insurgent, from whatever cause, against their Government!

18. Lord Castlereagh's speech on this occasion.

Lord Castlereagh said on this occasion: "The present bill has no retrospective operation; it is prospective only. The character of the offence, without which I may venture to assert Parliament would not have interfered, is that of a combination to make this country the spot where levies are to be raised and organised to take part in the unfortunate quarrel between Spain and her colonies. Not regiments merely, but *what might be called armies, have not only been raised, but received their military organisation in this country,* and sailed perfectly prepared to proceed to warfare on their landing. Vessels have been sent out from this country, and Government, under the present law, is unable to prevent their departure, carrying out regiments in an organised military shape, ready to take part in their quarrel. It may be admitted, that when a state like Switzerland has been in the practice of allowing its subjects to enter as mercenaries the service of foreign governments, if this is done with impartiality, no cause of complaint is given. But as it has not been the practice of this country to allow its subjects to enter as mercenaries the service of foreign Powers, so it is manifestly against the law of nations to allow troops to be raised *for one belligerent,* and *not for another.* What would the honourable gentlemen who with so much eloquence maintain the opposite side say, *if our colonies were in a state of revolt, and armaments should be fitted out to assist them in the ports of Spain,* or if the merchants of Boston or New York should fit out expeditions to assist them? If we refuse to pass this law, with what justice could we complain of their interfering in such a case? I should be ashamed as an English Minister, in that case, to call on a foreign state, merely because we happened to be the stronger nation, to

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take that course in regard to such expeditions which we ourselves had declined to follow.

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19. Continued.

"The present measure is in strict conformity with precedents; and whenever there have been any well-founded complaints from foreign countries of the unauthorised interference of British subjects in their contests, Parliament has always been ready to afford a remedy. The Act of 1736 was manifestly intended not solely with a view to internal security, but to prevent interference in foreign quarrels. The Crown might, indeed, in some cases, deal leniently with persons taken in the service of its enemies, but that does not invalidate the general principle, that it is necessary to preserve a real neutrality towards other belligerent Powers. If ever there was a time when we were imperiously called on to apply this principle, it is the present, for the character of the country has never before been so flagrantly and indecorously abused by the fitting-out of armaments in ports and cities to support a favoured belligerent Power. I repel the argument that because, in 1797 or 1807, we were disposed to have supported the South Americans in revolt against old Spain, that therefore we are entitled to do so now. On both these previous occasions *we were at war with Spain;* and, being so, we were entitled to dismember the Spanish empire if we could: but would that justify a similar course when we were on terms of peace and amity with that country?

20. Concluded.

"As to the claims of Spain upon this country to preserve at least a real neutrality between her and her colonies, the case is, if possible, still stronger. In 1808 we entered into a treaty, not merely of peace, but alliance with her; and at the close of the war a new alliance was formed, which has lain on the table of this House for five years, without objection, and was tacitly sanctioned in the treaties of Vienna. The first act of the present Sovereign was to give an assurance that he desired to renew the British alliance, and that the family compact with the Bourbons, which had given such umbrage to the British Government

in former days, should not be renewed. In the new treaty of alliance was an article respecting the slave trade, which has since led to a happy arrangement. If the proclamation put forward by this country at the commencement of this dispute was considered, it would at once appear that the Government could not go on permitting its chronic infringement. The common law is wholly insufficient to prevent such violations: the highest legal authorities have given it as their opinion that no proceedings against them could be taken without the aid of special statute. The Government, in the proposed bill, merely propose to prevent the recruiting foreign armies, or fitting out foreign navies in this country; and when other countries are doing the same as they are, can we alone remain behind? We are bound not to suffer the assembling of armed men on our shores to aid either side in this sanguinary contest; and the present bill, founded on that principle, is not only just in itself, but essential to the honour of the British nation."[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xli.904,907.

21. Result of the debate, and ultimate retribution inflicted on England in consequence.

On this debate the House of Commons supported Ministers by a majority of 61, the numbers being 190 to 129; the Lords, by one of 100 to 47. It was evident from these figures that the feeling of the country was running strongly in favour of the insurgents of South America; and in truth it was so strong, that the new act was as powerless as the common law had been to prevent it. In a few years after Lord Castlereagh's death, the semblance even of neutrality was dropped by Mr Canning, who, amidst the general applause of the nation, realised his favourite boast of "calling a new world into existence." But never was evinced more clearly the truth of Lord Castlereagh's prediction, and the justice of his arguments. The severance of South America from Old Spain, so far from being attended either with the impulse to the cause of freedom through the world, or the commercial advantages to this country which were anticipated, has proved to the very last degree disastrous to both. The insurgent Republics, wholly un-

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fitted, either from character, religion, or social habits, for the blessings of freedom, have escaped from the oppression of Spain only to fall under the tyranny, tenfold more disastrous, of despots of their own creation; and their subsequent condition has been so calamitous that history has ceased either to trace the thread of their convulsions, or portray the picture of their sufferings.

22. Calamities which, in an especial manner, it brought on Great Britain.

Nor has this country gained anything from the share she had, by iniquitous means, in bringing about this terrible convulsion. The trade which she had with all the insurgent colonies in 1827, after their independence was established, and the war had ceased, was only £1,292,000 of exports, against £15,000,000, which Spain had sent to the same regions before the war began. Even in 1842 it had only risen to £2,260,000, not a seventh part of its former amount, though Great Britain enjoyed nearly the whole export trade to these vast regions.[1] The consequences of this unjust and insidious assistance rendered by the inhabitants of Great Britain to the insurgent colonies of Spain, in South America, have been almost as disastrous to themselves as to the colonies assisted. By prolonging the contest, and at length determining it in favour of the insurgents, they reduced to a fourth part of its former amount the supply of specie for the use of the globe, and thereby depressed prices and industry, and aggravated the severe monetary crisis which the resumption of cash payments in the British Islands was at the same time occasioning. The result has been such an amount of suffering in the industrious classes in Great Britain for a course of years as brought about the Reform Bill, and that, by inducing a jealousy of legitimate Russia, and sympathy with revolutionary France, led to the Crimean War. This, in its turn, by spreading the belief in India that the British army had been totally destroyed in the trenches of Sebastopol, and that the time had come when they could successfully assert their independence, induced the Sepoy Revolt. We have good cause to thank our enemies for not following

[1] Porter's Parl. Tables, xii. 114.

our example; for, if either the Russians, the French, or the Americans, had acted to us in 1857 as we had done to the Spaniards during the South American revolution, beyond all doubt India would have been lost to Great Britain.

All-important as these questions were to the future destiny of the British empire and of the world, they yielded in present interest, and the anxiety with which at the moment they were attended, to those connected with and arising from the general suffering in the working classes, which arose from the contraction of the currency, in consequence of the resumption of cash payments by the act of 1819. The distress soon became so great and general, that it led to threatening demonstrations in nearly all the manufacturing and mining districts. On 16th May a great meeting took place on the Green or people's park of Glasgow, which was attended by at least 30,000 of the working classes, called professedly to petition the Prince Regent for relief, and the means of emigrating, but at which an amendment was proposed and carried, almost unanimously, that no good was to be expected but from annual parliaments, universal suffrage, vote by ballot, and reduced taxation. Great meetings of the same description took place in many other places during the same summer; and Government, seeing that a storm was approaching, took advantage of the return of the Duke of Wellington, on the breaking up of the army of occupation, to strengthen themselves, by admitting his Grace into the Cabinet as Master-General of the Ordnance. His presence at headquarters soon made itself felt by increased vigour and admirable military arrangements, and valuable circulars to the military and civil authorities in the disturbed districts.* At length mat-

23. Great meeting of the discontented, ending in that at Peterloo, near Manchester, on Aug. 16.

May 16, 1819.

July 7.

* "I strongly recommend to you to order the magistrates to carry into execution, without loss of time, the law against training, and to furnish them with the means of doing so. Do not let us be again reproached with having omitted to carry the laws into execution. By sending to Carlisle and Newcastle 700

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ters were brought to a crisis by a great meeting held at Manchester on 16th August, in a field, which acquired a melancholy celebrity under the name of *Peterloo*. The magistrates conceiving that the meeting was assuming a menacing character, gave orders for the armed force, consisting for the most part of yeomanry cavalry, to charge and disperse it. This was immediately done with entire success, so far as the military operation was concerned, but a number of unfortunate catastrophes accompanied the dispersing of so vast an assemblage. Two persons, including one woman, were pressed to death in the crowd, and twenty persons wounded by sabre-cuts.[1]

[1] Mem. of Lord Sidmouth, iii. 256, 261; Martineau, i. 229, 234.

24. General distress acknowledged in Parliament. Nov. 23.

These disastrous events led to Parliament being assembled earlier than usual, and it met on 23d November. There were no congratulatory words in the speech from the throne, or the address in answer; on the contrary, the former contained an emphatic admission of deep distress in several branches of industry.* It is not surprising that these admissions should have been made by the

or 800 men, cavalry and infantry, and two pieces of cannon, you would do more than is sufficient for all that is required. Rely upon it, that in the circumstances in which we are placed, *impression on either side is everything*. If upon the passing of the training law you prevent training, either by the use of force or its appearance, in the two places above mentioned, you will put a stop at once to all the proceedings of the insurgents. They are like *conquerors; they must go forward; the moment they stop they are lost*. Their adherents will lose all confidence, and, by degrees, every individual will relapse into their old habits of loyalty or indifference. On the other hand, the moment the loyal see there is a law which can prevent these practices, and means and inclination and determination to carry it into execution are not awanting, they will regain courage, and will do everything that you can desire."—DUKE OF WELLINGTON *to* LORD SIDMOUTH, *December* 11, 1819; *Sidmouth's Life*, iii. 293.

* "The seditious practices, so long prevalent in different parts of the manufacturing districts of the country, have been continued with increased activity since you were last assembled. They have led to proceedings incompatible with the public tranquillity, and with the peaceful habits of the industrious classes of the community; and a spirit is now fully manifested, inconsistent with the constitution of the kingdom, and aiming not only at the change of those political institutions which have hitherto constituted the pride and security of the country, but at the subversion of the rights of property, and of all order in society. . . . Some depression still continues to exist in certain branches of our manufactures, and I deeply deplore the distress felt by those who more immediately depend upon them. But this depression is in a great mea-

highest authority on this occasion ; for it appeared from the papers at the same time laid before Parliament, that wages in all the principal branches of the cotton manufacture had fallen *a half* in the preceding eight months, and those of other manufacturing trades in a similar proportion ; a decline which Lord Lansdowne, who especially noticed it in the House of Peers, ascribed to "*measures of political economy.*"* But from whatever cause the prevailing and most severe distress arose, it was not less the duty of Government to grapple with a firm hand with the seditious spirit to which it had given rise : for that spirit, so far from leading in the slightest degree to the alleviation of the existing suffering, threatened it with the most frightful increase, by tending to a political revolution, the division of property, and the entire destruction of credit of every kind throughout the country. The Cabinet accordingly resolved on the most effective coercive measures, and which proved entirely effectual in arresting the threatened danger. These consisted in four Acts, calculated to prevent seditious assemblages, with two others introduced at the same time, but not immediately connected with the public disturbances. These acts, long known in England by the name of the *Six Acts*, were on the 29th November introduced into the House of Peers by Lord Sidmouth, and on the same night into the Commons by Lord Castlereagh. As the former of these noblemen was the Home Secretary, upon whom the duty of preparing measures to secure the internal peace of the country properly devolved, it was against him that the obloquy consequent on the introduction of these measures should have been chiefly directed.[1] But as Lord Castle-

[1] Parl. Deb. xli. 675-677, 1295 ; Sidmouth's Mem. iii. 302, 303.

sure to be ascribed to the embarrassed situation of other countries, and I earnestly hope it will be found to be of a temporary nature."—PRINCE REGENT'S *Speech, November* 23, 1819 ; *Annual Register*, 1819, 116-117.

* "In all the great stations of the cotton manufactures, as Manchester, Glasgow, Paisley, the rate of wages *has fallen on an average more than one half.* This depression might be traced, *through the last twenty years, to measures of political economy.*"—LORD LANSDOWNE'S *Speech, December* 1, 1819 ; *Parliamentary Debates*, xlii. 422.

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reagh introduced them into the House of Commons, and he was known to be the most powerful man in the Cabinet, he was universally regarded, as he had been on a similar occasion in 1817, as the real author of the measures, and received from the Radicals the honour of being the principal object of their vituperation.*

25. Lord Castlereagh's speech in proposing the bills for repressing the danger.

The speech which Lord Castlereagh made on 29th November in introducing these bills was very able and elaborate, containing full details as to the state of the country, which had rendered these severe measures of repression necessary. These particulars, however, are for the most part of a temporary nature and interest only, and are too long to be here inserted; but a few paragraphs will show the amount of the danger, and the manly spirit in which it was encountered. He said, "I never on any occasion felt a more awful impression of the painfulness and difficulty of a task I had undertaken to execute than on the present. Nothing can be more painful than for a minister of the Crown to have to propose measures of a restrictive and coercive nature. Yet is it indispensable

* "By the first of these Acts, all practising military exercises or training by persons not authorised by Government was prohibited, and persons engaged in it were declared liable to punishment by fine or imprisonment not exceeding two years. By the second, Justices of the Peace were authorised to issue warrants in certain counties of England and Scotland, to search for arms or other weapons dangerous to the public peace, on a sworn information. By the third, the court was authorised, in the event of the accused allowing judgment to go by default, to order the seizure of all copies of a seditious or blasphemous libel, to be restored if the person accused was afterwards acquitted, and for the second offence transportation might be inflicted. By the fourth, no more than fifty persons were to be allowed to assemble except in borough or county meetings called by a magistrate, and the carrying of arms or flags at such meetings was prohibited, and extensive powers given to Justices of Peace or county magistrates for dispersing them. In addition to these Acts, a bill was introduced by the Lord Chancellor into the House of Lords, to prevent traversing or postponing the trial to the next assizes in cases of misdemeanour. In addition to this a bill was introduced into the House of Commons by Lord Castlereagh, subjecting newspapers to certain stamps, and to prevent the abuses arising from the publication of blasphemous or seditious libels. The first and third of these Acts, prohibiting training, and authorising the seizure of seditious publications, alone were proposed to be permanent; the second and fourth were temporary only, and have long since expired."—*See Parliamentary Debates*, xlii. 675, 677, 1295.

now to do so, for the crisis is one of imminent danger, unless Parliament meets the peril with manly firmness and vigour. I trust that in the measures we have to propose to meet it, we shall not forget on the one hand what is due to the security of life and property, and the existence of the Constitution now so seriously menaced, and on the other the sacred principles of right and liberty which have made great Britain a source of envy and admiration to the surrounding nations. But I can assure the House that the peril is not less imminent than serious. You have heard from the highest authority, the speech from the throne, that great danger exists in the country; that there has been disclosed in it a spirit incompatible with the constitution of the kingdom; that it threatens the existence of all the rights that are most valuable; that it aims not only at the destruction of all the political institutions which have hitherto constituted the pride and security of the country, but the subversion of property, and with it of all those domestic and social rights on which society depends. These facts are so notorious that they have been admitted in the speech of the honourable gentleman who moved the amendment to the address.

"Not only is the danger real, but it has assumed a tangible and pressing form. This has been certified in the most authentic and regular way from the best possible authorities, the grand juries of the disaffected counties. Those of Lancashire and Cheshire in particular, embracing a population of above a million of inhabitants, have testified to a spirit of disaffection in their counties bordering on rebellion. This is admitted by the noble Lord who represents the former of these great counties, and the member for Taunton has stated that the order of things in his district is such, that either the House must put them down, or they would overpower the Constitution. None are more deeply and immediately interested in the suppression of such principles than the working classes—

26. Continued.

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the poor deluded men who are put forward to maintain them. The agricultural classes, thank God! are still sound and loyal. Long may they remain such! and Ireland is as yet untainted; but it is not going too far to assert that the inhabitants of several of the manufacturing districts in Great Britain are in a state bordering on rebellion; and I call on Parliament to save them from their worst enemies, their own leaders and agitators.

27. Continued.

"Into the causes of the discontent now unhappily prevalent I shall not at present enter. From all, however, that I can discover (and my inquiries have not been scanty), it has not arisen from the narrowing of the market for our industry, either at home or abroad. At home it has rather increased; and abroad there has been no defalcation but in one instance, which is eminently calculated to teach the deluded men who were constantly complaining of our institutions. That one and only instance has been amidst the democratic freedom of America. *There* our commerce has indeed experienced checks unknown in the monarchical states of Europe. In this country some branches of industry have suffered depression since the conclusion of the war, but not greater than was inevitable in making the transition from war to peace; and no rational man can for one moment suppose that they can be remedied by legislative interference, or any change in the organic institutions of our country.

28. Continued.

"The most important part of the new acts which are proposed, is that which prohibits the military training of large bodies of men. That this is undertaken with no other view but that of rebellion against the Crown cannot for a moment be doubted; and can any man assert that such practices with such an object can be permitted in any well-ordered state? The supposed rights of the people to assemble in military array, with arms and flags, has been broadly asserted in such terms as calls for legislative interference, if the common law be really, as is asserted, powerless to prevent such dangerous proceed-

ings. In the famous document signed by Thistlewood, who doubtless had good Radical legal advice, it is unequivocally asserted that there is no law to prevent 10,000, 100,000, or 1,000,000 men assembling; that no magistrate can touch them till they have struck some blow; and that it is immaterial whether they come in military order or civil array, with or without flags or arms. If this really be the common law of the land, is it consistent with common sense that it should any longer continue so when the population has become so dense in the manufacturing districts, and their organisation is so complete that 60,000 or 80,000 can at any time be assembled in a few hours at the beck of the Radical leaders? Are such enormous bodies of men to be allowed to meet when and where they please, and to drill and exercise till they are perfected in the military art, and able to take the field against the sovereign, and the armed force of the monarchy? Is it to be tolerated that the vast bodies of the working classes are to be taken from their work at the command of the agitators, to take part in such dangerous assemblages, or if not engaged in them to be kept in a state of idleness and terror, not knowing where the blow is first to fall, and who is to be the earliest victim of the popular fury? Who are the men who are most interested in preventing such extravagant demonstrations? The working classes themselves; for if the Radicals realise their favourite project of putting a sponge to the national debt, the destruction of credit thence arising, and the cessation of the payment of dividends to the amount of £29,000,000 a year now got from the affluent classes, will diffuse an amount of general distress, in comparison of which the suffering now so much complained of would appear absolute paradise.

29. Continued.

"The chief remedy proposed is to limit such meetings in point of numbers; and this applied only to such meetings as were not called by corporations, grand juries, or by five magistrates. County meetings were excluded

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from the Act. The next limitation is of the district; when not called by some of the authorities above set forth, the meetings are to be within the parishes of the persons assembling. The third is to prevent the calling of simultaneous meetings in different parts of the country —evidently done to distract the military force and prevent any one from being sufficiently watched. No reasonable man can assert that these regulations go to abridge the real right of meeting to deliberate on public affairs, which is the inherent right of Englishmen, and essential to the exercise of our free constitution. They are meant and calculated only to prevent its flagrant abuse: to prevent its being turned aside entirely from its proper and legitimate object, and converted into a mere display of physical strength and preparation for open rebellion. Nothing can be more mischievous or useless than the assembling of immense multitudes, not in their own neighbourhood or locality, but from distant quarters, to listen, or rather not hear, unknown itinerant orators. Such meetings, however, strictly speaking, legal they may be, cannot but be dangerous to the industrious poor collected at a distance from their own homes only to disturb the industry of others, thus aggravating the sufferings of poverty by the interruption of employment, by the hazard of fatal accidents and the probable temptation to crime. Deliberation, or even hearing the speakers, is to the vast majority out of the question on such occasions, and indeed it is never thought of. The display of physical force, the open preparation for insurrection, is the real and only object. Government have not the remotest wish to interfere with or abridge the ancient right of meeting and petitioning, such as it has been practised from the earliest times, and still is, in the rural districts. Their only object is to stop the flagrant abuse of it which is now made in manufacturing and densely-peopled localities. In doing so they are not checking this valuable right; they are, on the contrary,

taking the only effectual means to support and perpetuate it. For, rely upon it, if we cannot devise means to render the exercise of our liberties consistent with the public peace, our liberties will inevitably perish, and society come to a speedy dissolution.

30. Concluded.

"I do not mean to say that, on the country returning to its usual peaceable and lawful state, it may not be possible and advisable to dispense with some of the laws; but in the mean time I do not think it would be wise to declare them temporary. Experience on former occasions has taught us that when this is done, agitators simply wait for the termination of the time specified, and then recommence their former practices. It will be better to let future parliaments deal with the subject, and repeal the laws, or some of them, if it shall appear that the reasons for imposing them have passed away. But at present there is no appearance of that; the evil, if not permanent, is not likely to be of short endurance; and while it lasts it is our duty to fence the constitution with such safeguards as may prevent it from perishing in the tumult. Wicked and depraved men must be deprived of the power of keeping the country in continual tumult and agitation. I implore the House, for God's sake, to look their difficulties in the face, and not be misled by an ill-timed lenity to induce dangers greater than those from which they recoil. I propose the measures without any limitation in point of time, leaving it to the wisdom of parliament to deal with them hereafter as may seem expedient, when the reasons for adopting them shall have passed away, for I regard them as bulwarks to the constitution, not encroachments."[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xli. 379-402.

31. Result of the debate and passing of the Bill.

Both Houses of Parliament passed the whole bills by large majorities, notwithstanding the most determined resistance on the part of the whole body of the united Whigs and Radicals. The feeling of loyalty evinced on this occasion in the House was so strong as to lead Lord Castlereagh to entertain sanguine hopes that the danger

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was past.* The majority in the Commons was no less than 223 — the numbers being 351 to 128; in the Lords, 97—the numbers being 135 to 38,[1] so strongly had the reality of the case and the urgency of the circumstances impressed the minds of the greater part of both Houses. Indeed, in regard to the first and most important of these Acts, which is still in force, that against training, the majority was much greater; many members of the Opposition, who usually voted against ministers, having come forward on this occasion, and testified by their speeches and votes to the absolute necessity of these coercive measures if we would save the country from destruction. Indeed, the ablest and most candid of the Liberal and Radical annalists admit the training in its fullest extent,† alleging only that it was intended merely for the procession at Manchester on the 16th August, not insurrection. But however strongly the Government and the House of Commons might be impressed with the

[1] Parl. Deb. xlii. 675-677, 1295.

* "As far as we can judge, our measures have operated very favourably on the internal state of the country. Radical stock is very low indeed at the present moment, and the loyal have resumed their superiority and confidence. The provisions of the laws which have been enacted will no doubt do a great deal to repress the mischief; but your Highness may rest assured that, whatever our reformers may choose to say, the voice of Parliament is in itself still all-powerful in this country, when clearly pronounced; and, as it never spoke on any former occasion in a more manly and determined tone, to this is chiefly ascribable the great moral change that has been wrought in so short a time. Lady Castlereagh is now sitting by me, and enjoins me to offer to your Highness her kindest remembrances."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* PRINCE HARDENBERG, *January* 15, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 174.

† "There is and can be *no dispute about the fact of military training*; the only question is in regard to the design and object of the practice. Numerous informations were taken by the Lancashire magistrates and transmitted to Government in the beginning of August."—*See* MISS MARTINEAU, i. 227, and BAMFORD'S *Life of a Radical*, i. 177-180.

Bamford has preserved a curious anecdote of the surprise of the Radical leaders when they were apprehended and examined before the Privy Council and brought in presence of those whom they had been taught to regard as cruel bloodthirsty tyrants. "Lord Castlereagh, the good-looking person in a plum-coloured coat, with a gold ring on the little finger of his left hand, on which he sometimes looked while addressing them; Lord Sidmouth, a tall, square, and bony figure, with thin and grey hairs, broad and prominent forehead, whose mild and intelligent eyes looked forth from their cavernous orbits; his manners affable, and much more encouraging to freedom of speech than was expected."—BAMFORD'S *Life of a Radical*, i. 166.

reality of the danger and the necessity of coercive measures, the democrats were by no means equally satisfied with their adoption; and from that time may be dated that rooted distrust of the House of Commons, as then constituted, which, ten years after, had acquired such strength as to lead to the change of the constitution, and that intense hatred at Lord Castlereagh which was so earnestly fostered by the Radical press, and still pervades a considerable portion of the least informed classes of society.

32. Cato Street conspiracy. Feb. 22.

But whatever difference of opinion might at first have existed as to the real objects of the Radicals, and the necessity of the sternest measures for their coercion, all doubt was ere long removed by themselves. On February 22, 1820, a project, long before set on foot, was attempted to be put in execution, for murdering the whole cabinet ministers, and immediately overturning the Government, and proclaiming a republic. An old soldier, named Arthur Thistlewood, was the chief of the conspiracy, the leaders of which were twenty-four in number, their chiefs being Ings a butcher, Davidson a creole, Brunt and Tidd shoemakers, and Edwards, who afterwards revealed the plot. They met twice a-day during the first three weeks of February in a hired room near Gray's Inn, and generally assembled, including their most trusted followers, to the number of thirty or forty. Their first project was to murder the Prince Regent; but this was soon laid aside as of little service, and in lieu of it the more practical design adopted of dispatching the whole ministers in their separate houses. Forty desperadoes were told off for these detached murders, and whoever failed in the part assigned him was to atone for it with his life. Two pieces of artillery were at the same time to be seized, stationed in Gray's Inn, and six in the Artillery Ground; with these the Mansion-House and Bank were to be assaulted, and as soon as they were carried a provisional government was to be proclaimed, the King dethroned, and London set on fire in several places. This design was so far matured,

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that the day for its execution was fixed, being the 19th February. But it was afterwards resolved to postpone it for a few days, as intelligence had been received that the whole Cabinet were to dine at Lord Harrowby's, in Grosvenor Square, on 22d February. Thistlewood immediately proposed that they should commence operations on that day, and by an attack on the assembled Cabinet when at dinner; "for," said he, "as there has not been a dinner for so long, there will no doubt be fourteen or sixteen there, *and it will be a rare haul to murder them all together.*" This was unanimously assented to; and it was fixed that on that day twenty-four of the conspirators, fully armed, should meet in a loft above a stable in Cato Street, off the Edgeware Road, at six in the evening, ready, under Thistlewood's orders, to proceed on the murderous enterprise.[1]

[1] Thistlewood's Trial, 37, 45. Ann. Reg. 1820, 30, 31.

33. Failure of the plot, and execution of the leaders.

On the day fixed the whole twenty-four, armed to the teeth, assembled at the appointed hour in the loft above the stable at six o'clock. Two of them were stationed in Grosvenor Square to see that the road was clear, and one was to call during dinner at Lord Harrowby's with a note, and when the door was opened the whole body, who were to have assembled by twos and threes in the vicinity, were to rush in and murder the entire Cabinet ministers. The heads of Lords Castlereagh and Sidmouth were to be instantly cut off and brought off as trophies, to be paraded through the streets, for which purpose bags were prepared. Meanwhile the cavalry barracks in King Street, Portman Square, were to be attacked by throwing fire into the forage depôt, and the Bank and Mansion-House assaulted by the conspirators. Ministers, however, had secret information of the design from Edwards, one of their number, and instead of dining as proposed at Lord Harrowby's in Grosvenor Square, they did so privately in Downing Street; but the preparations for the entertainment at Lord Harrowby's were allowed to go on without interruption. Meanwhile Mr Birnie (afterwards Sir Rich-

ard), the police magistrate, proceeded to the barracks of the Coldstream Guards, who had been ordered to have a detachment in readiness to support the civil power. Finding them not under arms, however, that intrepid officer, thinking that not a moment was to be lost, proceeded alone with his fourteen policemen to Cato Street, leaving directions to the military to follow as quickly as possible, which they accordingly did, but not in time to take part in the commencement of the affray which followed. Birnie meanwhile arrived at the stable in Cato Street, and the first of the police who mounted the trap stair was an active and brave man, Smithers, who, as soon as he got to the top, called aloud to the party to surrender, whereupon Thistlewood ran him through the body, and he fell. The lights were instantly extinguished, and a frightful conflict commenced in the dark between the police and the conspirators, who, being fully armed and ten superior in numbers, made a desperate resistance. Some dashed headlong down the trap-stair, and broke away before the Guards arrived; others, including Thistlewood, got off by the skylight to the back. In the midst of the tumult the detachment of the Guards arrived, and instantly entered, headed by Captain Fitzclarence, at whom a pistol was discharged, and a blow with a cutlass was aimed by a mulatto, which his covering serjeant warded off with his bayonet. Resistance then ceased, and nine in all were made prisoners. The rest escaped at the time, but most of them were taken the next day, including Thistlewood, their leader, for whom a reward of £1000 had been offered.[1]*

[1] Thistlewood's Trial, 65, 74; Ann. Reg. 1820, 32, 33.

* On the day following this surprising escape Lord Castlereagh addressed the following letter to Lord Stewart at Vienna:—

"*Most secret.*—You will be shocked by the official report of our conspiracy. There cannot exist a doubt that had our information not been such as to enable us to watch all their movements, and to interfere when we deemed fit, the fifteen Cabinet ministers would have been murdered yesterday in Harrowby's dining parlour. Thistlewood amongst this party of assassins when assembled had fourteen picked men, all ripe for slaughter. They would have moved to the attack in ten minutes had not the police arrived. After he had escaped from the place of rendezvous he went to Grosvenor Square, with the sword in

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34. Trial and execution of the conspirators.

The ministers whose lives had been saved went publicly to St Paul's some days after to return thanks for their providential deliverance. The impression produced on the country by this extraordinary event was very great, and it was enhanced by the details of the conspiracy which came out at the trial, which took place shortly after. Thistlewood, Ings, Tidd, Brunt, and Davidson, received sentence of death; five were sentenced to transportation for life; and one, after being sentenced to death, received a free pardon. The other five were executed on 1st May, in presence of an immense crowd of spectators, many of whom evinced the warmest sympathy with their fate. So far from denying what was charged against them, they openly admitted it before receiving sentence, and lamented only that their projects had not been carried into effect. They used the language, and probably were penetrated with the feelings, of indignant patriots sacrificing themselves on the altar of their country.* Their words afford

his hand bloody with which he had murdered the constable, and then went to Harrowby's door, and returned, on discovering that sentinels guarded the front and rear of the house, to his place of concealment. Our information did not fail us, and he was seized in his hiding-place this morning in bed. The constable who first entered the room suddenly threw himself upon him, and thus fettered his exertions until he was secured. The naked sword was by his side in bed under the clothes. He is a most desperate dog. Harrowby's dinner was left to wait for the arrival of the Cabinet to a late hour, so as not to arrest the preparations of the assassins. We had an idea at one time of going there and receiving the attack. But as this would have involved in point of prudence the necessity of some preparations for defence, which could not be managed without exciting observation, we thought it better to stay away from the festive board, and not to suffer it to go to single combat between Thistlewood and Marshal Liverpool. The whole has been arranged without a fault; and if you consider that we ministers have been for months the deliberate objects of these desperate concerts, planning our destruction, sometimes collectively, sometimes in detail, but always intent upon the project, and with our own complete knowledge, you will allow that we are tolerably cool troops, and that we have not manœuvred amiss to bring it to a final catastrophe, in which they are not only all caught in their own net, but that we can carry into a court of justice a state conspiracy, which will be proved beyond the possibility of cavil, and which would form no inconsiderable feature in the *causes célèbres* of treasonable and revolutionary transactions."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *London, February* 24, 1820; *Londonderry MS.*

* "Lords Castlereagh and Sidmouth have been the cause of the death of millions: *I conspired to put them out of the world,* but I did not intend to commit high treason. In undertaking to kill them and their fellow-ministers,

a melancholy proof how profoundly the British heart had come to be stirred at that period by the universal suffering which prevailed, and place in the clearest light the necessity of those coercive measures calculated to prevent that general misleading of the public mind in the working classes, which had been carried such a length as to have utterly confounded their ideas of right and wrong, and caused them to regard treason, murder, and fire-raising as the first of civic virtues.

35. Abortive insurrection in Scotland. April 2.

Events soon succeeded which demonstrated that this bloody conspiracy was not the mere ebullition of ardent minds, instigated by suffering and excited by political fanaticism, but the bursting of a vast and organised plan of general insurrection, which embraced the whole manufacturing and mining districts of the kingdom. It was fixed for the 2d April; and, meanwhile, the night training and drilling went on without intermission on the mountain solitudes of Lancashire, Yorkshire, and Westmoreland. The powerful military force, however, stationed in those districts by the Duke of Wellington's advice, prevented any serious outbreak there. But it was otherwise

I did not expect to save my own life, but I was determined to die a martyr in my country's cause, and to avenge the innocent blood shed at Manchester."—BLOUNT'S *Speech before receiving sentence, Annual Register*, 1820, pp. 946, 947.

"High treason was committed against the people at Manchester, but justice was closed against the maimed, the mutilated, and the friends of those who were upon that occasion indiscriminately massacred. The Prince, by the advice of his ministers, thanked the murderers, still reeking in the gore of their victims. If one spark of honour—if one spark of independence—still glimmered in the hearts of Englishmen, they would have risen as one man. *Insurrection then became a public duty*, and the blood of the victims should have been the watchword for vengeance on their murderers. Albion is still in the chains of slavery. I quit it without regret. I shall soon be consigned to the grave; my body will be immured beneath the soil where I first drew breath. My only sorrow is that the soil should be the theatre for slaves, for cowards, and for despots. I disclaim any personal motives. My every principle was for the prosperity of my country. My every feeling, the height of my ambition, was for the welfare of my starving countrymen. I keenly felt for their miseries; but, when their miseries were laughed at, and when they dared to express their sufferings, they were inhumanly massacred and trampled upon, my feelings became too intense, and I resolved on vengeance. I resolved that the lives of the instigators should be required to the souls of the murdered innocents."—THISTLEWOOD'S *Address before receiving sentence; Thistlewood's Trial*, 124; and *Annual Register*, 1820, p. 946.

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in Scotland. The people of that country, especially in the manufacturing districts of the west, evinced that profound and widespread fanaticism which is characteristic of their race, and has too often appeared in former days alike in religious and political disputes. On the morning of the 2d April the streets of Glasgow, Stirling, Paisley, and all the towns in the west, were covered by placards, posted during the night, calling on the people, *in name of the Provisional Government*, to desist everywhere from labour, on all manufacturers to close their workshops, on the soldiers to remember the glorious example of the Spanish troops in the Isle of Leon, and on all friends of their country to come forward and effect a revolution by force, and establish entire equality of civil rights. Strange to say—and this was the alarming thing—this treasonable proclamation, signed by none, emanating no one knew from where, was universally obeyed: labour immediately ceased; all the workshops were closed over a district containing nearly a million of inhabitants; and the streets were everywhere filled with anxious and agitated crowds, eagerly looking for the *non-arrival of the mail*, the agreed-on signal that the insurrection had begun in the north of England. But the second and the succeeding days passed over without the expected sign being given. Corps of regulars and yeomanry proceeded with great rapidity from the adjoining counties into the disaffected districts; 5000 men were soon assembled in Glasgow; a small body of insurgents, who had taken the field in Stirlingshire, was defeated at Bonnymuir; another which set out from Strathaven for Glasgow, melted away before it reached that city. After a few days, seeing that the insurrection had not taken place in the south, the people resumed their wonted labour; and a rebellion which had threatened to bathe the country in blood, was terminated with the loss only of three lives on the scaffold, and eight of the most dangerous characters transported. Still more

important was the lesson which it read as to the political feeling of the country; for the burst of loyal feeling which it called forth in the rural districts, and the efforts everywhere made by the better classes to support the Government, proved that the heart of the greater part of the nation was sound, and that the measures of coercion adopted by the Government and the Legislature met with the cordial approbation of the property and intelligence of the country.[1]*

[1] Scotch State Trials, ii. 100, 234; Ann. Reg. 1820, 37, 39; Personal knowledge.

36. Unfortunate marriage of the Prince of Wales, and its consequences.

Still the public feeling in the great towns and manufacturing districts was equally strong the other way, and nothing was wanting but a head of rank and dignity to give unity to the proceedings of the dissaffected, and attract to their standard the immense body who in every contest are inclined to attach themselves to persons rather than principles. This was soon furnished by an illustrious lady, the victim at once of an ill-regulated education, the unfortunate restrictions of the English Marriage Act, and the cruelty of a heartless and selfish husband. Born of the noble house of Brunswick, the daughter of the sister of George III., the Princess Caroline was married early in life to the Prince Regent, then Prince of Wales. Like most other royal marriages,† the union was formed from consideration of State policy, not personal inclination; or rather from the extremely narrow nature of the circle within which alone the British Marriage Act had circumscribed the choice of the royal

* "We have silenced the Scottish Whigs for our time, and drawn I think the flower of Scotland round the King and constitution. Literally I do not exceed the mark when I say that when Lord Huntly, our Cock of the North, presided over 800 gentlemen, there was influence and following among them enough to raise among us 50,000, and property enough to equip and pay them for a year. Young men not unacquainted with arms, and one or two experienced generals to command them, are all that is needed. I told this to my Whig friends who were bullying me about the popular voice; and added, they might begin when they liked, we were as ready as they."—SIR WALTER SCOTT *to* LORD SIDMOUTH, *February* 17, 1821; *Sidmouth's Life*, iii. 343.

† Happily *not all*, as may be seen in the marriage of our present gracious Sovereign, whose choice has been so fortunate an event for herself, her family, and her country.

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family. The consequence was, that from the very first the Prince conceived a repugnance to his wife's society, which soon increased to such a degree, that after the first few days of married life he never saw her in private again. The Princess lived apart from the Prince, at Blackheath, near London, where her lively manner and agreeable conversation attracted round her a brilliant circle of male acquaintances, embracing among others Mr Percival, Mr Canning, and Sir Walter Scott, who have all recorded their testimony to her agreeable qualities. Unfortunately, however, they attracted others of a less scrupulous or more dangerous character than these eminent men; and the result was the growth of rumours prejudicial to her character, which led to a "delicate investigation," in which it was probable nothing decisive was elicited, as no proceedings ensued upon it. The Princess, however, on the peace in 1814, left England, and travelled for the next six years, partly by land, and partly in her yacht, with an allowance of £35,000 a-year; and the reports which reached this country as to her conduct were not such as to dispel the suspicions which had formerly been entertained.

37. Further proceedings, and failure of an attempted compromise.

Mr Brougham, who had become the Queen's confidential adviser, proposed to Lord Liverpool in June 1819, that on condition of her Majesty's allowance of £35,000 being secured to her by Act of Parliament or Treasury warrant, instead of being as at present dependent on the Prince Regent's life, she should agree to remain abroad during the whole remainder of her life. This proposal was, in the circumstances, highly expedient for all parties; and accordingly it was very favourably received by the Cabinet. The Prince Regent, however, was not satisfied with the mere removal of her Royal Highness, but strenuously contended for a divorce; and at length they came to a sort of compromise, to the effect that no proceedings should be adopted so long as she remained abroad, but that if she returned to this country a process of divorce

should be instituted. Matters remained in this state till the death of the old King in February 1820; but that brought them to a crisis. As her Royal Highness then became Queen, she was undoubtedly entitled to have her name inserted in the Liturgy, but to this nothing could induce the King to consent, and, as he was the head of the Church, it was not easy to see how the difficulty was to be solved. The Queen, upon learning that there was a demur about inserting her name in the Liturgy, declared that such a denial was an imputation on her honour, which could not for a moment be submitted to, and that she would instantly return to England to vindicate her character. The King was equally obstinate, and resolutely contended for an immediate divorce if such an intention were persevered in. Foreseeing the risks of such a proceeding, the Cabinet unanimously tendered their resignation, and attempts were made to form a new ministry, with Lord Wellesley at its head, but the difficulties were such that the project failed, and the Cabinet reluctantly agreed that if the Queen returned proceedings should be commenced against her. Anxious, however, to avoid so hazardous an alternative, they offered, through Lord Castlereagh, to augment the Queen's allowance to £50,000 a-year, and secure it by Act of Parliament for life, if she would stay away. These proposals were formally sent to Mr Brougham, on behalf of her Majesty, on 15th April, and approved of by him. The indignant feelings, however, and intrepid resolution of the Queen, rendered all attempts at a compromise fruitless. She had been highly incensed in February by being refused abroad a guard of honour as Queen of England on the death of George III., and her anger was roused to a perfect paroxysm when she learned that her name had been excluded from the Liturgy.* She travelled post-haste

* "I have written to Lords Liverpool and Castlereagh, demanding to have my name inserted in the Liturgy of the Church of England, and that orders be given to all British ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, that I should be acknowledged and received as Queen of England; and after the speech

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accordingly from Italy, where she had been, and, having dismissed Bergami, her alleged favourite, landed at Dover on the evening of 6th June, and indignantly rejected the proposals laid before her by Mr Brougham and Lord Hutchison, who earnestly implored her to accede to them.[1] Lord Stewart was, by express orders of the King, sent for from his embassy at Vienna on this portentous event; and there remains in the *Castlereagh Correspondence* a very interesting letter, announcing to him that determination, and giving a full account of what had passed previously between the King and his Cabinet on this momentous question.*

[1] Lord Dudley's Letters, 226, 254.

made by Lord Castlereagh in the House of Commons in answer to M. Brougham, I do not expect to receive further insults. I have also demanded that a palace should be prepared for my reception. England is my real home, to which I shall immediately fly."—QUEEN CAROLINE, *March* 16, 1820; *Annual Register*, 1820, p. 131.

* "To enable you to understand the curious positure of affairs at home, which has given rise to your sudden recall, it will be enough to put you in possession of a very short outline, as we are so soon likely to meet. So long as the King lived, the question of the Princess was one with regard to which you might or might not advise the Prince Regent to institute a proceeding in Parliament; but, upon the King's demise, the matter forced itself upon the Crown and the Government in more shapes than one—in the Litany, in the coronation, in the future pecuniary maintenance to be assigned to the Princess. Thus, exclusive of the measure of divorce, the question inevitably and immediately called for a decision, and especially as the very first act of the new reign required that the prayers for the Royal Family should be adapted to the new circumstances of the case. You already know the position in which the whole of this business rested before the Cabinet when this event occurred. The Government had just received the supplementary information which had been collected in the last four or five months, and were upon the point of taking the whole case into their mature consideration. The celerity of the King's illness (which has had a most providential termination, entirely owing to Sir M. Tierney's intrepid conduct in bleeding his Majesty almost to death) precluded our access to him; whilst the horror of having the Queen made an object of the prayers of his people haunted his imagination and distracted his rest. His servants had no hesitation with respect to the advice they should offer him upon the single point of the Litany; but they did not feel that they should act honestly by his Majesty or by themselves, if, in tendering their opinion upon this insulated question, they did not submit it in connection with their view upon the whole of the case. They accordingly employed their utmost diligence for nine or ten days successively, to weigh with the most anxious solicitude the whole of this most arduous, perplexing, and most painful subject. The result of their unanimous judgment was submitted to the King on Friday, in a long, reasoned minute; and they had the following day the regret to receive from his Majesty (though not unforeseen), also in a written minute, the disapproval of that advice, with a distinct intimation that, if

No words can convey an adequate idea of the sensation which this courageous and decisive step on the part of the Queen excited in the British Islands. Nothing approaching to it had been witnessed in the memory of man. When she landed at Dover, on the 6th June, she was received, for the *first and last time*, with the salvoes of artillery due to crowned heads. An immense crowd assembled immediately, and attended her on her way to

38. Immense sensation which the Queen's return made in Great Britain. June 6.

they were not prepared to advise his Majesty to proceed by way of divorce, his *determination was taken—namely, to change his Government;* and if he could not form a Government which would relieve him to that extent, *his Majesty's intention was to retire to Hanover.*

"I may mention that the advice of the Cabinet did not go that length, at least not as a *first measure.* In advising that the measure of divorce should not be originated by Government, they did not preclude themselves from proposing that measure in the event of the Queen and her advisers provoking a Parliamentary inquiry, and the production of evidence becoming thereby necessary; but they deemed it advisable, in the first instance, to bend their course to such a proceeding as it might be competent for Parliament to *take up on the public notoriety of the Queen's conduct,* and the established separation long subsisting. This, in their judgment, would include omitting her name in the Litany, avowedly denying her the honour of coronation, and making her pecuniary provision wholly contingent upon her perpetual residence abroad, in the mode and in the scale of granting which they conceived terms might be made with the Queen, by which she might agree to lay aside the title of Queen of England, and to abstain from the exercise of such of the few legal privileges belonging to a Queen Consort, which could by possibility give umbrage (even during her exclusion) to the King. In short, their object was substantially to deliver the King from all personal annoyance from this infamous woman, to stamp upon her conduct the stain which the voice of Europe affixes to it, but to avoid volunteering, on the part of the King, the scandal and the dangers *of a public trial in these factious times.* If forced upon them, the reproach would rest with their adversaries; and it would be for them to draw, for the King, from the calamity of an hostile inquiry, whatever further measures of relief the temper of Parliament and of the country would afford a prospect of their being enabled to attain. Such was the outline of our views, which the many past conversations we have had will enable you to appreciate. The King's feelings that nothing but divorce would satisfy his honour, you will also well understand. In this position matters now stand; and although we have to submit such observations as occur to us upon the King's note, I consider the Government *as virtually dissolved,* and that the existing ministers only hold their situations till their successors are named.

"I need not say how deeply I have felt for the King's anxiety upon this occasion, and how much I deplore the view his Majesty has taken of what is due to his own honour, in contrast with what his servants have felt to be prudentially due to his interests and those of the monarchy; but, having done our duty, we must leave the rest to Providence, and hope, on this as on so many other occasions, it will vouchsafe to us its protection. I am afraid, amongst other distressing considerations, the inconvenience of an unexpected and *hurried* journey to Lady Stewart may press upon you. I forgot to mention

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the metropolis; before she reached London the *cortège* exceeded 200,000 persons. Night and day her residence was surrounded by a prodigious multitude, whose incessant cheers gave vent to the enthusiastic feelings with which they were animated. The courage characteristic of her race, which she had displayed on this trying occasion, her readiness to submit her conduct to public scrutiny, the fearlessness with which she had thrown herself upon the people of her adoption for protection, moved every heart. Even those who were most convinced of the fatal levity and imprudence of her manners, or even had not a doubt of her guilt, were swept away by the universal admiration of her fortitude. "Her promptitude and courage," said Lord Dudley, "at the time confounded her opponents and gained her the favour of the people. Whatever one may think of her in other respects, it is impossible not to give her credit for these qualities."[1] The vast majority of the people had not a doubt of her innocence. In their estimation she was as pure as the driven snow, as wronged as the veriest saint, the victim of a scandalous conspiracy between a profligate husband and a base subservient ministry.

[1] Dudley's Letters, 254.

39. Views of the Radicals in this affair.

The Radicals had different views. They did not take the trouble to inquire into her conduct, or care what it had been: it was enough for them that she was the enemy of their enemies—the King and the Ministry—and furnished a rallying-point which drew multitudes who had not previously joined them to their ranks. "The people," says Cobbett, "in their sense of justice, went back to the time when she was in fact turned out of her husband's house with a child in her arms, without blame of any sort being imputed to her; they compared what

at the outset of my letter, that the King said that he looked to your return to Vienna, but that your presence here was now *essential* to his service. You have now the whole before you to arrange for the best, and I earnestly trust your wife's health will be fully considered, and may be saved from serious hazard."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *February* 13, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 210-213.

they had *heard* of the wife with what they had *seen* of the husband, and they came to their determination accordingly. As far as related to the question of *guilt or innocence, they did not care a straw;* but they took a large interest in the matter—they went over her whole history, they determined that she had been wronged, and they resolved to uphold her."[1] The event proved that Lord Eldon had more correctly divined the probable issue of the case when he wrote at the time: "Our Queen threatens to approach England; if she comes she is the most courageous lady I ever heard of. The mischief, if she does come, will be infinite. *At first,* she will have extensive popularity with the multitude; in a few short weeks or months, *she will be ruined in the opinion of all the world.*"[2]

[1] Cobbett's Life of Geo. IV., 425.

[2] Eldon's Life, ii. 363.

40. Failure of an attempt at a compromise, and commencement of the trial.

After the return of the Queen another attempt was made by her Majesty's legal advisers, Messrs Brougham and Denman, to effect a compromise, and avoid the consequences, painful and injurious to all, to which an open investigation would necessarily lead. The basis of the negotiation was that the King should retract nothing, the Queen admit nothing; but that she was to leave Great Britain with an annuity settled upon her for life of £50,000. The negotiation had every prospect of coming to a prosperous issue; for it was conducted with the most earnest wish to come to an accommodation, by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Castlereagh on the one side, and Messrs Brougham and Denman on the other. But when every other difficulty was removed it proved abortive, from the determination of the King to refuse the Queen's name a place in the Liturgy, and the resolution of the latter to accept no terms in which that point was not conceded. The result was that the attempt failed; and on the 4th July the secret committee of the Lords, to whom the matter had been referred, reported "that the evidence affecting the honour of the Queen was such as to require for the dignity of the Crown and

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the moral feeling and honour of the country, a solemn inquiry." The next day the Queen declared by petition to the Lords her readiness to defend herself, and prayed to be heard by counsel. Soon after, Lord Liverpool, as the head of the Government, brought forward the bill of "pains and penalties," which soon became so famous, and which, on the narrative of improper and degrading conduct on the part of the Queen, and an adulterous connection with a menial servant named Bartolomeo Bergami, concluded to have her marriage with his Majesty dissolved, and deprive her of all her rights and privileges as Queen of England.[1] *

[1] Parl. Deb. New Series, ii. 167, 207, 248; Prot. June 15, 16, 1820; Ann. Reg. 1820, 159-161.

* "I have been a very bad correspondent, my dearest Charles; of late, but you will make allowances. We have, thank God, got, for the time at least, to the end of our labours. We shall finish in the House of Commons on Monday, and as soon as the bills return from the Lords, adjourn for the same period as the Peers do; meaning then to adjourn further while they are examining evidence on the bill. Assuming their Lordships to begin the 17th August, I do not expect the bill to reach the House of Commons before the beginning of November at the soonest, but more probably the 1st January. Upon the whole, I do not think matters, up to the present point, could have worked more favourably. We have contrived to get on to the point of actual trial, keeping the King always on high and safe grounds. His Majesty has had all the grace of forbearance without conceding anything; and the mind of Parliament has been gradually brought to settle to the calamity of a public trial of the Queen as an inevitable evil, from which no prudential effort could relieve them. This is an immense point gained. Another has been the throwing the lead in the inquiry upon the Peers. We could not have passed by the Commons, in the first instance, without offence; but having given them a certain swing upon the question and ——— them with the Queen, we, by a reasonable concession, made a countermarch for which our opponents were not prepared; and under the appearance of a forward movement, we took post, in fact, in their Lordships' rear. In this assembly the charge will be examined on oath, with gravity and decorum, so as to clear away the rubbish before we have to deal with it in the Commons.

"Our session, generally, has been a laborious one, and the temper out of doors very sulky. The popular delusion in favour of the Queen is astonishingly great; and, I presume, through the influence of the press, from a fellow-feeling, the soldiers have taken more interest than they should have done in her Majesty's fate. I do not, however, fear this taint going to any serious length. Now, as to business, you must, my dear Charles, settle with Metternich to passport all the Queen's witnesses as well as our own, and give us not only the names but the *characters* and the *private history* of all those her Majesty would like to call, so as to make our lawyers cross-examine them. Browne ought, when the importance of the party will justify it, to send over some person to swear as to the individual so intended to be produced not being entitled to credit in a court of justice. It is also thought of importance to be enabled to prove, on our part, the frauds and bribes by which the

41. Scene of the trial.

The trial, for such it really was, accordingly commenced; and the scene which ensued has been thus described by a contemporary annalist, himself an eyewitness of the proceedings: "Within that august hall, fraught with so many interesting recollections, where so many noble men had perished, and innocence had so often appealed from the cruelty of man to the justice of Heaven—where Anne Boleyn had called God to witness of her innocence, and Catherine had sobbed at severance from her children—where Elizabeth had spoken to the hearts of her people, and Anne had thrilled at the recital of Marlborough's victories—whose walls were still hung with the storied scene of the destruction of the Armada—was all that was great and all that was noble in England, assembled for the trial of the consort of the Sovereign, the daughter of the house of Brunswick! There was to be seen the noble forehead and serene countenance of Castlereagh—the same now, in the throes of domestic anxiety, as when he affronted the power of France, and turned the scales of fortune on the plains of Champagne, or braved the Czar in the plenitude of his power at the Congress of Vienna; there the Roman head of Wellington, still in the prime of life, but whose growing intellectual expression bespoke the continued action of thought on that constitution of iron. Liverpool was there, calm and unmoved, amidst a nation's throes, and patiently enduring the responsibility of a proceeding on which the gaze of the world was fixed; and Sidmouth, whose moral courage nothing could daunt, and whose tutelary arm had so long held in chains the

Princess procured for Bergami the ——— order, and the process by which it was afterwards cancelled. This, and his early history, are very material. Browne has been written to; but you can perhaps, through Metternich, get at the best evidence in regard to these proceedings. There is quite a new reign at C. House; Lady ——— has it all in all to herself. The King looks well, is in tolerable spirits, seems satisfied with our course, and trusts to time for deliverance from the she-devil. ——line has been embarrassing. He tendered his resignation, but has been *ordered* to remain—taking no part in the prosecution. He was, no doubt, one of the *many favoured*, and feels his hands tied. . . . Ever, dear Charles, with best love to Lady S."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *July* 14, 1820 (*Private*); *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

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fiery spirit which was now bursting forth on every side. There was Eldon, whose vast legal abilities had placed him at the head of this august assembly, and who was now called to put his vast stores of learning to their noblest use—that of holding the scales of justice—even against his own strongest interests and prepossessions; and Copley, the terror of whose cross-examination proved so fatal on the trial, and presaged the future fame of Lyndhurst on the woolsack. There was Gray, whose high intellectual forehead, big with the destinies of England, bespoke the coming revolution in her social state; and Lansdowne, in whom suavity of manner and dignity of deportment adorned, without concealing, the highest gifts of eloquence and statesmanship. There were Brougham and Denman, whose oratorical powers and legal acuteness were sustained by a noble intrepidity, and who, in now defending the illustrious accused against the phalanx of talent and influence by which she was assailed, apparently to the ruin of their professional prospects, worthily won seats on the woolsack, and at the head of the King's Bench of England. Lawrence there gazed on a scene more thrilling and august than the genius of painting had ever conceived; and Kean studied the play of passions as violent as any by which he had entranced the world on the mimic stage. And in the front of all was the Queen of England—a stranger, childless, reviled, discrowned, but sustained by the native intrepidity of her race and her people's love, gazing undaunted against the might of a nation in arms."[1]

[1] Hist. of Europe, Second Series, ii. 462, 463.

42. The result on the abandonment of the bill.

The trial went on for several months, and day after day the newspaper press of Great Britain was polluted by details, eagerly sought after by curiosity, faction, and licentiousness, with which a decent publisher would be ashamed to discredit his shelves. For long, the prepossessions of the people, and the national sympathy with innocence, as they conceived, oppressed, made them discredit all the evidence led for the prosecution; and the

witnesses adduced, chiefly Italians in the service of the Princess, were of so discreditable a character, and broke down so palpably on a cross-examination, that no reliance could be placed on their testimony when unsupported by better evidence. When the case for the prosecution was closed, and Mr Brougham had concluded the noble peroration with which he ended his opening for the defence, there is little doubt that if the vote had been called the accused would have been declared not guilty by a considerable majority. But, unfortunately for her reputation, her legal advisers, not content with this advantage, led evidence, or were constrained to lead evidence, on their own side to disprove, as they hoped, what had been sworn to by the witnesses for the prosecution. This testimony, consisting for the most part of the English officers on board the Queen's yacht with whom she had sailed in the Mediterranean, was above suspicion, and of such a kind as, without substantiating on any one occasion actual guilt, left grave suspicions in the minds of all who heard or read it, and distinctly proved against her Majesty such an amount of levity of manner and laxity of behaviour as rendered her unfit to be placed at the head of British society. The result was that, on 6th November, Nov. 6. after a long debate, the second reading of the bill was carried by a majority of 28, the numbers being 123 to 95. In committee, the majority was still greater for the divorce clause, which was carried by 129 to 62; but that was owing to the Opposition having nearly all voted for it, in the hope of rendering the measure so rigorous and startling as to insure its being rejected or abandoned on the third reading. This accordingly happened. On the third reading, which came on on 10th November, the majority sank to 9, the numbers 108 to 99. As this slender majority left no hope of carrying the bill in the House of Commons, Lord Liverpool immediately rose, with the entire concurrence of the Government, and withdrew it.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. iii. 1726; Ann. Reg. 1820, 184, 190.

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43. General enthusiasm on this event.

Immense was the joy felt in the whole British dominions at this result. Nothing like it had been seen since the battle of Waterloo, nothing approaching it was witnessed till the Reform Bill was passed. All classes were alike transported. The Whig aristocracy rejoiced at so great a triumph over the Government, and anticipated from it a speedy resignation of the Ministry, and their own installation in its stead; the middle ranks were gratified by so decisive a proof of their growing influence in the State; the working classes everywhere were transported at the victory of their intrepid leaders, and the rescuing of an innocent victim, a sovereign and a woman, from the fangs of her persecutors. In the great towns especially, the ferment reached the highest point; mobs assembled in all quarters to celebrate their victory, and compel a general illumination on the event, under the penalty to all who refused of having their windows broken, which generally had the effect of compelling submission. London was partially illuminated in this manner for three successive nights. Edinburgh, Dublin, Manchester, Glasgow, Liverpool, and all the great commercial towns followed the example. The Common Council in London, and nearly all the corporations popularly elected, voted addresses of congratulation to the Queen. The general transports raised the popular exasperation against Lords Castlereagh and Sidmouth, the supposed authors of the proceedings, to the highest point; they never appeared in the streets without being hooted and reviled by the mob, and both daily received anonymous letters threatening them with instant death if the bill against her Majesty were not abandoned. These intrepid men, however, disregarded those threats, and walked about the streets as usual without any attendants, and the people, admiring this spirit, abstained from actual violence. One day, at this time, they were walking together in Parliament Street, when, being recognised, a large mob got up round them, and they were violently hooted.[1] "Here we go," said Lord

[1] Life of Sidmouth, iii. 330, 333; Twiss's Life of Eldon, ii. 398, 404, 405; Cobbett's Life of Geo. IV., 447-449.

Sidmouth, "the two most popular men in England." "Yes," replied Lord Castlereagh, "through a grateful and admiring multitude." *

44. Rapid reaction against the Queen.

From this perilous and painful predicament the Government and the country were delivered by one of those violent reactions which so often ensue from the bow being violently bent one way, and to which the people of these islands are on such occasions in a peculiar manner subject. Various causes contributed to this result, but it came sooner than could have been anticipated, probably from the extreme violence of the opposite feeling by which it had been preceded. Her Majesty herself, seeing the victory gained and her position secured, ceased to court the popular leaders, and this soon cooled their ardour in her cause. The Whig ladies who had clustered round her when she was a valuable ally, and the proceedings against her afforded a prospect of overturning the Ministry, gradually dropped off when they had terminated and no prospect of a change appeared.† The great body of the people, when the success was gained, came to reflect on what they had done; they hesitated as to con-

* "Matters here are in a very critical state, fear and faction are actively and not unsuccessfully at work; and it is possible we may be in a minority in a few days, and the fate of the Government determined."—LORD SIDMOUTH *to* MR BATHURST, *October* 27, 1820. "I cannot describe to you how grievously I have suffered and suffer on account of the dangerous and deplorable conditions in which the King's Government, and indeed all of us, have been placed, and a situation from which I profess to see no satisfactory or safe deliverance."—LORD SIDMOUTH *to* MR BATHURST, *October* 28, 1820; *Life of Sidmouth*, iii. 330, 333.

† "The Whig faction flocked round the Queen directly after the abandonment of the bill, and her lawyers, who now called themselves her constitutional advisers, belonged to that faction who thought to get possession of power by her instrumentality, she having the people at her back. But the people, who hated this faction more than the other, the moment they saw it about her, troubled her with no more addresses. They suffered her to live very quietly at Brandenberg House; the faction agitated questions concerning her in Parliament, concerning which the people cared not a straw; what she was doing soon became as indifferent to them as what any other person of the Royal Family was doing; the people began to occupy themselves with the business of obtaining a Parliamentary reform; and her way of life and final fate soon became objects of curiosity much more than interest with the people."—COBBETT'S *Life of George IV.*, 454.

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tinuing their enthusiasm for one whose character at best was doubtful, and whose proceedings, as revealed in the evidence of her naval officers, Lieutenants Flynn and Hownam, had not been such as they would approve of in their own wives and daughters. Old feelings revived as new ones subsided; when innocence, as they thought, had been vindicated, loyalty returned; and, strange to say, the most popular days of the reign of George IV. were those which immediately succeeded the greatest defeat his Government had ever experienced.[1] *

[1] Twiss, ii. 419; Martineau, i. 260.

45. The Ministry remain at their posts notwithstanding.

But although the change in the public mind was thus rapid, and in the end decisive, yet, in the first instance, the defeat they had sustained was the subject of extreme anxiety to Ministers. It was so great a reverse, that on ordinary occasions it would undoubtedly have led to a change of ministry; and it was prevented from doing so on this one only because the Cabinet were sustained by a strong sense of duty not to desert their sovereign in the hour of his distress. The proceedings had originated so much in personal feelings on his part, and the Whig leaders had so universally voted against the bill in the divisions on the subject, that no reconciliation between them was practicable; and it was more than doubtful whether, if deserted by his present ministers, the King would not carry into execution his often-declared threat of retiring to Hanover. The monarchy, the country, therefore, were at stake, and the Cabinet could not retire without drawing the constitution after them in their fall. Actuated by these feelings, and sustained by the high moral courage of Lord Castlereagh and Lord Sidmouth, they resolved to stand by their sovereign and remain at their posts, though at the price of great anguish and mortifica-

* "It is clear beyond dispute, from the improvement of the public mind, and the loyalty the country is everywhere displaying, if properly cultivated, and turned to the best advantage by Ministers, that the Government will be able to repair to the country and to me those evils, of the magnitude of which there can be but one opinion."—GEORGE IV. *to* LORD ELDON, *January* 9, 1821; TWISS'S *Life of Eldon*, ii. 413.

tion to themselves. Their resolution was amply rewarded: the favour of the country rapidly veered round, not only to the King, but his ministers; the resignation of Mr Canning, who was succeeded by Mr Bragge Bathurst, was the only change which took place in the Cabinet from a defeat which threatened them all with overthrow; and Prince Metternich, who, from his distant watch-tower in Vienna, kept a vigilant eye on the proceedings, wrote to Lord Castlereagh to congratulate him on his triumph.[1] *

[1] Twiss, ii. 398-340; Life of Sidmouth, iii. 332, 340.

* Prince Metternich had cordially concurred with Lord Castlereagh in dissuading any proceedings of the nature of a divorce before the Queen's return; and on 7th March 1820, in answer to a letter of his Lordship, announcing the Cabinet minute, already mentioned, on the subject, he wrote:—"Lord Stewart a bien voulu m'informer du bonheur que j'ai eu de voir considérer le Roi l'opinion que je vous avois énoncé à Aix-la-Chapelle et à Bruxelles, sur l'un de ses intérêts le plus directs et les plus chers, comme venant de la part d'un homme sincèrement dévoué à sa personne et à sa gloire. J'ai le sentiment du mal qu'auroit fait à tous les trônes le scandaleux procès en divorce à un point qui me fait un devoir de vous féliciter sincèrement sur le succès que vous avez remporté. Vous êtes demeuré ferme sur une thèse indubitable, et que l'expérience n'eut pas manqué de prouver telle. *Dans un état bien organisé, les grandes vérités finissent toujours par remporter le triomphe.*

"Je vous prie au reste, mon cher Lord, de croire que la seule récompense que j'ambitionne pour ma vie très laborieuse est de pouvoir marquer les époques qui prouvent que les principes que je me fais gloire et honneur de défendre ne sont point perdus pour le bien général."—PRINCE METTERNICH *to* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *March* 7, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 220.

To this letter Lord Castlereagh replied, on 6th May:—"It has been a subject of some grief to me, mon cher Prince, to have been so long in possession of your private letter of the 7th March, without offering you my cordial acknowledgments for this renewed mark of your regard and friendship. . . . I have the consolation of hoping that, if I have been somewhat slow, I have, by the delay, procured the fullest and most deliberate examination of the subject in the largest sense, and that I can now refer you to the exposition which my brother will convey to you, as the unanimous opinion of the British Cabinet, formally submitted to and approved by the King. We cannot give to others a more decisive proof of our sincerity and our attachment than in the endeavour we have, upon this occasion, made to open ourselves to them without reserve.

"Your Highness will observe that, although we have made an immense progress against Radicalism, the monster still lives, and shows himself in new shapes; but we do not despair of crushing him by time and perseverance. The laws have been reinforced, the juries do their duty, and wherever the mischief in its labyrinth breaks forth, it presents little real danger, whilst it furnishes the means of making those salutary examples which are so difficult whilst treason works in secrecy, and does not disclose itself in overt acts.

"Our session is likely to be a troublesome one, and to me it begins inauspiciously, having been seized by the gout two days before the battle was to commence. I am, however, getting better, and expect to be in my place in

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46. Dangerous aspect of affairs in Europe and South America.

Thus, within two years of the time when, on the opinion of the Duke of Wellington that the Continent was thoroughly pacified, and all danger from the revolutionary hydra at an end, the Allied armies had been withdrawn from France, and taken their way to their distant homes, it had again raised its head in fearful strength, and threatened to involve both hemispheres in a general conflagration. The military revolt in Spain had been attended by unutterable calamities, both in the Peninsula and in the New World. By exhibiting the dangerous example of an established government being overturned by a well-concocted camp mutiny, it had at once shaken every throne in Europe, and prevented the extinction, otherwise certain, of that revolution which was spreading ruin and devastation over South America. The democratic party in Europe now saw what was to be effected by gaining the military; and instead of wasting their energies on extending their civil influences, they directed them entirely to acquiring the favour, or corrupting the fidelity, of the sworn defenders of government and order. The success of their altered tactics was soon apparent. The secret societies were the organs by whose agency they everywhere carried out their designs, and it was on the winning of the soldiers that all their efforts were concentrated. The effect was instantaneous; the success exceeded their most sanguine expectations. The Governments of Spain and Portugal, of Naples and Piedmont, were speedily overturned by military revolts which, speak-

the course of next week. Much will depend on the course her Majesty shall think fit to pursue. If she is wise enough to accept the *pont d'or* which we have tendered her, the calamities and scandal of a public investigation will be avoided. If she is mad enough, or so ill advised, as to put her foot upon English ground, I shall, from that moment, regard Pandora's box as opened. I cannot sufficiently express how much I feel your Highness's conduct upon this question. You have given us, in the most handsome and honourable manner, the full weight of your authority; and I have no doubt your individual opinion has had its due weight in reconciling our royal master to the advice which his ministers felt it their bounden duty to give to his Majesty." —LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* PRINCE METTERNICH, *May* 6, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 258, 259.

ing the language of freedom, and professing to introduce democratic government, based on universal suffrage in reality established military despotism in all the countries in which they were successful, and rendered the very name of liberty odious by the abuses which were introduced and the crimes perpetrated in its name.* England itself, with its centuries of freedom and long established popular government, had been rudely shaken during the shock; and the spirit of revolution, under the name of radical reform, had risen to a height which had never been reached during the fervour of the first French Revolution. The Ministry had been defeated on a great constitutional question by the popular voice; dethronement of the sovereign and a republican constitution had been openly advocated, and as a penalty for venturing to resist the demand, the whole Cabinet had been doomed to death, and narrowly escaped destruction.

47. Alarm on the Continent at these events.

These alarming symptoms excited, as well they might, a very great panic on the Continent, and by common consent a congress of sovereigns was agreed upon to take the state of affairs into consideration. What, in an especial manner, excited alarm was the *military* character of the revolutions, and the ease with which, in so many states, the sworn defenders of the throne had been converted into its most formidable assailants. It was difficult to see how government was to be upheld, or the social system preserved from anarchy, if the "last logic of kings" was in this manner turned against them. The Austrian Cabinet was in an especial manner nervous on the subject, not only because one of the most serious of these revolutions had

* "I am afraid that nothing will be done in the present Cortes towards altering the constitution. *There is not a thinking man in the country who is not convinced of the necessity of altering it*, yet no one is willing to take upon himself the responsibility of proposing it. It must be admitted, likewise, that the conduct of the King and his friends is not calculated to inspire confidence, and this leads many people to doubt the wisdom of throwing more power into his Majesty's hands, or at least renders them less active in promoting a change than they would otherwise be."—SIR H. WELLESLEY *to* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *Madrid, February* 25, 1821; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 369.

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occurred at Naples, and that disturbances were imminent at Turin, close to their Italian frontier, but because, both in their Italian and Hungarian provinces, a strong spirit of disaffection existed, which, under the agency of the secret societies, might any day break out into open revolt. Prince Metternich, early in this eventful year, expressed his alarm on the subject to Lord Castlereagh, and with just foresight designated Paris as the place where the malady was likely to assume the most dangerous proportions. His remedy for it was a cordial understanding and united action between the representatives of the four Allied Powers there;* and, guided by the same mo-

* "Ne croyez pas, Mylord, que nous voyons plus en noir que les circonstances ne l'exigent impérieusement; ne croyez surtout pas que nous admettions la possibilité qu'il pourroit exister un moyen matériel quelconque d'influence de la part de l'étranger sur la France, qui ne seroit pas condamné par nous comme *positivement dangereux*. Mais il ne faut pas se cacher que le sort de ce pays *est placé hors de la possibilité d'être calculé; et c'est ce fait que nous regardons comme le pire de tous*. Les maladies aigues sont préférables, en politique comme pour les individus, aux maladies de langueur enracinées.

"Ce que je vous demande est ce qui de tous tems eut du exister—l'uniformité la plus entière de la marche de nos représentans à Paris. Voulez-vous qu'ils parlent? Eh bien, que ce soit d'une manière uniforme: voulez-vous qu'ils se taisent? Que tous se taisent? Il est peu de points sur lesquels il soit plus facile de juger des dangers dont est menacé la dynastie royale en France que tout juste du point de Vienne. *Le Buonapartisme se couvre vis à vis de nous d'un voile infiniment plus léger que vis à vis de tout autre.* Le fait est simple, mais plus il est tel, plus il est dans le cours des choses naturel que nous devons être les plus directement appelés à avertir nos amis.

"Le but de ma dépêche, mon cher Lord, n'est au reste autre que de nous orienter sur ce qui est possible et sur ce qui ne l'est pas. Croyez que nous connoissons assez les positions pour savoir *que tout ce qui est désirable n'est pas toujours possible.* Ce qui toutefois l'est toujours c'est de voir clair, afin de pouvoir calculer et les chances de danger et les mesures de précaution qu'il est dans le devoir de tout grand état de prendre pour son propre salut."—PRINCE METTERNICH *à* LORD CASTLEREAGH, 7 *Mars* 1820; *Cast. Cor.*, xii. 219, 220.

"Les malheureux évènemens en Espagne ont fait ici [Paris] une très grande sensation. Votre Majesté daignera voir, par les journaux soi-disant libéraux d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, avec quelle avidité ils exploitent cette nouvelle mine féconde, pour exciter les méfiances et les alarmes, et pour regagner par cette tactique révolutionnaire ce qu'ils ont perdu déjà et ce qu'ils sont menacés de perdre encore par les décisions des deux chambres. Les Ministres François éprouvoient naturellement déjà de grandes inquiétudes à l'arrivée des nouvelles dont j'ai eu l'honneur de faire mention dans mon rapport No. 14, mais ils étoient, comme tout le monde, loin de s'attendre au funeste parti que le Roi d'Espagne a cru devoir prendre, de se laisser imposer de force la constitution des Cortès de 1812. . . .

"La lutte entre les intérêts des différentes classes de la nation va s'établir

tives, he shortly after suggested the meeting of a congress at Troppau, in Germany, to consider what defensive measures the crisis called for.

48. Policy of the British Cabinet on the occasion.

This congress at Troppau was agreed to by the sovereigns of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France; but although Great Britain sent a representative in the person of Sir Charles (now Lord) Stewart, who was sent back from London after the Queen's trial for that purpose, yet the Cabinet of St James's was far from going along with those of the other sovereigns on the course to be pursued in presence of the existing dangers; and there now appeared the first symptoms of that divergence from the Continental system which has ever since characterised the foreign policy of Great Britain. Lord Castlereagh was the original author of this divergence; and those only who have misapprehended and been misled as to the principles which regulated him during his whole life, can see in this course any deviation from them. The resolute opponent of tyranny in any shape or form, he was not the less the firm friend of freedom, and desirous to extend its blessings to every people *capable of receiving them.* His leading principle, in every situation, was the *maintenance of national independence.* This he regarded, with reason, as the first of national blessings—the only firm basis of domestic freedom; and he dreaded any invasion of it not less from monarchical than republican power. His whole life down to 1815 had been spent in combating the tremendous enemy to the independence of his country which had sprung up out of the fervour of the

en Espagne, comme elle l'est malheureusement en France, par suite de la révolution. Le Roi se trouvera dans la situation de devoir non-seulement pardonner, mais même récompenser ceux qui l'ont trahi. En attendant les élections et la réunion des nouveaux Cortès, le Souverain *se verra gouverné complètement par les chefs militaires de la révolte.* L'armée, sous ces chefs, élevant ses prétentions en proportion des grands services qu'elle prétendra avoir rendus à la patrie, ne sera pas plus satisfaite de ce que les Cortès pourront ou voudront faire pour elle que de son existence antérieure. Elle se prononcera bientôt alors contre les Cortès, qui, portant dans leur sein déjà tous les germes de la discorde, livreront enfin l'Espagne à l'anarchie et au despotisme militaire."—COMTE DE GOLTZ *à* PRINCE HARDENBERG, *Paris,* 18 *Mars* 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence,* xii. 225, 227.

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French Revolution; and on that account he was considered by the world in general, and constantly represented by the revolutionary party at home and abroad, as the decided enemy of freedom. This, however, was very far indeed from being the case. He was the champion of *general liberty and national independence*, and equally resolute in asserting them against either foreign or domestic foes—against rebels in Ireland, or Radicals in England, as against Napoleon in arms on the Continent, an oligarchy in Ireland, or the Czar when encroaching on Eastern Europe. He now saw, or thought he saw, more danger to European independence from a congress of sovereigns than from the conspiracies of the people; and he deemed the time arrived when it became Great Britain, the first-born of freedom, not indeed to ally her arms to those of revolution, but to cease taking an active part in suppressing movements in favour of it in inconsiderable foreign states. The same motives which had formerly dictated a system of intervention, now presented one of non-intervention. If France were to become revolutionary, its great power would again render defensive measures and a general coalition against it necessary.

49. Lord Castlereagh's Cabinet minute. April 30.

The first occasion on which this change of policy was reduced into practice was on the 30th April 1820, when Lord Castlereagh drew up the heads of a circular to the Allied Courts, which were submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet, and sanctioned by the King. Though cautiously and courteously worded, this state-paper indicated not obscurely a divergence of policy which could not fail, if persisted in, to be attended with the most important effects. The main object of this circular was to neutralise the effect of two circulars of the Emperor of Russia, of date 4th February and 3d March, which were intended to induce the Allied Powers to reduce the Holy Alliance into the form of a general guarantee of their respective Governments between the European Powers. Lord Castlereagh's desire was, instead of striving after such a remote and

unattainable object, in which a constitutional monarchy, such as Great Britain, could not be expected to join, to direct the attention of the Cabinets to the means of securing themselves against *military revolt*—the most pressing danger at this time, and the one least guarded against by all the warlike preparations which the Czar was desirous of accelerating. This state-paper, which was embodied in a circular soon after sent to the Allied Cabinets, including France, is remarkable as the first step in the great change of foreign policy on the part of Great Britain, which afterwards was attended with such important effects on the state of Europe.*

* "Lord Castlereagh, not being as yet sufficiently recovered to request permission to attend your Majesty in person, begs leave humbly to submit, for your Majesty's gracious consideration, a memorandum approved by your Majesty's servants in Cabinet, in which they have endeavoured to bring before your Majesty, in a connected point of view, those reflections to which the present seriously important state of Continental affairs has given rise. Should your Majesty be graciously pleased to approve of the course of policy therein submitted, they would humbly propose that the substance of the reasoning contained in this minute should be thrown into the form of a circular despatch, which your Majesty's Ministers should be directed to communicate confidentially to the Allied Courts, as a full and candid exposition of your Majesty's views and sentiments at the present conjuncture.

"1*st*, In order, without condescending to a justification, by an explicit avowal of your Majesty's sentiments on the late events in Spain, to repel the calumnies which have been recently circulated with respect to the course of your Majesty's policy in Spain—calumnies against which the uniform tenor of your Majesty's policy in all countries, but more especially in Spain, ought to have been more than a protection—as well as to lay down that course which, in your Majesty's judgment, it is most expedient that the Allies should pursue in the actual and very critical state of affairs in that country.

"2*d*, To furnish, on the part of your Majesty, a reasoned reply to the several propositions brought forward by the Russian Government in the despatch to Count Lieven of the 3d March; as well as to the still more objectionable overture received from Berlin, and which has been most properly, as appears by Lord Stewart's despatches, already disapproved by the Austrian Government.

"3*d*, Once more to recall the attention of the Allied Cabinets to the *true and correct principles of the alliance*, and to the necessity of *not generalising them*, so as to render the concert an embarrassment, especially to a Government constituted like that of your Majesty.

"4*th*, To decline, in the manner least likely to give umbrage to the Emperor of Russia's personal sentiments, the renewed overture contained in the Russian despatch of 4th February to M. Alopeus, for reducing the treaty of the Holy Alliance into the form of a treaty of general guarantee between all the European Powers.

"5*th*, To endeavour, in some degree, to dispel the alarm at present prevailing throughout Germany, by pointing, with some degree of precision, the attention

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50. Congress of Troppau, and Lord Castlereagh's private instructions to Lord Stewart.

The danger, however, was too pressing to the Continental sovereigns to admit of its consideration being any longer delayed by them, with or without the concurrence of Great Britain, and a congress of the whole Allied Powers, including France, was held at Troppau in the autumn of the same year. Lord Castlereagh's arduous duties as Foreign Secretary, rendered doubly pressing by the threatening aspect of Continental affairs, rendered it impossible for him to attend it personally; but in his stead he sent Lord Stewart from Vienna, who ably followed out his views on this momentous crisis. Those views, even more than in his official instructions, are contained in a private letter, of date 16th September 1820, which fortunately has been preserved in the *Castlereagh Correspondence*,* and throws a greater light on the com-

of the principal Cabinets to the means of security most within their reach, and to the improvement of which, especially against the danger of *military revolt*, their immediate efforts should be chiefly directed, instead of occupying themselves with distant considerations of policy, over which they can, in point of fact, exercise no effectual control whatever.

"So soon as Lord Castlereagh shall have been honoured with your Majesty's commands upon the matter now submitted, he proposes, with your Majesty's approbation, to communicate to the several Allied Courts the steps already adopted by your Majesty with respect to the affairs of Spain, as given in instructions to Sir Henry Wellesley, in the despatches, official and secret, already laid before your Majesty. Your Majesty will appreciate the anxiety which your Allies naturally feel to be informed of your Majesty's decision, as early as possible, upon this important subject."—*Cabinet Minute by* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *April* 30, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 255-257.

* "In addition to my official despatches, which will put you in possession of the measures which we have adopted under the present exigency, chiefly upon the recommendation of Sir William à Court, sanctioned by the concurrence of his Russian and French colleagues; and which will further convey to you the restrictions under which you are authorised to confer with the other Allied Ministers upon the present affairs, I think it may be useful and acceptable to you to receive some general observations from myself altogether for your private information. With all the respect and attachment which I feel for the system of the Alliance, as regulated by the transactions of Aix-la-Chapelle, I should much question the prudence, or, in truth, the efficacy of any formal exercise of its forms and provisions on the present occasion. If the existing danger arose from any obvious infraction of the stipulations of our treaties, an extraordinary reunion of sovereigns, and of their Cabinets, would be a measure of obvious policy; but when the danger springs from the internal convulsions of independent states, the policy of hazarding such a step is much more questionable: and when we recollect to what prejudicial misconceptions and popular irritation the conferences at Pilnitz and the declaration of the Duke of Brunswick, at the commencement of the late revolutionary war, gave occasion, it

mencement and reasons of the great change in the foreign policy of Great Britain than any other document in existence.

51. Proceedings of the Congress of Troppau.

Meanwhile the congress of the *five* Powers met at Troppau, and an equally important document throws as clear a light on the views of the northern Powers on this

may well suggest the expediency that whatever ought or can be done for the general safety against the insurrectionary movements of conspiring and rebellious troops should be undertaken, after full deliberation, in the manner which will afford the least handle for misrepresentation and excitement, and which may give the effort to be made the fullest justification of a local and specific necessity arising out of the particular case.

"I therefore hope that the Emperor of Russia will be content to confine the interview at Troppau within the prudent limits proposed by his ally, the Emperor of Austria, that whatever ministerial conferences may be held may be regarded as only adding to our other means of confidential explanation, and that whatever is done *shall be upon the particular case*, without hazarding general declarations, containing universal pledges that cannot be redeemed, and which, from the first, will be seen through and despised. Dissertations on abstract principles will do nothing in the present day unless supported.

"It is highly satisfactory to observe that, in all other respects than the form of proceeding, the Emperor of Russia seems to concur fully in the general sentiments, and looks to the Court of Vienna as the Power, from its exposed position, on which necessarily devolves the task of proposing for the consideration of its Allies the course to be taken on the present occasion. As far as I have been able to examine the memoir which, in furtherance of this purpose, the Austrian minister has prepared for consideration, it appears to me that it hardly touches the real question. It assumes a fact—viz., the duress of the King—and proposes to found upon it a blind engagement, which no responsible Government can possibly contract; but it leaves all the essence and difficulties of the business—namely, the end and object of the league—in obscurity. The substance of the paper is to be found in the series of propositions, five in number, with which it closes. Coupling these propositions with the avowed preparations of one of the Powers—namely, Austria—and her understood purpose to march an army into the kingdom of Naples for the liberation of the King and for the destruction of the existing order of things, no doubt can exist that these propositions, if agreed to, would substantially amount to the formation of a hostile league, on the part of the five Powers, against the *de facto* Government of Naples. If all are pledged not to recognise but with common consent the order of things now subsisting, that force, if requisite, is to be employed for its overthrow, all are principals, not only morally but *de jure* in the war, though all may not bear arms in the execution of the common purpose. Now this is a concert which the British Government cannot enter into:—1st, Because it binds them to engagements which they could not be justified in taking without laying the whole before Parliament; 2d, It creates a league which at any moment may involve them in the necessity of using force; for it is clear the *de facto* Government of Naples, upon such an act being agreed to by us, might, according to the ordinary laws of nations, without further notice, sequester all British property at Naples, and at once shut their ports against British commerce; and it further makes the continuance of that league dependent upon the common deliberation of all the Powers

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important crisis. They do not appear to have been actuated by any views of foreign conquest or aggrandisement, but to have been profoundly impressed with the idea that the success of the military revolts in the Spanish

composing it; 3d, It is further inconsistent with the principles of the neutrality which this Government, with a view to the security of the Royal Family of Naples, has been induced to authorise Sir William à Court to declare and to act upon; 4th, Such a league would render the British Government both morally and in a Parliamentary sense responsible for all the future acts of the league, and, consequently, if Austria should move forward her army into the Neapolitan territory, for the acts of a Power over whose councils, in the execution of her intended measures, they could not and ought not to have that species of detailed control which would justify such a responsibility; 5th, Before such a power could in reason be delegated by the Alliance to Austria, the whole course of measures must previously be settled by common consent, which is, from the very nature of the case, impracticable, or the Austrian commander, in the execution of the service, must be saddled with and act under the direction of a council of regency of the Allied ministers residing at headquarters, which is equally impracticable and inexpedient; 6th, Such a league would most certainly be disapproved by our Parliament; and even could it be sustained, it is obvious that, from that moment, every act of the Austrian army in the kingdom of Naples would fall as much under the immediate cognisance and jurisdiction of the British Parliament, and be canvassed as freely and fully, as if it were the act of a British army and commander-in-chief. The objections to such a system in a Government such as ours are insuperable; and I presume the consequences of it, as above stated, will be no less alarming to Prince Metternich; you will not, therefore, give his Highness any expectation of the possibility of our concurrence.

"The revolution at Naples does not, in strictness, come within any of the stipulations or provisions of the Alliance. It is, nevertheless, an event of such importance in itself, and of such probable moral influence upon the social and political system of Europe, that, in the fortunate intimacy of counsel which prevails between the five principal Powers of Europe, it necessarily occupies their most anxious attention. The result of their first explanations has sufficiently established that they concur in regarding the change as pregnant with danger and of evil example, as having been the work of rebellious troops and of a secret sect, the known and avowed object of whose institution is to subvert all the existing Governments in Italy, and to consolidate the whole into one Italian State. This danger, however, bears upon the different Allied States so very unequally, as to vary essentially the course which each may feel disposed or enabled, or even justified, to adopt with respect to it. To apply this remark to two of the principal Powers—viz., Great Britain and Austria—the latter Power may feel that it cannot hesitate in the adoption of immediate and active measures against this danger—the former State may, on the other hand, conceive that it is not *so directly or immediately menaced* as, according to the doctrines on which an armed interference in the internal affairs of another State has hitherto been sustained in the British Parliament, would justify it in becoming a party to such an interference. If this is the actual position of these two Powers, they cannot become joint parties to a league leading to measures of force, and which involves a common and equal responsibility; whilst the exclusive power of execution necessarily belongs to the State principally exposed. The same reasoning will more or less apply to

and Italian peninsulas had shaken every throne in Europe, that the danger was rapidly approaching themselves, and that, as a measure of self-defence, it had become absolutely necessary to take immediate steps, not only to

all the other Allied States. The natural result of this seems to be that Austria must, at least as far as we are concerned, make the measure, whatever it is, her own; that she may, by previous and confidential intercourse, collect the sentiments of her Allies, and thereby satisfy herself that she is not likely to incur their disapprobation, or be disavowed by them in what she proposes to attempt; but she must adopt it upon her own responsibility, and in her own name, and not in that of the five Powers, and she must be satisfied to justify it upon the grounds that decide her to act, receiving such an acquiescence or such an approbation from the other Powers as they may be prepared to afford to her.

"Before such acquiescence or approbation could be expected, Austria must, however, be prepared to satisfy her Allies that *she engages in this undertaking with no views of aggrandisement;* that she aims at no supremacy in Italy incompatible with existing treaties; in short, that she has no interested views, that her *plans are limited to objects of self-defence,* and that she claims no more from the country she proposes to enter, than having her army sustained in the usual manner, whilst necessarily stationed beyond her own frontier. Prince Metternich, I have no doubt, really means so to limit his views, but, to inspire the confidence necessary to his own purpose, and to protect himself against the jealousy of other States, he must explain himself more explicitly than he has done in the memoir in question. This being done, whatever hesitation particular Powers may have with respect to their own line of policy, none, I apprehend, will feel themselves disposed or entitled to impede or embarrass Austria in the course she may feel it necessary to pursue for her own security and that of her Italian States.

"But although Austria may not expect or wish other States to charge themselves with any part of the exertion which she conceives their safety as well as her own requires, yet she may wish to be publicly countenanced in what she may undertake, by their moral *appui.* This *appui* she will, in a great measure, carry with her, if, after a full explanation of her general views, they acquiesce in her measures, if they abstain under existing circumstances from re-establishing the usual diplomatic relations with the present Government of Naples. Their concurrence in her measures may be marked more or less decisively, according to their particular circumstances; but it seems too much to expect that the other Powers should wholly identify themselves in a proceeding which must mainly be conducted by Austria alone.

"For these reasons you will see that engagements of such a nature, at least on our part, are out of the question. We desire to leave Austria unembarrassed in her course; but we must claim for ourselves the same freedom of action. It is for the interest of Austria that such should be our position. It enables us, in our Parliament, to consider, and consequently to respect her measures as the acts of an independent state—a doctrine which we could not maintain if we had rendered ourselves, by a previous concert, parties to those acts; and it places us in a situation to do justice in argument to the considerations which may influence her counsels, without, in doing so, being thrown upon the defence of our own conduct. Austria must, as I conceive, be contented to find in these conferences the facilities for pursuing what she feels to be her own necessary policy; but she must not look to the involving by this

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prevent it spreading, but to extinguish it in those states where it had originally commenced.* Lord Castlereagh fully appreciated these dangers, and acknowledged the necessity of measures of precaution on the part of the

expedient other Powers in a completely common interest and a common responsibility. The consequence of so doing would be to fetter her own freedom of action. She must preserve to herself the power of pursuing with rapidity and effect her immediate views of security; and the other Allied States must reserve to themselves the faculty of interposing if they see cause for doing so.

"I have thus endeavoured to state for your information, in some detail, the chain of reasoning which brings us to the conclusion which has already been stated to you in my despatch of the 29th July, as well as in others of this date—namely, that the King's Government cannot attempt, by force of arms, to deal with this particular case; and that, however they may understand the considerations which may bring the Austrian Government to a different conclusion, and however they may respect that determination, they most distinctly decline the responsibility of advising or being in any wise parties to that decision; and, so far from embarrassing the Court of Vienna by the part they are now taking, I am confident Prince Metternich must feel that, by the step we have adopted for the protection of the Royal Family, we have essentially contributed to relieve his Court from one of its most anxious embarrassments, and that his course is thereby infinitely more facilitated than it could possibly be, were we to consent to incorporate ourselves with the other Allied States, as a passive member of the projected league, the formation of which, I am satisfied, is not essential to his object, and which, I am confident, can never be reduced, for any efficient purpose, into practice."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 311-318.

* "*Apperçu des Premiers Résultats des Conférences de Troppau.*—Les évènemens du 8 Mars en Espagne, ceux du 2 Juillet à Naples, la catastrophe du Portugal, devaient nécessairement faire nâitre dans tous les hommes qui veillent à la tranquillite des Etats un sentiment profond d'inquiétude et de peine, et un besoin de s'unir et de se concerter pour détourner de l'Europe tous les maux prêts à fondre sur elle. Il étoit naturel que ce besoin et ce sentiment fussent plus vifs dans les Gouvernemens qui naguères avaient vaincu la Révolution, et qui la voyaient aujourd'hui reparoître triomphante.

"Il étoit plus naturel encore que, pour la repousser une troisième fois, ces Gouvernemens eussent recours aux moyens qu'ils avaient si heureusement employé dans la lutte mémorable où l'Europe les avait vu briser le joug sous lequel elle gémissait depuis vingt ans. Tout autorisait à espérer que cette union des principales Puissances, formée au milieu des circonstances les plus critiques, couronnée des plus beaux succès, perpétuée enfin par les actes de 1814, 1815, et 1818—que cette union qui a preparé, fondé, et complété la pacification du monde, ayant délivré le Continent du despotisme militaire, exercé par l'homme de la Révolution, le délivreroit également du pouvoir nouveau non moins tyrannique, et non moins désastreux, du pouvoir du crime et de la révolte. Tels ont été les motifs et le but de la réunion de Troppau. Les uns doivent être si généralement sentis qu'ils ne demandent pas une plus longue explication.

"L'autre est si honorable et si utile que tous les vœux accompagnent sans doute les Cours Alliées dans leur noble entreprise. La tâche que leur imposent les devoirs et les engagemens les plus sacrés est vaste et difficile; mais d'heur-

Powers in the immediate neighbourhood, and first threatened. But he was not equally convinced that a general league of the Allied Powers, or mutual guarantee of their respective Governments, was either the appropriate anti-

eux présages leur premettent de croire qu'elles parviendront à la remplir en agissant sans aucune déviation dans le sens des traités par lesquels elles avaient rendu la paix à l'Europe, et établi une alliance générale entre tous les Etats Européens. Les Puissances ont usé d'un droit incontestable en se décidant de prendre des mesures communes de précaution et de répression envers des Etats dont le bouleversement opéré par la révolte, ne fut il considéré que comme exemple, serait déjà un acte hostile à toutes les institutions et à tous les Gouvernemens légitimes, envers des Etats surtout, qui, non contents de leurs propres malheurs, cherchent par leurs agens à les communiquer à d'autres contrées, et s'efforcent d'y faire naître les troubles et l'insurrection. La position et la conduite de ces Etats constituent une infraction manifeste du pacte qui garantit aux Gouvernemens Européens, avec l'intégrité de leurs territoires, le maintien de ces relations pacifiques dont le premier effet est d'exclure jusqu'à l'idée de se nuire réciproquement.

"Ce fait irréfragable devait être le point de départ des Cabinets Alliés. En conséquence, les plenipotentiaires qui pouvaient recevoir à Troppau même les ordres de leurs Souverains, ont arrêté entr'eux, et soumis aux délibérations des Cours de Paris et de Londres, les principes à suivre envers les Etats qui subissent une altération violente dans la forme de leur régime intérieur, ainsi que les moyens, soit de conciliation, soit de force, propres à ramener au sein de l'Alliance ceux de ces Etats, sur lesquels on pourrait exercer une action salutaire et efficace. Comme la révolution de Naples jette tous les jours des racines plus profondes, comme nulle autre ne menace d'une manière plus sensible et plus immédiate la tranquillité des Etats du voisinage, ni ne peut être atteinte par des voies plus directes et plus promptes, on a reconnu la convenance et la nécessité de faire au royaume des Deux Siciles l'application immédiate des principes qui viennent d'être indiqués.

"Afin d'entamer à son égard les mesures de conciliation, les Souverains présens à Troppau ont addressé à sa Majesté Sicilienne l'invitation de se réunir avec eux à Laybach, démarche dont le seul but a été d'affranchir la volonté de sa Majesté, et de l'engager d'interposer sa médiation entre ses peuples égarés et les pays dont ils compromettent le repos. Décidés à ne point reconnoître les Gouvernemens enfantés par la sédition, les Souverains ne pouvaient entrer en rapport qu'avec la personne du Roi. Leurs ministres à Naples ont reçu des ordres analogues.

"La France et l'Angleterre ont été invitées à se joindre à cette démarche. Elles s'y refuseront sans doute d'autant moins que le principe, en vertu duquel elle a été faite, est strictement conforme aux traités solemnellement ratifiés par ces deux Puissances, et qu'elle offre le gage assuré des vues les plus justes et les plus pacifiques. Le système concerté entre l'Autriche, la Prusse, et la Russie, n'est point un système nouveau; il ne présente qu'une application fidèle des maximes consacrées par les transactions qui ont fondé l'alliance générale. Loin d'affoiblir l'union intime des Cours qui forment le centre de cette alliance, ce système ne peut que la fortifier et consolider. Elle s'affermira comme elle s'est établie, conçue par les mêmes Cabinets, et successivement adoptée par les Puissances qui en ont reconnu les avantages.

"La réalité de ces avantages ne saurait être révoquée en doute. Il est d'ailleurs hautement démontré que ce ne sont ni des pensées de conquête, ni

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tode to the dangers, or called for in the circumstances; and he felt strongly the extreme inconvenience and possible hazard of involving England, with its popular constitution and liberal ideas, in a league of sovereigns governed by different interests, and guided by different views. For these reasons, while not opposing a declaration against the military revolts, and leaving to Austria her liberty of action in regard to the Italian one, by which she was immediately threatened, he declined to be any party to the repressive measures, and they were adopted by Austria in conjunction with Russia and Prussia alone. A variety of articles appeared in the semi-official journals of Vienna, which, more even than their official acts, revealed the real views of the northern Powers; and, meanwhile, the march of Austrian troops through Central Italy continued without intermission.[1] *

[1] Apperçu des Résultats des Conferences de Troppau, iii. 630.

52. Meeting of the Congress at Laybach. Jan. 4, 1821.

A holograph letter was, towards the end of November, despatched from the Allied sovereigns assembled at Troppau, to the King of Naples, inviting him to meet them in a new congress, to be held at Laybach in the beginning

le désir de porter atteinte à l'indépendance des autres Gouvernemens dans ce qui concerne leur administration intérieure, ni celui d'empêcher des améliorations sages et volontaires, conformes aux véritables intérêts des peuples qui ont dicté les déterminations des Puissances Alliées. Elles ne veulent que maintenir la paix, que préserver l'Europe du fléau des révolutions, que réparer et prévenir, autant qu'il dépend d'elles les malheurs qu'entraîne l'oubli de tous les principes d'ordre et de morale. A ces titres les Puissances peuvent se flatter qu'une approbation unanime les récompensera de leurs soins et de leurs efforts."—*Circulaire des Ministres de Russie et de la Prusse, Troppau, Decembre* 8, 1820; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 330-333.

* "On a acquis la conviction que cette révolution, produite par une secte égarée et exécutée par des soldats indisciplinés, suivie d'une renversement violente des institutions légitimes, et de leur remplacement par un système d'arbitraire et d'anarchie, est non seulement contraire aux principes d'ordre, de droit, de morale, et de vrai bien-être des peuples, tels qu'ils sont etablis par les monarques, mais de plus incompatible par les résultats inévitables avec le repos et la sécurité des autres états Italiens, et par consequent avec le conservation de la paix en Europe. Pénétrés de ces verités, les Hauts Monarques ont pris la ferme résolution d'employer tous leurs moyens afin que l'état actuel des choses dans le royaume des Deux Siciles, produit par la révolte et la force, soit detruit, mais cependant S. M. le Roi sera mis dans une position telle qu'il pourra déterminer la constitution future de ses états d'une manière compatible avec sa dignité, les intérêts de son peuple, et le repos des états voisins."—*Observation Autrichien; Decembre* 14, 1820.

of the succeeding year. The Emperor of Austria arrived on the 4th January 1821, the King of Prussia, two days later; the Emperor of Russia on the 7th; and the King of Naples, whom his rebellious troops did not venture openly to keep at home, on the 8th. Lord Castlereagh was prevented by the near approach of his parliamentary duties, from attending in person; but Lord Stewart accompanied the sovereigns there, who worthily represented his brother's views, and carried out the instructions of his Cabinet on this important occasion. It was the more momentous, and required the more mingled prudence and firmness of conduct and suavity of manner, that he was now to meet, but not with the same identical feelings as formerly, the sovereigns with whom he had stood side by side in many a well-debated field, and to announce, for the first time, that apparent deviation from former policy, which circumstances had rendered necessary, but which was not the less painful to the parties concerned, and threatened to dissolve many intimacies which had stood the strain of a quarter of a century.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iii. 642.

53. Treaty between Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

So much had been done at Troppau in fixing the principles on which the united action of the northern Powers should be rested, that little remained at Laybach but to give them a practical application. The principle which Alexander laid down, and which was adopted by the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia, was that the spirit of the age required indeed liberal institutions, and a gradual admission of the people to a participation in power, but that to be durable or beneficial, they must flow from the sovereign's free will, not to be forced upon him by his subjects, and that the worst of all sources from which they could spring were the machinations of secret societies or the violence of military revolt. No transaction or compromise, therefore, could be admitted with the Spanish or Italian revolutionists, and that not less in the interests of real freedom than those of order and peace. In pursuance of these principles, a treaty was signed on 2d February, Feb. 2.

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between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, by which it was stipulated that the Allied Powers should in nowise recognise the revolutionary Government of Naples, and that the royal authority should be re-established there, as it stood previous to the insurrection of the army on 2d July preceding. To carry this resolution into effect, it was agreed that an Austrian army, acting in the name of the three Allied Powers, should be put at the disposal of the King of the Two Sicilies; that it should forthwith invade the Neapolitan dominions in order to reinstate the royal authority there; that from the moment of its crossing the Po, its whole charges should be at the expense of the Neapolitan Government; and that the Neapolitan dominions should be occupied for three years by the Austrian forces, in the same manner and under the same conditions as the French fortresses by the army commanded by the Duke of Wellington. England and France were no parties to this treaty, but neither did they protest against, or enter into any alliance to thwart it. They simply adopted Lord Castlereagh's principle, so clearly announced in his secret instructions to Lord Stewart already given, which was to remain neutral, as in a matter in which they were too remotely concerned to be called on for any active interference. The views of the Allies were distinctly stated in a

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circular to the assembled sovereigns at Laybach, on 31st January, by Count Nesselrode; and the views of Lord Castlereagh, on which the Cabinets of France and Great Britain acted, were as clearly announced in a circular by him at the same time to the ministers of the Allied Powers.*

* "La Révolution de Naples a donné au monde un exemple, aussi instructif que déplorable, de ce que les nations ont à gagner lorsqu'elles cherchent les réformes politiques dans les voies de la rebellion. Ourdie en secret par une secte dont les maximes impiés attaquent à la fois la religion, la morale, et tous les liens sociales; exécutée par des soldats traitres à leurs serments; consommée par la violence et les menaces; dirigées contre le souverain legitime, cette révolution n'a produit que l'anarchie et la disposition militaire qu'elle a renforcée au lieu de l'affoiblir, a crée un régime monstreux, incapable de servir de base à un gouvernement quel qu'il soit, incompatible avec tout ordre public et avec les premiers besoins de la société. Les souverains Alliés, ne pouvant dès le principe se tromper sur les effets inévitables de ces funestes attentats, se dé-

This declination on the part of Great Britain, in which she was followed by France, to join in the measures of repression directed by Austria, with the concurrence of Prussia and Russia, against the revolutionary Government of Naples, being the first serious breach in the Grand Alliance, which had effected the deliverance of Europe, produced a very great sensation on the Continent, and was justly regarded as a prognostic, which subsequent events have amply justified, that the time was approaching when the balance of European power would be changed, and the absolute would stand arrayed against the constitutional states. As such it drew forth many warm and acrimonious comments at the Allied Courts, and the old déclamations against the selfishness and egotism of Great Britain were renewed, and, on this occasion at least, with

54. Sensation which this divergence of Great Britain produced in foreign Courts.

cideront sur le champ à ne point admettre comme légal tout ce qui la révolution et l'usurpation avaient prétendu d'établir dans le royaume de Naples, et cette mesure fut adoptie par la presque totalité des Gouvernements de l'Europe."—LE COMTE NESSELRODE *au* COMTE DE STACKELBERG, Ambassadeur à Naples, *Laybach, January* 19 (31), 1821; *Annuaire Historique*, ii. 698.

Lord Castlereagh's circular was in these words: "Le système des mesures proposées serait, s'il était l'objet de reciprocité d'action, diamétralement opposée aux lois fondamentals de la Grande Bretagne; mais lorsque cette objection décisive n'existait pas même que le Gouvernement Britannique n'en jugerait pas moins que les principes qui servent de base à ces mesures, ne peuvent être admis avec quelque sûreté comme systèmes de loi contre nations. Le Gouvernement du Roi pense que l'adoption de ces principes sanctionnerait inevitablement et pourrait amener par la suite, de la part des souverains moins bienviellants, une intervention dans les affaires intérieures des états beaucoup plus frequente et plus étendue que celle qu'il est persuadé que les augustes personnages ont l'intention d'user, ou qui puisse se concilier avec l'intérêt général, ou avec l'autorité réelle et la dignite des souverains indépendants. Quant à l'affaire particulière de Naples, le Gouvernement Britannique n'a pas hésité dès le commencement à exprimer fortement son improbation de la manière dont cette révolution s'est effectuée et des circonstances dont elle paraissait avoir été accompagnée, mais en même temps il declara expressement aux differens Cours Alliées qu'il ne croyait pas devoir, ni même conseiller, une intervention de la part de la Grande Bretagne. Il admit toujours que d'autres états Européens, et spécialement l'Autriche et les Puissances Italiennes, pouvaient juger que les circonstances étaient différentes relativement à eux; et il declara que son intention n'était pas de préjuger la question en ce qui pouvait les affecter, ni d'intervenir dans la marche que tels états *pourraient juger convenable d'adopter pour leur propre sûreté*; pourvu toujours qu'ils fussent disposées à donner toutes les assurances raisonables que leurs vues n'étaient ni dirigées vers des objets d'agrandissement, ni vers la subversion du système territorial de l'Europe tel qu'il a été établi par les derniers traités."—*Dépêche Circulaire pour les Cours Etrangères, Janvier* 19, 1821; *Annuaire Historique*, ii. 686-689.

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a great appearance of plausibility. It was observed that the character of England was unchanged and unchangeable; that self-interest was in every situation the ruling principle of her action. She was very conservative, and spared neither her blood nor her treasure, and was very urgent to get foreign Governments to join her, when the danger was at her own door, and her own institutions were threatened by the contagion of French principles; but she became very liberal, and systematically stood aloof, when other countries were threatened by a similar peril, and the states menaced with convulsion were Italy, Southern Germany, or France itself. The Continental nations have never entirely got the better of this impression, which has been greatly strengthened by the active part taken by Great Britain, on many subsequent occasions, to support, morally and physically, insurgents in foreign countries against their Governments. And there can be no doubt in consequence that the position of the British empire, if menaced by any formidable foreign Power, is, as far as Continental alliances go, greatly less secure than it was before this *apparent* change in her foreign policy took place.

55. The change was apparent only, not real.

And yet there can be no doubt that this change, so far as made by Lord Castlereagh, was in reality apparent only, and not real, and that there was in truth, on his part, no deviation from the principles either on which the war had been begun by Mr Pitt, or continued by himself. It never had been undertaken either to force an obnoxious dynasty on the French people, or to crush free institutions in that or any other country. *Security and the maintenance of our own independence* was the sole object of both. Mr Pitt was forced into the war with as much reluctance, as Mr Wilberforce said, "as a conscientious man is into a duel," by the approach of the French armies to Holland, the seizure of Antwerp, and the open attempts of the Convention to revolutionise Great Britain. Before war was declared, the principles

on which it was commenced was stated by Lord Grenville in a state-paper, 29th December 1792, in the clearest terms, and they expressly disclaimed all intention or wish to interfere with the internal institutions or family on the throne of France.* From this basis Great Britain never receded, either in thought or deed. During the whole course of the Revolutionary war there was not one occasion in which peace might not have been concluded with the French Republic, if its rulers could have been brought to retire within their own territory and renounce their projects of foreign conquest. Lord Castlereagh uniformly proceeded on the same principle; he treated at Chatillon for peace directly with Napoleon, and would have concluded it if the latter could have brought himself to abandon Antwerp, and his projects of aggrandisement for the Great Nation, and destruction of Great Britain; and peace was finally concluded without any stipulation either

* On 29th December 1792, Lord Granville, then Minister for Foreign Affairs under Mr Pitt, thus wrote to the British ambassador at St Petersburg, proposing the terms of an alliance against France:—"The two leading points on which such explanation will naturally turn are the line of conduct to be pursued prior to the commencement of hostilities, with a view, if possible, to avert them, and the nature and amount of the forces which the Powers engaged in this concert might be enabled to use, supposing such extremities unavoidable. With respect to the first, it appears, on the whole—subject, however, to future consideration and discussion with the other Powers—that the most advisable step to be taken would be that sufficient explanation should be had with the Powers at war with France, in order to enable those not hitherto engaged in the war to propose to that country *terms of peace*. That these terms should be *the withdrawing their arms within the limits of the French territory*, the abandoning their conquests, and rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, and the giving in some unequivocal manner a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles, or to excite disturbances against other Governments. In return for these stipulations, the different Powers of Europe, who should be parties to this measure, might engage *to abandon all measures or views of hostility against France, or interference in its internal affairs*, and to maintain a correspondence and intercourse of amity with the *existing Powers* in that country with whom the existing treaty might be concluded. If, on the result of this proposal so made by the Powers acting in concert, these terms should not be accepted by France, or being accepted should not be satisfactorily performed, the different Powers might thus engage themselves to each other to enter into active measures to obtain the ends in view; and it may be considered whether *in such case* they might not reasonably look for some indemnity for the expenses and hazards to which they would necessarily be exposed."—LORD GRANVILLE *to the* BRITISH AMBASSADOR *at St Petersburg, December* 29, 1792; *Parliamentary History*, xxxiv. 1313, 1314.

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for the return of the Bourbons or the internal institutions of the French nation. He openly avowed his wish for the "ancient race and the ancient territory;" but that was not from any desire to interfere with the internal institutions of France, but from a belief, which subsequent experience has abundantly verified, that peace would more easily be concluded with, and more faithfully observed by, the ancient race, than any revolutionary government, because its sovereigns could rest on a legal right and old traditions, and were not impelled by "the necessity of conquest to existence," which is always felt by chiefs resting on popular triumphs. In keeping aloof, therefore, from the contest in Italy, and leaving it to be conducted on her own responsibility by Austria, which was immediately threatened, Lord Castlereagh was not departing from his principles or those of his great predecessor—he was only correctly applying them, in the altered circumstances which had occurred on the Continent, in reference to the security of Great Britain, and the dangers by which Austria was threatened.

56. Effect of this declaration from Troppau on the different states of Europe.

The declaration of the three Northern Powers against the Italian Revolution, and the abstinence of Great Britain and France from taking any part in it, produced a deep impression throughout Europe, elevating the one party as much as it enraged or depressed the other. Then appeared for the first time traces of the deep division which takes place between states *according to their origin;* a source of discord more lasting and irremediable than either race, religion, or political jealousies. The constitutional monarchies were in raptures with Lord Castlereagh's declaration, and the obvious division which had taken place among the Allied Powers, whose united force had subdued the French Revolution.* On the

* "On Saturday last, at a private audience, the instructions to Naples and Vienna were communicated to his Majesty. It was impossible for him not to be in the highest degree pleased with the line taken by our Cabinet, and with the irrefragable reasoning by which it is supported, and certainly during the reading the progress was interrupted by strong expressions from him of

other hand, the Spanish Revolutionists expressed the strongest indignation at the Troppau declaration by the three Northern Powers, which they with reason regarded as prognosticating their own fate.* Already was to

applause and coincidence of opinion. Among these it will be sufficient to report one, as virtually embracing all. He said it was a line of policy which did us credit, and which had this advantage to us, that, if known, it would rally round us every state in Europe of the second order, as the only security of their own individual independence.

"As this our course of policy is known to his Majesty, the conclusion as regards him seems clear, and is likely to acquire additional strength (as it ought) from the persuasion, so well enforced in the principal despatch, that our internal system of government renders our resistance *to this Fifth-monarchy scheme*, attempted to be forced on the world, a matter of necessity as well as of choice; and this affords the best assurance for its permanence. . . . The effect of the note of 4th December seems to have been adequate, if not to have much surpassed what could have been expected from its first impression; and notwithstanding that, after the immediate disposal of the Neapolitan business (still, as I conceive, likely to be attended with much delay and difficulty), the acknowledgment of abstract principles by protocol is threatened, I think it probable that your excellent reasoning will have its operation with the Fifth-monarchists to prevent this—more especially when they consider that their scheme must now, *ipso facto*, be destroyed by it, and that England, separated from the rest, must carry with her possibly France, but certainly every other Power in Europe *not of the three, and leave this then triple-headed monster* unsupported otherwise than by its own ill-assorted combination."—LORD CLANCARTY, *Ambassador at Brussels, January* 1, 1821; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 337, 338.

"The circular despatch of 6th December, addressed from Troppau to the ministers of the respective sovereigns there assembled, and which has been communicated, or rather shown, to the ministers of all the Courts here, seems to have given *great satisfaction to some of them*."—SIR CHARLES BAGOT *to* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *St Petersburg, January* 3, 1821; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 339.

"I still think Metternich has essentially weakened his position by making it a European instead of an Austrian question. He might have had the same European countenance upon a much more intelligible case of interference. He would have carried public opinion (especially in this country) much more with him had he stood simply upon the offensive character of a Carbonari government to every Italian state, than embarking himself on the boundless ocean on which he has preferred to sail. In placing his effort boldly on its strong Austrian ground, Russia and Prussia might have infused the general interest into their declarations of adherence, without diluting the main question to their own remote interest. But our friend Metternich, with all his merit, prefers a complicated negotiation to a bold and rapid stroke."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *January* 5, 1821; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 341.

* "The worst consequences would follow any foreign interference here. Their irritation at the declaration of the three sovereigns, issued at Troppau, exceeds all bounds, and could only be removed by a public assurance that the Allies have no intention of interfering in their affairs. An assurance of this kind would, I think, lead them to turn their attention more seriously to the modifications so necessary in their system."—SIR H. WELLESLEY *to* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *February* 25, 1821; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 370.

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be seen foreshadowed a different balance of power, and fresh political alliances in Europe, which have subsequently led to some of the most important and stirring events of modern history. The despotic monarchies drew together; the revolutionary governments did the same. Between the two stood Great Britain and France, inclining by their feelings to the liberal, attached by their interests to the conservative side. The future balance of power in Europe would mainly depend on whether they remained united, or again broke into jealous hostility; for it was evident, if united, they would be more than a match for the absolute sovereigns. But it was more than doubtful whether they would keep together, and the separate interests of England, essentially a conservative monarchy, would not ere long come to be at variance with those of France, if she returned to the revolutionary regime, and thereby became again the head of the movement party in Europe.

57. Overthrow of the Neapolitan Revolution.

These events, however, as yet lay buried in the womb of fate, and the immediate consequences of the Italian Revolution were much less considerable than at first sight might have been expected. It was suppressed with so much facility that the operations undertaken could

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hardly be called a campaign. On 8th February a courier from Laybach announced at Naples that the sovereigns assembled there would not acknowledge the revolutionary authorities, and that hostilities were imminent. On the 5th, the Austrian army, 50,000 strong, crossed the Po at five different points, between Cremona and St Benedetto, and took the road for Naples in two divisions, the one by Ancona, the other by Bologna, Florence, and Rome. The Liberal Government did their utmost to make a resistance; they gave the command of the troops to General Pepe, an officer of experience and talent, and decreed the immediate raising of 50,000 men. In effect a strong force of 40,000, under General Carascosa, chiefly militia, occupied the strong position of St

Germano, barring the roads from Gaeta to Naples, while General Pepe, with 30,000, was charged with the defence of the Abruzzi, and opposed to the force advancing along the Adriatic. But the troops of the latter rapidly melted away when intelligence arrived of the approach of the enemy; and no sooner did the Austrian advance-guard, consisting of a splendid regiment of Hungarian horse, make their appearance, than the whole army, horse, foot, and artillery, took to flight before a shot had been fired, leaving their whole guns, ammunition, and baggage in the hands of the enemy.* This defeat, or rather dispersion of force without fighting, was a mortal stroke to the insurrection. The broken remains of Pepe's army dispersed in the Apennines, leaving the right flank of Carascosa's army at St Germano uncovered, which position was in consequence abandoned, and his troops too, in a state of total dissolution, fled to Naples. On the 20th a suspension of arms was agreed to, as further resistance had evidently become hopeless, on condition of the submission of Capua and Aversa, and on the 23d March Naples surrendered. The Austrian troops immediately took possession of these towns. Sicily, after a vain attempt at resistance, yielded soon after, and the ancient royal authority was everywhere re-established in the Neapolitan dominions. On 12th May the King reached his capital amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants, through a double row of Austrian bayonets.[1]

March 20.

March 23.

March 24.

[1] Colletta, ii. 430, 448; Ann. Hist. iv. 329-333.

* The following is General Pepe's account of this extraordinary rout:—"Vacellarono le nostre giovani bande si ritrarono le primie, non procederono le seconde si confusero le ordinanze. Ed allora avoazo prima lentamente, poscia incalcando i passi, et alfine in corsa un superbo reggimento di cavalleria Ungherese, si che nell' aspetto del crescente pericolo le milizie civili nuove alla guerra si trepidarono, fuggirono, strauenarono coll' impeto e coll' esempio qual che compagni di piu vecchi soldati si ruppero gli ordini, si undirono le voce di, '*Traditamento, salvai qui puo ;*' scomparve il campo. Proseguerono nelle succedente notte i disordino dell esercito: Antrodocco fu abandonnato; il General Pepe sequira i fuggitivi. Miserando rpectacolo! Ge Hati le armi et le insigne; le machoni di guerra fatte inecampo al fuggiri, rovescrate spezzati; gli argini, le trincore operi di molte menti et di molte braccia, a perte, abandonnate ogno ordini scomporto; earco le poco manza Spavinboso al nemiso, oggi volto in ludibrio."—*Colletta Historia della Guvira Italiani*, ii. 437. (A liberal historian.)

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58. Revolution in Piedmont, and its suppression by the Austrians.

To effect a diversion in Southern Italy, the Carbonari organised an insurrection in Piedmont, which was to break out when the Austrians were commencing the invasion of Naples, from which it was hoped it would compel them to withdraw their troops. But it fell out quite otherwise, and had no other result but, by demonstrating the aggressive designs of the revolutionists, to afford the best vindication of the Austrian attack upon them. It broke out, as already

March 13. mentioned, with complete success on 13th March, the very time when the Neapolitan army under Pepe was melting away at the sight of the Hungarian sabres. The revolutionists of Piedmont, however, deeming themselves too far gone to recede, continued their preparations for war against Austria. The Allied sovereigns did the same; a strong corps of observation was formed on the Ticino by the Cabinet of Vienna, and the Emperor of Russia directed the concentration of an army of 100,000 men at Warsaw, with orders to march upon Turin. The revolutionary Government issued proclamations assuring their partisans of "the succour of the Lombards and the support of France." But no French standards appeared on the summit of Mont Cenis; a division got up in the army which had at first revolted *en masse*, and 8000 left Turin and joined the royal standard which had been hoisted at

April 8. Novara. The Austrians crossed the Ticino and joined this body, and the united force attacked the insurgents unexpectedly and routed them entirely at Agogna with the loss of their whole artillery and amunition. Upon

April 12. this the whole dispersed, the revolutionary Government resigned, and on the 12th the capital was reoccupied by the royal troops, and the authority of the King re-established. The clubs were closed, the revolutionary journals disappeared, and the funds, which had fallen to 69, at once rose to 77.[1]

[1] Sta Rosa, Evènements en Piedmont, 147, 450; Ann. Hist. 350-352, 359, 370.

These events on the Continent were of too stirring and important a kind not to attract great attention in England; and accordingly it was early in the session of 1821

59. Debate on these foreign affairs in Parliament. Feb. 21.

made the subject of an animated debate in Parliament. It was opened by Sir James Mackintosh, who, in a brilliant speech, condemned the interference of the Austrians with the Neapolitan Revolution, and concluded with moving for "copies or extracts of such representations as have been made on the part of his Majesty's Government to the Allied Powers respecting the interpretation given by them to the treaties subsisting between them and Great Britain, with reference to the right of general interference in the internal affairs of independent states, and respecting the measures proposed to be taken by them in the exercise of such rights." Lord Castlereagh answered in a luminous and admirable speech, remarkable as *the last* which he ever addressed to the House on foreign affairs.* The debate was very animated, and called forth

* Lord Castlereagh said on this occasion: "We are now at the end of a long course of policy, with regard to which very different views had been expressed on the other side of the House. It is strange to find his Majesty's ministers now censured by the gentlemen opposite for not having committed their Government to a war with the greatest military Powers in Europe. The honourable gentleman and his friends, when we were recently engaged in war with a great military despotism that had overrun every smaller state, and threatened the independence of the greatest, were perpetually recommending that England should rest upon its oars. Ministers were then asked—'Why persevere in a fruitless contest? Our only chance of safety is in husbanding our resources.' Is it for them now to contend that, reversing all this, our resources are to be expended in a fresh gigantic contest, not undertaken in self-defence or for any necessary cause, but in prosecution of abstract rights, and what are called our 'moral duties?' It is rather too much, after all we have heard from them on former occasions of the distressed state of the country, when reductions of all kinds, and especially of the army, have been called for again and again, to be told that it is now incumbent on us to engage without any preparation in a fresh war, in order to dictate moral lessons to Europe.

"With regard to the alliance of the Continental sovereigns, of which so much has been said, I am far from being disposed to shrink from its defence. It is not surprising that the gentlemen opposite should feel a little sore at an alliance which has so much disappointed their dismal forebodings. It is, perhaps, too much to expect of human nature to behold with patience, much less with satisfaction, what, so long as it endures, must be a monument of their folly. This alliance, which I hope will long continue to cement the peace of Europe, has proved to demonstration the absurdity of those prophecies in which the honourable gentlemen opposite have indulged, and of the schemes of policy which they have recommended. It is but an act of justice to these Governments to say—and I say it with the utmost solemnity—that as far as my knowledge extends, and as far as the means I have had, from personal and confidential communications, have enabled me to judge, there has not been since

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warm strictures from the Liberals on the Holy Alliance, and corresponding praises of the Spanish and Italian revolutions. Ministers were loudly censured for not having at once joined the Spanish and Neapolitan revolutionists, and declared war against Russia, Austria, and Prussia. But as Lord Castlereagh had declared in the course of his

the year 1814 the slightest indication on the part of any of the Allied Powers of a wish for territorial aggrandisement.

"This being the case in general, founded on an intimate knowledge of these foreign Powers, has there been anything in their conduct towards Naples which showed that they had departed from their former principles? From all the information transmitted to me from the most authentic sources, I can assure the House that the parties to the Holy Alliance were sincere in the application of these principles to Italy. That, however, is a point which, fortunately for the cause of truth, rests on evidence more trustworthy than personal assertions or Cabinet communications. It is one of the admirable effects of that Alliance, so much decried by gentlemen opposite, that it is hardly possible for any system of territorial ambition to be conceived, which must not find in its principles an antagonistic and counteracting power. With regard to Italy in particular, any man acquainted with the first elements of the balance of power must see that Austria could not, if she acted consistently with her own safety and policy, take any steps towards a permanent occupation of Naples by a military force. If the Cabinet of Vienna wished to obtain territorial aggrandisement at the expense of that lesser Power, she was certain to meet with immediate opposition both from Russia and France, not to say anything of Sardinia and the north of Italy, through which her forces were now allowed to pass by special permission. The granting of that permission proved indisputably that Austria, in marching to Naples, was not even suspected of aiming at territorial aggrandisement. The real object for which she was moving her forces in that direction was of a very different nature, and of a purely defensive character. She was desirous to put down the revolutionary Government in Naples, not because it was revolutionary, but because it was *aggressive*, and rested on the efforts of secret and affiliated societies, whose object, aided by military revolt, was to overturn all the established Governments in Europe.

"With regard to the difference of principle which existed between the Allied Powers and the English Government, I must observe that the declaration to which the English Government had replied was by no means the final paper of the Allied sovereigns on that important and difficult question, How far the interference of one Government in the regulation of the internal administration of another is or is not a justifiable measure? The ministers of England and France took no share whatever in these discussions. The minister of England, indeed, was there, to notice any territorial aggrandisement, if anything of the kind had been contemplated; but he was not there with powers to commit his Government by any act or opinion of his own. The House would be doing injustice to the Allied Powers if it took anything contained in that paper as containing the calm and deliberate opinion of the Allied Powers. The English Government, however, would have abandoned a duty which it owed to itself, to the country, and to the world, if it had not, when these principles were submitted to its notice, explicitly declared its dissent from them. The House would be doing a gross injustice towards Ministers if it did not give

speech, that Britain was no party to the hostile measures of Austria in Italy, and that they were undertaken on her own responsibility, in consequence of the aggressive efforts directed against her by the secret societies in Lombardy and Piedmont, the House was in a great degree satisfied,[1] the more especially as it was evident that this country could

[1] Parl. Deb. New Series, iv. 894.

them credit for being sincere in that declaration, as it would be doing to the Allied Powers if it assumed their declaration as the deliberate and final enunciation of their principles.

"I certainly am of opinion that if the principle be once admitted that one Government has a right to interfere in the domestic economy of another whenever a revolution has been effected which is displeasing to it, the principle must apply to this country as well as to any other; and as I cannot admit the right of any foreign country to interfere with the administration of this country, or to express any satisfaction or dissatisfaction at any of its internal arrangements or changes, and as I cannot for a moment contemplate the possibility of any foreign potentate claiming a right to land his troops in this country without the permission of Parliament, I apprehend that the principle asserted in the paper of the Allied sovereigns has been carried further than is consistent with principle or sound policy. The British Government has, therefore, been driven to lay down a general principle upon this point, but not without an exception. That exception is, when such foreign interference is essential to national security from the propagandist effort made by the country in a state of convulsion. Even, however, if circumstances should occur which called for dissent or remonstrances of this country against the conduct of foreign states, it cannot be contended that we either should or could interfere with such talismanic effect as would compel all the great military Powers of the Continent to bow before us. If we wish, as all do, to live in peace, there is no truth more obvious than that this country ought to think twice before it commits itself. I am not one who thinks meanly either of the resources of the country, or of the influence which it possesses when it thinks proper to exert it. If we do speak, we ought to speak with effect; and I should deem it most pusillanimous conduct on our part if, after interfering in a question of this nature, we did not follow it up with some more effectual measures. Nothing would compromise the safety of the nation and the great name it had acquired in foreign countries so much as such a measure.

"Considering, therefore, the relative situation of England and Naples at the present juncture, I must say that even if I had felt, which I did not, that Austria had been committing an act of unjust aggression upon Naples, I would not have stated this feeling in a remonstrance or state-paper, because, had I done so, I should have considered myself bound to follow it up with harsher measures. The language held to Naples has been precisely the same as that held to Austria. I have explained them to Count Ludolph (the Neapolitan minister) as to the Court of Austria. For though the British Government have refused to receive Prince Cimitelli in his public capacity as minister of Naples, I have not refused to make those communications to that individual which his high rank, no less than his personal character, so justly demanded. I have never concealed from Prince Cimitelli the wish of the British Government to know more of the circumstances of the revolution of Naples before it affixed to them the formal seal of its sanction. The Neapolitan Government would indeed have been very glad to have had its new minister at once received; but

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have effected nothing in opposition to the three coalesced Powers on the continent of Europe. On a division, Ministers had a majority of 69, the numbers being 194 to 125.

60. Return of popularity to Ministers.

The disclosures made in the course of this debate, and, above all, the knowledge that the British Government was no party to the crusade against the freedom of mankind, as

the refusal to do so had not caused any interruption in the friendship of the two states.

"With respect to Austria, we intimated at once to that Power that as this question was one involving great interests, it appeared to us from the outset that it did not require us to wait for the decision of another Power. We intimated to her, because she was the Power most interested in the transaction, that whatever influence the Neapolitan revolution might have upon her position, upon ours it had no bearing that would justify us in interfering to counteract it. We admitted that the situation of Austria was very different from that of England, but we did not decide that because we had not a right to interfere Austria had such a right and ought to interfere. The question with regard to Austria divided itself into one of right and one of expediency; for the difficulty of it did not consist so much in the means to be employed in the occupation of Naples, as in the manner in which the elements of government were to be compounded after its occupation, so as to secure its future independence. It is not to be supposed that it is in contemplation to quarter an Austrian garrison to perpetuity in Naples. Those who suppose it is so do great injustice to the Allied sovereigns, who are acting in this transaction under the most painful circumstances for the good of mankind. Great difficulty may arise hereafter as to how Naples, after its miltiary occupation, is to be governed; and that being the case, nothing could be more impolitic in a British minister than to involve himself and his country in it. Even if Austria had a right to go to war, I have never given her any intimation that we wish her to go to war. On the contrary, I always held out to the Allied sovereigns that Great Britain was not at all interested in the transaction, and had so far separated herself from it as to be no party to it whatever.

"The whole question has been argued on the opposite side on an unjust and unfounded prejudice. Efforts have been made to raise a horror in this House and throughout the country against the late Government of Naples, by representing it as of a nature so horrible that the people in self-defence were obliged to destroy it; and that being such, the destruction of it could not be formidable to the Austrians. As far as our information goes, this is an unjust and unfounded representation of the fact. Without saying anything offensive to the present sovereign of Spain, I must observe that the circumstances which led to the Spanish and the Neapolitan revolutions were widely different. The Spaniards had formerly been in possession of a free constitution, and by their exertions during the late war had shown themselves again worthy to enjoy it. They had obtained one by their blood and treasure, and Ferdinand had first promised to maintain it, and then, after destroying it, he held out hopes to the nation that he would give them another. This he had failed to do. The army, which was instrumental in Spain to the revolution, was extremely ill-paid, was discontented, and for some time previous to it had been in a state of open mutiny. The case in Naples was very different. As far as I am acquainted with that country, it has practically enjoyed the blessings of a free country, though not in possession of a representative government. But I deprecate the doctrine

it was deemed, about to be undertaken by Austria with the concurrence of the Northern Powers, had a surprising effect in restoring the popularity of Ministers, and relieving Lord Castlereagh in particular of great part of the

that the subjects of Governments which do not enjoy a representative system are justified in throwing off their allegiance and resorting to arms in order to obtain one. Such an attempt to force the liberties of mankind, is the very last of which, for the sake of freedom itself, I should advise the adoption. A representative form of government, founded on the model of the British constitution, had been introduced into Sicily by Lord W. Bentinck, but it had not been productive of the benefits anticipated from it. In short, *it had entirely failed;* and therefore it was too much to say that a representative government was sure to put a stop to all the fraud, artifice, and oppression of a despotic power. But even if it were likely to be attended with such beneficial results, I must look upon its violent introduction by an armed force as most injurious. To hold any other doctrine would be to patronise principles calculated to loosen all the connections of society, and destroy the security of social existence.

"It is a gross misrepresentation to hold out the late Government at Naples as arbitrary and tyrannical. From all the information I have received from the very best sources of information, the fact is just the reverse. If any intelligent traveller had been asked, up to July last, when the military revolt broke out, what was the country in Europe which stood least in need of such a convulsion, he would without hesitation have said Naples. In a letter from a liberal man at that capital, dated 31st March last, he said—'The more moderate men of this party admit the general prosperity of the country, and the liberality of the views of those by whom it is governed; and admit that there is a greater degree of liberty than ever existed before. The existing Government has done a great deal for the benefit of the nation. The privilegè granted to communes of fixing among themselves their quota of taxes; the annual departmental assemblies for the purpose of remonstrating against grievances, and pointing out such measures as were necessary for the good of the state;—the abolition of the feudal system, with all its concomitant abuses; the rendering of all men equal in the eye of the law; the establishment of other codes, and the reformation of the tribunals,—all these were regarded as the first steps to liberal opinions, and as the foundation on which something better might be built when the nation had become prepared for the benefits of a free constitution.' In another letter, dated 5th July, just three days after the Revolution had been effected, the writer said—'Not a shadow of blame has been thrown upon the existing Government by the proclamation of General Pepe; a diminution of half the duty on salt is the only benefit held out to the people; so mild and paternal a government never before was known in these kingdoms.' With less security, and more distrust, the result would have been very different. An excess of liberality, however, has led to the same end in Naples as an excess of severity elsewhere. The Revolution was owing to the union between the troops and the Carbonari. The Carbonari were a sect which owed its origin to the late Government, and was encouraged at its outset as a means of sapping and undermining the colossal power of France.

"These Carbonari amount to hundreds of thousands; and I know positively that, at the moment when the late events were going on in Naples, a simultaneous plan was matured at Bologna, in the north of Italy. Yet this was the sect into whose hands the consolidation of Italy was to be intrusted, and who were to rule over it in future, as they now did over the Parliament of Naples.

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obloquy which had been laid upon him as the supposed head of the ultra-conservative portion of the Cabinet. The result of the Queen's trial had a great influence the same way; and never was seen a more striking instance than on this occasion of the alternate sway of opposite feelings on all popular societies, but especially those of the Anglo-Saxon race. Lord Eldon's prophecy was verified to the letter: the Queen, after being elevated for a brief period to the skies by the loud voice of the people, sank to rise no more. Lord Castlereagh, too, had prophesied when the public clamour against the King was at its height, that "in six months he would be the most popular man in his dominions." This prediction was as rapidly realised as the other; and the symptoms of the sovereign's returning popularity were so evident that, contrary to his usual habits and inclination, he was prevailed on by his ministers to appear both in the parks and prin-

Under such circumstances, I trust England will not be called on to interfere. Austria is engaged in her present course, under the jealous supervision of the other Powers, whose interest it especially is that she should not aggrandise herself by any proceeding now pending, but simply guard herself against the intrigues of the sect to which I have alluded. The revolution against which Austria has now armed, has been brought about by fraud and secrecy, upon an organised plan between the military and the Carbonari, got up in the style of the worst period of the French Revolution. It was so artfully managed by these means that it succeeded, though it began only by the act of 150 dragoons, three lieutenants of police, and one priest. Gentlemen opposite may make such acts the subject of unqualified approbation, but I think no nation can conduct its affairs with advantage to itself and tranquillity to its neighbours, if its sovereign is to be surprised by any act prepared in this manner. It is ridiculous to talk of the time afforded by this test to the King to frame a constitution. That monarch, in his declaration, bearing date the 2d July 1820, promised to give the people a constitution within *eight days*—a time surely not too long for preparing such an act; but the very next day his palace was attacked by the mob, who insisted upon the *immediate* proclamation of a constitution. The sovereign, thus attacked, and allowed not a moment for deliberation, was advised by his Ministers in Council to tender the Spanish constitution, *not one line of which had ever been read by any member of that Council*, by whom it was now, in the emergency of the moment, recommended as a model, in total ignorance of its nature, for the King of Naples to adopt! Surely, under such circumstances, the British Government were not much to blame if they hesitated to recognise an authority thus violently imposed upon a sovereign prince. The people of England will not be so imposed upon. They know that all is not gold that glitters, and that a constitution is not free merely because its advocates have built it upon the ruins of an established government."—*Parliamentary Debates, New Series*, iv. 866-880.

cipal theatres, on which occasions he was received with unbounded applause. These favourable symptoms induced Government to proceed with the coronation, which had been originally destined for the month of August preceding, but was postponed in consequence of the proceedings against the Queen, and the violent excitement against the monarch which it produced. It was fixed for the 19th July in the present year.

61. Coronation of Geo. IV. July 19.

The Queen, who was not aware that her popularity had declined as rapidly as that of her husband had increased, preferred a claim both to the King and the Privy Council, to the Earl Marshal of England, and to the Archbishop of Canterbury, to be crowned at the same time as Queen Consort; but the petition was refused. Upon this she declared her resolution to come and take her place in spite of all opposition, and the knowledge of this produced such a panic that tickets of admission, which before had been selling for ten guineas, were to be had for half-a-crown! The ceremony took place, however, without any disorder, and with the most imposing effect. It was the more remarkable that it was the *last* on which the imposing customs of chivalry were exhibited on the occasion. Subsequent economy has grudged an expense which carried the mind back to the Edwards and the Henries—the days of Cressy and Agincourt. Sir Walter Scott, who was present, took a different view of the matter. "A ceremony more august and imposing in all its parts, or more calculated to make the deepest impression both on the eye and the feelings, cannot possibly be conceived. The expense, so far as it is national and personal, goes directly and instantly to the encouragement of the British manufactures. It operates as a tax on wealth and consideration, for the benefit of poverty and industry; a tax willingly paid by the one class, and not less acceptable to the other, because it adds a happy holiday to the monotony of a life of labour."[1] "Men," says a contemporary annalist, "whose names have become immortal, walked—

[1] Edin. Chron. July 23, 1821.

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some of them, alas! for the last time—in that magnificent pageant. There was Wellington, who grasped in his hand the baton won on the field of Vitoria, and bore by his side the sword which struck down Napoleon on the plains of Waterloo, and whose Roman countenance, spiritualised but not yet dimmed by years, bespoke the lofty cast of his mind; there Lord Castlereagh, who had recently succeded to the title of Londonderry, in the magnificent robes of the Garter, with his lofty plumes, fine face, and majestic figure, appearing a fitting representative of the Order of Edward III."[1] He was received with loud acclamations, not only by the company within the abbey and the hall, but by the populace which thronged the passage between the two. What in an especial manner attracted attention was the serene expression and unruffled aspect of his countenance, like that of Napoleon—the result of a mind singularly equable and self-poised, but justly exciting surprise when seen in one who, though as yet little beyond the prime of life, had been so long in a prominent situation as a statesman, that the world had come to regard him as advanced in years.

[1] Hist. of Europe, Second Series, ii. 485.

62. Death of the Queen, and dismissal of Sir R. Wilson.

The Queen had in vain made an attempt during the ceremony to make her way into Westminster Abbey. Her having been respectfully but firmly denied admission by the persons at the doors, by orders from the Government, threw her into such a state of agitation as, combined with an obstruction of her bowels, proved fatal to her Majesty in a fortnight after. She directed her remains to be carried to her native country and buried beside her forefathers, with the inscription, "Here lies Caroline of Brunswick, the injured Queen of England." Her funeral, which took place on the 14th August, gave rise to a painful scene, which is too closely connected with a gallant officer, who occupies a distinguished place in his country's annals, to be passed over without special notice. Sir R. Wilson, who, since the termination of the war, had been a Member of Parliament and an ardent Liberal, took

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a prominent part in a great popular demonstration, which was intended to compel the authorities to convey the hearse containing the body, not by the circuitous route which had been prescribed to Harwich, the place of embarkation, but through the city of London. A riot took place in consequence at Cumberland Gate of Hyde Park, in which the populace were victorious, as they fairly forced the procession into the line which the people desired, and it was conveyed amidst loud acclamations, attended by an immense concourse of people, through the very heart of London. During the struggle at Cumberland Gate, the military fired, and two men were unfortunately killed by shots from the Life Guards. Sir R. Wilson interposed, and addressed some words to the soldiers, *not through their officers*, urging them, as his friends said, to humanity in the discharge of their painful duty; as the Government authorities said, recommending them to disregard their orders. The result was, that both the police magistrate who had given orders for the charge on the line of procession, and Sir R. Wilson, who had directly addressed the soldiers not through their officers, were dismissed from the King's service. It is impossible to record this transaction without deep feelings of regret, which were felt by none more strongly than Sir Charles Stewart. It was a melancholy day for him and the British army when one of its brightest ornaments, and the first man who had stood by his side on the summit of the great redoubt of Dresden, had ceased to dignify its ranks. Yet must impartial posterity confess that the step, however to be regretted, was unavoidable. Obedience is the first duty of a soldier: the armed force, in Carnot's words, "acts, but never deliberates." It was not a time to violate this sacred principle, when the Spanish and Italian peninsulas had been recently convulsed, and their governments overturned by military revolts. By acting as he did on this occasion, Sir R. Wilson afforded the most decisive vindication of Lord

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Castlereagh in transferring him from the Grand Army in Germany to the Austrian one in Italy, in the end of 1813. The man whose feelings were so ardent that he was swept away by them in this manner on such a momentous occasion, however gallant in mounting a breach or heading a charge, was not one to be intrusted with the delicate duty of advising his Government as to the military posture of affairs, or the course to be pursued in the impending negotiations for a general peace.*

63. Origin of the Greek and Spanish questions.

The time was now fast approaching, however, when Great Britain was to be involved in more serious questions than these internal heartburnings, and when Lord Castlereagh, as the head of the Foreign Office, was compelled to take a decided part in regard to two of the most important events of recent times—the Greek Revolution, and the French intervention in Spain. These questions were not only interesting in themselves, as affecting two considerable portions of the European commonwealth, but they became doubly so from the principle in which they both originated, and the imminent hazard to national independence and the balance of power with which they were attended. That principle was, the alleged right of popular and military revolt to change the form of government and correct alleged abuses—a principle of the utmost moment at any time, but especially at a crisis when all the monarchies in Europe were shaken by secret societies, associated together and aiming at the universal establishment of republican institutions. And that danger arose from the Powers immediately concerned in these convulsions, who now stood forward and claimed the right to intervene for their own security in their neighbour's affairs. These Powers were Russia and France. The former claimed the right to intervene in the affairs of Greece, on the principle of humanity and for the interests of the

* It is pleasing to be able to record that, when these heats were over, Sir R. Wilson was, by a succeeding Administration, restored to his rank in the army at home, and was for several years governor of Gibraltar—one of the best military appointments in the gift of the Crown abroad.

Christian faith, menaced with destruction in the East by the ruthless violence of the Turks; the latter as loudly insisted upon her right to intervene in the affairs of the Peninsula for her own safety, upon the principle stated by Mr Burke, "that if my neighbour's house is in flames, and it threatens to spread to my own, I am entitled to interpose to extinguish it before it proceeds further." Yet how just soever these principles might be in the general case, their application in this particular one was attended with no small hazard; for if Russia intervened in favour of the Greek insurgents, it would in all probability lead to the overthrow of the Ottoman empire and the entire establishment of Russian preponderance in the East; and if France did the same in the Spanish Peninsula, there would no longer be any Pyrenees, the work of Marlborough and Wellington would be undone, and the dream of Louis XIV. and Napoleon would be realised by the practical concentration of the forces of both monarchies in the hands of the sovereign of France.

64. Difficulties attending the Greek question.

The Greek Revolution first broke out, and it soon assumed most menacing proportions. The Czar was strongly urged, both by his own feelings, and the loud voice of his subjects, and the Liberals in Europe, to interpose in favour of his co-religionists in the Peloponnesus, and rescue the Christians in the East from the frightful and atrocious cruelty of the Turks, which menaced them with total extermination; and the Cabinet of St Petersburg deemed the opportunity arrived of pursuing the career of conquest in Turkey, and planting the Cross again, after the lapse of four centuries, on the dome of St Sophia. It was very difficult to know what was to be done; for every feeling of humanity and religion called for a speedy interposition to rescue the Christians of the East from the destruction which menaced them; and, on the other hand, that interposition could not be carried into effect without the surrender of Constantinople to the Russians, and such an addition to the influence of the Czar as would render him irresistible, and entirely

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subvert the balance of power in Europe.* In these circumstances, the utmost prudence and delicacy was required to avoid a general conflagration, and Lord Castlereagh conducted the negotiation with equal judgment and success. He availed himself of a permission which he had received from the Emperor Alexander to correspond directly with him, without his communication passing through the hands of his ministers; and he wrote to him a confidential letter, on the 16th of July 1821, which had a material effect in altering the views of that monarch, and at length extricating the Greeks from their danger, without subverting the balance of power in Europe. His letter fortunately has been preserved entire in the *Castlereagh Correspondence*, and remains one of the most striking monuments of his wisdom and foresight. It brought under the eyes of the Czar the danger which awaited his throne if he openly intervened in favour of an insurgent people. Alexander, as he said himself, "saw the mask of revolution in Peloponnesus," and desisted from any single or military interposition; and the battle of Navarino, fought by the *united* Powers of Christendom, delivered the East without endangering the independence of the West.†

* "The three Allied Powers had recently issued a decided proclamation against the Greek Revolution. On the 13th of May, the Hon. Mr Gordon wrote from Laybach to Lord Castlereagh:—"Austria could not speak with more decision if Russia had actually been transformed into a province of her empire, and confides as implicitly to her accord and support. On the other hand, serious apprehensions are entertained of the consequences which the Greek Revolution may lead to; the worst of which look to the possibility of the Emperor Alexander being compelled by his own subjects to adopt a different line, and take up arms as defender of the Greek religion. An obstinate resistance to the unanimous voice of his people, it is feared, might seriously endanger the existence of his Government, and the Russian temper is already sufficiently soured by the countermand order given to the troops. It is reported here to-day that the patriarch of Constantinople has been murdered—an event which, if it be true, will not fail to increase the general apprehensions."—Hon. R. Gordon *to* Lord Castlereagh, *Laybach, May* 13, 1821; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 396.

† "*Foreign Office, London, 16th July* 1821.

"Sire,—When admitted to take leave of your Imperial Majesty, previous to your departure in 1818 from Aix-la-Chapelle, your Majesty condescended to permit me to address myself directly to your Majesty on any occasion when the interests of the European Alliance might justify me in having recourse to this indulgence. That I have not hitherto availed myself of your Majesty's

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65. Difficulties of the Spanish question.

The Spanish question presented difficulties of a still more serious kind, for with it were wound up interests close at home of the most pressing and recent, as well as more remote associations of the most heartstirring kind. It was France which claimed the right here to intervene

gracious permission, is a proof that I have not been tempted to abuse this peculiar mark of your Imperial Majesty's favour and confidence. In obedience to the King my Sovereign's commands, and under a deep sense of the importance of the present crisis, I now presume to address your Imperial Majesty upon the affairs of Turkey; and I do so with the less hesitation, as I feel an intimate conviction, however your Imperial Majesty may be pressed and embarrassed by local considerations, and by the peculiar temper of your own people, that your Imperial Majesty's general view of these complicated evils will correspond with that of the British Government. And I entertain a not less sanguine persuasion that your Imperial Majesty, triumphing over every local impediment, will ultimately pursue that course of policy which will afford an additional, but not an unexpected, proof of your Imperial Majesty's determination to maintain inviolably the European system, as consolidated by the late treaties of peace. I am confident that the dreadful events which now afflict that portion of Europe are not regarded by your Imperial Majesty as constituting, in the history of these times, either a new or an insulated question. They do not originate exclusively in the conflicting and inflammable elements of which the Turkish empire is composed, but they form a branch of that organised spirit of insurrection which is sytematically propagating itself throughout Europe, and which explodes wherever the hand of the governing power, from whatever cause, is enfeebled. If its symptoms are more destructive in Turkey, it is because, in that unhappy country, it finds all those passions and prejudices, and, above all, those religious animosities which give to civil commotions their most odious and afflicting colours. The limitrope position of your Imperial Majesty's States; the religious sympathy of the great mass of your Majesty's subjects with the Greek population of Turkey; the extensive intercourse which reciprocally takes place between the people of the respective empires for commercial and other purposes; and, amongst other causes, the ancient jealousies inseparable from the history of the two States—place your Imperial Majesty in the very front of this scene of European embarrassment.

"It would be superfluous to waste your Imperial Majesty's time by arguing that Turkey, with all its barbarisms, constitutes, in the system of Europe, what may be regarded as a necessary evil. It is an excrescence which can scarcely be looked upon as forming any part of its healthful organisation; and yet, for that very reason, any attempt to introduce order by *external interference* into its jarring elements, or to assimilate it to the mass, might expose the whole frame of our general system to hazard. The real question which presses for consideration is—how the danger shall be kept at a distance from other States, and how the adjacent Powers can best preserve their pacific relations with a people so convulsed? The question presses most with respect to your Imperial Majesty's dominions, and it divides itself into the two considerations:—1st, What the risks are of the peace of your Imperial Majesty's own provinces being disturbed by the insurrection propagating itself in that direction; and, 2d, The injuries and indignities to which your Imperial Majesty's servants or subjects have been, or may be exposed, within the Turkish empire, during the continuance of these troubles.

"With regard to the former, I should hope that little or nothing is to be

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on the same ground on which Austria had asserted her right to interpose in the affairs of Italy—viz., that the security of her own dominions was endangered by the propagandist efforts of her revolutionised neighbour. The danger of this interference forcibly illustrated the

feared; and that, with the imposing force which your Imperial Majesty can assemble on the frontiers, the entry of the infection within the Russian territory may be regarded as impossible. The latter evil is of a more pressing nature; and it is lamentable to observe, from the latest intelligence from Constantinople, to what trials your Imperial Majesty's forbearance may be exposed under this head.* To expect or even to wish that your Imperial Majesty should not at a proper moment assert the just rights of your Crown and people, can form no part of the policy of this Government; but in proportion as your Imperial Majesty's power is undoubted, and, as the events of the late war have placed you on exalted ground, your Imperial Majesty can afford to temporise, and to suffer the tempest to exhaust itself. The Turkish State at this moment seems not only infected with all the poison of modern principles, but infuriated with all its ancient and distinctive animosities. The Government, as well as the population, have surrendered for the moment their ordinary faculties of reason and prudence, and have given themselves up to a fanatic madness, and to a blind spirit of internal and exterminating warfare. It is not at such a moment that wrongs can be satisfactorily inquired into, or reparation discussed. Your Imperial Majesty, it is humbly but confidently submitted, must wait for the moment of returning reason and reflection, unless you are prepared, Sire, to charge yourself with the perils and burdens of a military occupation, to be effectuated not amongst a Christian and tractable, but amongst a bigoted, revengeful, and uncivilised population.

"No doubt humanity shudders at the scenes which are acting, as it appears, throughout the greater part of European Turkey; and it will require all the commanding authority of your Imperial Majesty's great name and character to reconcile the Russian nation to witness the ministers of a congenial faith so barbarously immolated to the resentment of a Government under which they have the misfortune to live. But it is in vain to hope that we can materially alter their lot, or deliver them from their sufferings, and preserve the system of Europe as it now stands. The hazard of innovating upon this consecrated work, and the reflection that, whilst we cannot refuse to the Greeks our sympathy and our compassion, they have been the aggressors on the present occasion; and that they have yielded to the hazardous and corrupting practice of the times, so reproved by your Imperial Majesty, may well reconcile your Imperial Majesty and your Allies to observe rather than to intermeddle in the endless and inextricable mazes of Turkish confusion.

"The flame burns at this moment too ardently to be of long duration; a time must arrive, and that probably at no distant period, when the Turkish Power, exhausted by its own convulsions, will be accessible to reason, and when your Imperial Majesty's voice will be heard, and your wrongs be redressed; and perhaps Providence, in the many trials to which it has destined your Majesty in your eventful and glorious life, has never presented an occasion in which your Imperial Majesty may afford to your own times and to posterity a prouder manifestation of your Imperial Majesty's principles than by exercising towards this fanatic and semi-barbarous State that degree of forbearance

* Alluding to the recent murder of the Greek patriarch by the Turks.

risks with which the determination of the Northern Powers to interpose in Italy were attended; for here the principle was proposed to be applied, within a year after it had been announced, in the most hazardous of all circumstances for the peace of Europe, and eventually the balance of power and independence of all the States composing it. France proposed to invade Spain with 100,000 men, of whom 60,000 were to march direct from Bayonne upon Madrid, and 40,000 penetrate from Roussillon into Catalonia. With their united forces they were to overturn the existing Government, abolish the

and magnanimity which a religious and enthusiastic respect for the system which your Imperial Majesty has so powerfully contributed to raise in Europe could alone dictate under such provocations, and with such means at your Imperial Majesty's disposal.

"I presume to hope that the sentiments I have ventured to express will neither prove unacceptable to, nor be disavowed by your Imperial Majesty. Whatever degree of divergence of opinion may have occurred in late discussions on abstract theories of international law, and however the position of the British Government may have latterly been rendered distinct from that of the three Allied Courts, by the line of neutrality which the King thought it necessary to adopt with respect to Italian affairs, there happily has hardly occurred an instance, since the auspicious period which gave birth to the existing alliance, of any point of grave, practical, political difference between your Imperial Majesty's councils and those of my august master. I feel intimately convinced that each State, avowing conscientiously in the face of all the world its own principles, and at the same time adhering to its peculiar habits of action, will nevertheless remain unalterably true to the fundamental obligations of the alliance; and that the present European system, thus temperately and prudently administered, will long continue to subsist for the safety and repose of Europe.

"Your Imperial Majesty may rest assured that the King has no object more sincerely at heart than to give to your Imperial Majesty and to his august Allies every proof of attachment which his sense of duty and the nature of his Government will permit; and that your Imperial Majesty may rely upon receiving, on all occasions as on the present, the most undisguised exposition of his Majesty's views. I entreat your Imperial Majesty to interpret favourably the liberty which I have now taken, and that you will permit me, Sire, to seize this occasion of renewing to your Imperial Majesty the assurances of my respectful veneration and sincere attachment, and of the very deep personal sense which I can never cease to feel of your Imperial Majesty's gracious indulgence to me, whenever, in the discharge of my public duties, it has been permitted to me either to approach or to address your Majesty. It will always be my ambition to recommend myself to your Imperial Majesty's favourable opinion, and to labour to cement the connection between the two States. With the utmost deference, and with the highest consideration, I have the honour to remain, Sire, your Imperial Majesty's most humble and faithful servant, LONDONDERRY."—*Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 403-408.

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constitution which had been established by the revolted soldiery, and re-establish Ferdinand as "*El Re Assoluto,*" on the throne of his fathers. What was this but to renew the ambitious projects of Louis XIV. and Napoleon upon the Spanish Peninsula, which had led to the terrible wars of the succession and the Peninsula, and only been arrested by the shedding of torrents of blood? The French interference in any event would be attended with hazard: defeated, it would give an impulse to the revolutionary party in Europe which would probably overturn the Bourbon monarchy and land the Continent in a general war; victorious, it would establish French supremacy in Spain, and undo all for which Marlborough had fought and Wellington had conquered.

66. Other questions for discussion regarding Greece, South America, and slave trade, which led to Congress of Verona.

Besides this question, which was of paramount importance, there were others of great moment which loudly called for consideration and decision by the Allied Powers. The Greek question remained deeply interesting to all Christendom, from the classical associations with which it was connected, and the religious sympathy which it evoked; the terrible civil war of South America was still raging, and not only desolating its beautiful provinces by a contest of extermination, but covering the ocean with freebooters who, under cover of one or other flag, made prize of the vessels of all nations; and the slave trade, despite the declaration against it by the Congress of Vienna, and the subsequent treaty with Spain providing for its entire cessation by the vessels of that Power, still continued to flourish under cover of neutral, and especially the American, flags. In these circumstances it was wisely judged by the Allied Powers that a congress to adjust these important and delicate questions was indispensable, and it was agreed it should meet at Verona in September 1822. The numerous engagements of Lord Castlereagh, now Marquess of Londonderry, rendered it doubtful whether he could, in the first instance at least, take a part personally in it, and the Duke of Wellington was

intrusted with the important mission. But Lord Castlereagh furnished him before his departure with a long and minute letter of instructions, which fortunately is preserved in the Wellington Papers, and has been given in substance in the fourth volume of Mr Gleig and Captain Brialmont's valuable work. It is of surpassing interest and peculiar value, as being a summary of that great statesman's views on the most momentous points of *modern* European politics, in the mazes of which the world is still to all appearance inextricably involved. It is the noblest monument of his combined wisdom and liberality, and at the same time the most interesting, for it is *the last* he ever constructed.

67. Lord Castlereagh's instructions to the Duke of Wellington at Verona.

"It may be anticipated," said Lord Castlereagh in this memorable instrument, "that the subjects of general discussion will be these—first, the Turkish question, external and internal; secondly, the Spanish question, European and American; thirdly, the affairs of Italy. With this last question you will be careful not to concern yourself at all. As England has been no party to the military occupation of Naples and Sardinia, as she has merely acquiesced in it to prevent worse things, so she feels herself excluded from advising upon the arrangement, now that it is complete, lest by doing so she should appear to admit the justice of a proceeding against which, from the outset, she has protested. You will therefore, as representing Great Britain, absent yourself from all meetings at which Italian affairs are to be discussed, and if possible avoid connecting yourself with the congress till they have been settled.

68. Continued.

"With regard to the Turkish question, as well external as internal, the course to be pursued is this. All possible measures are in the first instance to be tried to reconcile the differences between Russia and Turkey. These connect themselves partly with the right of protection, which by treaty Russia is authorised to afford to Christianity in Turkey, and partly with certain restric-

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tions which the Porte has recently imposed upon the navigation of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. When this object has been so far attained as to avert the risk of actual collision between the two Powers, *then, and not till then,* the condition of Greece is to be considered. Now, Greece has gained of late so much in the contest that it is not easy to avoid dealing with the government which she has set up, as with a government *de facto.* Still you will, as British plenipotentiary, be cautious to act with great circumspection in the matter; and above all, stand aloof from any engagement with the Allies, either to accept the Greek Government as that of an independent State, or to compel the submission of Greece herself to the Porte by force of arms.

69. Continued.

"But by far the most tangled web of the whole is that in which Spain and her affairs are wrapped up; and not the least so, in that portion of it which embraces her relations with the revolted colonies, and the effect thereby produced upon the commerce of the world. As to the form of government which she has of late established for herself in Europe, *that is a matter with which, in the opinion of the English Cabinet, no foreign Power has the smallest right to interfere.* It rests entirely with the King of Spain and his subjects to settle their differences, if they have any, between themselves. And this important truth you will urge with all your influence upon the Allies, *and especially upon France.* But the case of the revolted colonies is different. It is evident, from the course which events have taken, that *their recognition as independent States has become merely a question of time.* Over by far the greater part of them Spain has lost all hold: and it has been found necessary, in order to admit their merchant vessels into English ports, to alter the navigation laws, both of England and Spain. You will accordingly advocate a removal of the difficulty on this principle: that every province which has actually established its independence should be recognised; that

with provinces in which the war still went on, no relation should be established; and that where negotiations are in progress between a revolted colony and the mother country, relations with the colony should be suspended till the results of such negotiations are known. All this, however, is to be brought about only after a full explanation with Spain herself, and entirely by independent action. There is to be no concert with France or Russia or any other extraneous Power in order to effect it. The policy projected is exclusively English and Spanish, and between England and Spain, and between them alone its course is to be settled. Other nations may or may not come into the views which England entertains; but upon their approval or disapproval of her views, England is not in any way to shape her conduct.

70. Concluded.

"Besides these more general questions, England has some of her own, which the statesman who is to represent her at the Congress will bring forward. Foremost among them all is the suppression of the slave trade, either by a general declaration from the Allies that it should be treated as piracy, or by obtaining from them an engagement that they would not admit into their markets any article of colonial produce which was the result of slave labour. There is besides a claim by England upon Austria for money lent to the latter Power early in the late war; and the Russian ukase of import duties must be discussed, and if possible softened down."[1]*

[1] Lord Londonderry's instructions to Duke of Wellington, July 6, 1822, given by Gleig, iii. 129-131, from Wellington Papers.

71. Reflections on these instructions.

Perhaps it is impossible to discuss the many delicate and important questions of international law here treated of in a more liberal spirit or with greater wisdom than is done in these memorable instructions. They reveal the entire pacific policy of Lord Castlereagh at a time when the peace of the world was threatened by simultaneous and combined popular insurrections in different

* This letter of instructions was, after Lord Castlereagh's death, transferred, without the alteration of a word, to the Duke of Wellington, by Mr Canning, his successor in office.

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States. That policy was mainly founded on three principles—non-intervention; universal national independence; and recognition of new Governments when fully established, and not till then. Following out the first principle, he kept Great Britain aloof from the convulsions of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and South America; following out the second, he protested against the interference of Austria in Italy, of Russia in Turkey, and of France in the Spanish Peninsula; following out the third, he was prepared to recognise and open diplomatic relations with such of the South American States as had *de facto* established their independence, but, till that was done, to keep aloof from either the one side or the other. These principles, which entirely coincided with his own opinions, were ably enforced by the Duke of Wellington at Verona; and although he could not prevent the French intervention in the Peninsula, which took place in the following year, he deprived it of its most dangerous character by limiting it to a temporary occupation. From this it appears that the recognition of such of the Spanish provinces of South America as had *de facto* established their independence, had been agreed on in the Cabinet before Lord Castlereagh's death, and formed part of his foreign policy. Mr Canning, therefore, was sailing under borrowed colours when he made his famous boast of "calling a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old." This new world, since its creation, has been the theatre of such incessant turmoil, bloodshed, and ruin, that it is now evident it has been prematurely called into existence; and that, bad as it was, it had better have remained some time longer in the maternal womb. But be this as it may, the credit or the discredit of calling it into being belongs to Lord Castlereagh rather than Mr Canning.

These important and weighty foreign transactions did not divert Lord Castlereagh's attention from the remedial measures called for by the internal distress, which had now become unbearable in consequence of the universal fall of

prices in articles of every kind, especially agricultural produce, from the vast contraction of the currency, to the extent of nearly a half, which had taken place from the effects of the measure compelling the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of England, by the Bill of 1819. It was provided by that bill that the issue of £1 notes should cease both on the part of the Bank of England and country banks on 1st May 1823, thereby rendering, after that date, the greater part of the circulating medium, and with it the whole credit of the country, entirely dependent on the retention of gold by the Bank of England. It has been already shown how great and disastrous had been the effect of the last and sudden contraction of the currency which had taken place from the operations of the Act, which had in four years (from 1818 to 1822) reduced the exports of the country from £46,000,000 to £36,000,000 (declared value); its imports from £36,000,000 to £30,000,000 (official value); and lowered the price of wheat from 83s. to 43s., of cotton from 2s. to 1s. per lb., and of iron from £9 to £6, 10s. a ton.[1] It may readily be conceived what distress so great and ruinous a fall of prices must have occasioned in a community, nearly the whole of which lived either on the remuneration for labour or on the profit to be made by buying or selling its produce. A committee had been appointed in 1821 to take into consideration the general distress, especially in the agricultural classes; but though its report admitted fully the universal suffering, they were unable to recommend any remedy. The Radicals had a remedy at hand; it was annual parliaments, universal suffrage, and vote by ballot. Meanwhile the general distress continued not only unabated, but was continually increasing, and in the first months of 1822 reached such a height as threatened a general suspension of credit and collapse of industry.

72. Great distress in the country owing to the contraction of the currency by the Bill of 1819.

[1] Vide ante, chap. xvi. § 10, note.

In this extremity the good sense and practical sagacity of Lord Castlereagh suggested the appropriate and only

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73. Lord Castlereagh's remedy by an extension of the currency. July 2.

remedy, and which quickly proved entirely successful. On 2d July 1822 he introduced a bill—*the last* he ever brought into Parliament, permitting the issue of small notes to go on for *ten years longer*, and declaring the £1 notes of the Bank of England a legal tender everywhere, except at that Bank itself. This bill, which was to all practical purposes a repeal of the Act of 1819, save when a general demand for gold sent all the notes in the kingdom to the Bank for payment, attracted very little notice, and passed without a division. Lord Castlereagh put the case upon its true ground. "This," said he, "is a question of currency—*the currency of the country is too contracted for its wants*, and it is our business to apply a remedy." The remedy he proposed was applied accordingly, and a most effectual one it proved. Rapid as had been the decline of prices and the spread of misery and suffering in the abodes of industry under the former system, the return to prosperity and the spread of comfort and contentment among the poor was still more rapid.* The currency for the two islands, which had

* Table showing the Amount of the Currency, Exports, Imports, Revenue, Price of Wheat and Iron, from 1822 to 1825, both inclusive:—

Years.	Total Bank Notes in Circulation.	British and Irish Exports Declared Value.	British, Irish, Colonial, and Foreign Exports. Official Value.	Imports. Official Value.	Wheat per Quarter.	Iron per Ton.	Revenue.
	£	£	£	£	s. d.	£ s	£
1822	26,588,600	36,968,964	53,464,122	30,500,094	43 3	6 10	55,663,650
1823	27,396,544	35,458,048	52,408,276	35,798,707	51 9	6 10	57,672,999
1824	32,761,152	38,396,300	58,940,336	37,552,935	62 0	7 0	59,362,403
1825	41,049,298	38,877,388	56,335,514	44,137,482	66 6	12 0	57,253,869

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, 3d edition, pp. 148, 356, and 475. TOOKE *On Prices*, ii. 406; and *Parliamentary Papers*, quoted in *History of Europe* (1st series), vol. xiv., chap. xcvi., Appendix.

It is true these four prosperous years terminated in the terrible monetary crisis and collapse of December 1825. But that was by no means the result of Lord Castlereagh's measures, which simply restored prosperity, and averted the catastrophe for four years. It was to be ascribed entirely to the unfortunate monetary system established in 1819, which, by rendering the notes in circulation, and consequently the credit of the country and the remuneration of industry, *entirely dependent on the retention of gold* by the Bank of England, necessarily exposed both to the most dreadful reverses the moment that, by any external cause occasioning a great demand for gold in foreign

sunk in 1822 to £26,500,000, was rapidly extended, till in 1825 it exceeded £41,000,000; and with the facilities thus afforded, the industry and consumption of the country advanced in a surprising degree. The imports (official value) rose from £30,000,000 to £44,000,000; exports (official), from £53,000,000 to £56,000,000, or in declared value from £36,000,000 to £38,000,000; and the revenue from £55,000,000 to £57,000,000. Wheat rose from 43s. to 66s., and agricultural distress was no more heard of. Never, perhaps, was so great a blessing conferred on a nation as it was on Great Britain by Lord Castlereagh, by this the last public act of his life. And thus, at the time when he was denounced by the Radicals in this country as the mere mouthpiece of the Holy Alliance, and the worst enemy of freedom, he was exerting the whole influence of Great Britain to prevent it from encroaching on the new-born liberties of Southern Europe; and when he was held out as the enemy of the working classes at home, he was preparing a measure which, by restoring an adequate circulation, for the first time secured a due remuneration for industry, and spread contentment and happiness through all classes of society.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. vii. 1458, 1662; Stat. iii. Geo. iv. c. 172.

74. Break down of Lord Castlereagh's mind under the pressure of his public duties.

But the end of this noble and patriotic career was approaching. The excessive labour of a life of incessant toil and mental effort had now come to tell on a constitution naturally strong, and a mind singularly placid and composed. For ten years he had been leader of the House and Foreign Secretary, and that during a period of unparalleled importance and interest. Towards the latter part of this time he had in addition been charged with the superintendence of the Home Department. Notwithstanding this fearful accumulation of the most ardu-

parts, it was withdrawn in any considerable quantities from the coffers of the Bank of England. And such a cause occurred in 1825, in consequence of the vast British loans to South America, and the joint-stock companies established there by British capitalists.

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ous duties, he never for a moment relaxed in his habits of regular and systematic labour; he was at his office early every morning, and remained there invariably till four o'clock. No despatch of the least moment, during the time he was at its head, ever emanated from the Foreign Office that had not been written by himself with his own hand. But in addition to this he had become involved in negotiations and duties for some years back of a singularly harassing and anxious nature. The great democratic movement which convulsed all Europe in 1820, reacted with fearful effect upon the British Foreign Minister. At home, he was forced by threatened insurrection and incipient high treason into being a party to measures of coercion utterly abhorrent to his nature and at variance with the even tenor of his life. Abroad, he was under the necessity, from the success of the Spanish, Italian, and Greek revolutions, of separating himself in a great measure from his old companions in the great contest for European freedom, and chalking out a path for his country which, though nowise at variance with the policy which she had always professed, was directly so with that now pursued under the pressure of external danger by his former allies and confederates. Though he never for an instant swerved from his duty as the servant of a constitutional monarch and the minister of a free country, yet he felt the delicacy of his situation when thus separating for the first time from his former comrades, and exposing himself in the eyes of the inconsiderate multitude to a charge of inconsistency. These difficulties and anxieties fell with accumulated force upon him in the latter part of the session of 1822, when the discussions in the Cabinet on these subjects were going on, and his instructions to the British plenipotentiary were under consideration. The effect of this accumulation of labour and anxiety was to produce a state of febrile excitement, similar to what he had already undergone at the close of the great contest regarding the Irish Union in May 1801.[1]

[1] Vide ante, c. i. § 111, note.

Towards the end of the session of 1822 Lord Castlereagh's mind became evidently affected, and he was much occupied with the prospect of his mission to Verona, where at that time it was intended he should be plenipotentiary. The first symptoms of aberration appeared in the House of Commons, when he professed ignorance of a despatch which was lying before him; and was also displayed in a nervous state of anxiety on the subject of his journey, and a sort of superstitious fear lest some unforeseen incident should interfere to prevent it. His family, however, did not apprehend any danger, and ascribed it to the fatigue and excitement consequent on the close of an arduous session, and a severe attack of gout which he had had in the preceding spring. The excitement, however, by degrees became such that, for some days prior to the fatal event, the scrolls of despatches which he wrote were illegible, though his handwriting was in general singularly clear and distinct. His nature seemed changed: instead of his usual gentleness of manner and placidity of demeanour, he became querulous and suspicious. The King was the first to observe a decided alteration; and after one of the last Cabinet councils at which Lord Castlereagh was present before his departure for Scotland, his Majesty was so much struck with it, that he wrote to Lord Liverpool, mentioning the circumstance, and urging the necessity of immediate precaution and medical advice. The Duke of Wellington, too, who was warmly attached to Lord Castlereagh, and entertained the highest respect for his character, as well as affection for his person, soon after observed it. He spoke to his Lordship on the subject, and tried to combat the delusions in regard to difficulties on the subject of the journey to Verona with which he saw he was beset. He advised him to send for his family physician, which he promised to do, but did not. At length, on the 9th August, the Duke was so much struck with his manner, that, after walking with him to the Foreign Office, he went to his

75. Symptoms of approaching aberration of mind, and his death. Aug. 12.

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medical attendant, Dr Bankhead, and not finding him at home, wrote a letter expressing his apprehensions, and not obscurely hinting at mental delusion.* Dr Bankhead no sooner received this alarming intelligence than he went out to Cray Farm, Lord Castlereagh's seat in Kent, and, seeing the Duke of Wellington's fears too well founded, he slept in the house the next two nights, and gave orders to his valet to remove the razors from his Lordship's dressing-case, and take other precautions against self-destruction. He did so without being observed; but unfortunately, not recollecting that there was a penknife belonging to the case in one of the drawers of the washing-stand, he neglected to secure it. The consequences were fatal. During the 10th and 11th of August he remained in bed, wandering, but expressing no alarming intentions. On the morning of the 12th August, Lady Londonderry, who was with him, reported that he had passed a restless night, and that he wished to see Dr Bankhead, who was in an adjoining apartment. When Dr Bankhead went into his dressing-room, he found him standing opposite the window looking out, with his hands above his head, with his throat cut, and bleeding profusely. Consciousness, as is often the case, returned with the flow of blood. He threw his arms round the doctor's neck, and, saying, in a feeble voice, "Bankhead, let me fall on your arm; I have opened my neck; it is all over," sank on the ground and expired.[1]

[1] Cast. Cor. i. 66, 67, 68; Gleig's Wellington, iii. 118, 119; Coroner's Inquests; Ann. Reg. 1822, 436.

No words can express the mingled feelings of grief and horror which pervaded the country upon this terrible catastrophe becoming known. The King, who was at

* "DEAR SIR,—I called upon you with the intention of talking to you on the subject of Lord Londonderry, and to request of you that you will call and see him. I told his Lordship that he was unwell, and particularly requested him to send for you; but lest he should not, I sincerely hope that you will contrive by some pretence to go down to his Lordship. I have no doubt he is very unwell. He appears to me to have been exceedingly harassed, much fatigued, and overworked, during the last session of Parliament, and I have no doubt he labours under mental delirium; at least this is my impression. I beg you will never mention to anybody what I have told you respecting his Lordship.—I am, &c., WELLINGTON."—GLEIG'S *Life of Wellington*, iii. 118, 119; *Londonderry MS.*

the time on a state progress in Scotland, received the intelligence at Holyrood House on the 13th, and was profoundly affected. All his colleagues in the Cabinet and in the Government shared their sovereign's emotion; it was universally felt by all capable of forming a just opinion on the subject, that Great Britain had lost her right arm, and that, too, at one of the most momentous crises of her history. The Duke of Wellington, who was strongly attached to the deceased, wrote a touching letter to his brother, Lord Stewart, at Vienna, expressing his profound grief at the melancholy catastrophe.* Its suddenness, its unexpected nature, the snapping asunder the cord of being in the midst of existence, in the flower of life, struck every generous heart with consternation. Even the bitterness of political rivalry was for a season forgotten in the more generous sympathy with private affliction; and the noble-minded of all parties hastened to bear testimony, in numerous letters to his family,† of their high sense of

76. Universal grief at his death.

* "My dear Charles,—I do not trouble you to tell you that of which I am certain you are convinced—my heartfelt grief at the deplorable event which has recently occurred here. But I could not allow the post to go to Vienna with the account that the King has desired should be sent there without taking a few lines from myself.

"You will have seen that I had witnessed the melancholy state of mind which was the cause of the catastrophe. I saw him after he had been with the King on the 9th inst., to whom he had likewise exposed it; but fearing he would not send for his physician, I considered it my duty to go to him, and not finding him, to write to him, which, considering what has since passed, was a fortunate circumstance.

"You will readily believe what a consternation this deplorable event has occasioned here. The funeral was attended by every person in London of any mark or distinction of *all* parties, and the crowds in the streets behaved respectfully and creditably. There was one exception at the door of the Abbey, which showed that, even upon such an occasion, the malevolence of the Radical party could not avoid displaying itself. Those who misbehaved there, however, were few in numbers, were evidently engaged for the purpose, and were ashamed of showing themselves. God bless you, my dear Charles. Pray remember me to Lady C. and Lady Stewart, and believe me ever yours most affectionately, Wellington."—*Londonderry MS.*

† "*Kingston House, June* 16, 1830.

"My dear Lord,—I assure your Lordship most sincerely that it affords me great pleasure at all times to obey your commands, especially on such a subject as the memory of your excellent brother's transcendent virtues and public services. I well recollect the dreadful pang which his irreparable loss occasioned to me in Ireland, and also the urgent anxiety which I felt to discharge my mind of my sacred duties toward his affectionate and afflicted brother. I fear that a copy of my letter was not kept; the sentiments I expressed flowed

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77. His funeral in Westminster Abbey. Aug. 20.

the illustrious deceased, and the irreparable loss which the country had sustained by his death.

Ample evidence of his disordered state of mind was produced to the jury, who returned a special verdict, finding that he had killed himself while labouring under a mental delusion, the effects of disease which had rendered him of unsound mind. Dr Bankhead's evidence, and that of the domestics, did not leave a doubt on that point.*

from a heart full of esteem, respect, and gratitude. I owe many obligations to your great brother, not only on account of Ireland, but also of India. His administration of that vast empire in a most critical moment is entitled to the highest praise, and to my everlasting gratitude.—Ever, my dear Lord, your obedient and obliged servant, WELLESLEY."—*MS.*

* "During the last fortnight he repeatedly said some persons had conspired against him; he was very wild, particularly in the last day before his death. When he saw two people speaking together, my Lady and Dr Bankhead, he always said, 'There is a conspiracy laid against me.' I have not the least doubt his mind was disordered for some time before his death. . . . He asked me why Lady Londonderry had not been to see him; I answered she had been with him all day. She had been so, and was then in the dressing-room."—MRS ANNE ROBISON'S *Evidence, Lady Londonderry's Maid, Evidence before Coroner, Annual Register*, 1822, 293. Dr Bankhead said, "I arrived at Northcrag about 7 o'clock on Saturday evening. On entering his bedroom, I observed Lord Londonderry's manner of looking at me expressed suspicion and alarm. He said it was very odd that I should come into his bedroom first, before going into the dining-room below. I answered I had dined in town, and knowing that the family were at dinner down stairs, I had come to visit him. Upon this he made a reply which surprised me exceedingly. It was to this effect, that I seemed particularly grave in my manner, and that something must have happened amiss. He then asked me abruptly, whether I had anything unpleasant to tell him. I answered, No; that I was surprised at the question, and the manner in which it was proposed. He then said, 'The truth is, I have reason to be suspicious in some degree, but I hope you will be the last person who would engage in anything injurious to me.' His manner of saying this was so unusual and disturbed, as to satisfy me he was at the moment labouring under mental delusion."—DR BANKHEAD'S *Evidence, Ibid.*, 436.

Lord Clanwilliam has recorded a very interesting conversation with Lord Castlereagh a few days before his death, to the same effect. "Seymour and I had, as far back as eight or ten days ago, remarked a certain, to him, unusual restlessness of mind, and a degree of uneasiness about trifles entirely alien to his general disposition. He said he dreaded the responsibility of going to Verona, and that he thought there were plots against him. Four days ago he said to Seymour that he felt himself overworked, and felt it here, putting his hand to his forehead. The same evening he said also to Seymour, putting his hand to his head, 'My mind, my mind is, as it were, gone.' On the 9th he saw the King, and then went home. The King was so alarmed at his manner, that he spoke the moment he was gone to the Duke of Wellington, who wrote immediately to Dr Bankhead. . . . On the 10th, his mind began to wander more decidedly; he seemed afraid that he was watched; talked much to Lady Londonderry, and asked her, with great anxiety, 'where the pistol-case was, and whether she would give him the key.' On the

His funeral, which took place on the 20th August, though intended by the relatives to be only a private one, was attended by nearly all the persons of note or consideration in London at the time, and by the whole foreign ambassadors. The feelings of grief were universal and heartfelt; the emotion of the Duke of Wellington and the Lord Chancellor was in an especial manner conspicuous. From his Lordship's residence in St James's Square, from whence the cortège proceeded, to the gates of Westminster Abbey, the streets were literally paved with heads; you might have walked on the foreheads of men. The conduct of the crowd, as far as the gate of the Abbey, was respectful and decorous;* but when the coffin was

morning of the 11th he expressed a forced and unnatural desire to shave, which again alarmed Lady Londonderry, who then locked up the razors and whatever else that might be dangerous in the bedroom. He remained in bed all day, talking incessantly, and very wandering, chiefly to Bankhead, on plots, and in the most desponding tone. On the morning of the 12th he got up, and went towards his dressing-room, where he met Mr Robinson, who, I believe, was going to follow him, and said to him very sternly, 'Mr Robinson, I will not be watched; go and send Dr Bankhead to me instantly.' Three or four minutes elapsed before Dr Bankhead arrived. When he came to the door of the dressing-room, he saw Lord Londonderry standing with his back to him in an upright posture, and both arms in the air. Dr Bankhead said, 'For God's sake, my Lord, what are you doing? what is the matter?' He answered, 'I have done for myself; I have opened my neck.' Bankhead rushed forward and caught him in his arms, as he was in the act of falling. It was but too true. The instrument of self-destruction was a knife belonging to the dressing-case, which he must have recollected to be in one of the drawers of the washing-stand."—LORD CLANWILLIAM *to* LORD STEWART, *Cray Farm, August* 13, 1822; *MS.*

Mr Hamilton Seymour wrote on the 20th August: "On Thursday, 8th August 1822, I saw Lord Londonderry go by himself towards the river at the foot of the grounds of Cray, and there was something so melancholy and dejected in his manner, that I resolved to follow him, and, if possible, by conversing with him, to draw him out of the state of gloomy reflection in which he appeared to be absorbed. After in vain endeavouring to make him converse upon some other subjects, I mentioned our approaching journey to Verona, and said, 'I hope, Lord Londonderry, you are looking forward with pleasure to our Continental trip; the journey, I think, will be of use to you, and you will have the satisfaction of renewing several of your former diplomatic acquaintances.' Lord Londonderry drew his hand across his forehead, and said, very slowly, 'At any other time I should like it very much, *but I am quite worn out here*,' (keeping his hand upon his forehead), 'quite worn out; and this fresh load of responsibility is more than I can bear.'"—MR H. SEYMOUR *to* LORD STEWART, *Cray Farm, August* 20, 1822; *Londonderry MS.*

* "Being near the hearse, I could hear no expressions but those of sympathy and regret; and I never saw so large an assemblage conduct themselves so orderly. . . . The Duke of Wellington told me he had laboured under

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removed from the hearse for interment in the Abbey, some miscreants, mixed with the multitude at the door, raised a savage shout which was re-echoed through the lofty aisles of the venerable pile. Such a shout was natural enough from the associates of Thistlewood and the Cato Street gang; and the fact of its having been raised in such a place and on such an occasion, is the best proof of the diabolical character of those conspirators whom his decided measures of coercion prevented from exciting a revolt in the country. To the disgrace of British literature, the shout was afterwards re-echoed by some whose "talents might have led them to a more generous appreciation of a political antagonist, and their sex to a milder view of the most fearful of human infirmities." These pages shall not be polluted by their quotation. They are now forgotten, and their authors, if they had lived to this time, would, without doubt, gladly consign them to oblivion. "They meant," as has been well said, "to commit murder, and they have only committed suicide." Lord Castlereagh was committed to the dust in Westminster Abbey, amidst the kings and heroes and statesmen of England, between the graves of Pitt and Fox; and the glorious fane does not contain the remains of one whose heart beat more warmly for his country's weal, or who has left a more illustrious name in its annals.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1822, 180, 182; Martineau, i. 287.

78. Extreme exasperation against the memory of Castlereagh.

Perhaps there is no statesman in the whole course of English, it may almost be said of European history, whose character has been so assiduously traduced by the efforts of party, or whose motives have been so systematically misrepresented, and services so strangely forgotten, as those of Lord Castlereagh. While the struggle was going on, indeed, and his tutelary arm was required to avert disaster or postpone danger, he enjoyed great and deserved popularity. But when it was over, and his wisdom and

some delusion as to his horses being sent after him without orders, when they were at Cray, and that he had taken him by the hand, and prayed him to dismiss these illusions from his mind."—LORD HARDINGE *to* LORD STEWART, *August* 20, 1822; *MS.*

resolution had won for his country security, independence, and glory, all these services were forgotten, and he became, beyond any other individual, the object of the most persevering invective, the loudest and most intemperate abuse. The Radicals, and extreme Liberals in particular, were unbounded in their vituperation of the man who had saved them from the chains of imperial despotism, and done more than any one else for the extinction of the slave trade. The peace party were equally inveterate against the greatest and most lasting pacificator whom Europe had ever seen, and who gave it forty years of unbroken repose. So general were these efforts, so cordially were they received and eagerly seconded by a large part of the press, that a whole generation were utterly misled as to the real character of their object, and the name of Castlereagh became synonymous, in the opinion not only of ignorant Radicals, but of many well-informed party men on one side, with everything which is most tyrannical and oppressive among mankind. Yet it may safely be affirmed that never were imputations not only more unfounded, but more directly the reverse of the truth; and there is perhaps no great man of his age, either in Great Britain or the Continent, whose public conduct and motives of action have come so immaculate from the most searching test, or have borne so well the minutest examination by the most unfriendly eyes. This is now generally admitted by candid and well-informed writers on all sides in politics. The old abuse has been succeeded, in many instances, by a generous desire to repair a long-continued injustice. Happy if these pages can tend in any degree to aid this honourable impulse, and rescue the memory of one of the greatest men the empire ever produced, from the heaviest load of obloquy that has ever yet been laid on a public character during its long and varied annals.

So far from having been the supporter of tyranny and the friend of arbitrary government, he was throughout life the strongest and most determined, as well as suc-

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cessful, opponent of both. He resisted oppression with equal vigour when it appeared in the form of a dominant Protestant oligarchy in Ireland, of a tyrannical mob committee in England, of an imperial despot in France, of an encroaching Asiatic autocrat in Poland, or of a conclave of arbitrary sovereigns at Laybach. His ruling principle was not the support of any one party, or the steadfast resistance to another, but the prosecution of what he deemed the public interest, irrespective of the wishes of any man or body of men. It was this which constituted his greatness, it was this which was the secret of his passing unpopularity. All eminent statesmen who in any age have done the same with the same unbending character, have, at one period or another of their lives, undergone a similar storm of public indignation; and the magnitude of previous public services, so far from being a safeguard against such unpopularity, is in general the greatest possible aggravation of it. The majority can bear anything rather than a resistance to their will on the part of a great public man. You may, in general, measure the magnitude of the public services of such undaunted characters by the violence of the storm raised against them during their lives. The examples of Themistocles and Aristides, of Scipio Africanus and Belisarius, in antiquity, of Marlborough and De Witt in modern times, sufficiently prove this. Napoleon escaped death at the hands of his own subjects at Orgon, in 1814, only by assuming the dress of an Austrian courier; Wellington being massacred on 18th June 1831, in London, by the gallantry of the students of the Inns of Court. It was not to be expected that Castlereagh's great public services would not meet with a similar requital.

79. His real character was the very reverse of what was represented.

But in addition to this, there were several causes which in a peculiar manner exposed Lord Castlereagh to unpopularity, and weakened the support which in general combats, and in the end overcomes it. From his independence of character and high moral courage, he would submit to the dictation of no party, how powerful soever,

80. He had been brought into collision successively with all parties.

and was successively brought into collision with all the factions who divided the Government of the country, or aspired to its direction; and they never could forget the manner in which he had discomfited them. The Irish revolutionists could never forgive him for having put down the rebellion in their country, and extinguished all hopes of a forcible separation of the Hibernian isle from the crown of Great Britain. The Protestant oligarchy there, who had so long farmed out its Government for their own exclusive benefit, felt indignant at a champion who had followed up that victory by the hated measure of the Union, and remained through life the steady supporter of Catholic emancipation. The English Whigs were of course opposed to a Tory politician who for ten years led the House of Commons, and successfully opposed all their party moves and legislative measures. The English Tories, though they in public supported, in secret were jealous of him; he was an Irishman, and not one of themselves; he claimed descent from the magnates of neither of the great parties which, since the Revolution, had alternately ruled the State. The partisans of Napoleon and of French domination, whether in this country or the Continent, were, of course, to the last degree exasperated at the statesman who, beyond any other human being, had opposed their designs and thwarted their ambition. The Legitimists distrusted him because he had been willing to treat with Napoleon at Chatillon, thwarted the ambition of Russia at Vienna, and kept aloof from the Holy Alliance at Troppau and Verona. The British Radicals were hardly less infuriated against the minister who had stood foremost in the fight with domestic treason, and combated revolution with its own weapons, and the energy generally found only in its own supporters. Thus he had, from the very independence and patriotism of his career, been brought into collision, at one time or another, with the chief parties into which his country or Europe was divided, and incurred the real hostility of all without having secured, at the moment at least, the cordial

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support of any—the usual fate of those who are actuated by the love of their country rather than zeal for a party, and pursue measures calculated for the general good, not those likely to support the desires of a particular section of the community!

81. The Radicals are most *acharnés* against his memory.

Of all these parties, either openly or secretly hostile to Lord Castlereagh, the most persevering and the most inveterate have been the Radicals; and it is chiefly owing to their systematic and sustained efforts that his character has been so misrepresented, and so much injustice done to his memory. The reason of this is, that he was the most formidable opponent they ever met with, and the man who, beyond all others, has thwarted their most cherished and deep-laid designs. Though he was neither Prime Minister nor Home Secretary during the trying years from 1815 to 1822, fraught with such anguish and suffering to the industrious classes of the community, yet he was universally regarded as the real leader of the Cabinet, and the instigator of the stringent coercive measures which then so strongly excited the country, and effectually extinguished revolt. Nor was this belief without reason, for he introduced into Parliament the suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* and the Six Acts, and his known weight in the Cabinet, as well as emphatic speeches in bringing them forward, left no room for doubt that they met with his entire approbation. In judging of his conduct on these occasions, we must consider the character of the opponents with whom he had to deal, and the nature of the contest which awaited the Government, if not averted by these precautionary measures. It had no resemblance to the great struggle which afterwards, in 1832, convulsed the land: revolution, not reform, was inscribed on its banners. To dethrone the King and introduce a republican government, were the ulterior objects of the most determined of the party; to establish universal suffrage, vote by ballot, and the six points of the Charter, by physical force and open rebellion, were the fixed intentions of the most moderate. The means by

which their designs were to be effected were as unscrupulous as the objects themselves. Thistlewood expressed their ideas when he said to the Cato Street conspirators, hatching a design to destroy the Cabinet, "It would be a *rare haul to murder them all together.*" In a word, Lord Castlereagh was combating a party who proposed to overturn the Government and dethrone the King by the dagger and the pistol. Is he to be blamed that he combated them with the milder methods of imprisonment and transportation?

82. His system of government had become distasteful to the nation.

Notwithstanding this, it is now evident, and may without difficulty be admitted, that the system of government to which Lord Castlereagh was wedded, and which he successfully maintained to the latest hour of his life, was one which was gradually wearing out when he made the last efforts to uphold it; and that if the mournful catastrophe of August 1822 had not terminated his existence, he would ere long have been driven from power in consequence of the growing passion of the nation for self-government. He belonged to the old class of statesmen who really governed the country; in the latter years of his life he dipped into the new class which is governed by it. He never could have existed in such an element. Regardless of passing disapprobation, despising the obloquy of faction, careless of present praise, he did what he deemed right and for the public good, without descending to any of the arts by which, in later times, Government have in general endeavoured, and in truth been forced, to carry their measures. Courteous and affable to all, he had no peculiar compliments for "the gentlemen opposite;" strenuous in debate, resolute in conduct as a Parliamentary leader, he made no attempt to conciliate the press, or direct public opinion by any means but the arguments he advanced, or the influence he enjoyed in the House of Commons.* In this he was

* His character has been unconsciously drawn by that great master, Sir E. B. Lytton, in these noble words—"Away with the cant of public opinion,—away with the poor delusion of posthumous justice; he will offend the first, he will never obtain the last. What sustains him? *His own soul!* A man

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probably wrong; at least, in acting thus he certainly misunderstood the signs of the times. But even if he had read them aright, and with the benefit of all the subsequent experience that we have had, he would probably not have acted otherwise. He was of too lofty a character to change with the fleeting veering of public opinion. *Ultimus Romanorum*, he would have said with the Roman patriot, even in the last extremity—

"Victrix causa Deis placuit, sed victa, Catoni."

That this system of government is directly the reverse of that which has been pursued since his time need be told to none, and therefore in no event could he have been much longer maintained in power. Which of the two systems is the best has not yet been determined by experience. The second, or conceding one, is only beginning its trial in Europe and America. The first, however, has given England twenty years of a successful and glorious war at one time with the united forces of the Continent, and forty subsequent years of unbroken peace. When the new system has produced similar results, it will be entitled to stand in comparison, and not till then.†

thoroughly great has a certain contempt for his kind while he aids them: their weal or woe are all; their applause, their blame, are nothing to him. He walks forth from the circle of birth and habit; he is deaf to the little motives of little men. High, through the widest space his orbit may describe, he holds on his course to guide or to enlighten; but the noises below reach him not! Until the wheel is broken,—until the dark void swallow up the star,—it makes melody, night and day, to its own ear: thirsting for no sound from the earth it illumines, anxious for no companionship in the path through which it rolls, conscious of its own glory, and contented, therefore, to be alone."—*Rienzi*, Book II., c. iii.

† Lord Castlereagh's principles of domestic government are thus explained by the individual in existence who knew them best:—"He was the determined enemy of what was called reform of Parliament, and of all the new-fangled schemes for upsetting, under pretence of reconstructing, the English constitution. He knew well what England had done without that reform, and he foresaw what she might be driven to under the proposed changes. He always maintained that in a representative government the preponderance of property and high station was more conducive to order and general prosperity than that of mob orators or needy adventurers. He thought that a certain number of nomination boroughs were *far less perilous than double the number of corrupt constituencies;* that legislative measures were more likely to prove good and advantageous in the hands of those who had a stake in the country than in those who had none. He was no friend to a system which was to be directed by men who had no other influence than what they could acquire by pandering

The chief mistake, as it seems to the author, committed by Lord Castlereagh in his whole career, and the one which has indirectly induced the greatest load of obloquy on his memory, was his concurrence in the monetary changes which brought in 1819 such fearful distress and suffering on the country, and was the chief cause of the general discontent and formidable insurrections which, more or less, disturbed the island during the whole period from the peace of 1815 till his death in 1822. This is the more unaccountable as he had, by his single efforts, done so much to save the country from the fatal return to cash payments in June 1812, sought to be forced upon it by the Bullion Committee, *in the midst of the Peninsular, and on the eve of the Russian war;* and by his establishment of a paper currency, guaranteed by the Allied Powers in 1813, had provided the funds which set on foot the gigantic armaments which expelled the French from Germany, and effected the liberation of Europe. Had the same wise and enlightened system, under *proper safeguards against undue extension*, been followed after the peace, there can be no doubt that the general discontent produced by universal suffering would have been averted; and the last years of his life, instead of being darkened by the widespread distress which prevailed from 1816 to 1821, would have been gladdened by the joyful acclaim which was heard through the world when Providence extended the currency of all nations by the gold discoveries thirty years after.

83. His error in regard to the currency.

But without pretending to justify a line of policy which the event seems now to have proved erroneous, it is easy to account for it. His position in the Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs during all that time in some degree

84. Causes which induced this error.

to the low interests and lower passions of a misguided rabble. He knew that the government of this country could be safely and successfully conducted only by an administration which enjoyed the decided and unequivocal confidence of Parliament and the Sovereign, and he would not lend his hand to hasten the day when the two Houses of Parliament would necessarily be placed in a state of perpetual variance on questions of vital moment to the stability and repose of the empire."—MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY *to* LORD BROUGHAM, *August* 31, 1839; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, i. 121.

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withdrew his attention from domestic, and fixed it on diplomatic concerns. So general was the feeling, and so widespread the belief, which prevailed regarding it, that probably if he had urged a change of policy in this respect on the Cabinet, his efforts would have been overruled. He resisted, however, the fatal step as long as possible; and it has been seen that he nobly repaired his error. Alone, of all the Cabinet which had sanctioned these measures, he had the magnanimity to confess his mistake; and one of the last acts of his life was the introduction of a bill extending the circulation of small notes for ten years longer, and declaring them a legal tender everywhere but at the Bank of England,—a wise and salutary measure, which at once applied a remedy to the prevailing evils, and induced the unexampled prosperity of 1823, and the two subsequent years; too soon terminated, alas! by the infatuated tenacity of error, in making public credit dependent on the retention of gold, which, after his death, induced the terrible monetary crisis of December 1825.

85. Confirmation of the justice of his opinions, which subsequent times have afforded.

It is not a little remarkable, that although Lord Castlereagh was the object of such obloquy during his life, and for a quarter of a century after his death, experience has already demonstrated the justice of his opinions which were most controverted, and the expedience of his measures which were most condemned. Nothing made him at the time more unpopular than his great effort in 1816 to retain the income-tax; but Sir R. Peel was obliged to put it on again during peace in 1842, and it is now one of the settled irremovable burdens of the country, and most applauded by the Liberal party. He made a strenuous effort in 1819 to get a real sinking fund of £5,000,000 yearly, resting on indirect taxes, permanently established; but it was abandoned after his death, in pursuance of the cheapening system, and the consequence is, that the public debt is as heavy now as it was at the battle of Waterloo; though, had his system been followed out, it would, in the forty years of peace which have since intervened, have been reduced to half its amount. His favourite maxim

was, "The ancient race and the ancient territory," in regard to France; and with a new race on its throne, has already come the thirst for a new territory. Europe is arming at all points, and 150,000 volunteers have started forth in Great Britain to maintain the integrity of the British dominions. He was the author of the Irish Union, and the steady advocate of Catholic emancipation; and already Ireland is making more rapid strides in prosperity than any other part of the British dominions. He was the resolute opponent of democracy in all its forms; and already an iron despotism in France, and a frightful civil war in America, have shown to what it leads, and induced a manifest return to Conservative principles in the British Islands. He resisted reform as long as he lived, but the nation conquered it after his death; but experience has already taught the people its results, and it has refused to advance farther in the same career. He always maintained that Italy could not be united into one dominion, and that the attempt to do so would only lead to its becoming the right arm and vassal of France.* The attempt has been made; and already Italy sees its capital occupied by French troops, its northern Alpine gates in her hands, and Sardinia, with its noble harbours, secretly claimed as the price of their protection! He strenuously resisted the sweeping reductions in the extra-regimental departments of the army so vehemently supported by the Liberals, and the sufferings of the Crimea proved he was right. On all the leading points on which Lord Castlereagh was at issue with his times, subsequent events have proved that he was right and they were wrong.

* In a semi-official pamphlet just published in Paris the following observation occurs:—"La Revolution Française par ses principes égalitaires sapait dans sa base l'oligarchie Britannique. Mais si aujourd'hui nous férions, ne fut ce qu'indirectement une Vendée en Italie nous férions, une chose non-seulement coupable mais absurde; puisque ce serait travailler contre l'affermissement de l'œuvre inaugurée par nous dans les plaines de Magenta et de Solferino, et d'entraver le développement *d'une nation qui repose sur les mêmes principes que la France, et qui loin de devenir pour elle une rivale est sa première et meilleure alliée.*"—*L'Empereur, Rome, et l'Italie*, p. 10. Paris, 1861.

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86. His powers as a parliamentary speaker.

By the common consent of all his contemporaries, Lord Castlereagh was not a brilliant parliamentary speaker. This is very remarkable when it is recollected that for ten years he led the House of Commons, and that in the face of an opposition headed by Brougham, and often by Canning, and numbering among its ranks Sir James Macintosh, Mr Tierney, Mr Horner, Mr Ponsonby, Sir James Graham, Mr Grattan, Sir Samuel Romilly, and many of the most powerful debaters whom England has ever seen assembled within the Chapel of St Stephen. He must have had some eminent qualities as an orator who, with very little assistance from his own side, was able to make head for such a time against such a phalanx. Nor is it difficult to discern, even through the dim light of parliamentary reports, how this came to pass. His speeches were full of information, ably argued, and contain the best summary of the views on which the Government of the time was founded, that are perhaps anywhere to be met with. This is abundantly obvious from the abstract of his arguments which has been given in the preceding pages. To the orations of none will the historian turn with more advantage for the reasons on which the Administration of the period acted. But he had few of the graces of oratory, little of the persuasion of eloquence in his composition; the play of fancy, the fire of imagination, the ardour which bears down all opposition, and often gives to error itself the power of truth, were awanting in his speeches. We turn to them to be instructed, but not to be fascinated; hence his speeches read better than they appeared when delivered. This arose not so much from the want of a poetical turn of mind—for on some occasions it was decisively proved that he possessed such in a very high degree—as from the *equal balance* of his mental faculties. The imagination was in subordination to the reason. Caulaincourt rightly divined his character when he said he was "just and passionless." Like Marlborough he passed for a man of no genius, because he had none of its eccentricities; because an ardent mind was in his case

so subdued by a powerful intellect, that its existence was not suspected. His public despatches were singularly lucid, closely reasoned, and convincing; and such were his powers of application, that, during the time that he held the Foreign Office, there was not a despatch of the least moment sent off, of which the draft was not written in his own hand. His eloquence was that of a judge who impartially sums up the evidence, not that of a barrister who forcibly presents the case of his client; and it is the speech of the barrister, not the judge, which ever presents the flowers of rhetoric. He was essentially a man of action: his mind was set on things, not on words; his monument is to be found in the acts of the Congress of Vienna and the forty years' peace, rather than the pages of Hansard.

87. His occasional imprudence of expression.

In one particular, the consequence of his intrepid disposition and fearlessness of character, he was, for present reputation at least, unfortunate. He was at times eminently imprudent in expression, especially in those curt and pithy sayings which are easily recollected, and strike between wind and water the prevailing prejudices of the day. His sayings on these occasions were generally perfectly true, but that only rendered them more provoking, and induced the greater hostility against him. Unable either to deny or refute them, men had no resource but in vilifying their author. Nothing is so provoking as disagreeable truths, briefly expressed. Never was a truer expression than "the ignorant impatience of taxation," of which he complained when the Income-tax was thrown out in 1816: if the nation had listened to it and followed his counsel, the whole national debt might have been discharged by 1845, and the entire naval and military armaments of the State have been paid *for ever* out of what now annually goes for the interest of that burden! But the expression was ill-timed, and only the more exasperating that it was perfectly just. In like manner when he said, during the severe distress of 1817, that

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"rather than give money to the poor for nothing, he would employ them in digging holes and filling them up again," he did no more than utter a sentiment on the demoralising influence of mere eleemosynary relief, without giving employment, now generally admitted and acted upon with universal approbation in later times, when Government, during the Irish famine, laid out several millions in making good roads bad ones, to avoid the appearance of mere gratuitous assistance. Yet this just expression was instantly laid hold of by a faction as indicating a heartless disposition, and made a pretext for representing one of the most generous men that ever existed, as destitute of the common feelings of humanity.

88. The courtesy and high breeding of his manners.

If the independence of Lord Castlereagh's character, which led him to express fearlessly what he felt strongly, was hurtful to his popularity at the time with one section of the community, the extreme courtesy and high-breeding of his manners was eminently conducive to his influence with another. "*Suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*" was his ruling principle; and never was more strongly evinced the sway of elegance and urbanity of demeanour in softening difficulties, and overcoming the most formidable opposition. Like Marlborough, whom he resembled in many respects, though his very reverse in consistency of conduct, he often won more by the grace of his refusals than others by the favours they conferred. This quality, so valuable to public men in every grade, was invaluable to one so often, and in the most confidential way, brought in contact with sovereigns and persons of the very highest rank, under circumstances when unanimity was impossible, and ears were of necessity exposed to contradiction which perhaps had never before heard it. It was by this quality, joined to his high moral courage and chivalrous bearing, that he acquired and retained such influence over the Allied sovereigns and ministers in 1814 and 1815, as rendered him in a manner the ruler of their deliberations and the arbiter of the fate of Europe. The same qualities made him, beyond all other men, temperate

and calm in debate, and alike generous and indulgent towards his political opponents. This is admitted by his ablest antagonists in the parliamentary arena. "No political opponent," says Sir James Graham, "whom Lord Castlereagh honoured by admission into his private society, and no leader of a party, was ever so generous towards his adversaries. I never can forget the charm of his amiable manners and of his noble nature. History, I am persuaded, will be more just than his contemporaries; and he is not the first great man over whose tomb has been written *ingrata patria*."[1] *

[1] Sir James Graham to Lord Londonderry, July 27, 1839; Cast. Cor. i. 133.

89. Sir R. Peel's and Mr Croker's opinion of him, Mr Whitbread, and Lord Aberdeen.

These great and varied qualities in Lord Castlereagh's character won for him the respect and admiration of all the leading public men with whom he was brought in contact during his parliamentary career. "I doubt," says Sir Robert Peel, "whether any public man (with the exception of the Duke of Wellington) who has appeared within the last half century, possessed that combination of qualities, intellectual and moral, which would have enabled him to effect, under the same circumstances, what Lord Castlereagh did in regard to the union with Ireland, and to the great political transactions of 1813, 1814, and 1815. To do these things required a rare union of high and generous feelings, courteous and prepossessing manners, a warm heart and a cool head, great temper, great industry, great fortitude, great courage, moral and personal, that command and influence which makes other men willing instruments, and all these qualities combined with the disdain for low objects of ambition, and with spotless integrity. It is not flattering to say that Lord Castlereagh had these qualifications,

* The testimony of another formidable political rival is equally honourable to both. "Lord Castlereagh's friendship and confidence were the prime causes which induced his Majesty's Government to desire my services; and I can truly add, that my unreserved reliance on the cordiality of his feelings towards me, joined to my perfect knowledge of the wisdom and liberality of all his public objects and opinions, were the principal causes which induced me to accept the honour which was proposed to me. Nothing can ever occur to me in political life so calamitous as the event which, in common with all his country and Europe, I so deeply deplore."—Mr Plunket *to* Marquess of Londonderry, 1823; *Castlereagh Correspondence*, i. 138.

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and that by them, and the proper use of them, he overcame practical difficulties which would have appalled and overwhelmed almost every other contemporary statesman."[1] Mr Wilberforce's opinion of Lord Castlereagh, when he came to know him, was equally decided. "Of Lord Londonderry (Castlereagh)," says Mr Croker, "Mr Wilberforce seemed at first to have formed a very low and, we need not add, a very erroneous opinion. But when his Lordship's situation became more prominent and his character better defined, that polished benevolence, that high and calm sense of honour, that consummate address, that invincible firmness, that profound yet unostentatious sagacity, won the respect of Wilberforce, as they did of reluctant senates at home and suspicious cabinets abroad."[2]* "It may be said with truth," says Lord Aberdeen, "that few men have ever deserved so highly of their country as Lord Castlereagh, and I am sure that none could ever more effectually secure the love and attachment of their friends. Having experienced his friendship for so many years, not only in my own person, but in those also most nearly connected with me, I have always felt, and shall ever feel, the warmest interest in everything which can affect his name and reputation."[3]

1 Sir R. Peel to Lord Londonderry, July 23, 1839; Cast. Cor. i. 131.

2 Croker in Quarterly Review, lxii. 277.

3 Lord Aberdeen to Lord Londonderry, July 24, 1839; Cast. Cor. i. 132.

90. His character in private life.

Like most other great men of the highest order, Lord Castlereagh, in private life, was simplicity itself. Gentle and unobtrusive in his manners, vanity had no place, envy

* Mr Whitbread had the candour to form, and the honour to admit publicly, a similar change of opinion in regard to Lord Castlereagh. "I had originally opposed the administration of the noble lord (Castlereagh); but seeing an alteration in his tone from what I had observed in his predecessors, and that, too, at a moment when more than ordinary success might have been supposed to have made him immoderate, I reposed confidence in his administration, telling him that I had done so, and that the time would come when I might declare it publicly. That time has now arrived, and I tell the noble Lord that, except in the article of the treaty regarding the slave trade, he has completely and fully justified the confidence I reposed in him. There is one part of his history which, in my opinion, redounds more to his honour than all the rest, and that is, that having fairly tried the experiment of negotiating with the Emperor of France, which was broken off by the madness of the Emperor himself, his firmness was not damped; he persevered in his undaunted course, and by his firmness contributed to keep the Allied Powers together till the war was brought to a glorious peace."—MR WHITBREAD, *June 29, 1814; Parliamentary Debates*, xxviii. 455.

no share in his character. He was not without ambition, "the last infirmity of noble minds;" but of selfishness, or any of the lower motives of action, he had not a particle in his composition. He could not be said to have brilliant colloquial powers; and he was too unostentatious to take the lead in conversation, even when all felt it was his due; but the charm of his manner, and the winning kindness and simplicity of his demeanour, rendered his intercourse inexpressibly captivating to those who were privileged to enjoy it. His temper was uniformly calm and unruffled. Set upon great things, he felt none of the irritations which so often disturb the equanimity of lesser men. He was neither annoyed by calumny, nor solicitous for praise. He did what he deemed right, without looking for any ulterior reward. The love of gain, the thirst for power, the cravings of vanity, were alike unfelt by him. No man in modern times ever received such flattering distinctions from emperors or kings; but neither their intimacies nor their eulogies seduced his steady mind. He never forgot he was a British minister because he was the favoured confident of foreign sovereigns. Many of the most important and decisive acts of his life were done in direct opposition to their wishes, and exposed him for a time to their decided hostility. Possessed of unbounded influence, and wielding the most extensive patronage, he never was accused of nepotism. Disposing of kingdoms, seating dynasties on thrones, his integrity was never for a moment suspected even by his bitterest enemies. Gifted by nature with a handsome countenance, a fine figure, and a commanding air, his splendid personal appearance attracted an involuntary cheer from the crowd at the coronation of George IV.* But although these advantages were enhanced by that charm of manner which rendered him the idol of women wherever he went—and he was in constant intercourse, from his position, with ladies of the

* It may be judged of by the noble picture of him, at full length, in his coronation robes, painted by Sir Thomas Lawrence, and admirably represented in the well-known engraving which so faithfully reflects it.

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highest rank and most attractions, both at home and at foreign courts—no scandal was ever connected with his name; and the malignity of faction itself has been unable to stain his memory with any of the usual vices of those exposed in exalted stations to similar temptations.

91. His generosity of disposition and benevolence of heart.

His disposition, from his earliest years, was singularly generous and affectionate. None felt more keenly for the sufferings of others; none would hazard more than himself to avert them. The occasion has already been mentioned when, while still a schoolboy, he put his life in imminent hazard in supporting for two hours a companion in the water, who could not swim; and a similar incident occurred in maturer years. "When leaving, on one occasion, Mount Stewart, for Dublin, he embarked in a small schooner at the pier of Portaferry; he was much affected, and departed amidst the lamentations of the poor, who prayed fervently for his speedy return. When the schooner in which he sailed had accomplished about half her voyage, a storm arose; one of the masts was carried away by the force of the gale, and a man swept overboard; he sank to rise no more. Another would have shared the same fate, but Lord Castlereagh, who had been animating the men by his words and personal example, fearlessly sprang into the chains to which the shrouds were fastened, and, seizing him by the collar of his jacket, dragged him on board at the risk of his own life. This inspired the crew with confidence, and they exerted themselves so strenuously that in a few hours they rigged a jurymast, and at daybreak made shift to get safe into the harbour of Castletown, in the Isle of Man. A fever was the consequence of the exertions which he had used in the dangers from which he had so happily escaped, and he was confined to his bed for weeks."[1] On another occasion, when returning from shooting on the Wicklow Hills, a sport of which he was extremely fond, he was suddenly attacked by two robbers, one of whom seized his fowling-piece. Lord Castlereagh instantly drew a pistol from his breast, and shot his assailant. At this instant a third ruffian sprang from an adjoining bush,

[1] Cast. Cor. i. 73, 74.

and seized his Lordship, whose second pistol having missed fire, he was on the point of being overpowered, when a young man rushed up to his assistance, by whose aid the third assailant was secured, and, with the wounded man, brought in to Lord Castlereagh's residence at Dundrum, in Wicklow. The youth who so bravely interposed, proved to be Mr Jennings, a lieutenant in the navy, for whom Lord Castlereagh immediately obtained the command of the Rose cutter, of 14 guns, and presented him with £100 for his outfit. The robbers proved to belong to the tender Liberty, of Dublin. Instead of prosecuting them for robbery, and attempt to murder, he merely sent them on board the tender, to expiate their offence by serving their country. In his own family his gentleness of manner was extraordinary; he was never known to raise his voice, or speak in a harsh manner, to any of his domestics, by whom he was extremely beloved.[1] [1] Cast. Cor. i. 74-76.

92. His private munificence and liberality.

Though far from affluent during the greater part of his life, he was always munificent and liberal in works of beneficence or charity. The Roman Catholic chapel of Strangford having gone into ruins, near the spot where he extricated in early youth a companion from a watery grave, he had it rebuilt at his own expense, which amounted to £500. This gift to a rival church came with peculiar grace from the acknowledged champion of the Protestant faith. He was a munificent patron of the Belfast Academy, which attained eminence under his fostering care, aided by the efforts of the learned Dr Bruce and the Rev. Hamilton Drummond. He was instrumental in establishing the Gaelic Society of Dublin, which published some valuable pieces; and one of the last services he rendered it was releasing O'Hannegan, its secretary, a man of genius, from prison, where he had been confined for debt. His habits were abstemious; he seldom partook of more than two dishes, and was very sparing in the use of wine. Careful and neat in his dress, he avoided giving his servants trouble, and, except on state occasions, dressed himself without assistance.

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When alone, he retired early after dinner to his library, where he remained two or three hours. He was a very early riser; in winter his usual hour for rising was seven, in summer five, and the hours before breakfast were at once devoted to business. It was chiefly by this means that he contrived to get through the immense mass of correspondence which always awaited him, while in general partaking largely of society. His political despatches, which arrived daily, were read and answered with the utmost regularity. The work of one day was never permitted to run into the next. When in London, he always went to his office at eleven, and remained there till three or four; and such were his powers of despatching business that he never failed to overtake everything that required to be done during these hours, so that even when most pressed there was time left for exercise before dinner, which was sometimes on foot, sometimes on horseback. He was a living exemplification of the truth of De Witt's maxim, "that the great secret of getting through business is to do everything at the proper time, and put everything in its proper place." Like many other great men of a similar placid turn of mind, he was fond of gardening, and found a recreation from the affairs of nations in cultivating, with his own hands, parterres of beautiful flowers, or grafting fruit trees.[1]

[1] Cast. Cor. i. 80-82.

93. His religious feelings and principles.

Throughout life he was deeply impressed with religious sentiments; and, though liberal in matters of faith to others, he himself was a steady adherent of the Church of England. He attended divine service regularly on Sunday wherever he was, and always had prayers read daily in his family, sometimes in the morning, more frequently in the evening. No man ever more thoroughly carried into practice, not only in his public career, but in private life, the principle of patience and submission to the Divine Will, so strongly inculcated in the gospel. It was a common saying of his to any one labouring under misfortune, "patience, and all will yet be well."

A faithful and affectionate husband, he bore with unvarying temper several little caprices of Lady Castlereagh, who was an uncommonly handsome woman, much followed at the very head of fashion, and perhaps a little spoiled by the admiration she met with. He had not a trace of jealousy in his composition, and surprised the Parisians not a little, when at Paris in 1815, by walking out arm in arm with her in the morning, without either carriage or attendants. On one occasion his indulgence to her whims had nearly cost him his life. Lady Castlereagh had a passion for large mastiffs, and two or three of these formidable inmates were generally in the house. Two of them having engaged in a furious combat, Lord Castlereagh rushed between them, seized one by each collar, and by a great exertion of strength tore them asunder; but, in doing so, his hands and arms were severely bitten, and he suffered long great pain from these wounds. In his latter years he suffered much from hereditary gout, notwithstanding his abstemious habits; but the pain he underwent, often so productive of ill-humour even in the best tempers, never occasioned irritability in him. In his will he left a legacy to every one of his domestics, down to the lowest helper in the stables; a last act in perfect harmony with the uniform sweetness and benevolence of his disposition.

94. His combined economy and liberality.

His conduct to all public persons with whom he was connected was marked by the same unselfish feelings and kind forethought. He acted himself on the principle—which he uniformly inculcated on others—that the head of any office was bound to sustain and protect all those under him, when their conduct was not obviously indefensible, and undertake all responsibility where there was any doubt upon the matter. So far did he carry this, that during the latter years of the war, when the currency was depreciated below gold by its excessive issue, he repeatedly remonstrated with the treasury upon the hardship thereby sustained by our consuls, and other representatives abroad, who were paid in English notes at par.

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He was constantly met by the objection, however, that no relief could be given, because that would be an admission of the depreciation of the Bank of England notes. In consequence, he desisted, but made up the difference to the severest sufferers from his own resources, which were far from considerable, and as much affected as theirs by the change. His hereditary fortune was by no means large, the estates of the family, though extensive, being burdened with debt; and it required more than his official salary to meet the heavy expenses to which, as Foreign Secretary, he was necessarily put. Unlike many other great statesmen, however, he was not unmindful of his private affairs. He had no personal expenses, except the considerable sums he devoted to charity; his household was well regulated; and his establishment, though very handsome, was not beyond what his income could bear. He had a strong feeling of pride, however, in upholding the dignity of his office in the eyes of foreign diplomatists, and his entertainments to them were on a scale of uncommon magnificence, to which the splendid Dresden and Sevres china, presented to him by foreign sovereigns, according to established usage, on the conclusion of the treaties of Paris and Vienna, not a little contributed.

95. Descent of his title and estates.

Lord Castlereagh left no family; and after his death the titles and family estates descended to his immediate younger brother, Sir Charles Stewart, who became the third Marquess of Londonderry. With the title and family estates Sir Charles inherited also a considerable part of the beautiful vases and other ornaments which had been presented to Lord Castlereagh on occasion of the signature of treaties by the Allied sovereigns, and which now form part of the magnificent decorations of Holderness House in London, the splendid town mansion of Frances Anne, Marchioness of Londonderry.

CHAPTER XVII.

SIR CHARLES STEWART, FROM HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE EMBASSY TO VIENNA IN 1814 TO HIS WITHDRAWING FROM OFFICIAL LIFE AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VERONA IN 1823.

1. Change in Sir Charles Stewart's career after Lord Castlereagh's death.

WITH the death of Lord Castlereagh in 1822, the national career of his brother ere long came to an end. Sir Charles (now Lord) Stewart indeed held the important situation of ambassador at Vienna for a short period after, and acted as one of the plenipotentiaries of England at Verona in November and December 1822; but, as will hereafter appear, he did not long retain it under his successor Mr Canning, and from the time of his resignation of office and return from Verona in 1823, although he took an active part in public affairs as a member of the House of Peers and Lord-Lieutenant of the county of Durham, as well as on his paternal estates in the north of Ireland, yet his actions had ceased to have as formerly a direct bearing on the course of public events. He was no longer the adjutant-general of Lord Wellington's army in Spain, directing its most important movements, or intrusted in the north of Germany with the onerous duty of holding an unwilling Crown Prince to the charge. It no longer depended on him to bring 70,000 additional troops into the field of Leipsic, or convert a drawn battle or a possible defeat into a glorious victory. This biography, therefore, with the change in the situation of its object, must undergo a corresponding alteration. It no longer requires a narrative to be given of public events to con-

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vey to the reader a just conception of the weight with which the actions of the two brothers pressed on the scale in which they were balanced; it becomes rather a disclosure of the private life and opinions of those by whom such great things were done. It will partake, therefore, less of general history, and more of individual biography: but it will not, on that account, be the less interesting or the less important, when the magnitude of the public services rendered by the objects of that biography has been previously established.

2. His reluctance to become adjutant-general to Wellington, and Lord Castlereagh's efforts to make him take the situation.

Heart and soul a soldier, and at the same time gifted with the eye of a general, Sir Charles Stewart was in his element when he was leading the charge of the pickets on the Imperial Guard, on the banks of the Esla, or disarming the French colonel of cuirassiers at the head of his regiment in single combat on the field of Fuentes d'Onoro. His disposition led him to these gallant and daring deeds, rather than the direction of the methodical arrangements of a great army: his nature was chivalrous rather than administrative. His feeling was that of Henri de la Rochejaquelein, when he said, during the war in La Vendée, "If we succeed in restoring the King to his throne, I hope he will give me a regiment of hussars." But Lord Castlereagh, who knew him better than he did himself, had discovered in him administrative powers of no ordinary kind, and he deemed him fitted for a more elevated sphere of action than heading, however bravely or skilfully, a brigade of cavalry. Accordingly, when Sir Arthur Wellesley on being appointed to the command of the army in Portugal, offered Sir Charles (then General) Stewart the important post of Adjutant-General to the army, the latter hesitated at first about accepting it, and said he would rather have the command of a brigade of cavalry. Upon this Lord Castlereagh addressed to him several long and affectionate letters, eminently descriptive both of himself and the brother whom he so tenderly loved, and which deserves a place in these pages as alike

characteristic of and honourable to both.* They had the desired effect, and launched Sir Charles on the elevated career which he afterwards entered on with so much honour to himself and advantage to his country.

* "*Stanmore, Saturday,* 1809.

"My Dearest Charles,—I don't know that I can add anything to what I stated for your consideration yesterday. I think your decision ought to depend upon what you propose to yourself hereafter as a professional man. If your mind is bent on pursuing the profession on the larger scale, I think you ought not to hesitate to connect yourself with Wellesley; and to consider everything else as secondary to employment in a prominent situation. If you limit your views to a cavalry command in your turn, there is no claim upon you to force the point now, and there may be a balance between your official duties and those which might be assigned you in command of a brigade of cavalry. But then you must make up your mind to this description of employment being, in its nature *and in our service,* a very limited career. If you mean to be hereafter a candidate for high command (which I think you may aspire to) you cannot too soon emerge from the character of a partizan; and I don't think any step promises to place you so much in the way of general military reputation as being close to Wellesley's person and at the head of his staff. It embarks you with him; and I don't know any school in which I would prefer to study, or which is likely to obtain for you the public confidence in an equal degree.

"As to my official convenience, I am sure it ought to be secondary to us both. It really does not deserve a thought in comparison with what is most for your permanent interest. I should enjoy your remaining; I shall enjoy your returning to me; but I should much more *enjoy to witness the augmentation of your reputation,* which has opened under such favourable auspices. Political situation is uncertain: professional character is a much more stable reliance; and as you would always be sure of being employed on the staff at home on your return, this, with the prospect of a regiment at no distant period, would make you at ease in point of income, even when out of office. I trust, my dearest Charles, that you will feel I have given you the best proof of my affection in speaking to you thus openly. I certainly think that the course of your future military life must materially hinge on your present decision. Thinking so, I am bound to say so; but still the alternative is the question of more or less of ambition. Honourable your station must be in any event; but if it is to be great, or as full of distinction as your own talents and the advantages of your situation in life are calculated to make it, you must mark to all the world that your profession has no competitor in your eyes, *not even your wife;* and upon this view of the case your determination ought to be taken. With the case before you it must be quite your own. God bless you, my dearest Charles. That you may decide for the best is very near my heart.—Ever yours most affectionately, C."—*MS. Lond. Papers.*

Again he wrote soon after:—

"*Stanmore, Sunday, 26th March* 1809.

"My Dearest Charles,—I don't know that I ever performed an act of duty with more of conflict in point of feeling, than in answering your letter of last night. It was not done without an effort of that sort of virtue which forgets every consideration of private convenience, and even the personal safety of a friend, in contemplation of his glory. I cannot but rejoice in your decision. I trust and feel convinced that it is *the only one* which, upon reflection,

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3. Lord Stewart at the Congress of Vienna.

After his appointment to the embassy at Vienna in July 1814, Sir Charles (now Lord) Stewart continued, with a very few intermissions, to reside at that capital, engaged in his official duties. They were at first extremely arduous, especially in the latter part of the succeeding year, when the Congress sat there. Although Lord Castlereagh was present then, and of course charged with the more important negotiations, especially with Austria and Russia, yet Lord Stewart was intrusted with most important duties in it. He was active in assisting the German committee, on whom was devolved the onerous task of arranging the vast internal affairs of the Confederation; and in that capacity he both supported the claims of Hanover, which very much by his exertions received an accession of 250,000 souls and a considerable territory, and did good service in aiding to adjust the very serious differences which arose among the greater Powers, particularly in regard to Saxony and Poland. He was also a member of the statistical section of the Congress; and many very valuable reports on that subject bear, among others, his signature.* In the important

would have satisfied your own mind. If I thought you were only calculated to fill an ordinary station in the profession you have chosen, I should have indulged the selfish views my convenience suggested; but, indulging brighter hopes in regard to the destiny which awaits you, and in the hope that Providence may conduct you in safety through all its dangers, I have encountered the responsibility of encouraging you to make every other consideration subordinate *to your fame as a soldier*. Modesty is no proof of want of resources; do not, however, detract from your own powers. I am confident in your energy and capacity: resolve to rise, and you will succeed.. Rejoice that you have a new and difficult task assigned you: don't be impatient to return to the more limited walk in which you have latterly shone. You *must* be distinguished in the more liberal view of the art of war; and there is no reason why you should always be exposed as a common dragoon at the advanced posts.—God bless you, dearest brother.—Ever yours most affectionately, C." —*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* The diplomatic acts of the Congress which *bear Sir Charles Stewart's name* ATTACHED (in connection with the *Congress of Vienna*) I find to be the following: He signed—1. The general treaty of 9th June 1815; 2. The declaration of the Allied Powers on the affairs of the *Helvetic Confederacy* of the 20th March 1815; 3. The Protocol of the 29th March 1815 on the cessions made by the King of Sardinia to the Canton of Geneva; 4. The Declaration of the Powers on the abolition of the slave trade, of the 8th February 1815; 5. The Regulation concerning the precedence of diplomatic agents, of the 19th March 1815.—*Congrès de Vienne.*

conferences which led to the formation of the secret alliance between Great Britain, France, and Austria, to resist the encroachment of Russia on Poland, of which an account has already been given, he bore a prominent part, and actively supported Lord Castlereagh in his efforts to rescue Poland from the domination of the great Russian autocrat.

4. Affection of the Prince-Regent for Lord Stewart.

One of the most remarkable features in Lord Stewart's character, and which, as much as his distinguished energy and ability, led to his great success in life, was the charm of his manner when in intimate society, which generally proved irresistible, and won for him not merely the respect and regard, but the warm affection of the most exalted personages with whom, during his eventful career, he was brought in contact. The love—for it can be called by no other name—which subsisted throughout between him and Lord Castlereagh, was more like that of Orestes and Pylades, in ancient days, than anything in real life; and the same charm early won for him the warm friendship of the Duke of Wellington, who never called him by any other name than "Charles." It disarmed also the hostility of the Crown Prince, even after all the discord and high words which, it has been seen, had passed between them, and during the latter years of the lives of both they were on terms of cordiality. But this charm acted yet more powerfully on persons of still higher rank. None felt it more strongly than the princes of our blood royal, who not only watched with the warmest interest his military career, but constantly addressed him both in conversation and writing in terms indicating not only the highest regard, but the warmest affection.* Lord Stewart's position at Vienna from 1814

* "*Carlton House, January* 8, 1809.

"The Prince of Wales is extremely sensible of Lord Castlereagh's attention, and sincerely congratulates him upon the general success of the British cavalry; but it affords him a peculiar gratification to know that his *friend Stewart* bore so distinguished a part on the occasion."

Carlton House, January 10, 1809.

"My dear Stewart,—The Prince commands me to express his admiration of the judgment, zeal, and enterprise you have manifested in the duties of the outposts, the details of which have this day reached his Royal Highness. He has read them with pride and gratification, as bearing such honourable testi-

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to 1823, necessarily led to his being intrusted with various duties, some of a very arduous and delicate kind, by the highest personage in the realm. The ability, talent, and judgment with which he discharged them afforded the very greatest satisfaction to his royal master, which was expressed to him in holograph letters of his Royal Highness, bearing evidence equally of the high estimation in which his conduct was held, the warmth of the gratitude and affection which it had awakened, and the refined taste and power in composition of their royal author.*

5. Affection of William IV. for Lord Stewart.

It is not very often that the same individual wins the affection of successive monarchs,—an heir-apparent and a ruling sovereign, but such was undoubtedly the case with Lord Stewart. Numerous letters are extant in the Londonderry Collection from William IV., both when Duke of Clarence and when on the throne, which breathe

mony to the gallantry of the British cavalry, in which you have borne so distinguished a part."—SIR H. BLOOMFIELD *to* SIR C. STEWART, *Jan.* 9, 1809.—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* In relation to Lord Stewart's conduct in the Congress of Vienna and the arduous duties arising out of it, which extended through the whole of 1816, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent expressed himself in the most gratifying and affectionate terms, in the following holograph letter, the original of which is in the *Londonderry Papers*:—

"MY DEAR CHARLES,—After the recent events that have taken place at Vienna, I cannot resist taking up my pen, and sending you a few lines in my own handwriting. The sincerity and warmth of the affection I have uniformly felt for you now for so many years, I thought had been such as to admit of little possibility of either addition or increase. But I find myself completely mistaken and deceived; for your conduct on the late occasion, in whatever point of view I consider it, and that it offers itself to my view, has called for and given rise to in me warm feeling towards you far beyond what I ever did or thought I could have felt for or towards any individual, even yourself. Having said this much, you cannot be surprised when I tell you that I cannot find any words or language that are at all adequate to convey to you (and as I should wish) all that my heart feels towards you. The line which you at once laid down for yourself and pursued, portrays not only the discretion, ability, talent, and firmness of the sound statesman and diplomate, but beautifully blends with it all the high sense of private honour, as well as the delicate anxious care of the most affectionate of friends. Indeed, your conduct has been such as to outstrip all and everything that approbation or encomium would offer or convey; and as to the effect it has had upon me, I can only say that it has most indelibly and for ever rooted and engraved itself in my heart. With the most fervent prayers that you may long enjoy health and every other possible worldly blessing, and that myself and the country may long, long, long continue to benefit by the services of so sincere a friend and able a minister, I remain, my dearest Charles, ever your most affectionate friend, GEORGE, *P. R.*"—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

as warm, almost romantic, an affection as those of his elder brother, the Prince Regent. This is certainly a very remarkable circumstance, especially when taken in connection with the rancorous and persevering hostility of which he and Lord Castlereagh were for long the object, on the part of a numerous and noisy portion of the community, because they had courage enough to resist their unreasonable demands. The explanation of it is to be found in the energy and ability with which Sir Charles discharged his public duties, and the unaffected simplicity and *bonhomie*, as well as high-bred courtesy, which distinguished his private manners. His kindness to the son of the Duke of Clarence, whom he took with him to Spain as one of his aide-de-camps, drew forth the warmest acknowledgment from that Prince.* This combination,

* "BURLY HOUSE, *October* 23, 1809.

"DEAR CHARLES,—A vast variety of causes have combined till now to prevent my answering yours of the 8th September from Badajos, delivered to me by George [his son]. I was anxious to have seen Lady Catherine before I wrote, but George and myself have been unfortunate in not meeting with her ladyship. I am now proceeding to attend a sick sister at Weymouth, but cannot leave this place without returning you my sincere thanks for all your kindness to George, who is, believe me, not ungrateful. My son arrived here on 28th September better, but far from well, and has been ever since under the care of Sir Walter Farquharson. I feel most sensibly your attention to my son, and I may assure you, with truth, George will be most happy at any time to serve with you, and particularly before the enemy. But under the present circumstances the Prince, who has so kindly adopted him, is of opinion it would be advisable for my son to make himself perfect in the regimental duty, and George will join the 18th Hussars the moment he is quite well. Your letter I have, of course, shown to the Prince, who approves of everything you have done relative to my son.

"I cannot too often or too warmly express my gratitude for your kind attention and protection to George; he cannot have been with a better officer than yourself, and I feel most singular gratification that you assure me you will in future receive him again. It will ever be his anxious wish and mine that you should serve together. Your rank and service in this country must insure to you future and great commands, and also, my dear friend, your merits; and I look forward with pride and satisfaction to George being your companion-in-arms. With these sentiments of gratitude for your attention to my son, and looking forward to your both serving together in future, in higher and more conspicuous situations, permit me to present you with a sabre of the value of one hundred guineas, which you will order to be made whenever you please, only I request, in lieu of an inscription, there may be introduced your arms and mine. I must lament that such gallant officers as Lord Wellington and yourself should have such little prospect of eventual success. Had Spain and its inhabitants even met our army half-way, the

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rare in any rank of life, but especially in those who in general form the society of princes, appears to have won the heart of every one who was admitted to his intimacy, and to have in an especial manner captivated those highest in rank and first in station. So strongly did the Duke of Clarence feel his kindness during the Talavera campaign to his son George (Earl of Munster), that he requested Sir Charles Stewart's acceptance of a splendid sabre as a testimony of his gratitude and esteem.

6. Lord Castlereagh gets for him the red ribbon in January 1813.

So strongly was Sir Charles Stewart's inclinations directed to military service, and so passionately desirous was he of military renown, that it was with reluctance that he exchanged it for the diplomatic career towards the close of the war. Even the offer of the important situation of military envoy and minister at the Court of Berlin was not sufficient to wean him from his longing for warlike renown and renewed service with Lord Wellington. Lord Castlereagh, seeing his contest of feelings, and fearing they might lead him to reject it, applied for, and got for him, the military decoration of a red ribbon in the end of January 1813, which soothed his feelings, and led to his acceptance of that appointment.*

affairs of the Peninsula would be in a very different state, and the illustrious heroes of Talavera would have to receive everything they deserved after the most glorious achievement of the British arms. My best wishes attend Lord Wellington; and believe me, dear Charles, yours most sincerely, WILLIAM." —*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* "My brother not unnaturally apprehends, after his desire for more active service has been so long known, and as often disappointed, . . . that his being fixed, apparently without prospect of advancement, in the laborious situation which he never liked, and accepted four years since not without reluctance, may be interpreted into a reflection on his conduct as an officer, which he is not conscious of deserving. My brother has been at the head of the staff of the (Peninsular) army since the commencement of Lord Wellington's command. He has always courted active service whenever it could be found, having relinquished the situation of Under-Secretary of State for that purpose. Exclusive of two campaigns with the Austrians, under the Archduke Charles, he has served under Lord Moira, Abercrombie, Moore, and Lord Wellington. He has been repeatedly wounded, suffered severely in his health, and has hardly ever been employed in the active command of troops without having his conduct particularly approved in the published orders."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD LIVERPOOL, *January* 23, 1813; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

Sir Charles immediately after received the desired honour.

1814.

7. His services when Minister at Vienna, from 1814 to 1822.

During Lord Stewart's stay at Vienna, where he was ambassador during eight years, he discharged with equal tact and ability the important duties which devolved on him in that capacity. Several of them were of a kind so delicate and confidential, that though a full account of them exists in the Londonderry Papers, it would be premature to give them to the public. He upheld with splendour and magnificence the dignity of his situation, and exercised in the most liberal and sumptuous manner the generous hospitality which became the representative of the greatest Power in Christendom. He continued to receive the most affectionate letters from many of the most distinguished persons in the realm, and from none more than the Prince Regent, whose affection for him seemed to increase rather than diminish with the lapse of time and long-continued severance. The unhappy affair of the Queen gave him many opportunities of serving his royal master, and on all these occasions his assistance called forth his warmest and most grateful acknowledgments. But he never forgot his own dignity in these delicate affairs, and his efforts were entirely devoted to inquiring from reliable sources into the real conduct of her Royal Highness, and taking such steps as seemed best calculated to prevent the scandal connected with it from being bruited abroad to the world. He for long was successful in doing so; but at length the impetuosity of her Royal Highness rendered all his efforts nugatory, and brought on that catastrophe which so nearly overturned both the Ministry and the throne.*

* "BRIGHTON, *December* 12, 1818.

"MY DEAREST CHARLES,—I wrote you a few lines, enclosing to your care a letter for Metternich. I have not introduced in my letter anything respecting myself or those wishes of mine which I confided entirely to your care and attention, as I judged it best to confine the language of the epistle entirely to general grounds. At the same time, I cannot but hope that there is not an expression in it that will not prove highly satisfactory to his royal and imperial master. With regard to yourself, my dear friend, you are really too good, and I hardly know where to find words to express to you how sensible I am of your kind recollection and attention in sending the beautiful little *cadeau*—which I received quite safe—or of the real value which I shall set upon

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1818.

8. Lord Stewart's marriage with Frances Anne, daughter and heiress of Sir Harry Vane-Tempest.

Lord Stewart was one of the *corps diplomatique* which attended their Imperial Majesties to Aix-la-Chapelle in the autumn of 1818; but as Lord Castlereagh was also there, his duties were chiefly confined, on that important occasion, to forming the channel of communication between the British plenipotentiary, and Prince Metternich, and the Austrian Cabinet, whose confidence, from long-continued and tried services together, he possessed in the very highest degree. From Aix-la-Chapelle, when the conferences broke up, he proceeded to revisit the

it, as coming from you. But I do assure you, my dearest Charles, I do not stand in need of any such proof of your sincere regard and affectionate friendship for me, for I have already received too many from you not to make a deep impression on my heart, and such as to put all possibility of doubt upon that head quite out of the question. I trust that your own affairs are going on quite as you would wish them, and that I shall have the happiness of seeing you here very shortly again to bring them to the speediest and happiest conclusion, a reward to which I am sure that in every point of view that one can take of it, you are most justly entitled, whether it be from the critically correct and honourable conduct you have observed throughout this affair, or from the extreme delicacy which you have all along testified to the young lady herself. I cannot help thinking that the death of ——, melancholy as it was, will prove no detriment to your ultimate establishment in the possession of all that you like and love, and that can and will, I doubt not, secure to you lasting happiness, and these also, I do assure you, are my most sincere and fervent prayers.

"This very morning, and for the very first time that such a thing has been pointed at anywhere, the *Morning Herald* has broken the ice, and in a very short paragraph, merely mentioned and made a statement of not above a line or two, of a fact that has come, as it says, to its knowledge, that there is a commission gone to Italy, consisting of three persons, with Mr Cook, a barrister, at the head of it, for the purpose of making some interesting and important communications to the Princess of W[ales] there. I hope that everything is proceeding both favourably and successfully for me in that part of the world; however, it is a matter of no small wonder to me, that, considering the number of witnesses they have already been under the necessity of examining, nothing as yet, to our knowledge, and until this very day, should have transpired or been brought before the public upon this subject. Sooner or later it was sure to get wind, and we might therefore make up our minds to meet it entirely and with that portion of manly firmness, having all the right and reason on our side, which it may require and ought to be met with. I conceive that I must now, my dearest Charles, have put your patience to the very utmost extent, by the length of this scrawl, and by having encroached so much upon your time, which must be always, in your station, so much more usefully, as well as at times agreeably, employed and occupied than it can be in receiving any epistle from me. I shall, therefore, hasten to a conclusion, assuring you that there is no one on this earth that values or loves you more truly than your very affectionate friend, GEORGE, *P. R.*"

British Islands; and there he formed an acquaintance which led to an event of the very highest importance, and which exerted a lasting influence upon his future life and fortune. He then met and formed the acquaintance of the LADY FRANCES ANNE, only daughter and heiress of Sir Harry Vane-Tempest, by Anne-Catherine, late Countess of Antrim, in her own right. This young lady, then only in her nineteenth year, was not only one of the greatest heiresses, but one of the most charming and accomplished persons in England. In right of her father she inherited the noble estate and mansion of Wynyard Park, in the County of Durham, and from both father and mother she was descended from ancient and noble families. With the advantage of a tall and elegant figure, and uncommon personal beauty, she was endowed, at the same time, with a fascination of manner which few could withstand; and an energy of character and loftiness of mind which eminently qualified her to take a part in great undertakings, and to devote her fortune to the most noble and beneficent purposes. At this time she was still a ward in Chancery; and as Lord Stewart, though in possession at the moment of the embassy to Vienna, had only a younger son's fortune and his professional income, to depend upon permanently, there were in the first instance some difficulties to be overcome in the way of aspiring to her hand. But the distinction of Lord Stewart's character, the elegance of his manners, and his chivalrous bearing, overcame all obstacles: like the knights of old he won a principality, and the princess who ruled it, by his sword; and all difficulties being finally adjusted, he was married to the fair enchantress on the 3d April 1819, on which occasion he assumed the additional surname and arms of Vane,—being those of Lady Stewart's family.

1819.

April 3, 1819.

This auspicious union, which was blessed with a fine and numerous family, in its ultimate effects materially changed and modified his prospects and destinies in life.

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1819.

9. Advantageous results of this marriage to Lord Stewart.

Possessed now of great wealth, and the master of a noble estate, he had the means of devoting himself to its improvement, and exerting his active and ardent mind on projects of amelioration, which in some degree supplied the want of the excitement of war and diplomacy. This was a very fortunate circumstance; for his mind was so active, and his disposition so energetic, that had nothing come in the way to supply the void when the termination of the war closed his fields of fame, and the change of Ministry threw him out of diplomatic employment, he would have pined for want of occupation, and possibly become morose and discontented. Whereas, in the management of his estates, and the vast undertakings in the way of harbours, mines, and railways which were connected with it, or arose out of the resources which his marriage put at his disposal, he found ample employment; and, as the event in the end proved, a vast increase both of wealth and consequence to his family. This, joined to the society of a most superior and charming woman, who entered with corresponding ardour into all his projects, and supported them with her great talents and resources, more than compensated the cessation of public occupation, and rendered the evening of his life, if not the most brilliant, the most serenely happy and useful, of his long and honourable career.

10. Commencement of Lord Stewart's duties at Vienna when the British change of Continental policy began.

Though attended, however, in the end with these important effects on Lord Stewart's fortune and destiny, this brilliant marriage, in the first instance, made no change on his position and public duties. He returned, after the honeymoon was over, with his young and beautiful bride to Vienna, when he was soon involved in the arduous and delicate negotiations consequent on the return of the Queen to this country, her open braving of the court, and the revolutions in the Spanish and Italian peninsulas, of which an ample account has been given in the chapters relating to those important events. His situation and public duties, as ambassador at Vienna,

now became of the very highest importance, and beyond any other requiring delicacy and tact on the part of the representative of Great Britain; for he was required to break to the Austrian Cabinet—with whom he had so long acted in concert, and of which he enjoyed the entire confidence—the change of policy on the part of the English Government in consequence of recent events and its virtual secession from the Grand Alliance which had worked such wonders for the liberation of Europe. As such, he had a very difficult, and, in some respects, a painful task to perform; but he was aware that the British Cabinet was unanimous on the subject, and himself the depositary of Lord Castlereagh's inmost thoughts and feelings on it, he worked out their ideas honestly and in good faith, though perhaps they were not always in exact conformity with his own views regarding it. The private letters which passed between him and Lord Castlereagh at this time are of peculiar value, as demonstrating how sincere the latter was in his application of the former policy of Great Britain,—which was that of upholding national independence and preserving the balance of power,—to the new circumstances which had arisen, and how completely his official despatches and instructions were in harmony with his private opinions.*

The affair of the Queen's return to England, and subse-

* "I wish you distinctly to understand that, in proportion as events at Paris and here give to our general position a more serious character, our Allies may expect to see us more determinedly wedded to the position upon which alone we feel the smallest hopes of rallying the national sentiment, if necessary, to exertion. Pitt, in the early years of the late war, neglected the necessary caution in this respect. He was thereby weakened for the first ten years of the war by a decided schism of public opinion, whether the war was of necessity or brought on by bad management. In all the latter years of the war, profiting by experience, we never exposed ourselves to a question of this nature, and we were supported in the war, under all its accumulated burdens, by the whole energy and power of the nation. This is our compass, and by this we must steer; and our Allies on the Continent may be assured that they will deceive themselves if they suppose that we could for six months act with them unless the mind of the nation was in the cause. They must not, therefore, press us to place ourselves on any ground John Bull will not maintain; and as to Metternich's instructions, it is a mere protraction of etiquette if ex-

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11. Lord Castlereagh's confidential correspondence with Lord Stewart regarding the Queen's trial.

quent trial, with the delicate and perilous investigations connected with it, formed during the first half of 1820 the subject of close and anxious correspondence between Lord Castlereagh and Lord Stewart; and, as already mentioned, at the special request of the Prince Regent the latter returned to England in the autumn of that year to give the benefit of his counsel and information to the Government in regard to that most distressing affair. Lord Castlereagh's anxious attention had been turned to this subject for four years back, and his secret

plained, and limited in the only sense in which we could be parties to it."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *February* 24, 1820; *MS.*

Along with the important instructions to Lord Stewart at Troppau, already given, Lord Castlereagh sent him the following private letter:—"I send you an instruction by Esterhazy's courier, and have drawn it more fully than was otherwise necessary, in order that it might serve, if you think fit confidentially to communicate it to our Allies, to explain the position in which we stand. I presume our refusal to send a member of the Government to Troppau will be complained of; but if we had, we could have given him no other instruction, nor, in truth, any greater latitude than you have, while such a mission at the present moment would have been productive of the greatest misconception and inconvenience.

"There was but one opinion about it, and you may be assured it was decided entirely on public grounds. I trust the reasons that have been assigned to Lieven and Esterhazy for declining the joint request of their courts, will prove satisfactory, and that no consideration personal to yourself has stood in the way of our compliance. I cannot disguise from you, however, that the way it was claimed, and more especially in the Russian communication—namely, as an obligation imposed on us by our treaties—rendered it still more impossible to alter the line previously adopted and declared. But had it been even urged upon the very grounds of my despatch of this date—that is, upon our own terms—still I should have declined; so strongly do we feel the inconvenience of at present raising an alarm in this country on such a question, and more especially the extreme delicacy,—while our own declared line with regard to Naples is that of neutrality—upon a condition of hazarding a member of the Government in discussing, where he might at once find himself involved, without instructions, in deliberations founded upon a different basis, and which, if he was to take any part in them whatever, must, amongst other objections, lead him, at the most obvious inconvenience, to become either an *approving* or *protecting* party; and with the farther evil, that it would be hardly possible for us in such a case to render our line clear and intelligible in Parliament without bringing before both Houses more of the Allied proceedings than can be desirable at such a moment to submit to the invidious criticism of Europe."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *October* 15, 1820 (*Secret and confidential*); *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

"I very much agree with à Court both as to the King's position and the inexpediency of returning now to the old system after all that has passed. I still think Metternich has specially weakened his position by mak-

correspondence with Lord Stewart at Vienna regarding it was characterised by his usual just appreciation and cool judgment. His uniform advice was to do nothing in a hurry; to distrust all evidence merely circumstantial, how clear and conclusive soever; to trust to nothing but the direct testimony of eyewitnesses, and, if possible, that of persons of this country, and unconnected with his Majesty's household. These views were very clearly expressed in a secret letter to Lord Stewart, so far back as the beginning of 1816.* In the same letter are some

ing it [the Neapolitan] an European instead of an Austrian question. He might have had the same European countenance upon a much more intelligible case. He would have carried public opinion, especially in this country, with him, had he stood simply upon the offensive character of a Carbonari Government,—than embarking himself on the boundless ocean on which he has prepared to sail. In placing his efforts boldly on strong Austrian grounds, Russia and Prussia might have infused the general interest into their declarations of adherence, without diluting the main question to their own standard of remote interest. But our friend Metternich, with all his merits, prefers a complicated negotiation to a bold and rapid stroke. God bless you ever, C." —LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *January* 5, 1821; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* "In any future communication with him you must make ——— feel the importance of not risking an exposure except upon *sure* grounds, and he ought to secure the presence of some unexceptionable evidences who could testify that they had *ocular demonstration.* English witnesses are to be preferred; and should such an attempt be made, it is material (lest it should fail) that it should be made so as not to implicate you or any other person in the Prince Regent's service. You will keep in mind that there are two objects to be aimed at. The first and best would be such unqualified proofs of what no person can morally doubt, as would for ever deliver the Prince Regent of having a woman so lost to all decency in the relation of a wife. To effect this, or to justify, in prudence, a proceeding for divorce, the proofs must be *direct and unequivocal,* and the evidence such, of the parties to be examined, as would preclude their testimony from being run down and discredited. We must always recollect that this proceeding, if it be taken, must ultimately be a parliamentary one. Party would then soon give it the character of a question not merely between the Prince and Princess, but between the Prince and the Princess Charlotte, and a great deal of intrigue might arise out of such a case, especially if there were any disrepute which could be thrown on the proofs, or if the evidence were circumstantial merely and not direct. But there is another most important object short of divorce—namely, to accumulate such a body of evidence as may at any time enable the Prince Regent to justify himself for refusing to receive the Princess in this country, or to admit her to the enjoyment of any of those honorary distinctions to which his wife, if received into his family and court, would be entitled. The idea of any stipulation with such a person is not to be thought of. The Prince would dishonour himself by entering into terms with her; and there are no means by which terms, if

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interesting details as to the simple way in which the marriage of the young Princess Charlotte, the hope of England, was arranged between her and her royal father, which are peculiarly pleasing in persons in their exalted position in life.

12. Queen's arrival in London, and correspondence regarding it.

From this time forward the principle on which Lord Castlereagh constantly acted, and which Lord Stewart at Vienna did his utmost to carry out, was to avoid any public rupture and all the scandal with which it was sure to be accompanied, by keeping the Princess at a distance, and quietly collecting such a body of evidence regarding her as would deter her from returning to this country,

broken on her part (which would inevitably happen, whenever any mischievous purpose might be thereby served), could be enforced.

"The only prudent course is to augment and confirm the proofs the Prince already has, and which, when used deferentially to justify his own fixed determination never to suffer so depraved a character to approach his person, will bear his Royal Highness triumphantly before all mankind in such determination. I consider this latter purpose as already gained, and that this woman . . . will never again venture to present herself for factious support in England. It is the efficacy of the means we are already in possession of to protect the Prince Regent against farther personal annoyance, that ought to make us doubly cautious of embarking in any offensive proceeding, except upon the clearest grounds of practical expediency. But as a legal deliverance from such a person would constitute, undoubtedly, the only result completely satisfactory in itself, subject to all the prudential considerations I have adverted to, it is an object never to be lost sight of. I need add no more to make you see your way clear, and to enable you to furnish me with any information in your power.

"I am happy to be able to tell you the Prince and Princess C. [Charlotte] are once more comfortable together. Having waited a due time, and satisfied himself there was no personal objection to the Prince of Cobourg, the Regent consulted his daughter kindly about her wishes, and finding that she preferred Prince Leopold to any other of the possible aspirers, he undertook, in the most indulgent manner, to invite him over. We expect him shortly, but as the proposition was not made in the Regent's letter desiring to see him in England, the alliance cannot be avowed; nor is it admitted by the Prince, although, like everything else, *true* or *false*, the newspapers have got it. I am very glad that this has been solicited. She seems so much to wish it, that I really think it affords the best chance of making her happy; and at all events the Regent will have nothing to reproach himself with if it should unfortunately prove otherwise. I trust Cobourg is not an intriguant, and will keep himself and her out of politics. He has apparently a great deal of domestic resources; and if they can keep to this and enjoy their situation in the country in good humour with the Prince, and without meddling with party, the Princess C. will be happier than she can ever afterwards hope to be on the throne."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *Craig Farm, January* 21, 1816 (*Most private and secret*); *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

and thereby avert all the unpleasant and even dangerous consequences with which such a step would be attended. In these efforts they were for long successful; and her legal advisers, Messrs Brougham and Denman, contributed their powerful aid to the continuance of the same auspicious state of things. But though this course of matters continued as long as the old king lived, yet it was brought to an abrupt and painful termination upon his decease, in February 1820, as already mentioned, in consequence of his successor positively refusing to have her Royal Highness's name inserted in the liturgy as an object for the prayers of the nation. This dilemma was from the very first the object of the greatest anxiety to both Lord Castlereagh and Lord Stewart, and led to an anxious correspondence between them, and to the latter being recalled for a short time from Vienna to London. But matters were cut short, and the crisis brought on sooner than was anticipated, by the sudden and unexpected resolution of the Queen to return to England and brave all the consequences which took place in the beginning of June. This was communicated by Lord Castlereagh to Lord Stewart the same evening in a letter to Vienna, which is extremely curious, chiefly from the marked and striking contrast it exhibits to the widely-different and auspicious state of things at this time.*

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June 5, 1820.

* "MY DEAREST CHARLES,—The die is cast. The Queen is at Alderman Wood's, in South Audley Street, and the green bag with all the papers on the table of both Houses. We shall name our committee to take them into consideration, and to advise the House whether any and what proceedings should be had thereupon to-morrow. So as now the whole proofs must be adduced, the Vice-Chancellor writes to you and Brown to send us all the witnesses. We shall have a difficult and tedious proceeding; but we have so managed as to place the king on strong ground.

"If Brougham had gone to Geneva, as she pressed him to do, he might have sent her back to Italy with the greatest ease. But he said that he could not leave the House of Commons, that she must come near the coast. Wood then got hold of her, and Brougham could make nothing of her. I was with the King this evening when the cavalcade passed Carlton House. The alderman occupied Bergami's post — sitting forward in the landau beside her Majesty. When opposite the palace this insolent citizen stood up without his hat in the landau, and invoked a cheer from the shabby crew that attended the

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13. The bill is thrown out, and Lord Castlereagh's letters regarding it. Nov. 9, 1820.

The giving up of the bill of pains and penalties already mentioned, by the Government, was a very severe blow to the Administration, and but for the firmness and perseverance of Lord Castlereagh, would probably have proved fatal to it. He wrote at the moment a very interesting and important letter to Lord Stewart on the subject, which throws a clear light on that momentous passage in the domestic history of the empire.* Subsequent to that

party, which did not exceed in quantity or quality the *posse* that usually follows Burdett from the hustings at Covent Garden. We had a blast from the Radicals to-day on my presenting the message—Bennett, Crevey, Wilson, Lord Archibald (Hamilton), Denman, and Brougham. To-morrow we shall have a debate. By the by, I ought to mention that Sir C. Stuart regularly reported Wilson's proceedings at Paris on the Queen's business. The lot above, and others, certainly did their best to excite her to set us at defiance. There is not time to say anything upon foreign politics, except to thank you for your long and interesting communication."—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *June* 6, 1820 (*Private*); *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

Lord Stewart wrote from Vienna on 25th July to Lord Castlereagh:—"I give you the greatest credit for your admirable display of the progress of your battle. Indeed, throughout, I have admired in all your speeches the admirable dexterity by which a feebleness in the closet was propped by your boldness on your legs. Now don't be angry at my remarks from afar. But, *entre nous*, I think Brougham bamboozled the Vice-Chancellor, Carlton House, Lord Hutchison, his Majesty's ministers, and, perhaps, finally bamboozled himself. I think Government might have couched Wilberforce's address better than to have committed themselves, at least, to those who study at a distance and do not understand the abstruse theory of parliamentary management. On the whole, however, your task has been, beyond all your former labours, herculean and transcendent; and I am sure the King will owe *all* to you, and you alone. You must, however, give me credit for predicting this fatal business, sooner or later, would be grappled with, and at Aix-la-Chapelle, long before I felt and knew, it could not be avoided. . . . . I grieve at what you tell me of the taint among the soldiers; when one sees what military insurrection is doing throughout Europe, and when one observes the manner they are worked upon by the Radical faction, it is very tremendous. C———'s history is most curious; I can conceive no hotter hell than his seat in the House of Commons last month. What a glorious thing for you to be the sole supporter of the poor King, whom one cannot but love with all his errors. . . . Metternich's domestic misfortunes have thrown a gloom over all here. Kindest love to Lord C. Ever your most devoted and affectionate, VANE STEWART."

* "You will probably have heard before this reaches you of the failure of our bill. I call it a failure when our majority was reduced to so low an ebb on the third reading as not to justify Liverpool in sending it to the House of Commons. The reasons were, 1st, That it is not usual to send any measure of vital importance upon a small majority from one House to the other; 2d, That the chance of success in the Commons was more unpromising, and failure would have served to whitewash the Queen, and enabled the Radicals and Opposition to press her claims to be treated as an injured and innocent person.

event, the Queen accepted the enlarged provision made for her by Parliament, on the motion of Government. Lord Castlereagh then wrote another letter to his brother, which is equally valuable, as giving a picture of the state

In closing the proceeding in the Lords, her guilt is established upon the uncontroverted decision of the judicial branch of the Legislature—second reading carried by 28; the preamble and report without a division; and a considerable number of those approving her guilt, who nevertheless voted against the bill—she stands thus degraded, though not punished. The diminution of numbers on the third reading was partly owing to conscientious scruples against the divorce clause, and partly to some peers wishing to establish her guilt, but not to expose the country to all the evils of protracted proceedings in the House of Commons. I should have felt it my duty to fight the question to the last had the bill come down; but there is no possibility of estimating the embarrassments in which we would have found ourselves. When we came to the examination of witnesses, we should have had no judges to guide us; all sorts of questions would have been asked and pressed; we should have had endless motions of adjournment; false evidence without end, and a cloud of witnesses to throw dirt upon the Milan Commission, against whose testimony we should be without defence, as time would not be granted to bring counter proof from Italy. Upon the whole, under all the daily increasing difficulties, my conviction is that, in going farther, we should have fared worse. The King was strongly impressed himself with this opinion, and was against its going to the House of Commons. But, with his usual ignorance of parliamentary management, and habitual disposition to get himself and Government into scrapes, he wants us now to meet Parliament on the 23d, and try some new effort to get rid of the Queen. We shall, however, press a prorogation until January, and in the interim the fermentation may subside. We can judge our course better then; and, if we keep quiet, and make no overtures to the Queen, it is possible she may either offer terms to us, or go abroad and leave her friends to act for her. I think the King's health, as might be expected, is a little shaken; he is thin and ill at ease, complains of want of sleep, and, although calm in manner, can hardly sustain the miserable state of annoyance he leads. In short, my dear Charles, he now has found that I was but too true a prophet of what it is to contend with a desperate and malignant woman, in a country full of treason, and a licentious press, and with a measure to carry through both Houses unparalleled in the history of the country, and in every stage of which questions spring up that shake not only the Administration, but the throne itself to its foundation. You will see that, in order to improve the chances of carrying the bill, the Government wished to give up the divorce clause. No sooner did Liverpool take up his ground on this part of the bill, than the Opposition, who have made the defeating of the whole a complete party question, threw their 60 votes into the other side, Lord Grey avowing his motive for doing so to be the improving the chance of throwing out the bill on the third reading. In these tactics he was but too successful, however inconsistent it was to vote against the adultery, and for the divorce, in a case where he would not admit the crime had been established. What will surprise you most, will be to observe the line taken by many peers on whom the King counted as personal friends. For instance, Lord Hutchison, not voting; Lord Egremont, against; Lord Darlington, against; Duke of Dorset, not voting; Cholmondsley, away; two Lords of the Bedchamber, Delaware and Amherst, against. In short, there were 39 of our usual supporters against us on the second reading. All this saves the tribunal from reproach, but it shows

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of parties at that time, and of the sincerity of his departure from the policy of the Holy Alliance.*

Subsequent to the abandonment of the bill of pains and penalties against the Queen, Lord Stewart remained with his young and beautiful wife at Vienna, where the grace of her manners, and the talent of her conversation, threw an additional charm over the brilliant circle of which their hotel formed the centre. It was at this time that a

that a measure in this country ought to proceed with great caution in these times; and, above all, not to risk personal questions. . . . . If we can get rid of Parliament until January, we shall have full time to look into our *case, and prepare for our trial.*"—LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* LORD STEWART, *November* 13, 1820; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* "(*Private.*) LONDON, *March* 13, 1821.

"MY DEAR CHARLES,—The incessant labour in and out of the House has led me to delay from day to day sending you a messenger, not so much from having any instruction to send, as for the purpose of keeping you *au courant* of what is passing here, both of public and private interest. As to the first chapter, you will find all the elements of our situation in the newspapers. The Queen's question may be regarded as finally and triumphantly closed by her Majesty's acceptance, in defiance of her own message, of the provision made by Parliament. The letter she wrote is quite her own in style, spelling, &c., and is submissive to the King. Brougham has gone the circuit, apparently broke down both in looks and spirit, as he certainly is in reputation; and the Alderman [Wood] having fixed a rendezvous with her Majesty, to prepare a proper answer to Lord Liverpool, was dismayed to learn that the Queen had answered the communication of her own hand the day before. We are only now alarmed lest the King should wither his own laurels by some wretched proceedings against this degraded woman in Hanover, when her fate is sealed, if he will let her alone, and that ten times more completely than the passing the bill through both Houses could possibly have effectuated. She has quarrelled with the Whigs, abused Brougham, and will soon leave the country, if she is not forced to stay at home by some fresh and feeble attack by the King's servants in Hanover, the unpopularity of which in this country would be extreme, and fall entirely on the King. You have learned from Bloomfield the King wishes you should come over in time for the Coronation, and his Majesty's excursion to Ireland is an excellent measure, and I should be glad if you could be one of his attendants on the occasion; but this, I conclude, must hinge on domestic calculation. Your leave of absence, under present circumstances, need not be an obstacle.

"Our parliamentary campaign is now assuming a new shape. We have beat the enemy in regular warfare, and they are now going to try their fortune as guerillas. Tierney, out of health, out of spirits with himself, and disgusted with the insubordination of his troops, has thrown up the command, and there is now no avowed leader, nor are they likely to agree about a successor. The active warfare is in the mountain. Hume, Barnet, and two or three others, have formed a committee to sift details, and worry us with incessant divisions. They tried their hands last night, for the first time, and the consequence was, in the division we beat them 5 to 1, having several of the best of the Whigs with us. In our camp, matters for the present rest as they did, except that we have the

fire of the most threatening kind broke out in it, which seemed to forebode the melancholy catastrophe of Princess Schwartzenberg, at Paris, twelve years before, and in which the life of Lady Stewart was only saved by the singular coolness and presence of mind of her husband.

14. Lord Stewart resigns his situation at Vienna in consequence of Lord Castlereagh's death.

The melancholy death of Lord Castlereagh in August 1822, however, made an immediate change on Lord Stewart's position in relation to the Government, and ere long terminated, if not his public, at least his official career. He was too well acquainted with the ultra-liberal propensities of Mr Canning, who succeeded him in the foreign office, not to be aware that he would soon detach

prospect of securing Plunkett. This will be an immense stroke, if we can keep him in the House of Commons. You will see that we have carried the Catholic question by a small majority. I do not expect that seats in Parliament, or the higher offices, will now be conceded, but there is certainly a great relaxation of tone among the opponents of the question. Canning is expected over from Paris in the course of next week: he comes over for the call on Plunkett's bill. Why he ever went out is now as inexplicable as why Peel did not come in. They both put the concern into jeopardy; but, as matters have turned out, the Government made good their own ground, however slippery in appearance at the outset.

"I see by your and Gordon's letters, received to-day, that our Allies will still deceive themselves upon the political attitude of this Government. They idly persevere in attributing the line we have taken, and *must steadily continue to take*, to the temporary difficulties in which the Government have been placed, instead of imputing them exclusively to those principles *which in our system must be immutable*, and which, if the three Courts persevere much longer in the open promulgation of their *ultra* doctrines, will ere long work a separation which it is the wish of us all to avoid. Lieven lately communicated to me the Russian instructions to Madrid. It prudently aims at disavowing any intention of hostile interference, but it starts from ———, and declares Spain excluded from the alliance. Lieven, perhaps wisely, did not give me a copy, and consequently escaped with a verbal commentary; but as the Russian chargé d'affaires is authorised to read this document to De Castro,* we may ere long be catechised by the Spanish Government whether we regard our alliance with Spain as suspended or at an end. Our answer must be given in the negative, thus furnishing to Europe a new and uncalled-for test of a divergence of sentiment on a fundamental point. Diminution of confidence, interruption to that species of intercourse which arises out of confidential habits, might well have been understood; but alliances and treaties annulled, while amicable relations are preserved, does to the English ear sound altogether incomprehensible. I am confident both Lieven and Esterhazy have given their respective courts correct opinions on all these points, and I hope they may have their weight. Ever, dear Charles, yours most affectionately, CASTLEREAGH."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* The Spanish chargé d'affaires in London.

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Great Britain from the continental alliance, and instead of the cautious system of non-intervention in contests of opinion, pursued by his predecessor, would place her at the head of the movement party in Europe. At first he felt desirous of continuing to hold his diplomatic situation; but the appointment of Mr Canning as foreign minister altered these views. He was too experienced in diplomacy not to be well aware that a certain degree of unity of opinion on material points is essential to the success of its operations, and that an ambassador, especially in such an important position as Vienna, cannot serve, either with advantage to the public or credit to himself, unless his political opinions coincide in the main with those of the Cabinet which he represents. Add to this, that Lord Stewart had acted too long, and in too arduous circumstances with Metternich, Hardenberg, and Nesselrode, not to have become in a great degree the depositary of their inmost views; and, as a man of honour, he felt a repugnance at the thought of seeming even to take advantage of this knowledge, to thwart their wishes in public affairs, or communicate them to a Cabinet which now might be inclined to do so. Actuated by these feelings, he took the only step which, as a man of high principle, remained open to him; he resigned his appointment as ambassador at Vienna, and offered to withdraw from diplomatic and public into private life, so far as that could be attained by one now bearing the name of Londonderry, and occupying the prominent social position which he held. He wrote accordingly a private and grateful letter to the King resigning his situation, and another to Lord Liverpool announcing his having done so; and his resignation was accepted.* But as the

* The letter to the King was in these terms:—

"VIENNA, *September* 20, 1822.

"SIRE,—However deep and heartrending my private affliction has been, I have thought it ill became me, at a moment when the affairs of the empire pressed so heavily upon your royal attention and fatherly protection, to trouble your Majesty with any communication from myself. The moment

Congress of Verona was just at hand, and it would obviously have been detrimental to the public service to have the ambassador at Vienna changed as it commenced, Mr Canning requested Lord Stewart, now Marquess of

however, appears to have now arrived when, in justice to that devotion I have ever borne your Royal service, it is my duty to lay at your Majesty's feet the resignation of the high appointment of your ambassador at the Court of Vienna, which your Majesty for above eight years has deigned to confide to my hands. During the course of that very eventful period I have most anxiously endeavoured to perform my duty. The same duty teaches me now that if, from a peculiar arrangement of position, and if from particular feelings or interior conviction, I can no longer, by my humble labours, serve my King with the same advantage as heretofore, I am bound spontaneously to withdraw myself from his Royal service; evincing thereby that such service weighs in my mind far above any personal consideration whatever. I entertain a confident persuasion that your Majesty will continue to me in a private station the gracious favour and protection which have on so many occasions been shown to me in my public capacity; and although my humble services will easily pass away, those of the names I now bear will, I am persuaded, live for ever in the memory of the father of his people and the most just of kings.—I am Sire, &c., VANE LONDONDERRY."

The letter of resignation to Lord Liverpool was as follows:—

"VIENNA, *September* 25, 1822.

"MY DEAR LORD,—In the first moments of that agonising calamity, which has loaded so many with a weight of sorrow, I felt myself unequal to address your Lordship on any private subject. My first attention on my arrival here was devoted to my public duty at a very anxious moment, and I have endeavoured as well as my state of mind and spirits would permit to execute my official business.

"So soon as I was able to reflect on my private situation, the feelings most prominent in my mind were, first, that I should act in such a manner as my ever lamented brother would have wished; and, secondly, as my life hitherto had been entirely devoted to the public service, I owed it to myself, and the little character which I possessed, to make it evident to all that my public employment did not entirely derive its existence from fraternal partiality. With these impressions your Lordship will not be surprised at my desire to remain in the service of my King. After eleven years of diplomatic situations, and eight at this court, the attachments I have formed here, and the habits I have been in, with Prince Metternich and the Court, led me to believe that not only I could by remaining at this post afford to my character a greater degree of independent political consideration, but also from my facilities and confidence with which I have been treated, I still would further his Majesty's service as well as a new representative. Actuated by these feelings I wrote to Lord Bathurst and my friends accordingly.

"Since that period, however, the final ministerial arrangements have been concluded with the same sincerity with which I have developed my first intentions, I owe it to your Lordship to state without reserve my present feelings. Your Lordship's high honour and excellent heart will understand that there are particular impulses born with a man which lead him in the eventful moments of his life to act exclusively from his own judgment. In ordinary cases we consult friends, those upon whose opinions we rely, but there

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Londonderry, to continue in the mean time to hold office, and act along with the Duke of Wellington at Verona as one of the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain. To this he at once acceded, on the understanding that his duties

are points upon which our own nature alone can determine. In the particular office that I fill I am (or at least ought to be) thrown into the most confidential habits of communication with the able individual whom his Majesty has called to his councils; but neither the world would suppose, or perhaps our mutual feelings allow, that sort of intercourse which must be beneficial to the public interests. With the utmost respect for those abilities and talents, I owe it to his Majesty's new foreign secretary, as well as the public service and myself, to relieve him from that embarrassment which the past might possibly throw over the future.

"In taking the line of humbly offering my resignation to the King, I consider I am doing that which relieves his Majesty's Government and Mr Canning from all difficulty, as far as relates to my appointment under the Foreign Office. I am fortified in this opinion from a belief that your Lordship's former friendship for another, if not for myself, would have induced you to have written to me one line, either during or at the close of the late arrangements, expressive of your Lordship's opinion or wishes on the subject. In the absence of any expression from the Government, and guided by what I think must be your Lordship's view as well as my own judgment, I have to request your Lordship will move the King to direct my letters of recall to Vienna, where I shall proceed, as in duty bound, and take leave of their Imperial Majesties on my way to England.—I have the honour to be, &c., VANE LONDONDERRY."

The King, with the most flattering assurances of regard and esteem, acceded to Lord Londonderry's wish to retire from the embassy; but both Mr Canning and the Duke of Wellington, who had received the Royal command to go to Vienna as plenipotentiary in lieu of the late Marquess of Londonderry, expressed an earnest wish that he should retain office till the Verona conferences, just approaching, were over. Lord Londonderry acceded to their wish by the following letter to Mr Canning:—

"VERONA, *October* 29, 1822.

"SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your separate despatch of the 15th October, conveying to me his Majesty's gracious permission to retire from this embassy. I am wholly inadequate to express the deep gratitude which I feel for the gracious commendation which it has pleased his Majesty to bestow on my humble services, during the series of years that I have held this eminent station. The mode in which these services have been now recorded, and the gracious terms in which the commendation of them has been announced, will be my chief pride and consolation during the remainder of my life. Permit me, sir, to solicit that you will lay the homage of a grateful heart at the feet of the King.

"May I offer also to yourself my best thanks for the consideration which marks your communication with regard to the *period* at which I may present my letters of recedence? I certainly feel that I ought to consult alone in this respect what is most convenient and proper towards the public interests, and I have intimated my desire to the Duke of Wellington to conform to whatever he shall think expedient. I have thought it entirely superfluous, during the Duke of Wellington's presence, to trouble you with any communication from myself; but if any duties should remain for me to perform before my letters

were to be temporary only; and this led to a correspondence between him and the Foreign Office, the material parts of which are given below, and which constitute not the least interesting part of the Londonderry Papers.

15. Lord Londonderry acts along with the Duke of Wellington as plenipotentiary at the Congress of Verona.

The conferences at Verona, and the correspondence of Lord Londonderry with Mr Canning regarding these, are chiefly valuable as indicating at once the complete divergence of policy which had, in consequence of the Spanish and Italian Revolutions, arisen between England and her former Continental allies, and the vigour and good faith with which Lord Castlereagh, the Duke of Wellington after his death, and Lord Londonderry, carried out the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, so distinctly adopted by the former as the basis of the future Continental policy of Great Britain.* It appears from this correspondence that the representatives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia had separate conferences with the Sardinian and Piedmontese ambassadors *before* the result of their deliberations regarding Italy was submitted to the plenipotentiaries of France and England; while, with regard to Spain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria united in a common course of action with France as to an armed intervention in that country, in direct opposition to the views of England. Times were changed from the days of the congresses of Chatillon and Vienna, and of "*les Quatre*," excluding France. Nay, on the affairs of the Spanish Peninsula *another* "*Quatre*," composed of *France*, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, was formed, from which England was excluded, and against the actings of which her representa-

of recedence are actually presented, my best efforts and exertions shall be employed to merit the continuance of the gracious expressions I have had this day to acknowledge.—I have the honour to be, &c., VANE LONDONDERRY."

* Great Britain was represented at the congress by the Duke of Wellington, Lord Stewart (now Lord Londonderry), Lord Strangford, and Lord Burghersh; Austria, by Metternich and Count Lebzeltern; Prussia, by Prince Hardenberg and Count Bernstorff; Russia (whose Emperor was present in person), by Nesselrode, M. de Takicheff, M. de Strogonoff, and Count Pozzo di Borgo; and France, by M. de Montmorency, M. de la Ferronnays, and M. de Chateaubriand.

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tives protested! Yet was the new policy announced by Lord Castlereagh, and worked out by Lord Londonderry, though apparently different from, in reality based on the same principle which had formerly led to the deliverance of Europe. That principle was the establishment of the *balance of power*, and the maintenance of the independence of nations. During the revolutionary war they had been all but destroyed by the power of France and the coalition of vassal states, of which it formed the head, and this was the danger to be guarded against at the Congress of Vienna. Now they were threatened by the preponderance of Russia and the confederacy of military monarchies, of which it formed the head, and this was the danger which, on the same principle, required to be guarded against in the Congress of Verona. Lord Londonderry's memorandum sent to the Foreign Office of his secret conferences with Metternich and the Emperor of Russia before the Congress formally began, leaves no doubt as to these being the principles which at that critical juncture regulated the policy of Great Britain.*

* "It may not be uninteresting to follow the mode in which Prince Metternich seems to be working the Spanish question; and in placing upon paper the conversation he held with Lord L. (Londonderry) yesterday (28th October), there may be some ground for reflection hereafter upon this particular proceeding. His Highness began by assuring Lord L. he now saw daylight through his operations. He thought he could commit it to paper and seal it up, to be opened at the close of the congress, and it would be found to be correct, as portraying the proceeding and line which all the Powers would take upon this most interesting subject at the meeting. 'You will remember,' added he, 'my anxiety *to launch France by a paper into the field*, as soon as M. de Montmorency came to Vienna. My reason was simply that I wished her to be committed to state what she wished, what she aimed at—whether *I had a good or a bad France*. I wished also to be certain that there was no disunion among the French ministers here; that they were both in the same line which M. de Chateaubriand's arrival rendered doubtful, as it was rumoured he came to play a great game as the avowed confident of the acknowledged first minister of France. Having succeeded in ascertaining the position of France here, and committing her to certain views and declared propositions, I am most desirous to bring the exact station of the other four Powers forward on this general French debate which had been circulated, as the true principle is generally to be found in the middle course. My labour was directed to bring each of the Allies to their maximum and minimum of action before I went into conference. It was not *necessary for me to ask England what she could or would do*; I knew her position; but in having her opposed to the *mad notions and pretensions of the Emperor of*

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16. Wellington's important conversation with the Czar on his departure.

More even than by the diplomatic papers of the period is the tenor of the policy impressed by Lord Castlereagh on the Duke of Wellington and Lord Stewart at Verona, brought out by the parting conversation of the former with the Emperor of Russia before his departure from the congress on 27th November. It is thus narrated from his private papers by his Grace's biographer: "His Grace's parting interview with the Emperor of Russia,

Russia, whom it was necessary to calm and bring down from impolitic and impossible fancies, I derived the greatest assistance from the ability and talents of the Duke of Wellington. The difficulty of elucidating the Emperor as to the exact line of France, was not a duty that devolved on me. I was more anxious that he should undeceive himself; having first fully ascertained from the French minister that they did not go so far as an offensive line against Spain, but were content with a strict defensive. I did not fail to bring M. de Montmorency to a categorical explanation upon this point, and I would not allow him to shelter himself under the notion of a defensive position for any overt warfare. The Emperor of Russia, however, was yet an unbeliever as to France being against an attack upon Spain, against his marching an army through Europe into Piedmont. But how much better is it that we should discover this from France herself than from Austria and England. I now stand with the knowledge of what France wishes and desires. It is fair and reasonable to a certain extent only in my opinion. 'I also know that Russia looks to a view of the question to which France, the next interested Power, will never arrive. She will come, therefore, *to my aid in stemming the torrent of Russia which England opposes more energetically than any of us.* Having thus ascertained how each stands, it will be for Austria to shape her course in such a manner as to bring the whole as near as possible to a focus, or at least that all should understand what aid in *morale* or *materiel* can be afforded by any or each of us, and how we shall all take up our ground in rear of the advance, which is France. I do not mean to compare the question of Spain with that of Naples; but I wish to act upon it to a certain degree upon the same principle. We succeeded against Naples; we shall equally, in the end, succeed against Spain, if we are cautious, persevering, and play our game with ability. France cannot take the great conduct against Spain that Austria did against Naples, and yet France is called on as the one most implicated and concerned to take the prominent situation.

"'The Emperor of Russia,' however,' continued Metternich, 'would desire that France should force her gangrened armies into Spain, *in order that he might bring his* 200,000 *or* 300,000 *Russians into France;* but this is exactly establishing that revolution which it is our business to guard against. To such a proposition my Emperor would say 'No.'. So long as France, with a regular government, good or bad, demands from Russia assistance, and wishes for her army in her capital, I am content; but when France is unwilling to have this aid I, as Austria, will never submit to its being forced upon her, whatever may be the intimate affection and understanding that there is between the two Emperors. Well, then, if France and Austria are agreed upon this point, nay, if all Europe would rise in arms, rather than see, without the most dire necessity, a Russian army in central Europe, have I not discovered the means by management of paralysing the eagerness of the Emperor of Russia without offending that chivalrous and moral spirit and action which

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which occurred on the 27th, was both longer and more interesting. The Duke availed himself of that opportunity again to express his regret at the prospect of war with which Europe was threatened, and to repeat

it is so much all our interests to preserve? The state, indeed, of the Allies and Spain may be compared to a patient that has the appearance of the yellow fever at Barcelona,* and that five physicians are summoned to consider his situation. It is desirable for all interested in the sick man's case (as for himself) to know first if his malady is contagious or not; secondly, if so, to what extent it is contagious; and, thirdly, to discover if it cannot be cured, and what are the best means to adopt towards lessening it, or diminishing the ravages it might create. In every situation or position there is a remedy and a principle of action; it is the duty of physicians to discover and proceed upon this notion. One physician, England for example, declares there is no danger at all, and the fever is not infectious; another says the plague will extend its fatal consequences far and wide. The physician in the next house to the patient cries out to apply rapidly some treatment, as he fears for his own family; and the other remaining men of the faculty take into their grave consideration how to save the patient, especially attending to their friend and colleague in the first instance, and all endeavour to apply that ingredient into the remedy which, upon a joint consideration, the medicines under their control can afford.' In admitting M. de Metternich's ingenuity, and giving him credit for all that he could accomplish, Lord L. in rejoinder suggested that England might be the physician that would not be quite prepared to admit that the patient had a contagious fever, and might wish to apply no remedy at all. He also said that, confining France to the defensive, he thought it might be difficult to get the other Powers to agree to any one system of conduct which would suit all, or that all were in a state equally to afford. His Highness replied that he thought he was in a position to go into conference: he had the arrangement in his brain; for nights he had not slept in consequence; but now he felt sure, and he thought the foundation-stone was laid. This was the purport of his communication on the 28th October, which may hereafter be interesting to look back to.—LONDONDERRY."—*Memorandum, October* 29, 1822; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

"It is evident that the position of Great Britain becomes more difficult at the present reunion, than it has been on any former occasion, not only from the mode in which Austria is playing her game, which is evidently directed to keep up her assumed power over Russia, but also from France, which is the Power that thwarted most the assistance of the Allies, having surrendered herself entirely to the direction of the Holy Alliance. There appears to be two grounds on the part of France for this line of conduct. The one is their want of confidence, exhibited in all their late silence towards England with regard to Spain, which their jealousy of Britain may have produced; the other, the certainty that the Emperor Alexander and the Continental triumvirate of potentates would sound the tocsin of revolutionary danger, and come sooner to the aid of a Bourbon throne, than England might find herself either disposed or enabled to do. No doubt can now exist that the three Powers are at present upon one line with France. They have all answered France's propositions in the affirmative, and the last Austrian paper places England in the embarrassing position of declaring herself in opposition to the alliance in this determination on the Spanish question. This is a distressing predicament, of an

* Then raging at that town.

all the arguments he had formerly used to show both its injustice and folly. The Emperor, on the other hand, dwelt upon the mischievous effect on other countries of the example set by Spain, and lamented that

entirely isolated nature, which has never yet occurred in any former meeting, not even at Laybach. France then leant to a constitutional view of the transaction, and some aid was derived from her having a different position from the three other Powers, arising from her having a government not so ultra in the cause of *Le chef des Bourbons* as the present one. But at the present moment there seems no possible ground by which the Duke of Wellington can approach the position of the Alliance, preserving the principles which have been declared by Great Britain to Europe.

"Prince Metternich, on reading to me his paper, argued that the Duke of Wellington should not consider *les phrases;* nor should his Grace, he said, if he could not agree to one consideration in it, reject another which he felt himself able to entertain. The point was to determine if England could aid the general decision of the other Powers of the Alliance, in any manner, and to what extent; or, if she could not aid them, if she would remain neutral and not thwart them. 'It is in vain for me to conceal,' added the Prince, 'that had it not been for my power over the Emperor of Russia, and my bringing France, as I have done, in decision against all offensive action, a *Russian army would have invaded Europe;* and having *accroched* myself with the Emperor of Russia, remembering how he acted towards Austria in the Italian business, how can I depart from *les mesures preventives* which it behoves the Continental Powers to adopt? Besides, France has a right under our treaties to demand our discussion of her danger created by the revolutionary state of Spain. She reckons on the Continental Powers more than England, and the proof of this is, that when the Duke of Wellington offered the good offices of England with Spain to M. de Montmorency, he refused them for France; and I knew that he would do so, as France had placed herself in the hands of the Allies, and unless the Allies in common deputed England to act, France could not withdraw her cause from them.' Without detailing further the long arguments the Prince adduced, or my replies, it is sufficient to observe, that I could distinctly learn that the other four Powers had made up their determination to act without us, if they could not have us with them. This same sentiment has been repeated to me by the French Plenipotentiary. It is certainly a trying and responsible moment for him, who is charged with these great transactions here, to witness, on the one hand, that England, by the force of her power in the Alliance, has preserved peace in the East; to see, on the other, that these very Allies whom England has so befriended, are forcing that Power away from them, who is the only one who can be effectually of service, or render any decisions of the other of substantial real avail.

"The consideration of what would grow out of any schism in the Alliance, is so stupendous, and the consequences so little to be foreseen, that I urged to try and put upon paper what he conceived England could do with her acknowledged principles, and with her declared system as promulgated to Europe, upon the paper presented by Austria to the Congress. He has promised to do this; but whether he will or not, I cannot pretend to determine. But the crisis is a most important and difficult one, and God only knows how it can end."—*Memorandum*, LORD LONDONDERRY *to* MR SECRETARY CANNING, *November* 2, 1822; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

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England should now stand aloof from the policy of order on which her Allies had entered. There was, however, no help for it. England, with her popular government, could hardly avoid taking part with Revolutionists everywhere; whereas the line of the Continental governments pointed in an opposite direction, and they must follow their course as England followed hers. Moreover, it was the clear duty of Russia, in the present instance, to take the lead in this movement. If she refrained from doing so, no movement could be made, because the armies of France could not be depended upon, and Austria and Prussia, without Russia, could accomplish little. It was, indeed, quite possible that if France entered single-handed upon a war with Spain, she would be beaten; and if beaten in the field, it was not to be expected that she would escape internal convulsion. But for every contingency Russia was prepared. She was able, with the support of Austria and Prussia, to crush revolution both in France and Spain; and if the necessity should arise, she was determined to do so.

17. The Duke's answer.

"The Duke heard his Imperial Majesty to an end, and then ventured to assure him 'that there was no sympathy, and could be none, between England and Revolutionists and Jacobins anywhere. The system of English Government was founded on respect for property: Jacobinism or Revolution, in the sense in which his Imperial Majesty applied to the term, on the confiscation of property. All for which England ever pleaded was, the right of nations to set up over themselves whatever form of government they thought best, and to be left to manage their own affairs so long as they left other nations to manage theirs. Neither he nor the Government which he represented was blind to the many defects which disfigured the Spanish Constitution; but they were satisfied that the best remedy for these would be provided by time, and to that greatest of all practical reformers he advised that Spain and her constitution should be left.'[1] The Emperor did

[1] Gleig's Life of Wellington, iii. 157, 158.

not gainsay the justice of these remarks, neither was he willing to be persuaded by them; so, after expressing himself well pleased with the settlement which had been effected of the Turkish question, he embraced the Duke, and they parted."*

The Congress of Verona, it is well known, terminated

* The diverging views of England and the Allies are thus explained by Lord Stewart:—

"VERONA, *November* 8.

"The intelligence which I procured yesterday deserves to be noted. M. Tatzchoff, Count Nesselrode, and Count Lieven, all called upon me. The object of their visit appeared to be, to discover if possible whether, in the event of the Duke of Wellington not approving, or not being able to support *the démarche* made by the Allies by their separate despatches to their ministers at Madrid, his Grace would nevertheless send such instructions to Sir William à Court as to induce that minister, in an indirect if not in an open manner, to sustain the objects set forth in their representations to the Spanish Government. It is worthy of remark that the Allies seem to be pursuing an exactly similar course as at Laybach, and it is singular that Sir William à Court should stand at Madrid much in the same position as he formerly did at Naples. The Allies, in like manner, at Laybach, addressed separate despatches conveying the same instructions on the Neapolitan Revolution, and they were, on their receipt, to make a united declaration, while, at the same time, I was solicited to encourage Sir W. à Court in every way to support *secrètement* the common effort.

"It was my duty, of course, to profess to the minister above alluded to, my perfect ignorance of what the Duke of Wellington would be disposed to do. This led to a consideration of what the probable sentiments would be which were to be conveyed in the despatches; and although I was not able to obtain much from the Russian minister, I learnt in the course of the day that the French despatch had been given into Prince Metternich, and that he approved generally of its contents, considering it moderate, but that he had made some alterations. The Prussians had also produced their document, and Count Nesselrode and the Austrians were to have theirs ready on Sunday or Monday next. When I asked if it was a very usual course in the spirit of the alliance for the four Powers to settle their accounts, as it were, and then bring their vote made up to England, instead of carrying Great Britain along with them in considering and comparing each particular paper. I was replied to, that it appeared evident there was such a wide difference between the course intended to be pursued by the four Powers and the sentiments adduced by the Duke of Wellington, that there would be no use in consulting his Grace on details which he would feel it necessary perhaps to decline entering into, and then the case would be more difficult than if the Duke was presented with a whole result.

"I then asked, for my own information, candidly to be informed what the Allies promised themselves as the course of their *démarche*, and to what they ultimately looked. I was replied to, that the rupture of diplomatic relations in the recall of their ministers was the extreme of what could or would be done, especially by Austria and Prussia. These Powers felt themselves bound to the Emperor Alexander to do something: his sacrifices in the East imperatively demanded an effort in the West. They could not separate from this

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18. Result of the Congress.

against the wishes of the Cabinet of Great Britain, and was followed by the invasion of Spain by the French armies, and the overthrow of the revolutionary Government in that country. The whole efforts of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Londonderry—who followed out with equal vigour and ability the instructions of Lord

meeting without pronouncing themselves in the same language as at Laybach; and, having done this, the rest must be in the hands of Providence. I inquired if the four Powers really supposed that they would be in a better situation, or the Revolutionary system of Spain nearer its annihilation, when they had perfected their measure of recalling their ministers, and that the English mission still remained at Madrid, than they at present stood, without a proclaimed difference in the system of the alliance, and the spirit of it ready to be put in force in case of extreme difficulty, or a just ground of war arising.

"The answer was, that they did not conceive their position would be better, but they were committed to persevere in the same course as heretofore, and they were aided in it by the moderation of France. If the tone of that Power had been that of offensive warfare, Austria and Prussia would have found themselves opposed both to the Emperor Alexander and to France, and then nothing but confusion and broil would have resulted from this meeting; but, as it happily turned out, the counsels of France were directed by the sage principles of the alliance, and they back it to everything fair and reasonable, and it was the duty of the other Continental Powers to support them."—*Memorandum by* LORD LONDONDERRY *to* MR SECRETARY CANNING, *Verona, November* 8, 1822; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

"VERONA, *November* 14, 1822.

"SIR,—Prince Metternich's conversation with me this morning gives me the impression that he is not entirely so sanguine of the result that may be expected from the congress of the *four* Powers, as he seemed to be some days since. In the first place, he admitted that the position and *le travail* were unexpectedly difficult; next that it was so to get France exactly to *précise*. Her wishes and object were far from easy; and, thirdly, although there existed no doubt in his mind as to the *moderation* of France and of her positive decision against an offensive warfare, still, however, that Government did not see very clearly how to proceed. Beyond these reflections, Prince Metternich proceeded in a tone, I think, new to him. He said, suppose we should arrive at doing nothing, it appears to me that the Spanish revolution, from the daily accounts which we receive, seems to be drawing to a close, even by its own acts, and the terrors which have been inspired by the meeting of the Congress. In the nation itself there is no popular feeling that rallies around the constitutional Government. It is not from Madrid alone you must judge of Spain. From the reports from all sides, we know the country is very sick of its revolutionary position; and when '*une révolution ne marche point c'est prête à sa mort.*' The work may possibly be effected without our agency, and merely by our attitude. This was rather a new turn for his Highness, and without replying to it, I asked him if there was any idea of M. de Montmorency setting out soon for Paris, being the bearer of his own documents, upon which (as I understood) the other was to be in some measure framed, if this *pièce* was first to be approved of by the King's council at Paris. Prince Metternich answered, that as yet nothing was fixed, nor had these points been fully considered. He saw himself no objection to this course, if M. de Montmorency preferred it, and

Castlereagh on this subject, already given,[1] and they were many and earnest—were inadequate to prevent the invasion of the Peninsula by the French forces, and the temporary establishment of French ascendancy at Madrid. This was justly regarded as a very great stroke by M. de

[1] Ante, c. xvi. § 67.

dreaded the responsibility of acting for himself. It would be satisfactory also to the Allies to be quite sure of the Government of France before they actually proceeded in their *démarche*. I observed this course would probably delay the meeting, if it should be decided on, longer than was at first conjectured. He answered, 'No;' that he calculated if M. de Montmorency left this night week, they might have accounts by the end of the month from Paris, and the first days of December would probably bring them to some decision. In the mean time they had enough to occupy them, and probably by the 15th December, on his calculation, the Congress would break up. He reckoned with certainty on passing his Christmas at Vienna. Although, from the above observations, Prince Metternich's mind may not be in so high a key of *practicability* as it has been, from coming more in contact with the opposing element which besets him, still I cannot bring myself to believe that the Emperor of Russia will yield to such a proposition as the delay of any positive declaration until M. de Montmorency reaches, and is able to communicate back from Paris. Much less can I ever imagine that he (the Emperor) would allow Congress to back up without some decided expression and positive act on the part of the four Allies as to Spain. Austria, and possibly Prussia, would emancipate themselves from any proceeding whatever in proportion as the difficulties become more apparent, and the path more thorny; but they are committed to Russia, and France has taken the initiative. It would be far too sanguine a view of the case were we to suppose for a moment that Russia's object and counsels would be completely subdued, and largely as she has abandoned her ground, to think that she would resign every inch of her diplomatic territory. The more probable reasoning surely is, as I heretofore ventured to intimate, that a result would be arrived at by the four Powers, and that they will not separate before this result has been communicated to Spain.

"On the Turkish question, Prince Metternich informed me he was to see the Emperor of Russia to-morrow, and that he entertained no doubt he should bring him from the false notion he had in contemplation of sending an Austrian minister back to Constantinople with Lord Strangford to superintend more particularly the Russian interest and honour.—I am, Sir, &c., VANE LONDONDERRY.—MR SECRETARY CANNING, *London*."—*MS. Londonderry Papers*.

The opening of the conferences, which commenced on 3d December 1822, announced to Mr Canning by Lord Londonderry on the same day on which he said: "I have the honour to acquaint you, as his Majesty's plenipotentiary at Verona for the conferences on the state of Italy, that these have already commenced; that is to say, that the three courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, are engaged in preliminary discussions with the court of Sardinia. . . . I am informed by Prince Metternich that the result of these discussions is agreed on, and is entirely satisfactory, and will be communicated to the Plenipotentiaries of France and England at a general conference to be held to-morrow, when the protocol and the formal proceedings will be held and considered. It is proposed by Prince Metternich to conduct the arrangement of the affairs of Naples in the same manner—viz., for the three Courts to agree

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Chateaubriand, the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, by whom it was chiefly designed, and was a proportional mortification to Mr Canning, who had so warmly espoused the opposite side on that question. It was not

with Prince Ruffo upon all the points in the first instance, and then any discussion in the general conference will be avoided. It will then only consist in formal details. The Neapolitan affairs also, I am informed, are very near settled; and although Austria, under the treaty, might continue the occupation eighteen months longer, still she has determined to commence immediately a partial reduction of her forces in Naples, to the extent of 15,000 or 20,000 men. Prince Metternich seems to be of opinion these disinterested demonstrations on the part of H.I.M., will have considerable effect on the mischievous insinuations that are circulated to the prejudice of the Court of Austria. It is evident that the conferences on the Italian affairs could be closed in two or three days, so little is there left to be done. But as the Government and their Ministers are desirous to remain assembled till they hear from Paris and London, they seek delay to keep the Italian Princes together, in order to prove the Congress has only had two epochs, one for European concerns, the other for the affairs of Italy."—LORD LONDONDERRY *to* MR SECRETARY CANNING, *Verona, December* 3, 1822; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

"VERONA, *December* 5, 1822.

"SIR,—The first conference on Italian affairs took place on the 4th inst., as alluded to in my despatch, No. 1. I have the honour to enclose the protocol of the preliminary conference, held here between the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and of his Sardinian Majesty, which was read to the Plenipotentiaries of France and England, as having been agreed to by the former Powers. The Plenipotentiary of France expressed the satisfaction of his Court at the result of the arrangement. I had only to add my humble convictions of the pleasure it would give the King, my master, to learn that the military occupation was diminishing, and shortly to cease on grounds so congenial to the interests of the sovereign, and the sentiments of the Allies. I should observe that previous to the protocol being read, the Comte de la Tour presented a statement by the King of Sardinia's command, upon which the protocol was founded; but his Excellency particularly requested that the document should be regarded merely as *une pièce de Cabinet*, and not entered in the journals. I enclose the document in a separate despatch.

"After the lecture of the paper above alluded to, Prince Metternich informed the conference he should be enabled, in a day or two, to communicate to them the result of the definitive arrangement with the Court of Naples, which was nearly concluded. The immediate diminution of 17,000 men (from 52,000, leaving 35,000) of the Austrian forces is agreed upon, and some of the new Neapolitan troops will replace the Austrians immediately in garrison in Sicily, except at Palermo, where a garrison of Austrians will still remain. Prince Metternich enlarged much on the striking proof which this must afford to Europe, that the Emperor, his august master, alone considered, the interest and welfare of his Allies, as H.I.M. was in no degree called on to alter the existing treaty of a military occupation for a year and a-half to come.

"Prince Metternich also informed the conference that Prince Ruffo would communicate a proposal which he had to make direct to Switzerland to engage some Swiss regiments, which he hoped France would use her good offices to assist in being obtained. They were the best troops for Naples to subsidise,

less so to the Duke of Wellington, who grieved to see the French eagles triumphant in those regions from which he had expelled them with so much glory to himself, and advantage to Europe. But Lord Londonderry's warning proved too true; France was now in the same line with the Northern Powers, and their united force, for military operations on land, it was altogether beyond the power of Great Britain to withstand. In the course of his correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on the momentous subjects brought under discussion in this congress, Lord Londonderry saw good grounds for confirming him in the opinion he entertained of the aspiring dispositions of that able and eloquent man, and for self-congratulation at having so early detached himself from his banner. On the formation of the cabinets of April 1827, under the premiership of Mr Canning, he said, in his place in the House of Lords, "So long ago as 1822, when I had the honour of being ambassador at Vienna, I predicted to my noble friend the Duke of Wellington, and stated to him my conviction, that if that individual, after the death of my lamented brother, were appointed Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a few years would not elapse before he would show that he would not be satisfied, but he would force himself to the head of his Majesty's councils. That right honourable gentleman has realised this prediction on many occasions, but particularly on a recent one in the extraordinary speech he has made on the affairs of Portugal." [1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxxi. 572.

19. Lord Londonderry's departure from Verona.

It will be seen in the sequel how correctly Lord Londonderry had scanned Mr Canning's disposition and ulterior views, even at this period, and how exactly his predictions were realised when the first opportunity presented itself for carrying them into execution. This schism in the Tory party, thus created by the more liberal of their number taking office with Mr Canning, to the others going

and the arrangement seemed the most desirable. The French plenipotentiary did not conceive his Court would oppose the least objection.—I am, Sir, &c., VANE LONDONDERRY.—MR SECRETARY CANNING, *London.*"—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

CHAP. XVII. 1822.

into opposition with the Duke of Wellington, is a more important crisis in British history than is generally supposed, for it was the first great widening of the breach by which in subsequent times the wedge of democracy was forced into the Cabinet, and the old balance of the constitution permanently and irrevocably altered. The congress having closed its labours, in the end of December Lord Londonderry returned home, which he reached in the beginning of January, and with that closed his official career.

CHAPTER XVIII.

LORD STEWART, FROM THE CLOSE OF HIS OFFICIAL LIFE IN 1823 TO HIS DEATH IN 1854.

1823.

1. Lord Londonderry's return to private life, and his claim for additional honours.

ALTHOUGH with the conclusion of the Congress of Verona Lord Londonderry's official and public career came to an end, yet he took an active part afterwards, in his place in Parliament and as a peer of the realm, in public affairs, both in his native county in Ireland, and in the county of Durham, where the great estates of Lady Londonderry lay. But he did not afterwards hold any diplomatic appointment or military command. Government, however, felt that his great services during the last ten years merited some additional and signal mark of the royal favour. He had been created, as already mentioned, Lord Stewart in 1814, on account of his signal services in the campaigns in Germany and France, in that and the preceding year, and when he was on the eve of setting out to discharge the important duties of the embassy at Vienna. But since that time he had for eight years performed the duties of that exalted situation with equal ability and advantage to this country, had taken an important part in the Congress of Vienna, and acted as one of the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain in the Congresses of Troppau, Laybach, and Verona. Such a series of public services, at such times and on such theatres, evidently called for some recognition on the part of the sovereign, which the strong affection of the King for Lord Stewart personally led him to desire to make in the most unequivocal manner.

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2. Lord Stewart is created Earl Vane and Viscount Seaham. March 28, 1823.

The situation of Lord Stewart's family pointed clearly to the mode in which this could be done in the way most flattering both to Lord and Lady Stewart, and most suitable in itself. Their marriage had been blessed with a numerous issue, to the eldest son of which the vast possessions of his mother in the county of Durham would of course descend. Lord Stewart's son, by his first marriage, was heir to the marquisate and the family estates in the north of Ireland; but these estates, though large, were by no means so valuable as those which would devolve on the eldest son of the second marriage in the county of Durham. Thus the highest title would descend to the issue of one marriage, and the largest estates to that of another—a predicament not unusual in cases of second marriages in the aristocracy, but which can seldom occur without drawing after it awkward, sometimes unpleasant consequences. In bestowing a suitable title on Lord Stewart, with remainder to his second son and the heirs of his family, the debt of gratitude due by the nation was satisfied, the known wishes of the noble recipient of the honours were gratified, and the desire of the sovereign was complied with. These concurring causes produced the desired result. On 28th March 1823, shortly after his return from Verona, Lord Stewart was created Earl Vane, and Viscount Seaham, with remainder to his second son, the present Earl Vane, and the heirs-male of that family. Thus had Sir Charles Stewart the singular good fortune, or rather the extraordinary merit, to obtain an earldom, a viscountcy, and a barony for his family; while his elder brother, Lord Castlereagh, had been rewarded by a marquisate and an earldom for his father, to which he himself succeeded on his death! It is rare indeed to have such an accumulation of honours bestowed, in a single generation, on one family; but more rare still it is to see in it at one time the public services which had deserved them.

Chivalrous in disposition, and covetous of military re-

nown, Lord Londonderry was utterly destitute of the more ordinary desire of money. An opportunity had occurred in the preceding year of evincing this in the most unmistakable manner. Lord Bloomfield, who had long held a confidential situation in the King's palace, and stood high in his royal master's favour, having incurred the displeasure of the still higher influences which then reigned paramount at Court, had lost his situation, and was in very precarious circumstances, as he was married, and had a family. Lord Londonderry, who was warmly attached to him, immediately offered to resign in his favour the situation of Commander of Fort St George, in Jamaica, a sinecure worth £650 a year, which was the only permanent remuneration for his public services he had ever received. It was accepted, and awakened the most unbounded feelings of gratitude in the breast of his esteemed friend. Next year the King had an opportunity of testifying his sense of the disinterested feeling which had dictated this sacrifice by appointing him to the colonelcy of the 10th Hussars, vacant by the resignation of his Majesty, who, as Prince of Wales, had commanded that distinguished corps.

3. His disinterested conduct in regard to Lord Bloomfield, and appointment to the command of the 10th Hussars.

March 1822.

June 28, 1823.

Lord Londonderry, however, was of too energetic and ardent a temperament to rest contented with honours won, however worthily, in the service of his country. No sooner was he relieved by the resignation of his embassy of public duties, than he applied himself with characteristic vigour to the improvement and embellishment of the estates which he had acquired by Lady Londonderry in the county of Durham. The mansion-house of the Tempest family at Wynyard was a large old house, in the Flemish style of rural architecture, but without the elegance of modern structures. It was pulled down to the ground, and in its stead a splendid edifice erected on the spot where the old house had stood, in the chastest style of Grecian architecture. Not many years after the noble structure was completed, a fire accidentally broke out

4. His active operations at Wynyard in building.

CHAP. XVIII. 1823. Feb. 1841. from a heated flue connected with the conservatory, which consumed two-thirds of the building, including the principal public rooms. Great as this calamity was, it did not for an instant damp the energy of Lord Londonderry's mind or the determination of his will. The restoration of the edifice was immediately commenced, and proceeded with in so vigorous a manner, that in a few years the restored Jan. 1848. mansion was completed, with its noble suite of public rooms and august hall, which now constitutes one of the principal ornaments of the north of England.

5. And of the estate of Wynyard. The improvement and embellishment of the estate of Wynyard also occupied a large portion of Lord Londonderry's attention. This was done in the most systematic and approved way, partly by draining the soil, which was a stiff clay, and in many places very wet, and partly by forming numerous broad plantations in a circular form, intersected by cross belts round the property. These were so arranged that they admitted in the mean time of broad green rides being formed through them of many miles in length, and of numerous picturesque scenes being brought into view, formed by the wooded dells with which the undulating surface was intersected. These belts were so disposed that they could with very little trouble and expense be converted into the ring fence of a splendid park several thousand acres in extent surrounding the beautiful wooded valley, on the edge of which the mansion-house is situated. The Duke of Wellington paid Sept. 6, 1827. his old companion-in-arms a visit in this scene of rural activity and improvement; a circumstance which is commemorated by a lofty obelisk, on a rising ground in the park near the house, bearing the names of the two warriors, which forms a landmark for all the country round, and constitutes one of the many ornaments of Wynyard Park.

But all these domestic undertakings, how numerous and important soever, soon sunk into insignificance compared with the purchase of the estate of SEAHAM, and the formation of the harbour of the same name on the bold and rocky

6. Situation of Seaham in the county of Durham, where Lord Byron was married.

shores of the county of Durham. This beautiful estate, lying on the sea-coast, though not of great extent, was known to be exceedingly rich in minerals, the layers of which in bold relief appeared even in the perpendicular cliffs which overhung the ocean. But the want of a harbour or the means of cheap conveyance to Sunderland or Newcastle rendered them valueless; and the upper seams of coal only were worked for the sale of the country adjoining, which was of limited extent. The harbour dues at both these seaports were so heavy that they rendered it impossible to send the minerals to either at a profit for exportation. Railroads at that period, thirty-five years ago, in that neighbourhood, there were none. In these circumstances it was evident that next to nothing could be made of the minerals till a harbour was opened for their reception, at which they might at once be shipped to London; but how was this to be done on an iron-bound coast, where sea-cliffs, 200 feet high, were lashed by the waves of the German Ocean, and tenanted only by clouds of sea-mews, which had their nests in the inaccessible crevices of the rocks? The mansion of Seaham, which is beautifully situated close to the shore, on the edge of a rocky dell, in the bottom of which a streamlet finds its way to the ocean, has become classic ground in English story, from its having been the property of the Millbank family, with a daughter of which Lord Byron contracted his ill-starred union. He was married in the drawing-room of the house: his signature to the parish register is to be seen in the neighbouring church, and a romantic path in the adjoining dell, overshadowed by trees, is still called the "Poet's Walk."

This property having been brought to sale by the Millbank family, Lord Londonderry became the purchaser in 1822. In taking this step he was entering upon a very bold but, as it has turned out, wise and successful undertaking. He had resolved among the rocks of Seaham, and on the most desolate part of that iron-bound

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7. Which is bought by Lord Londonderry, who commences the harbour of Seaham. March 1822.

coast, to construct a harbour which should at once furnish the means of export, with moderate harbour dues, to the vast coal-fields in its vicinity on the Seaham estate, and become an emporium for a similar traffic for all the neighbouring properties. But to effect this a great expenditure of capital was indispensable; and how to raise it to an amount at all commensurate to the undertaking was the real difficulty; and it was one of such magnitude as would have deterred almost any other man. Having begun life with a younger son's portion, and lived on the military appointments he had since held, Lord Londonderry had, of course, realised no capital when he received the embassy at Vienna; and since he held that office he had dispensed hospitality in too magnificent a style in that brilliant capital to have made money even on its ample allowances. The hereditary estates in Ireland were already burdened by the first Marquess's debts, and charged with the former Marchioness's jointure; and the great estates of the present Marchioness, in the county of Durham, were in the hands of trustees, which rendered impossible the raising money on any but her ladyship's life interest in them, which had been already heavily charged by the building of the splendid mansion of Wynyard Park, and the purchase, in 1822, of Holdernesse House from Lord Middleton. At least £200,000 were to be provided to complete the undertaking, which promised such great eventual profit; and as this immense sum required to be raised during the years of extraordinary commercial distress which followed the terrible monetary crisis of 1825, it may be conceived with what difficulties the prosecution of the work was attended. So strongly were these difficulties felt, that Lord Londonderry's own agent protested against the undertaking, and declared he would come under no responsibility whatever as manager of his lordship's collieries, for the expenses of an operation which could terminate only in disaster.

Though Lord Londonderry felt the pressure in its full

intensity, he was never for a moment discouraged; he began the undertaking with only £1500 in hand. Aided by the Marchioness, who with equal cheerfulness, and in a noble spirit, gave him her powerful support, he struggled on in spite of every difficulty; and at length their united energy and perseverance met with their deserved reward. Amidst the rocks of Seaham spacious docks were constructed; its numerous fallen stones were carved into piers which bridled the stormy ocean; gradually streets and houses arose in the vicinity of the growing emporium; the harbour was largely frequented by coasting vessels; the whole coal trade in the vicinity centred in its quays; and before a quarter of a century had elapsed, a considerable and thriving seaport town had arisen on the scene of former solitude. By the census of 1861 Seaham contained 8427 inhabitants; its harbour-dues amounted to £18,000 a-year. The port contains two wet and one dry dock, with a tidal basin, at which between four and five thousand vessels annually load. The export of coal from its wharfs has come to be 700,000 tons annually; an iron foundery, chain and anchor manufactory, blast furnaces, shipbuilding yards, and a glass-bottle work of vast dimensions, have arisen within its bounds. It possesses a literary institute, gas and water works, public baths, and numerous schools; eight churches are open for the faithful of different creeds to perform their religious duties according to their persuasion; it is rapidly becoming a favourite bathing-place, and has taken a distinguished position in the volunteer movement, having four companies of volunteer artillery in arms. Nearly all these beneficial institutions were commenced or designed by Lord Londonderry, and have since been upheld by the princely beneficence of his worthy successor, Frances Anne, his widow, who was appointed sole executor of his will after his death.

8. Great difficulties of the undertaking, and its ultimate and splendid success.

This undertaking, vast as it was, did by no means constitute the only objects of domestic interest to which Lord Londonderry's attention, after the termination of his official

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9. Purchase of Holdernesse House in London, and Garron Tower in Ireland.

labours, was directed. He acquired, in 1822, as already mentioned, also the magnificent mansion of Holdernesse House, in London, which, by additional constructions, he more than doubled, and which, adorned as it soon was with the splendid works of art, statuary, painting, and vertu, which had been presented to Lord Castlereagh and the present Marquess, by the Allied sovereigns or their diplomatic friends, soon became one of the most sumptuous structures of that city of palaces. Not content with this, Lord Londonderry determined on constructing a castle on his hereditary romantic estate of Garron, on the north-east coast of Ireland, between Belfast and the Giant's Causeway, and in the neighbourhood of Lady Londonderry's ancestors' estates of Antrim. He there, in the first instance, greatly enlarged and improved the harbour of Carnlough, which, like Seaham, on his Durham property, opened up and gave the means of improvement to the tenantry on his estate there, who, in consequence, rapidly improved in industry and agricultural skill. In its neighbourhood

Feb. 1848.

he built a sumptuous castle of black marble, in a situation in the highest degree striking and imposing. It is placed on a narrow little plain, or rather ledge of level ground, elevated some hundred feet above the sea, to which the descent is by a steep wooded declivity, surmounted by a precipitous mountain, which rises eight hundred feet on the other side. In this noble pile the Marchioness Frances Anne has repeatedly entertained Lord Carlisle, Lord Eglinton, and other viceroys of Ireland, in a style of princely magnificence; while Holdernesse House, in London, has for many years been, and still is, the centre of elegance and fashion for the very highest and most brilliant circles in the metropolis.

10. His political correspondence with the Duke of Wellington.

These details of the private affairs of the Londonderry family have been thrown together without strict regard to chronological order, in order to bring out the strong light which they throw on the energy and decision, as well as intrepidity, tempered by prudence in action, by which Lord

Londonderry was distinguished. They did not, however, engross his attention to the exclusion of public affairs. On the contrary, he continued, down to the time of his death, thirty years afterwards, to take an active part in the matters brought before Parliament, and not unfrequently addressed the House of Peers, on momentous occasions, with vigour and effect. During this long period he was on terms of the closest intimacy with the Duke of Wellington, with whom he kept up a constant correspondence of the most confidential kind, which is fortunately all preserved in the Londonderry archives. The Duke's letters throw great light on the most important steps in his future parliamentary career, in particular, Catholic emancipation, his opposition to reform, and his views on our monetary affairs and the national defences. Such of his letters as are of a general character, and do not implicate living characters, or those recently deceased, shall be given in the remainder of these memoirs.*

Lord Londonderry, as already noticed, had predicted

* On the 22d December 1824, the Duke wrote to Lord Londonderry as follows, in relation to the state of Ireland:—

December 22, 1824.

"My dear Charles,—I have received your letter of the 19th instant, and I am very much obliged to you and Lady L. for your inquiries. I am a great deal better, and indeed have every reason to hope that time will set me right altogether, except that I am afraid I shall never recover the hearing of my left ear.

"Parliament will meet on the 3d February, and I believe that you are right in thinking that it will be an Irish session. I hope that you were right, and I wrong, respecting the state of Ireland. The state of that country appears to me, however, now to be exactly this, in a few words. The Roman Catholic people are completely organised, and the management of this immense organised body is in the hands of a few leaders of the Roman Catholic Association in Dublin, Mr O'Connell principally. They have money at command, in sums sufficient to render such an organisation still more formidable. I don't believe that the leaders are prepared for any immediate insurrection, and I doubt that there will be any till they order it. But this only seems to prove still more strongly the powerful position in which they stand. On the other hand, the Protestants are crestfallen, and feel no confidence in the Government. I am sorry to say it, and they either give no intelligence, or such as is false. I can tell you nothing about the dissolution of Parliament. I am under an impression it must be dissolved next summer. — Ever yours, most affectionately, Wellington."

In this letter is the germ of the ideas which, five years after, produced the emancipation of the Catholics. The same views were followed out in a letter in the following year, which also contains some interesting remarks of the Duke

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1826.

11. Death of Lord Liverpool and formation of Mr Canning's administration. Feb. 15, 1827.

to the Duke of Wellington at Vienna, in 1822, that such were Mr Canning's ambitious talents and aspiring disposition, that, if he were made Foreign Secretary, many years would not elapse before he had made himself Prime Minister. The Duke was not inclined at the time to credit this prophecy; but events in the spring of 1827 too surely demonstrated its truth. Lord Liverpool, the head of the Administration, was, on the 15th February in that year, the very night when he was to have introduced a motion on the subject of the corn laws in the House of Peers, struck with paralysis so

on the Emperor Alexander, the intelligence of whose death at Taganrog had just been received, and on the monetary crisis which was approaching.

"*January* 4, 1825.

"MY DEAR CHARLES,—I have received your letter, and I assure you I was indeed very much concerned to learn the death of the Emperor of Russia. I don't think his value was ever sufficiently appreciated, particularly latterly, in this country. But we must now exert ourselves to maintain that disposition in the Russian Imperial Court of amity towards others, to which the late Emperor was naturally led by antecedent memorable transactions. We foolishly thought that the union of the great military powers of the Continent was inconvenient to us; I hope we shall *not find their disunion more inconvenient.* But besides his good qualities and influence as a public man, the Emperor had really some admirable qualities as a private individual, which rendered him highly estimable, and much to be regretted.

"I am glad you are so well satisfied with everything in Ireland. I have always since the rebellion of 1798, considered the north of Ireland as a country as loyal to its Government as any in the world. I think we have all been galloping too fast, which is the cause of the breaking of the Banks. But a very serious question is coming on, and that is, Can we allow the continuance of the country banks issuing paper to the extent they please, and placing the whole country in a state of confusion and jeopardy at every moment? The case is easily understood. A few bankers by false operations stop payment, and the consequence immediately is a run upon all country banks, and many London banks. Many are ruined, in reputation at least, who are perfectly capable of paying all demands upon them. But this is not the worst part of the evil. The country banks had engrossed the whole currency of the country by their one and two pound notes, which, at the moment of the alarm, were immediately returned upon them, and gold immediately called for. Now, in consequence of the circulation being filled by the country banks, gold can be found only in London and in Lancashire; and thus the circulation of London and Lancashire is at once called on to supply the ordinary circulation of all England, by the demand occasioned by terror at a particular moment. This really creates an inconvenience which cannot be submitted to. We must have a gold circulation throughout the country, and we can only have that by prohibiting the circulation of one and two pound notes; and we cannot allow the whole country to suffer in order that the country bankers may enjoy a little more profit. I don't believe that Parliament

severe, that, though not immediately fatal, it rendered him during the next six weeks incapable even of signing his resignation, and during that long period the nation remained without a Prime Minister. 1826. In the end of March, March 27. however, he was so far recovered as to be able to tender his resignation to his Majesty, who, after some hesitation, sent for Mr Canning, and authorised him to form an April 10. administration, of which of course he himself was to be the head. Upon this the Duke of Wellington, Mr Peel, Lord Eldon, Lord Bathurst, Lord Westmoreland, and Lord Melville, resigned, and their places were filled up by persons of a liberal stamp. This important secession, which was the first great schism in the Tory party, and was ominous of still more fatal divisions in after times, was not so much the result of any irreconcilable differ-

will be dissolved till after the session. But I really don't know anything about the matter at present.

"Pray remember me most kindly to Lady L., and believe me ever your most affectionate, WELLINGTON."

This is a very valuable and most worthy letter, which foreshadows the great monetary changes introduced in 1826, after the crisis had ceased. It is not less remarkable for what it says than for what it leaves unsaid. It describes with truth and force the evils consequent on the whole country being thrown during a panic on the gold circulation of London and Lancashire, when the country banks supplied the ordinary circulation; but it does not allude to the still *greater danger* of the whole commercial world being thrown, during a general commercial panic, on the circulation of Great Britain, when its circulation below five pounds was exclusively metallic, without any legal substitute existing to supply its place during the temporary absence of the precious metals. But it is not surprising that the Duke of Wellington, a soldier who had been in harness nearly all his life, should be at fault on this subject, the source of such terrible calamities in subsequent times, when those of the Ministry who were in an essential manner connected with the commercial interests of the country, and had been placed in the Cabinet to support them, were alike mild, and rushed equally blindfold into the danger of an exclusively metallic circulation, with no acknowledged and safe substitute to supply its place when temporarily withdrawn. Nothing can be clearer than that these evils, among the greatest and most regular of recurrence which now afflict society in this country, and which Free Trade has so fearfully aggravated, are entirely of artificial creation, and might be obviated by the simple expedient of *Government* issuing an inconvertible paper when the gold is withdrawn to the extent of the sums removed, to be drawn in when the precious metals return; but so prejudiced is the nation on this subject, and so strong the moneyed interests, whose profits are periodically tripled by the recurrence of the commercial disasters, that it is probable one-half of the present mercantile generation must go to their graves, and the other half be rendered bankrupt, before the safe, certain, and easy remedy is applied by the Legislature.

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ence in political principle as of personal jealousy and pique. The dissentients thought Mr Canning had reached his present eminence by intrigue or unworthy means, and they were determined not to act under his banner. The private motives which led to this irreparable breach are clearly revealed in the subjoined letters, written at the time by the Duke of Wellington to Lord Londonderry.*

12. State of political feeling in London regarding the new administration.

The administration formed by Mr Canning,—consisting, besides himself as Prime Minister, of Sir John Copley as Lord Chancellor, under the title of LORD LYNDHURST; the Duke of Clarence as Lord High-Admiral, in room of Lord Melville; the Marquess of Anglesea as Master-General of the Ordnance, in room of the Duke of Wellington; Mr Robinson as Colonial Secretary, in room of Lord Bathurst, with the title of Lord Goderich; Lord Dudley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in room of Mr Canning; and Mr Sturges Browne as Home Secretary, instead of Mr Peel, in which office he was soon succeeded by Lord Lansdowne, — was too exclusively of a Whig character to admit of its attaining any degree of stability without a great change in the House of Commons, which could only be effected by an extensive alteration in the representation. As it was the first step towards that great revolution, was obviously calculated to lead to it, and

* "*London, April* 13, 1827.

"MY DEAR CHARLES,—I have received your note this morning. I had no choice respecting the resignation of my office of Commander-in-Chief. Indeed I had scarcely one respecting the Cabinet. I should at any rate have experienced great difficulty in conducting the duties of my office, Mr Canning being Minister. But in order to render that difficulty an impossibility, he wrote me a letter in the King's name, which everbody who has seen it admits puts the matter beyond all doubt. I shall show you the letter when I see you.—Ever yours, most affectionately, WELLINGTON."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

"*London, April* 14, 1827.

"MY DEAR CHARLES,—Since writing the note last night I have received and read your memorandum. When you will call upon me I will show you all that has passed, from which you will see that no effort has been spared to keep the thing right. The King believes, or thinks he believes, everything Mr C. tells him—for believe him with his sense he cannot—and he takes the chapter of accidents and the advice of this charlatan. God send that this chapter may not turn out fatally.—Ever yours most respectfully, WELLINGTON."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

as it had given the Liberals an entrance into the Government in consequence of the dissensions of their opponents, it excited a very great sensation both in the political circles in London and throughout the country; and contemporary letters prove that party spirit never before ran so high, or was commingled with such an amount of personal bitterness.* The Duke of Wellington predicted that Mr Canning's government could not stand. This prophecy, ere six months were over, was verified by that statesman's death; which melancholy event, after some vain attempts to form a Liberal administration under another leader (Lord Goderich), led to the Duke himself being sent for to form a government.†.

* "The whole conversation in town is made up of abusive, bitterly abusive talk of people about each other—all fire and flame: I have known nothing like it. I think political enmity runs higher and waxes warmer than I have ever known it."—LORD ELDON *to* LADY J. T. BANKS, *April* 7, 1827; *Eldon's Life*, ii. 588.

† "*September* 2, 1827.

"Many thanks, my dear Charles, for your letter. I desired Hardinge to forward to you the letters and papers which I had sent to him; and I did not write to yourself, because there were many to whom I was under the necessity of writing, to whom such communication could not be made by another, as to you, and I had but little time. I have no notion of what the general feeling is about Lord Goderich's government; I think the nearly unanimous opinion is that I have done what I ought. I think that recent events must have tended to lower the public opinion of Lord Goderich and his government. Lady L. may rely upon my waiting upon her. I doubt my being able to go to Doncaster, as I believe I must be in town that week; but I will certainly be at Wynyard on Saturday or on Monday.—Ever yours, most affectionately, WELLINGTON."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

"*December* 19, 1827.

"MY DEAR CHARLES,—I received your letter when I was at Wooton, and on my arrival in London in the end of the week I heard of a fresh dissolution in the Government—viz., the resignation of Lord Goderich. There are many rumours of the King. I believe the truth to be that Lord Goderich wrote to the King on Monday, 10th, to tell him that Government required strength, and to recommend that Lord Holland and Mr Brougham should be appointed to efficient office, or Lord Wellesley. He showed this letter to Lord Lansdowne and Mr Huskisson, but to none other of his colleagues. He added a postscript, which he did not show even to these two, stating that the state of affairs, his own health and Lady Goderich's, were such that he wished to be allowed to resign. The King did not answer his proposition for strengthening the Government; but, in respect to himself, told him that he would be in town on Thursday, and would endeavour to make arrangements to put another person at the head of the Government, and to keep it together. They say that Lord Lyndhurst and Mr Huskisson advised him to send for Lord Har-

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1872.

13. Wellington's difficulties in forming an administration.

The Duke soon found that it was no easy matter in those transition times to form a stable administration. The even balance of the Liberal and Conservative parties prevented either from obtaining a decided majority in the House of Commons; and not only was Government itself weak, but it required to be formed of materials and lend its support to measures not very harmonious in themselves, nor consistent with former professions or principles. In a confidential letter to Lord Londonderry when he completed his Cabinet, he observed that "the arrangement was not precisely what you would have wished for, but you will observe we cannot form a ministry as we do a dinner or a party in the country. We must look to its stability and its capacity to carry on the King's business in Parliament, and carry with it the respect of the country, and of Ireland, and of foreign nations. I hope I have succeeded in these respects, and that your confidence in this administration will increase its stability and strength."[1] Lord Londonderry was, as the event proved, a truer prophet: he had little trust in the stability of the new administration from its commencement, although it was homogeneous in one respect, that the whole Cabinet was composed of tried and unflinching Conservatives. But the course of external events soon proved too strong, even for the "Iron Duke;" and he was, ere long, driven by public danger to introduce measures which proved fatal to his administration, and

[1] Duke of Wellington to Lord Londonderry, Jan. 21, 1828; Lond. MS.

rowby. He was sent to, but declined to accept, and came to town on Monday and saw the King at Windsor. In the mean time Lord Goderich had, as usual, altered his mind, and Lord Harrowby, having recommended to H.M. that he should allow Lord Goderich to recall his resignation, the last I heard was that that proposition was under consideration, and I think it most likely it will be adopted. There are a variety of other stories in circulation—such as Lord Wellesley having been sent to and the Duke of Portland. I believe that if Lord Wellesley has been sent to, it is only to come over with a view to being employed in the Government without any particular office being designated. I know no more of this, however, than I do of the rest; but I believe all the first part is tolerably correct.—Remember me most kindly to my Lady, and believe me ever yours, most affectionately, WELLINGTON."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

in their ultimate effects entirely subverted the ancient constitution of the country.*

Lord Londonderry, as may well be believed, after all that had passed, was strongly opposed to Mr Canning, and on several occasions in the House of Lords he spoke earnestly against his foreign policy. But there was nothing selfish or ungenerous in his hostility: he fully and cheerfully admitted his great talents; and after his death he voted for a pension to his family. In common with Lord Castlereagh, he was friendly to the Roman Catholic claims—the concession of which he regarded as an essential preliminary to the pacification and tranquillity of the country. But though favourable to their just demands, he was resolutely opposed to the hostile assertion of them, and was far from approving the menacing tone in which their petitions were often couched, and which undoubtedly had its effect in bringing about their ultimate concession. On one occasion, in 1827, while presenting two petitions in favour of the Catholics from the counties of Londonderry and Monaghan, he expressed his hopes that the claims of the Catholics would be conceded; but he advised them to wait with patience and resignation, trusting to the magnanimity of a British king and senate. He added, "If I could conceive that they would have recourse to force and rebellion in order

14. His views on the Catholic question.

* Lord Londonderry wrote to the Duke in answer as follows:—

"*January* 22, 1828.

"MY DEAR DUKE,—I am much obliged to you for your letter. I recognise in its expressions that kindness you have so long shown me. When you say the arrangements are not exactly those which I should have wished for, nor certainly expected after the transactions of last year, you say all that I should presume to advance.

". . . I wish, my dear Duke, my confidence in the administration on its first appearance was really considered as capable of adding to its stability and strength. But I suspect too strongly that my name is an interdict, and it is of little moment what course I steer. My personal position with his Majesty may be awkward from my adherence to my friends rather than hanging on my sovereign's favour as others have done, and which his Majesty no doubt expected. My situation relative to Lord Dudley last session is still more difficult. But these are private circumstances which I have no right now to press upon your attention, and which I only hint at to show I am not without heavy embarrassment and little prospect of friendship (as in

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to obtain from Parliament these claims, and not to persuasion or argument, I hope, as an honest Irish soldier, I should be in the vanguard of those who opposed such proceedings." When the removal of the Catholic disabilities was brought forward in 1829 by the Duke of Wellington and Sir R. Peel, Lord Londonderry gave it his cordial support, and he pronounced a warm and eloquent eulogium upon the noble Duke in his place in Parliament when the bill came up from the House of Commons. This proceeding was the more generous on his part, that he had perhaps some cause of complaint, and most men would have felt it so at not having been included in his appointments when the Duke came into office in the preceding year.*

15. His steady opposition to the Reform Bill.

Lord Londonderry's feelings on the Catholic Relief Bill were somewhat of a mixed description, from the contest between the justice of their demands, and his abhorrence at the loud and menacing tone in which they had latterly come to be urged. Not so with the next great constitutional question, which came before Parliament—that of

happy times that are passed) to guide an erring judgment through the mazes of the moment. However, believe me, I shall endeavour to act so that he, whom, since the death of my poor brother, I have been solely and exclusively devoted to, shall have no just or fair cause to condemn my conduct.—Ever yours, most sincerely and affectionately, VANE LONDONDERRY."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* On this occasion Lord Londonderry said in the House of Peers :—

"I hail with a feeling of gratitude the measures about to be carried for healing the wounds of that distracted country. I feel deeply interested in the success of that measure; and I hope the noble Duke at the head of the Government will use all his powers to carry it into effect. In doing this let him bear in mind the exertions of those lamented statesmen who have worked and waded through many difficulties to carry this measure into effect which the noble Duke has at length taken in hand. It is, however, a most extraordinary thing that this great object is about to be carried by those who have so long opposed it. I quarrel not, however, with those who have formerly been hostile to Catholic emancipation, I only look forward with joy and satisfaction to the great result. When noble lords talk of the sacrifices which this or that man requires to make to bring this about, I confess I think there is only one individual who can be said to have made a great sacrifice, and that is the individual who cannot tender his resignation. If that individual, however, takes the course which I believe to be necessary for securing the happiness of that part of the empire, he will be adored in that country hereafter, and be described in her annals as having achieved her salvation. In that quarter there is a

Reform. To that change, in all its forms from first to last, he gave his most decided opposition. On several occasions during the two years that it dragged its weary length along, he spoke against it in the House of Peers in the strongest manner; and for this intrepid and manly conduct he incurred, as a matter of course, the inveterate hostility of the Radical party, by some of whom he was, like the Duke of Wellington, attacked in the streets, dragged off his horse, and seriously injured. Government hastened at this juncture to evince their abhorrence of such violent measures, by making him (26th June 1830) a Privy Councillor. But the hostility of the multitude went on constantly increasing. Nothing, however, could abate his steady and courageous resistance to a measure which he deemed fatal to the best interests of the country. On the second reading of the Bill in 1831, he spoke strongly against it, and quoted with great effect the opinion of Mr Fox on the subject: "'We are bound to support,' said Mr Fox, 'the true interests of the people in preference to the desires of their hearts, and the constitution makes us the sole arbiters of those interests, notwithstanding the imaginary infallibility of the people! Shall we sacrifice our reason, our honour, and our conscience for fear of incurring the popular resentment? and while we are appointed to watch the Hesperian fruit of liberty with a dragon's eye, shall we, ourselves, be the only slaves of the community?' Perhaps I may be told that nothing but the 'soul of absurdity' could suspect the people of a design against their own happiness. I do not suspect the people of any such design, but I very much suspect their capacity to judge of what will best conduce to that happiness. I know they are generally credulous, and generally uninformed; captivated by appearances, while they neglect the most important essen-

June 26, 1830.

strong feeling in favour of the Irish people; and if the measure to be proposed by ministers receive the royal assent, it will excite feelings of gratitude from one end of Ireland to the other."—*Parliamentary Debates*, xx. 470, 471, New Series.

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tials; and always ridiculously ready to believe that those persons who, from their extensive property, have the greatest reason to be anxious for the public safety are always concerting measures for the oppression of their own posterity. I stand up for the constitution, not for the populace. If the people attempt to invade the constitution, they are enemies to the nation. Being convinced, then, that we are bound to do justice, whether it is agreeable or disagreeable, I am for maintaining the independence of Parliament, and will not be a rebel to the King, to the country, or to my own heart, for the loudest huzzas of an inconsiderate multitude." [1] Men will differ according to their political prepossessions, probably to the end of the world, as to the justice of these opinions. But there is no generous mind which must not ever admire the intrepid spirit which dictated these words at a period when the "brickbat and the bludgeon" were openly recommended to the use of the infuriated multitude, and the disinterested patriotism which led to their being spoken at a time when, to all human appearance, they inferred an open renunciation during the whole remainder of life of all prospect of political elevation.

[1] Lond. MS.

16. His letter to Lords Harrowby and Wharncliffe, and correspondence with Wellington on Reform.

The resolute and intrepid disposition of Lord Londonderry led him to condemn, in the severest terms, the conduct of those peers, "Waverers," as they were termed at the time, who, after the first Reform Bill, had been thrown out by a majority of 41 in the House of Peers, in the autumn of 1831, went over to the other side and voted for the second reading of the new Reform Bill on the specious pretext of amending it in committee. Such a mode of proceeding was directly opposed to his honest and straightforward mind, which disdained all subterfuges, and inclined on all occasions to meet a difficulty and front a danger openly and manfully, be the consequences what they might. Unable to restrain his indignant feelings at this secession, he composed and published in the newspapers a very able article under the title of

a "Letter to Lords Harrowby and Wharncliffe, by a Peer of Parliament," which, at the time, made a considerable impression. The great battles for the constitution in which they were both now engaged, drew him closer than ever with the Duke of Wellington, and an active correspondence between them took place in consequence. Among other valuable documents of his Grace, preserved in the Londonderry Papers, is a very long and able letter, dated 12th January 1832, containing a full exposition of his views on this the most momentous crisis of British history. It is given at full length below; and few letters of that illustrious man are more characteristic, both from the clearness of the thought and the vigour of the expression.*

* "*London, January* 12, 1832.

"My dear Lord.—There are two very easy and straight roads for the destruction of the British monarchy. One is a *moderate Reform Bill* as *efficient* as that thrown out last October by the House of Lords. That *efficiency* is necessary to secure the honour of the Minister, which it seems is much more important in these good times than the safety of the Crown and constitution of the monarchy! The other is to destroy even the semblance of independence in the House of Lords, by creating peers to counterbalance the majority which voted against the Reform Bill. It is expected and intended to carry the new Reform Bill by this *coup d'état*.

"I don't care which mode of proceeding is adopted; the monarchy equally approaches its termination.

"It is impossible to expect that a precedent such as that which will be given on the occasion, will not be followed in future. Our late royal master created sixteen peers on his coronation, of which about nine were neither Scotch nor Irish, and were added to the House of Lords. The present King could not do less than make sixteen new peers upon his coronation, *all added* to the number of the House of Lords, and observe that this was in addition to *nine* new peers already created by the King, and recommended by Lord Grey, making in all *twenty-five* in less than one year. To this add an Irish peer created, and a bishop appointed. Now, to those, put the 30 or 40 in addition, and what becomes then of the independence of the House of Lords? After such a precedent it will be of no use to the existence of the monarchy, none to the democracy. It will be the ridicule of the public, and a despair to itself.

"We are then called upon to advise the King not to create peers. The King knows the mischief of such creations as well as we do. His Ministers tell him that he will have an insurrection and civil war in the country if they do not carry the Reform Bill; and his Majesty says that all he desires is to have the Bill fairly discussed in a committee of the House of Lords! His Ministers tell him this. But they ought also to tell him that those who vote for the second reading of the Bill in order that it may be discussed in committee, admit its principle; that is to say the principle of *efficiency*, which Lord Grey, however, requires without reference to the consequences to his Majesty's

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17. His correspondence with Sir R. Peel and the Duke of Wellington in 1834.

After the passing of the Reform Bill, and when Sir Robert Peel, at the head of a small minority in the House of Commons, was maintaining a gallant fight to prevent or retard its effects in destroying the other institutions of the country, he was brought into still closer proximity with the two great Conservative leaders in the Lords and Commons. Numerous letters remain in

interests of the admission of this principle. There are some in the House of Lords who would *prefer death to such a course.*

"But it is said if this course be not adopted we shall have insurrection and civil war!!! What have we had throughout the year 1831? Is it tranquillity? Is it the British constitution? Is it security to any man, for his property, his rights, his house, or even his life? Nothing can be worse than what we have had. *Any* change would be an improvement. I cannot consider the King of this country as a cypher, to be cut by political parties from one to another, and then to be moulded as they please. This King in particular has lived in the world, has taken a part in Parliament, and knows as well as any of us the consequences of his actions. Why then am I to suppose him ignorant of the consequences of his actions? He ought not to be so. He can obtain information as well, if not better than, any of us. He is surrounded by persons who can inform him, and I conclude, indeed I *know*, that he has chosen the course which he has taken. I lament it for his own sake, for that of his family, and for that of this great but unfortunate nation! But I can do nothing to impede that course excepting in my place in Parliament. There is nothing so wrong as to say the King is abandoned. By whom? Not by me, not by my friends, not by the House of Lords. The King is a tower of strength. His Majesty has allowed his name to be used in favour of reform, nay, of *this reform* in Parliament. Who can successfully oppose a combination consisting of the King, his Government, the House of Commons (elected, by the by, for the purpose of carrying *this* bill of reform), the dissenters from the Church of *all* descriptions, and the mob?

"The other party, consisting of the majority of the House of Lords, the Church of England absent to a man, and nineteen-twentieths of all the property and intelligence in the country (including in number, some members of both Houses of Parliament who vote for the bill), are powerless in opposition to the King. They can delay and impede the measure. They may and do look to better times, when the King may see this danger, and the people may follow his example. In the mean time they consider what is passing, and the probable consequences, with affliction bordering on despair.

"We are governed by the mob, and its czar—a licentious press. Let any man contemplate what is passing. He will see that it is so. Parliament was assembled in December, because the unions and the press insisted upon it, and they could not be resisted, particulary as the Government had issued a sort of condemnatory proclamation against the unions. What does Parliament do? What had it to do when it met in December? Nothing. The Reform Bill was forced through two readings in the House of Commons, although in point of fact neither the Bill nor the documents on which its enactments were founded, were ready to be produced to the House till after the motion for the first reading was passed. The House of Commons did nothing except appoint a committee to inquire into Irish tithes, and then adjourn for a month. The appointment of these committees has put an end to the payment of tithes in

the Londonderry archives written in the course of this struggle, valuable alike as indicating the views of those great men during its continuance, and the affectionate regard with which they looked back to the departed great, under whose banner the fight would, but for a terrible

Ireland. I call this mob-government and nothing else. Who ever heard of assembling Parliament and having nothing for them to do? Nobody but the mob and Mr Place, the tailor. The King knows all this as well as you or I do. *He* alone can save himself and the country from the difficulties in which it is placed, and from the still greater difficulties for his Majesty and his people in which he will soon find himself. Nothing is requisite but resolution and persevering firmness; and his Majesty will have degenerated in a rare manner from the distinguishing qualities of his family if he should not possess these. —Yours ever, WELLINGTON."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

During the whole progress of the Reform Bill in the House of Commons and Peers in 1831 and 1832, both the Duke of Wellington and Lord Londonderry entertained the gloomiest views of the prospects of the country. On August 14, 1831, soon after the bill had come up from the House of Commons, the Duke wrote to him as follows: "MY DEAR CHARLES,—I don't recollect that anything was said in Parliament, in Mr Canning's time, respecting the creation of peers. I recollect that many noble lords wished that the subject should be mentioned, but they gave it up. I would earnestly recommend that the subject should not be touched upon. The King certainly has a right to create peers; and it is a right for the continuance and exercise of which the House of Commons have always contended against the House of Lords. A motion for an address to the Crown to refrain from making peers carried in the House of Lords would afford the strongest possible ground to the ministers and their adherents of the Radical press and the mob, to urge upon the King the creation of a large number. They would say to his Majesty: 'The oligarchy is too strong for you and your Government; they will not allow you to make an effort to relieve yourself from this tyranny. You must make an effort, or you will lose your character and your POPULARITY. The people will not believe that your are in earnest.' Mind, I do not think the ministers will refrain from using the language whether the motion is made or not; but I prefer not to give them ground for using it, and to avoid to excite the feelings of several good, and well meaning, but not very firm minded people. I understand that the creation of a large number of peers is strongly objected to by many of the adherents of the Government, and that some of the eldest sons of peers who are in the House of Commons have refused to be called up to the House of Lords. I cannot say whether there is any foundation for this report; but if there is, I am convinced that we must cautiously avoid a course of proceeding which would undoubtedly lead to their taking another view of the subject.—Yours ever, WELLINGTON."

On October 15, the Duke again wrote: "MY DEAR CHARLES,—I never go to the House of Lords on Wednesday, and was not present when Lord Wharncliffe spoke, and I really don't know what he said. He has always, however, spoken for himself only, as have Lord Harrowby and others. It is very evident to me, however, that the result of our vote of last week * is worth nothing more than a gain of time. In the interval of time the country may manifest an important change of opinion. A Providence may otherways save us from the

* When the Reform Bill was thrown out by a majority of 41.

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calamity, have been maintained. These expressions came with a peculiar grace from the intrepid statesman then with equal courage maintaining the struggle.* The letters of both are in the highest degree valuable, as indicating the light in which they viewed the great constitutional change which had been effected. The views of the Duke were peculiarly gloomy; he regarded the revolution

misfortunes impending over this devoted nation. I am very glad you are sufficiently recovered to go out of town.—Yours ever, WELLINGTON."

On November 27, 1831, the Duke wrote to Lord Londonderry: "MY DEAR CHARLES,—I have received your letter of the 23d. Lord Wharncliffe has informed me of his communication with the Government, commenced by Lord Grey. I have told him that I will not take part in his deliberations. I think that the question turns upon this, 'Have the Government separated themselves from the Radicals and the unions?' If they have, and Lord Wharncliffe feels his position, and has firmness enough to avail himself of its advantages, the country may be relieved by his negotiation from some of the evils of the bill. I think, however, that there is some reason to doubt the real separation. This doubt is founded upon the conduct of the press for the last three weeks, and of the Birmingham union, in refraining from advocating its organisation on the very day the proclamation was published in London. If the separation has not taken place, Lord Wharncliffe's negotiation will produce no effect except to withdraw from the cause of anti-reform the POWERFUL support of himself, Lord Harrowby, and others who will follow their example.—Believe me, ever yours, WELLINGTON."

On March 13, 1832, he again wrote to Lord Londonderry: "MY DEAR CHARLES,—I return your newspapers. In answer to your note, I assure you I have nothing to say to Lord Wharncliffe's proceedings, either in the way of encouragement or discouragement.

"I don't know any man in the House of Lords with whom I have had less communication than with his Lordship. It is true the country is in a terrible state. But I thank God, I have nothing to reproach myself in producing the existing state of affairs.—Ever yours affectionately, WELLINGTON."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* "*Whitehall, February* 24, 1829.

"MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—I am greatly obliged by your kind letter; I have put the enclosure into the hands of Lord Granville Somerset, who will write to Mr Hyatt this day, and thank him for his acceptable offer. Would to God your lamented brother had been spared to us, and that I was at this moment fighting under his banner, instead of occupying a post which most justly belonged to him.—Ever yours, most faithfully, ROBERT PEEL."

"*Whitehall Gardens, April* 27, 1834.

"MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—I am always more than repaid by my own feelings, whenever an opportunity offers of vindicating the memory of your noble brother. The losses of time and the comparison with others who have tried to walk in his footsteps are constantly diminishing the necessity of such vindication, and insuring perhaps tardy but, on that account, permanent justice to his character.

"To gratify at the same time the feelings of his affectionate family is a double reward.—Believe me, my dear Lord, affectionately yours, ROBERT PEEL."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

as effected, and the ultimate ruin of the country as inevitable in consequence.* But that conviction did not in the least degree weaken his resolution to fight it out to the last, and to make "a stand-up fight for it," leaving the final result to a merciful Providence.†

* "*March* 7, 1833.

"My dear Charles,—I have received your note. I do not see any prospect of a necessity for an attendance in the House of Lords. *In truth the revolution is effected;* the question is, what will it do? In the mean time property, and the House of Lords in particular, have lost their political influence. Any deliberative body composed of men of education, of habits of business, and of talent, may, by their discussions, have a moral influence in society, and over the legislature and the mob. But their discussions must be opportune; and those of the House of Lords in particular, which still possesses a legislative power, but no political influence, ought to be very cautiously managed. I have been here generally amusing myself with the foxhounds. When I was in London last week, there was a report that the King had said to somebody that all the ministers had resigned except Lord Brougham and Lord Stanley. However, they are still in office. I understand that it is now reported Lord Grey wishes to abdicate into the hands of the Duke of Portland. I think that Lord Grey's resignation will be quite the most blackguard act that any statesman was ever guilty of. He first destroys the constitution of his country; he is repeatedly warned that neither he nor any one else will be able to carry on the Government under the new system which his act of Parliament would establish. He perseveres, carries his measures, and as soon as he experiences the difficulties into which he has brought the country, he says he has grown old, is tired, and means to retire.—Believe me, ever yours, most affectionately, Wellington."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

† "*Burton, June* 17, 1834.

"My dear Charles,—I return the Duke of Buckingham's letter; it is really necessary that the Duke should come to town and judge for himself what course he will take. My conviction is that this Government (Lord Melbourne's) cannot be broken up as the last was, by a combination of parties of all opinions against it for that purpose; and being convinced that the formation of any Government which we might hope would conduct public affairs on better or on any principles, is impossible, and that the ruin, of which the seeds were sown in the end of the year 1830, would be completed, I cannot be a party to any combination of discontented Whigs or Radicals or others to promote this object; nor vote for measures which I should consider destructive, and could not carry into execution if the object was attained. I also am for *a fair stand-up fight;* such has always been my practice. It is not that of the Duke. In the last session of Parliament I fought several fair stand-up fights throughout the dog days, and till the end of August, with the support of not more than a dozen peers, upon questions of the greatest public and private interest, even to the Duke of Buckingham himself; but I do not recollect that I had the advantage of the Duke of Buckingham's support on any of those occasions. I will follow this course again this year. But I decline to make the Poor-Law Bill a party question, or to oppose any provision in it which, when I see, I shall approve. I decline likewise to move abstract questions upon the Irish Church Commissions, for this reason. Contradictory propositions will be moved and carried in the House of Commons; and I do not choose to be the person to excite a quarrel between the two Houses of Parlia-

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18. His history of the Peninsular war, 1828.

These numerous and arduous public and private duties, which he discharged with such energy, both in his place in Parliament and on his own estates, did not altogether engross Lord Londonderry's active mind. His recollections still reverted, with almost increasing delight, to the scenes of his youth, and the days when, side by side with Wellington, he combated on the fields of Spain for the liberties of Europe, and the independence of England, The numerous and valuable letters which he had received from his illustrious general during that time, as well as those equally valuable which he had written to Lord Castlereagh during its continuance, formed the basis of his "Narrative of the events in Spain and Portugal," which was published in 1828. It met with very great, though not undeserved success, having gone through three editions within a year after its first appearance. Independent of its being a work of unquestionable au-

ment. This quarrel will occur in its time, and the House of Lords will probably be overwhelmed. But it shall not be attributed to me, with truth at least.

"The country is in a most serious state. A man like the Duke of Buckingham, with his stake in it, should come to town and see with his own eyes, and hear with his own ears, what is passing, and give his assistance to prevent the progress of the mischief. Much may be done by the House of Lords in its legitimate legislative capacity, and I must add that I can be a party only to such measures.—Believe me, ever yours, most affectionately, WELLINGTON."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

On occasion of the serious and long-protracted monetary crisis of 1838, which led to dismal strikes in every part of the country, especially the mining and manufacturing districts, the Duke addressed the following valuable letter to Lord Londonderry:—

"*London, August* 14, 1839.

"It appears to me that the combination is general, the members combined unknown, and their objects equally so. Nothing known except that there are no means of resistance. When matters broke out in Hants some years ago, I induced the magistrates to put themselves on horseback, each at the head of his own servants and retainers, grooms, huntsmen, gamekeepers, armed with horsewhips, pistols, fowling-pieces, and what they could get, and to attack in concert if necessary, or singly, these mobs, disperse them, destroy them, and take and put in confinement those who could not escape.

"This was done in a spirited manner on many instances; and it is astonishing how soon the country was tranquillised, and that in the best way, by the activity and spirit of the gentlemen.—Ever yours, most affectionately, WELLINGTON."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

thority, as coming from the pen of the Adjutant-General of the army, who had access to, or in his own hands, the best sources of information, it possessed one merit of a peculiar kind, which added to the charm of the work. From his having throughout maintained so constant a correspondence with his brother, the events of the war, day by day and week by week, were to be found narrated in his letters to him; and he had the good taste to form his narrative entirely on these, as they may be called, "sketches from nature." Thus, the work exhibits a graphic power and fidelity of description, which never could have been attained if it had been merely composed after an interval of years, from the dim recollections of long-past events. Such was the brilliancy of many of these descriptions, especially of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, that it was suspected by many at the time, that he had got some assistance in the composition; and the present Chaplain-general of the forces was freely mentioned as having contributed his aid. But Lord Londonderry had himself great powers of description, and he had a portfolio of original sketches by his own hand, which superseded the necessity of any foreign assistance. The author can give the most decided contradiction to this statement, for he found all the brilliant passages which were imputed to another in Lord Londonderry's original letters to Lord Castlereagh, written from the trenches or the field of battle.

19. Lord Londonderry's appointment as ambassador at St Petersburg in 1835.

On occasion of Sir Robert Peel's brief accession to power in December 1834, a striking opportunity was afforded Lord Londonderry of evincing the mingled disinterestedness and decision of his character. Sir Robert, on receiving the reins of power, recommended him for the high and important office of ambassador at St Petersburg, which, though not formally made out, had been officially announced. He thought, with reason, that it was a very important object, as an embroilment with France on the Eastern question was evidently approaching, to restore amicable

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relations with the Court of St Petersburg, which had been seriously impaired since the divergence on Continental affairs, at Troppau and Verona; no one seemed so well calculated to effect this as the gallant soldier diplomatist who had fought and bled with the Emperor Alexander on the field of Culm, and by his energetic bearing towards Bernadotte, mainly contributed to rendering the victory of Leipsic decisive. Upon this, the Liberals in the House of Commons, headed by Mr Sheil and Mr Cutlar Fergusson, who had never forgiven his courageous stand against the Reform Bill, made a motion to have the appointment cancelled, upon the ground that Lord Londonderry had said in his place in Parliament, that the Poles who had revolted against the Russian Government in 1831 were "rebels;" and that, having ourselves set the example of violating the treaties of Vienna, by sanctioning the partition of the kingdom of the Netherlands, then guaranteed by all the Powers, we had no right to complain of the Emperor of Russia having, in consequence of that revolt, withdrawn the constitution which by the same treaty was guaranteed to the Poles. The subsequent conduct of the English themselves, has demonstrated that both charges were unfounded; for, on occasion of the great revolt in India in 1857, the whole inhabitants of Great Britain, including the most violent Liberals, were unanimous in stigmatising the Sepoys as "rebels," though they had, like the Poles, violated their oaths of fidelity and allegiance, in the attempt to restore the independence of their native land; and as to the partition of the kingdom of the Netherlands between a monarchical and revolutionary state, it has been repeatedly referred to by subsequent Liberal governments, as affording a precedent for fresh invasions of the treaty of Vienna. And of all men in the world, Lord Londonderry was the *last* whose appointment should have given any just cause of umbrage to the Poles,[1] for he was the representative and inheritor of the policy of the

[1] Parl. Deb. xxvi. 939, 986.

statesman who had by his single efforts preserved a remnant of Polish nationality at the Congress of Vienna, and obtained for them a constitution under which they had for fifteen years enjoyed a degree of prosperity unknown in the long annals of Polish democratic insanity.

20. Who resigns it after the debate in the House of Commons.

Sir Robert Peel made a feeble defence of the appointment which had been suggested to him by the Duke of Wellington, resting on the well-known military and diplomatic services of Lord Londonderry, and the constitutional danger of the House of Commons interfering with the undoubted prerogative of the Crown in this particular. Lord Stanley, however, supported the motion, adding a hope that Ministers, if not too late, would yet cancel the appointment. The Cabinet was now in a very awkward predicament, for they had not a majority in the House of Commons, and an adverse vote on this appointment might necessitate a resignation. But Lord Londonderry relieved them from all difficulty, for no sooner did he read in the newspapers of the following day what had passed in the House of Commons, when his appointment was brought under discussion, than he rose in his place in the House of Peers, and said, "Having but one object, and that is to serve the King honestly and to the best of my ability, were I to depart from this country after what has passed in the House of Commons, I should feel myself as the representative of his Majesty placed in a new, false, and improper position. My efficiency would be impaired, and it would be impossible for me to fill the office to which I have been called with proper dignity or effect. Upon these grounds, I have now to state that no consideration will induce me to accept the office which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer upon me." The Duke of Wellington, with characteristic manliness, then rose and said, "*I recommended* that my noble friend should be appointed ambassador at St Petersburg; and I did so, founding on his great and important military services, on my knowledge of my noble friend for

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many years past, and on the fitness which he has proved himself possessed of for diplomatic duties in the various offices he has filled for many years, particularly at the Court of Vienna, from which he returned with the strongest marks of approbation of the Secretary of State. Being a military officer of high rank in this country, and of high reputation in the Russian army, he was peculiarly fitted for that employment." These were noble words on both sides, and it was worth the refusing such an appointment to have such a testimony borne by such a man.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxvi. 1004, 1007; Ann. Reg. 1835, 133, 134.

21. Which leads to his journey to Sweden, Russia, and Constantinople. Aug. 1836.

The numerous and flattering letters, expressing regret at his appointment to the Court of St Petersburg being broken off, which Lord Londonderry received from the very highest quarters at the Russian Court, led to his carrying into execution a project he had for some time entertained, of making a tour of the northern coast, and once more, before he died, renewing his personal intercourse with his old companions at arms at Stockholm and St Petersburg. It took some time to make the arrangements requisite for carrying on, during his absence, the extensive undertaking he had in hand, particularly at Seaham Harbour; but, everything being at length in readiness, he set out, accompanied by the Marchioness, early in August in the following year, and directed his steps by Berlin and Göttenberg to Stockholm. They were everywhere received with the utmost distinction and *eclat*, which gave decisive evidence of the judicious nature of the appointment which the Cabinet had made, and which the factious opposition of the House of Commons had rendered abortive. At Stockholm, in particular, they were the guests of Bernadotte, who, much to his credit, forgot all old grudges, and treated Lord Londonderry and his Lady with the distinction due to persons of their eminence, and the cordiality of an old companion-in-arms. From Stockholm they proceeded to St Petersburg, where they were received by the Emperor Nicholas with the utmost distinction and magnificence. Reviews,

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banquets, and balls, succeeded one another with all the splendour for which the Russian court is so celebrated; the whole military archives of the nation were thrown open to the Marquess's inspection, from which he extracted a great variety of important information; and advantage was taken of the anniversary of the entire deliverance of the Russian territory from the French, December 24, 1812, to present him with the medal instituted in commemoration of the taking of Paris in 1814, which he wore at the solemn service in the cathedral on the following day.* Lord Londonderry always afterwards said that these days spent among his old companions-in-arms, every one of whom recalled some interesting and heart-stirring recollection, were among the happiest in his life. Nor was Lady Londonderry, amidst all the personal homage with which she was surrounded, less gratified at seeing such decisive proofs of the high esteem in which her husband was held by the most distinguished men in Continental Europe, and of the strange truth that he was the object of animosity only to the Radicals of his own country, whom he had so largely contributed to save from imperial bondage.

22. Their journey to Moscow, Africa, and Spain, and again to Vienna and Constantinople.

From St Petersburg the Marquess and Marchioness travelled by Moscow to Odessa, and thence by sea to Constantinople. With the former ancient metropolis of Russia they were both inexpressibly affected; and the vividness of the Marchioness's impression was reflected in a description of that picturesque capital, which appeared

* "*Chancellerie, St Petersburg*, 24 *Decembre* 1836 (*January* 5, 1837).

"MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,—Sa Majesté l'Empereur a voulu profiter du séjour de votre seigneurie à St Petersburg à l'epoque où l'Eglise célèbre la délivrance de la Russie de l'invasion de l'ennemi en 1812, pour vous offrir la médaille instituée en commemoration de la prise de Paris en 1814. Sa Majesté Impérial en conséquence m'a chargé de vous faire parvenir ce médaille en vous priant de vous en servir pour la cérémonie du 25 de ce mois, et de continuer de la porter en souvenir de la campagne glorieuse qu'elle rappelle, et à laquelle votre seigneurie a pris un part si active et si noble. En m'acquittant de cet ordre de mon souverain, j'ai l'honneur d'offrir à votre seigneurie les assurances de ma très haute consideration.—LE PRINCE VOLKONSKY."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

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in a subsequent periodical, and is by far the most graphic account of it which exists in the English language. The presence of the plague at Constantinople, however, as they passed through the Dardanelles, having rendered it hazardous to land there on that occasion, they embarked in the yacht of Mr Bentinck, M.P., a great friend of both, and after traversing the enchanting sea of the Archipelago, coasted along the shores of Africa, where they visited Algiers and the ruins of Carthage, and thence crossed over to Spain, the scene of Lord Londonderry's early achievements and enduring predilection. Having returned to Great Britain in the autumn of 1837, he arranged his papers, and gave to the world the result of his observations in two volumes, entitled *Tour in the North*, which is replete with valuable information, both military and statistical, and to which, in his *History of Europe*, the author has been repeatedly indebted.

23. Lord Londonderry's duel with Cornet Battier of his own regiment, in 1823.

Like many other persons of warm feelings and a high chivalrous sense of honour, Lord Londonderry was apt, when he felt strongly, to indulge in perhaps too unmeasured expressions. This led to two incidents in his life which, though not of public importance, are too characteristic of the man to be passed over without notice. These were two duels; the first originating in a military, the second in a political dispute. On both occasions Lord Londonderry was the party challenged, not the challenger, so that he was at least guiltless of the intention to shed human blood. On both occasions he might have, in strict honour, availed himself of personal privilege to decline the challenge, but on neither did he do so, and on neither did he return his antagonist's fire, but, without retracting the words used, fired his pistol in the air. The first was with an officer in his own regiment of hussars, Cornet Battier, and occurred in 1823. The cornet was unpopular in his regiment, and complained to Lord Londonderry, as his colonel, of the conduct of his brother officers towards him. Upon inquiry, Lord Londonderry

did not think he was called on to interfere, as the complaint related simply to some passing expression used by them as to his horsemanship, which the young officer had taken more to heart than in reason he should have done. He declined, accordingly, to interfere, saying the complainer could not ride, and he had better go to the riding school. Upon this Battier called him out; and of course as it was a military dispute touching the discipline of the regiment, Lord Londonderry, as the commanding officer, was entitled to have refused to fight his inferior officer. This, however, he declined to do; but, waiving his rank, accepted the challenge, went out, received his adversary's fire, but discharged his own pistol in the air. Sir Henry (afterwards Lord) Hardinge was his second on the occasion, and entirely approved of his Lordship's proceeding; although, as involving a breach of military subordination, his conduct in accepting the challenge of an inferior officer in a dispute arising out of military discipline, was very properly disapproved of by the Horse Guards.

24. His duel with Mr Grattan in 1839.

The second occasion on which Lord Londonderry fought a duel was in 1839, and it was with Mr Grattan, on account of some violent expression reported in the newspapers as having been used by that gentleman, in reference to the famous political struggle between the Liberals and Tories, which occurred in that year, on occasion of the resignation of Lord Melbourne, and the Queen sending for Sir Robert Peel to form a new administration; which proved abortive owing to the disinclination of her Majesty to make any change in the Ladies of her Bedchamber. On this occasion Mr Grattan made a speech at a meeting of St Paul's parish, Dublin, in which he was reported, in a liberal journal of that city, to have said that if the Tories had succeeded in getting possession of the reins of power at that time, her Majesty's life would have been placed in danger from the machinations of the Tory Ministers or their Ladies of the Bedchamber. This extraordinary and absurd accusation,

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which would have been too contemptible to call for notice, were it not for the talents and social position of the person preferring it, excited very great indignation among the political leaders on both sides; and it was noticed in terms of just indignation, both by Lord Brougham and Lord Londonderry, in the House of Lords.* The former said that the charges were "false and slanderous;" the latter, that it was "base and infamous." Upon reading the remarks in the *Morning Chronicle* of the 31st May, reporting the speeches of the preceding evening in the House of Lords, Mr Grattan wrote to both the noble Lords requiring an explanation, and desiring to know whether the epithets were intended to apply to him. Lord Brougham returned a long answer, which, as containing a full statement of the matter in dispute, is given below entire.† Lord Londonderry contented himself with replying—"I meant to repel an unfounded accusation, and I can

* The paragraph in the *Dublin Freeman's Journal*, represented as forming part of Mr Grattan's speech, was as follows:—Mr Grattan said, "You have powerful motives to urge you on at the present crisis, and not among the least powerful is this, that if we get under a Tory regime, and if the Queen were surrounded by Tories such as Sir Robert Peel and the other members of the Tory Cabinet, *I for one would not answer for her life* (the Queen's) *for a single hour.* History abounds with instances in which rulers have been taken away by the hands of their courtiers; and not the least remarkable of these is that which Aristotle mentions of the death of Alexander the Great, who, he says, died without any of those external symptoms which usually accompany the ordinary diseases by which man is liable to be deprived of life. If the charges which have been brought against a certain royal person, namely, the King of Hanover, be true, I do declare solemnly I do not think the royal lady would be safe in her palace, while surrounded by the minions and protegés of his Highness,—why, I would not, for my part, give so much as an orange peel, despicable as it is, for the life of the Queen, were the same once in the hands of Tory keeping. I feel sensible that had the odious party the power over a lady in darkness; had they *the mixing of the bowl or the preparation of the opiate, then indeed would her subjects soon behold their beloved Queen composed in a long and endless sleep.*"—*Dublin Freeman's Journal, May* 21, 1839.

† Mr Grattan's letter was in these terms to Lord Brougham:—

"*Reform Club, June* 1, 1839.

"My Lord,—I see in the *Morning Chronicle* newspaper a reported speech of your Lordship last night. Your Lordship is there represented as having alluded to me, and as having used expressions which no gentleman can permit to be applied to him. I therefore hope your Lordship will explain this circumstance, and that you will be so good as to remove from my name the impres-

only adhere to the purport of my former communication, that, unwilling as I should be to affix upon any individual the responsibility of having uttered such sentiments as those reported in the public accounts of the meeting to

sion which the offensive terms of 'falsehood and slander' must naturally occasion."—I have the honour to be, &c., HENRY GRATTAN."

To this letter Lord Brougham returned the following answer :—

"SIR,—Whilst I protest distinctly against being held answerable to any person out of the House to which I belong, for anything said or done by me in that House of Parliament, I am disposed to answer your letter by the respect which I have ever borne towards your family, and which you are aware I do not now for the first time profess. When I shall have stated the passage in your speech at the late Dublin meeting, to which alone I referred in my statement of Friday last, and which I believed to have been spoken by you, because it was cited by another speaker with approbation in your presence, without any correction from yourself, you will at once percieve that the offensive words mentioned in your letter could not have been applied to your invectives, whatever other comments they might justly occasion. I quote from the newspaper supposed to be in the interest of your party (*The Dublin Weekly Register*), but I first saw the speech in another.

" 'The people and their sovereign have triumphed over the base, the lying, the tyrannical faction for whom no falsehood is too great. They are abusing and calumniating every loyal and respectable man, and they are abusing and calumniating the people, the priesthood and their religion, and yet the liars would tell you that they are the advocates of liberal principles! But their falsehood and hypocrisy have been exposed ; we have confounded their knavish tricks, and covered them with shame and confusion. I tell you more,—that if her Majesty was once fairly placed in the hands of the Tories, I would not give an orangé peel for her life. If some of the low miscreants of the party got round her Majesty, and had the mixing of the bowl at night, I fear she would have a long sleep.'

"To say that Tory Ladies of the Bedchamber would commit treason, and murder the Queen, may be very senseless and very uncharitable, but it could never, with any propriety of language, be called a falsehood or even a slander. Accordingly, the only two persons present, one of them a countryman of your own and a friend of your family, whom I have spoken to on the subject, are quite clear in their recollection that I never applied to your speech the words which you say have naturally given you pain. The newspapers which I have seen also coincide with their recollection. But I must add that the comments which I did make upon your speech, though not such as to justify any personal call from you upon me, were such as very possibly have given you pain. I am sorry for it, and I expressed at the time the uneasiness which I felt on being compelled by a sense of duty and of justice to make those remarks. However strong, they were not stronger than the universal feeling of the audience went along with. But I expressly ascribed your conduct to the feelings of party zeal and violent excitement under which you laboured. Your great unwillingness to have language applied to yourself so incomparably less offensive than you are represented to have used with respect to others, makes me entertain some hope that, contrary to all probability, I may have been misinformed by an incorrect report of your speech. I, of course, have no kind of right to ask you any question; but I may perhaps be pardoned if I add, that nothing would give me more sincere gratification than to be told by you that

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which I alluded, I must adhere to the opinion I have already expressed as applying to any individual prepared to avow such language." This answer was followed by a challenge from Mr Grattan, which Lord Londonderry, waiving his privilege as a peer in regard to words spoken in Parliament, at once accepted. The parties went out, Mr Bentinck, M.P., being Lord Londonderry's second. They exchanged shots, happily without effect, Lord Londonderry's being discharged in the air. Mr Grattan declared himself "perfectly satisfied," and the parties separated without the words complained of having been either retracted or qualified.[1]

[1] Lond. MS. and Times, June 3, 1839.

25. Reflections on this duel.

Upon these facts it is evident that Mr Grattan was decidedly in the wrong, and Lord Londonderry's conduct highly straightforward and honourable. The words used both by Lord Brougham and Lord Londonderry were indeed very strong, and such as would have given Mr Grattan just ground of complaint, if they had been the beginning of the controversy. Whether they gave him a right to challenge a peer for words spoken in Parliament, is a different question, on which, if Lord Londonderry had not waived his privilege as such, there could be no doubt. But these words were not the beginning; they were *the end* of the controversy, till the personal correspondence began. Mr Grattan said, at a public meeting in Dublin, in so many words, that the Queen's life was in danger if the Tories and Tory Ladies of the Bedchamber were around her person. This appeared in the reports of his speech by the journals of his own party;* and no contradiction of the words there imputed to him was inserted in these columns or elsewhere. In these circumstances, Mr Grattan's course was clear. Either he spoke

this conjecture is well founded, and I should not fail to state in my place my satisfaction at being undeceived.—I have the honour, &c., BROUGHAM.—*To* H. GRATTAN, ESQ."

With this explanation, after some further correspondence, Mr Grattan declared himself satisfied.

* The *Dublin Weekly Register* and *Dublin Freeman's Journal.*

the words ascribed to him, or he did not. If he had not done so, he should, in a matter involving so serious a charge, have written to the journals in which his speech was reported, disclaiming them, or done so in the correspondence which followed, and then Lord Londonderry's and Lord Brougham's observations would at once have flown off from him, and there was an end of the matter. If he really had used the words ascribed to him, or ones of a similar import, he had no right to complain of the expressions used in reply in the House of Peers by the two noble lords. He who claims moderation in language should begin by using it. No man has any title to complain in the war either of blows or of words, if the defence is conducted with the same weapons as the attack. Mr Grattan said that the Tory chiefs were prepared to commit treason and murder. Lord Londonderry answered that the charge was "base and infamous." Baseness and infamy are incomparably less serious charges than treason and murder. The weapons used in defence were greatly less damaging than those employed in the attack. If an enemy begins an engagement with red-hot shot or exploding shells, he has no right to insist that his antagonist shall reply only with cold four-and-twenty pounders.

26. Lord and Lady Londonderry again set out for Constantinople. Aug. 1840.

Having been disappointed on the former occasion of their visit to the East in seeing Constantinople, Lord and Lady Londonderry resolved on again making the attempt to do so; and they were the more inclined to undertake this from the opportunity that it would afford, by going overland, of visiting the Austrian capital, and renewing their old relations with the warriors and diplomatists there. Accordingly, in autumn 1840, they again embarked from London, and proceeded by Rotterdam, Frankfort, Munich, and Linz, to Vienna. They there renewed, with the utmost satisfaction, their ancient and friendly relations with the Austrian Court, and especially Prince Metternich, still, though advanced in life, the pillar of the state, and the delight of the elevated circle in which he moved. On

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leaving the Austrian capital *en route* for Turkey, the veteran diplomatist addressed Lord Londonderry a letter, singularly interesting and characteristic, which is not the least valuable document in the Londonderry archives.*

27. Lord Londonderry's reception at Constantinople.

Lord and Lady Londonderry pursued their journey by Presburg, Buda, Belgrade, and Bucharest, to Constantinople. They were there received in the most magnificent manner by the Sultan, who displayed to their admiring gaze all the beauties of the far-famed Queen of the East. His lordship was honoured by a special audience of the Sultan, and what was much more remarkable, and excited no small sensation among the ladies of the seraglio, the Marchioness was distinguished by a special audience of the same potentate. She went *en grande tenue*, adorned by her magnificent diamonds, and was received with the most respectful courtesy by the Sublime Porte, in whose breast, notwithstanding his Eastern education, the feelings of chivalry still lived. From the Turkish capital Lord Londonderry addressed a very long and interesting letter on the Eastern question, then in the course of angry solution by the bombardment of Beyrout and Acre, to Sir Robert Peel, with whom he corresponded in the course of his long and varied travels. It is the more interesting from his Lordship having so recently come

* "*Vienna*, 15 *Octobre* 1840.

"MON CHER MARQUIS,—C'est avec bien des regrets que je ne vous ai plus vu: conservez moi votre amitié et revenez nous voir, car je n'ai guère de chance d'aller vous chercher. Mon existence resemble à cette des cerveaux fixés sur un roc, et qui ne se déplacent qu'avec la base sur laquelle ils sont attachés.

"J'accepte avec satisfaction votre bon augure, car je ne voudrais également mourir sans vous avoir revu. Notre connoissance et amitié date d'une epoque qui aujourd'hui à la valeur de ces temps que l'histoire même qualifie d'héroique. Tous les souvenirs qui s'attachent à des temps pareils ont un charme égal pour l'esprit et pour le cœur.

"Je vous recommande au Lt.-Colonel Philippville qui fera le voyage avec vous à Constantinople. C'est un officier très distingué, et qui nous envoyons en Turquie pour le mettre aux ordres de la Porte. Il pourra vous servir de dragoman, car il sçait le Turc aussi-bien que nous deux ne le sçavons pas. Vous trouverez ce enclos la lettre à l' . . .

"Mille homages à Madame la Marquise; et que le bon Dieu vous protége dans votre voyage. Conservez moi souvenir et amitié, METTERNICH."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

from the Courts of St Petersburg and Vienna, where he had been made acquainted with the light in which their respective Cabinets viewed this new phase of the Eastern question; and the more valuable from the clear light in which it places what should have been the true policy of the Western Powers after having delivered the Porte from his formidable rebellious vassal. And that was to have fortified the Bosphorus, under the guarantee of England and France, *against* the Czar, by granting to the ships of war of the Western Powers the right to enter the Black Sea; instead of giving him, as Lord Palmerston practically did, the key of those straits, by sanctioning as a part of European policy the exclusive right to pass them to the armed vessels of Turkey alone, thus leaving her capital undefended, save by her own resources, against the eighteen sail of the Russian line collected at Sebastopol and in the Euxine.*

* "*Constantinople, December* 28, 1840.

". . . The contest in Asia Minor may now be considered at an end. The power of Mehemet Ali, always ephemeral, may be totally overthrown by the Turks themselves before the Allies make up their minds whether they will allow the Viceroy to retain the hereditary sovereignty of Egypt, or even the possession for life. For it is clear if Ibrahim is now defeated the Turks can move through the desert on El Arish and Cairo; and if a rising takes place there, Alexandria must fall. The means of the rebellious chief have been greatly overrated; more ball and less paper would have closed affairs long ago. From the first the Egyptians showed they would never really fight against the Turks; and if the principle of putting down rebellion is to be acted upon, it is a nice point to discover upon what crotchet you are to pause without fostering it into a new break out.

"The Allies have drawn the sword in alliance with the Sultan against his rebellious chief. His Majesty resolves to depose him during partial successes; a negotiation proceeds on this point; a great victory is then gained. Is it good policy after a conquest to grant to the vanquished the same, or anything like the same, terms as were proffered before the battle? What has Mehemet Ali done to deserve any mercy? If he has introduced greater civilisation in Egypt, he has turned it against what civilisation should teach obedience to—legitimate authority. If the Powers, nevertheless, now refuse to agree to the deposition, let the Sultan complete the object alone. Is it to be denied that Turkey has the undisputed right to persevere in re-establishing her own strength and power; and upon what can be based the opposition to his lawful will to do so? It can only be rested on arbitrary dictation. France has now placed herself on the line of the old quadruple alliance; and although I admit she should be much conciliated, I would not yield to this necessity at the expense of opening anew her intrigues and management in the East. Preserve Mehemet Ali in the East, and he will be a Prefet of France; Asia Minor, as well

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28. He is made Colonel of the 2d Life Guards and Lord-Lieutenant of Durham. June 21, 1843.

Upon Sir Robert Peel's return to the head of affairs in 1841, Lord Londonderry gave his government a sincere and cordial support, and from his influence in the north of England and Ireland this was now a matter of moment. He received soon after the most gratifying proof of unshaken regard and affection from his old commander-in-chief, in his appointment to the colonelcy of the 2d regiment of Life Guards, vacant by the death of the Earl of Cathcart.* This appointment was the

as Africa, will be a constant focus of his enterprise, to which Egypt, still under French influence, will be a stepping-stone.

"If the balance of power in Europe requires the strength, power, and integrity of the Ottoman Empire to be maintained, it is a strange mode of accomplishing it first to abstract Greece from her sway and raise it to an independent monarchy. But this is not all. With a measure before your eyes, from which calamitous results have followed, Wallachia and Moldavia are next abstracted: Egypt and Syria would have then fallen, if a wiser policy had not prevented it; for what empire could remain unshaken where continual dismemberments proceed in the rapid space of a few short years? It seems to me the true line of England is to foster and protect the Turkish Power against all encroachments. But as its government may be, there are elements in it, from all I learn, of rapid improvement. Our commercial interests, from the changes induced by steam navigation, have been placed with Turkey on a new foundation: Impose upon her naval and military instruction, and aid her in her attempts to civilise her institutions; the Government has some Ministers who would appreciate these advantages. It is alleged here that Russia, having fourteen ships of the line which she can now always command at Odessa, *can arrive by the Black Sea in a few days at Constantinople*, supporting her fleet by a large army through Servia by land, and thus holding the entrance of the Dardanelles, *the Empire of the East falls into her hands.*

"But these are phantoms and shadows if the *great gates from the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea are to be made impregnable. Let England assist Turkey with such powerful preparations, and no Russian force would advance* from Wallachia, or Moldavia, or Servia, with an Austrian army in the rear. A complete understanding and union of sentiment with Austria, Turkey, and Great Britain, would enable the Sultan to guard *against Russian influence on the one hand and French hostility on the other.* Of England alone Turkey can never have real dread. If we have neglected and thought little of those interests in this quarter which have become *la pomme de discorde*, it is not too late to review a great European question. To conclude my humble reasoning, with which you must be sadly tired, I shall beg you to record my prophecy (I have not been wrong in many predictions from abroad), that if Mehemet Ali is left in any manner in Egypt, there never will be peace and tranquillity in the East during our natural lives.

"We proceed from hence in a few days to Smyrna, Corfu, Malta, and Naples. Our kind regards to Lady Peel and Julia.—Believe me, my dear Sir Robert, with great truth and regard, yours ever most sincerely, VANE LONDONDERRY."
—LORD LONDONDERRY *to* SIR ROBERT PEEL; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* "*Horse Guards, June* 21, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—I write one line to inform you that her

more flattering from its giving the recipient an official place at Court near the person of her Majesty. It was soon followed by his being promoted to the situation of Lord-Lieutenant to the County of Durham by Sir Robert Peel—an appointment which, although the highest in its bounds, is in the common case rather an honorary dis-

Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve of your Lordship being recommended to her Majesty for the command of the 2d Life Guards, vacant by the death of General Earl Cathcart, K.G. I will send you official notification thereof from the office, without loss of time.

You are aware that the Colonel of the 2d regiment of Life Guards performs the duty of the officer bearing the gold stick; and in that capacity attends upon her Majesty at her courts and in council, in turn with the Colonel of the Royal Regiment Horse Guards (Blue), and the Colonel of the 1st Regiment of Life Guards.—Ever yours most sincerely, WELLINGTON."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

On this occasion Lord Londonderry addressed the following letter to his old companions-in-arms in the 10th Hussars, the colonelcy of which he of course relinquished on his promotion to the Life Guards :—

" *Holdernesse House, June* 28, 1843.

" Brother Soldiers !—There may be many among you now to whom I am personally unknown; for time, who steals our years away, steals our service also. Still none that I address can be ignorant of the eventful records of this distinguished corps. The connection of George, Prince of Wales, with the corps forms a bright page in its history. And if the Prince of Wales is again placed at your head, your glorious banner of the plume of feathers, and 'Ich Dien,' will once more, under royal command, become the pride and glory of the army. But for this object the *esprit de corps* which has ever animated you must never slumber—your deeds must be the same, your conduct as meritorious. Let the memory of the past lighten your hopes of the future; and let the actions on the plains of Castile and Estremadura, of the Esla and Benavente, and, above all, of glorious Waterloo, be ever before your eyes.

" It is now my painful duty to take leave of you. I cannot deny, whatever distinction or honour awaits me, I leave you with sincere regret. For twenty years I have been at your head; for the same period, nearly, I commanded the gallant 18th, comrades in some of your battles and your fame. Always a hussar since their first establishment in our service, I have thought little of any other arm. A separation, under such circumstances, must be felt; but when I also recollect I was selected by the Prince Regent to succeed him in the command of the corps, I have ever thought it the proudest feature of my humble career.

" At that period my directions to the commanding officer were as follows :—Let every point of discipline, service and detail, be conducted as heretofore. Let the clothing, accoutrements, and appointments, remain the same. By perseverance in what the Prince Regent has established, keep your honour bright, and let the name only of your head be altered. I am proud to believe that, through the indefatigable and arduous exertions of your excellent commanding officers, Sir George Quentin, Colonel Henry Wyndham, Colonel Lord Thomas Cecil, and Colonel Vandeleur, aided always by an admirable corps of officers, my orders had never to be repeated; and while I bear this testimony to their merits, I offer to them, collectively and individually, my warmest thanks,

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tinction than anything else, but became widely otherwise in the stormy times and difficult crisis which was approaching.

29. Publication of his "War in Germany." 1840.

His renewed intercourse with his old military and diplomatic friends at the Courts of St Petersburg and Vienna in 1837 and 1840, induced Lord Londonderry to carry into execution a design which he had long meditated, of giving the public a narrative of the war in which he bore a part in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814. It appeared accordingly in the year 1841 in one volume quarto. Its value and importance as a historical monument may be judged of from the numerous extracts from it contained in the preceding pages, and the still more frequent references for facts and

hoping I leave the regiment inferior to none in efficiency, discipline, and devotion to her Majesty's sacred person and Government.

"You will know before this reaches you that the Queen has been graciously pleased to confer upon me the high distinction of the Household Brigade by placing me in command of the 2d Life Guards. Sensible of the high promotion, and grateful for this mark of favour, I now, in dutiful obedience, bid you farewell. My parting words have been dictated by that interest and affection I must ever feel for the 10th Royal Hussars, for whose military fame and welfare I shall ever offer up an earnest prayer."

To the officers and privates of the 2d Life Guards, on Lord Cathcart's decease, Lord Londonderry, on taking the command, thus addressed himself:—

"General the Marquess of Londonderry is deeply sensible of the honour her Majesty has conferred upon him in appointing him to the Household Brigade; and in assuming the command of the 2d Life Guards, he takes the earliest opportunity of assuring the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, that his never-ceasing study and pride will be to preserve in the regiment that high state of discipline, exemplary conduct and character, which they have so pre-eminently maintained under their late most accomplished and highly-respected Colonel (Lord Cathcart)—a soldier, whom to know was to admire and love, and whose example and tried abilities in the councils and conduct of the armies of Europe in 1813, 1814, and 1815, Lord Londonderry was in the position to endeavour humbly to imitate what no one could ever surpass. It was, however, Lord Cathcart's talents as a tactician and profound knowledge of the interior economy of the army, that rendered him remarkable in the service of his sovereign, especially in the conduct of a regiment. This it is unnecessary to recall to Lieut.-Colonel Reid and the 2d Life Guards, further than to express their new commander's anxious hope and desire, that the spirit which has fled may still live in the admirable system laid down; and while his successor expects and enjoins the most exact obedience to orders, the strictest discipline and duty, and also the greatest of all advantages, that of a cordially united corps, he begs to assure them every effort on his part shall be unceasingly directed for the honour, welfare, and happiness of a regiment he feels now so proud to command."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

figures stated in the text. It is written in his usual graphic and animated style; and from the number of official documents in his possession or at his command, it must always be a work of standard authority on the events of that memorable period. Some of the descriptions, particularly that of the battle of Leipsic, written on a stone on the field of battle, and of the entrance into Paris, sent off on the very day of that event, bear the signet mark of *original sketches;* and on that account will always take a prominent place in the histories of these events. But with these exceptions the work, though a standard one in point of authority, does not possess the charm of composition which distinguishes the annals of the Peninsular war. The reason is obvious: it is more diplomatic. The author was then immersed in the great political and diplomatic concerns of that eventful time, and he had not leisure to prepare those graphic sketches on the spot except on particular occasions, which give so much life and spirit to his work on the Spanish contest.

30. Publication of his letter to Lord Brougham on Lord Castlereagh.

These literary labours were by a fortunate circumstance directed into another channel after the publication of this work, which became of equal moment to the memory of both brothers. In April 1839 Lord Brougham published in his *Historical Sketches of the Reign of George III.* an account of Lord Castlereagh, in which, not content with representing his acquirements and abilities as of the most insignificant and ordinary description, he stigmatised his *foreign* policy as "singularly destitute of merit." This extraordinary statement, coming from such a writer as Lord Brougham, and so long after the event had set its seal upon the deeds of Lord Castlereagh, affords only a melancholy proof how party spirit and the long habits of party warfare can render even the most powerful minds and the acutest intellects insensible to the plainest truths. This intemperate sally, which no one now probably will more regret than the noble and learned Lord himself who gave

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vent to it, created at the time a considerable sensation; the more so from the marked contrast which it presented to the dignified and high-bred courtesy with which Lord Castlereagh, both in Parliament and out of it, always spoke of his great political antagonist.* It drew forth from Lord Londonderry accordingly an able and spirited reply, in the form of a pamphlet, extensively circulated at the time, and which was afterwards published in the introductory memoir prefixed to the first volume of the *Castlereagh Despatches*. Never was a more striking example afforded of the manner in which the bending of a bow too far one way occasions a rebound which sends it equally far the other. The obvious unfairness of Lord Brougham's criticism in this instance led to the giving to the world a host of letters from the most eminent statesmen and public characters of the day, of all parties, addressed to Lord Londonderry, bearing the most emphatic and evidently heartfelt testimony to Lord Castlereagh's great qualities as a statesman and public servant. Many of these have already been given in the preceding pages. The character of the whole remaining ones may be judged of by the three from Lord Wellesley and Sir Walter Scott, to the latter of whom Lord Londonderry had applied in 1827 to write the memoir which has now fallen into less worthy hands.† The manner in which Lord

* As for example, on 15th February, 1822, Lord Castlereagh said, alluding to Lord Brougham: "If the House has read with as patient attention as I have,—*and everything that proceeds from the honourable and learned gentleman is worthy of attention*,—the speeches which he made in 1816 and 1817, on the manufacturing and commercial state of the country, they must have remarked the striking contrast between those speeches and the speech which the honourable and learned gentleman delivered the last time he addressed this House."—*Parliamentary Debates, February* 15, 1822.

† "DEAR SIR,—I am favoured with your letter, and feel it a particular honour that I should be thought capable of undertaking a work of so much consequence as a memoir of the late Lord Londonderry. No man wishes more, or would more delight to contribute to any work which should contribute to place that most upright and excellent statesman in the rank which he ought to hold with his countrymen. I am conscious that, by dint of repeating a set of cant phrases which, when examined, have neither sense nor truth, a grand effort has been made to blind the British public as to the nature of the important services which he has rendered to his country; and that the truth

Londonderry had discharged the important duty of vindicating his brother's memory drew forth the warmest commendations from the most competent judges, particularly Sir Robert Peel, Lord Aberdeen, and Mr Disraeli.*

of history has in no case been so much encroached upon to serve the purposes of party. I have often looked for some occurrence to speak a little plain sense on this subject, and I hope I shall find one. But notwithstanding, I feel myself in some most important particulars totally incapable of doing justice to the task which your good opinion and that of Lord Londonderry would impose on me."—SIR WALTER SCOTT *to* REV. S. M. TURNER, *October* 27, 1827; *Londonderry MS.*

On August 18, 1823, Lord Wellesley wrote to Lord Londonderry: "Although separated from your brother for a long period of time in the course of political affairs, I had long acted with him, and the spirit of mutual esteem had never been extinguished between us. On my appointment to the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland, I received from him the most cordial support and the most active and useful assistance, and I found in him the greatest knowledge, combined with the purest zeal for the interests of Ireland, and the most liberal sentiments, combined with the soundest prudence, discretion, and practical wisdom. The whole benefit of these invaluable qualities he imparted to me without reserve. His loss, therefore, severe as it was to his country and his friends, was to me irreparable; and I must have been as inconsistent as ungrateful if I had not considered his memory with a degree of affection and reverence proportioned to my sense of the value of his confidence and generous friendship."—LORD WELLESLEY *to* LORD LONDONDERRY, *August* 18, 1823; *Londonderry MS.*

On receipt of Lord Londonderry's pamphlet, Lord Wellesley wrote to him —"MY DEAR LORD,—Accept my best acknowledgments for your obliging attention in sending me a copy of your letter, which I have read with great attention. It is complete in all its parts, and in my judgment unanswerable. —Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely, WELLESLEY."—*Kingston House, July* 24, 1839; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* "MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—After my return from the House of Commons last night, I read your letter to Lord Brougham. I think you were perfectly right in noticing his unjust estimate of the character and abilities of Lord Londonderry; and I think also that you have noticed it in the most effectual manner by maintaining throughout that dispassionate and temperate tone which is so much more becoming to the occasion, and makes a much deeper impression than irritation and violence, however natural or justifiable. You well know that no vindication of your brother's memory was necessary for my satisfaction—that my admiration of his character is too firmly rooted to be shaken by criticisms or phrases and cavils at particular acts, selected from a long political career. I doubt whether any public man (with the exception of the Duke of Wellington) who has appeared in the last half century, possessed that combination of qualities, intellectual and moral, which would have enabled him to effect, under the same circumstances, what Lord Londonderry did effect in regard to the union with Ireland and the great political transactions of 1813, 1814, and 1815."—SIR ROBERT PEEL *to* LORD LONDONDERRY, *July* 23, 1839; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

"*July* 24, 1839.

"MY DEAR LORD,—I have just read your letter to Lord Brougham, and I cannot deny myself the pleasure of congratulating you on the publication of what is not only a very spirited yet dignified vindication of your eminent re-

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31. Which leads to the preparation of the *Castlereagh Correspondnce.*

The signal success which attended this *brochure* in defence of his brother's memory led Lord Londonderry to project, and ere long begin to execute, the great work which he fortunately lived to complete, and publish entire, the *Castlereagh Correspondence.* That the materials for a great minister's life are mainly to be found in his official correspondence is universally admitted; but how to collect these materials and arrange them in proper order, as Lord Castlereagh's were, was not so apparent. Great part of his most valuable papers had been lost on the voyage to India, in the custody of the gentleman (the Rev. S. M. Turner) to whom the preparation of his life had been committed, and those which remained, though of enormous number and bulk, were in great part rendered hardly intelligible by the loss of the connecting links to which they referred, and were nearly all in such a state of confusion that it required no common nerves to attempt even their arrangement or a selection from them. Lord Castlereagh's incessant and exhausting duties during the last twenty years of his life, extending generally to ten or twelve hours a-day, had left no time for the arrangement and classification of his papers, and his sudden and calamitous

lative's memory, but is an extremely interesting and valuable contribution to our political and historical literature. The style is worthy of the theme, fluent, yet sustained, and the sarcasm polished and most felicitous. It will make a considerable sensation; and if only for the original documents which it contains, will be often referred to. I assure you, my dear Lord, I cannot easily express with what entire satisfaction I have perused this well-timed appeal to that public opinion which has been too long abroad on the character and career of a great statesman.—I am, my dear Lord, ever your obliged and faithful servant, B. DISRAELI."

Lord Aberdeen wrote on July 24—"I rejoice that you have persevered in your letter, for you have executed your task most admirably. With much taste, feeling, and judgment you have touched the principal events of your brother's life, and have placed them in a light as advantageous as it is just and true. You must be so thoroughly aware of my affection for the memory of your brother, as well as of my respect for his character, that you will have no difficulty in giving me credit for the sincere pleasure with which I have read your vindication of his character. I believe it may be said with truth that few men have ever deserved so highly of their country; and I am sure that none could more effectually secure the love and attachment of their friends." —LORD ABERDEEN *to* LORD LONDONDERRY, *Argyle House, July* 24, 1839; *MS. Londonderry Papers.*

death entirely deprived him of those few years of retirement which the benignity of Providence sometimes concedes to review the moments of a life actively devoted to the public service. This laborious and important duty now devolved upon Lord Londonderry, the heir of his name and the protector of his memory; and he set about the Herculean task with a vigour which nothing but the energy of his character, coupled with the ardour of his attachment to the deceased, could have produced. Under the combined influence of these feelings, every difficulty was surmounted and every obstacle removed. The immense mass of correspondence was arranged according to their dates, the only practicable principle in collections of that magnitude; the publication of the series, selected out of numbers tenfold greater, commenced in 1848, and was terminated, in 1852, by the twelfth volume; and before he himself was summoned from this transitory scene, he had the happiness of feeling assured by the best of all evidence, the testimony of his generous political opponents, that his labour of fraternal love had completely succeeded in vindicating his brother's memory.*

* "*Admiralty, April* 28, 1853.

"My dear Lord Londonderry,—I was always desirous that you should give to the world the correspondence of your brother with the greatest statesmen and commanders at the most eventful period of modern history. The result has not disappointed my expectations. You have enabled the present generation to form an accurate judgment of the services rendered to Europe by those who overthrew Napoleon, and who established peace on a basis which has lasted forty years, and you have done justice to the memory of your brother, whose character and merits will be most highly appreciated when they are best known and most closely scrutinised. He has nothing to fear from posterity or the historian; his fair fame has been well sustained by his friend and brother, whom he loved so much, and the materials are his private thoughts and secret correspondence. You judged rightly when you decided that Lord Castlereagh's reputation would be exalted with this proof; and I cordially and sincerely congratulate you on the result.—I am, my dear Lord, yours faithfully, J. G. Graham."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

This generous letter was sent by Lord Londonderry to Mr Croker, who returned it with the following answer:—

"*West Molesey, Surrey, April* 30, 1853.

"My dear Londonderry,—Sir James's letter is very gratifying. He expresses himself with frankness and spirit, as well as with justice and taste.

"I sincerely congratulate you on having got through your important and arduous task, which will do justice to your brother's memory and to your own

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32. Lord Londonderry's efforts on behalf of Abd-el-Kader in Algeria.

The surrender of the famous Arab chief Abd-el-Kader to General Lamoricière and the Duc d'Aumale, son of Louis Philippe, on condition of his being allowed to retire to Alexandria or St Jean d'Acre, on December 23, 1847, and his subsequent detention in the face of the capitulation by the Government of Louis Philippe in France, awakened strong feelings of indignation in the breast of Lord Londonderry, who felt the honour of his profession stained when a gallant soldier, who had long struggled for his country, was treacherously detained a prisoner, contrary to the conditions of his surrender. Impressed with these feelings, he no sooner heard of the violation of the capitulation, than he made the most strenuous efforts in his behalf, both by letters addressed direct to Louis Philippe and repeated applications to his principal ministers. The fall of that monarch, which so soon after occurred, prevented these exertions having, at the time, the desired effect; and the noble Arab remained some years longer in honourable captivity in the south of France. But the efforts of Lord Londonderry were not in vain: they were ultimately instrumental in procuring his release, and that in a way so strange and unexpected that it savours rather of the improbability of romance than the events of real life.

good feeling, as well as ability. I do not think you will have any complaint from the quarter you apprehend. Will you desire Murray to send me the last four volumes. If you are to pay me a visit, it must be *very soon*; for my wife takes me down to the sea-side on Tuesday, for, we hope, six weeks. Locomotion and change of air, the doctors think, may do me good. I have little faith, but great submission, so I go. Though I do not expect much improvement, yet as the moving is no inconvenience to me, it is possible that with a pulse that was no higher this morning than twenty-eight, such a trip may mend my sluggish circulation, and this agreeable change in the weather make the experiment more promising.—Ever affectionately yours, J. W. CROKER."

Mr Croker's answer was sent to Sir James Graham, who replied 2d May 1853—"I am obliged to you for sending me Croker's letter, which I return. It is pleasant once again to agree in opinion with an old acquaintance heretofore so intimately associated with me in the confidence and friendship of Sir Robert Peel. I am sorry to observe he gives so bad an account of his own health. It is, however, a still greater gratification to me that the sincere expression of my honest opinion respecting your brother's merits, as illustrated by your publication, should have been agreeable to your kindly feelings.—I am, &c., J. G. GRAHAM."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

33. Which at length lead to his liberation after the accession of Louis Napoleon.

Among the numerous guests who at this time and for some years previously had frequently shared in the magnificent hospitalities of Wynyard Park was one young Frenchman, who bore a great name, and was born to destinies very different from those which at that period appeared to await him. His name was LOUIS NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE, the son of the ex-King of Holland, and the heir, after the demise of the Duke of Reichstadt, of the family of the great conqueror. After the abortive issue of his attempt at Strasburg, and liberation from custody by the generous humanity of the French Government, he came back to Europe from America, whither he had agreed to go on the plea of visiting his mother, who was dangerously ill. The French Government winked at his return, and he was a frequent guest, and almost a *habitué*, of Wynyard Park, in the interval between his two captivities. Prince Louis Napoleon, at that time, was reserved and taciturn; no one anticipated his future fortunes. He had that strong internal conviction, however, regarding them, which so often works out its own accomplishment; and though his fortunes were at so low an ebb, he abated nothing of his imperial pretensions, and always asserted, generally with success, his right to the *Pas*, even when persons of the highest rank, from dukes downward, were in company. He continued a casual, but frequent, correspondence with the Marchioness for several years after, when his hopes were, to all appearance, irrecoverably wrecked by the miscarriage at Boulogne; and one of the most interesting of the many interesting collections of manuscripts in the Londonderry archives is a volume of his letters, the first of which is dated from the Chateau of Ham, and the last from the Palace of the Tuileries. In some of his later visits, after his return from Ham, he repeatedly conversed with Lord and Lady Londonderry on the breach of faith, dishonourable to Christendom, of which France had been guilty towards the gallant Mohammedan, and these ideas were so warmly embraced by the young Prince, that one of his

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first acts, in coming to supreme power, was to remove the stain by setting the Arab chief at liberty.

1847.

34. Lord Londonderry's conduct on occasion of the monetary crisis of 1847.

The terrible monetary crisis of 1847, arising from the drain upon the precious metals, occasioned by the unprecedented importation of grain in that year, resulting from the bad harvest and Irish famine of the preceding, with the insurrectionary movements to which it gave rise, brought forward Lord Londonderry's character, at once sagacious and intrepid, in a varied and favourable light. In October 1847, when the sudden contraction of the currency by the Bank of England, and, in consequence, every other bank, to avoid the effects of the drain, had nearly deprived the country of any currency, either metallic or paper, the pressure was felt with peculiar severity in the county of Durham, and on Lord Londonderry's own estates, where every fortnight wages to an immense amount required to be paid to the colliers and miners. Deeply impressed with the danger of an entire abstraction of the currency in the great hives of industry, Lord Londonderry, as Lord-lieutenant of the county, wrote in the strongest terms to Government, representing the alarming state of the country, where above a hundred thousand persons were threatened with immediate loss of subsistence, and pressing the immediate adoption of the only possible remedy in an instant suspension of the Bank Charter Act. It was with the utmost reluctance, however, that the Cabinet could be induced to adopt the necessary remedy, so strongly were the interests of realised capital intrenched in the Ministry and the Legislature; but at length these representations, coupled with the decisive warning of the bankers of London, that if the great remedial measure were any longer delayed, they would in a body *withdraw their balances from the Bank of England*, produced the desired effect; and by a letter signed by Lord John Russell and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the suspension of the Bank Charter Act was announced, and the issue of notes beyond what it allowed permitted. The effect was instantaneous and magical;

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the notes authorised to be issued never were sent out; the knowledge that this *could be done* at once arrested the catastrophe. Hoards of notes and coin previously locked up made their appearance, the fall of the funds was arrested, credit slowly revived, and the industry of the nation, like the wheels of a great manufactory which had been stopped by the cessation of the supplies of fuel to keep the moving force in motion, at once revived when the steam power was restored.

35. Lord Londonderry on April 10, 1848.

It is impossible, however, to check, even for a time, the industry of a great commercial and manufacturing state without inducing political dangers, and giving rise to disturbances which may threaten, and possibly endanger, the Government. The distress, especially in the mining and manufacturing districts, in consequence of the monetary crisis, and consequent fall of prices, wages, and loss of employment, was so severe, that it inspired the Chartists with the hope of being able to overturn the Government, and establish, after the model of that of France, a Republic in lieu of the time-honoured monarchy of Great Britain. This crisis was of the most serious kind; for, while the working-classes in the manufacturing districts were involved in real distress from the contraction of the currency, their imaginations were inflamed by imaginary hopes, in consequence of the success with which the efforts of the Revolution had been attended in France, Austria, Prussia, and Italy, in all of which the existing governments had been overthrown, and revolutionary authority established in its stead. The 10th of April 1848 was the day fixed for a general insurrection against the Government in London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, and all the great hives of manufacturing industry. The Duke of Wellington, who, fortunately for the country, held the office of Commander-in-Chief, was at his post at the Horse-Guards by four in the morning, and before many minutes had elapsed, his old adjutant-general of the Peninsular army was at his side. Lord Londonderry held no official military situation

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in connection with the military government in the metropolis, though he was the colonel of one of the regiments of Life Guards. But he required no call of duty to summon him, in the moment of danger, to the aid of his ancient and beloved commander. The trumpet of alarm was enough to bring him wherever peril was the greatest, and the most effective service could be rendered to his country. He was beside the Duke of Wellington through the whole of that memorable day; he was intrusted by him with an active part in the admirable arrangements made to meet the peril, which were attended with such entire success; and though his frame was now enfeebled by advancing years, the old adjutant-general did as good service as he had rendered on the field of Talavera or Busaco.

36. He officiates as one of the pall-bearers at the funeral of the Duke of Wellington. Nov. 14, 1852.

Before many years had elapsed, Lord Londonderry was summoned to the side of the Duke of Wellington on a more melancholy occasion. Full of years and of honour, the Duke died on the 14th September 1852, of an affection in the head, induced by the ceaseless mental efforts of above sixty years. His funeral, which was a public one, and conducted on a scale of unparalleled magnificence, took place in St Paul's on the 18th of November following. Above half a million of human beings were assembled on the line the procession took, which was from the Horse-Guards, up Constitution Hill, Hyde Park Corner, where it met the body, and thence by Piccadilly, St James's Street, Pall Mall, Trafalgar Square, the Strand, and Fleet Street, to its last resting-place under the dome of St Paul's. The corpse was borne aloft on a gigantic car, surmounted by sable plumes; the arms of the hero were on his breast; his charger, with empty saddle, and the stirrups crossed, followed immediately behind. The first and greatest of the land were there; all the ambassadors of Europe, except that of Austria, were present; even that of France, in a worthy spirit, followed the remains of his country's great antagonist to the grave. There was not a dry eye in the immense multitude assembled on the line when the gigantic

hearse, with its sable plumes, made its appearance. All the divisions of party, all the heartburnings of former years, were forgotten in one feeling of overwhelming and common emotion. The Duke of Cambridge, as representing the army of England, received the body, with the Lord Mayor, and all the civic dignitaries, at Temple Bar. Detachments from every regiment in the service, with his own regiment, the 33d, entire, attended the procession. When the body entered the Cathedral, and the anthem was struck up from the powerful organ and a splendid orchestra, twenty thousand voices swelled the strain. The pall was borne by the Marquess of Anglesea, the Marquess of Londonderry, Lord Gough, Lord Combermere, Lord Seaton, Sir Harry Smith, Sir Charles Napier, Sir Alexander Woodford, and Sir Peregrine Pickle. The foreign marshals and princes stood at the head of the coffin, Prince Albert and the English generals, his old companions-in-arms, at its foot. It was lowered into the vault in the centre of the Cathedral, close beside Nelson's tomb, where it still remains. Side by side the two Paladins of England lie in their last resting-place. Europe cannot show a more interesting spot—Britain a sepulchre of which her children will ever be more proud.

37. Lord Londonderry gets Wellington's Garter.

The death of Wellington led to an honour, the last and greatest he ever received, being bestowed on Lord Londonderry; and it was done with the grace and felicity for which Lord Derby, who was then in power, and recommended it to the Queen, is justly celebrated. The Garter of Wellington having become vacant by his death, it was conferred, on the very day on which the intelligence was received, on the Marquess of Londonderry.* In acknow-

* "*Balmoral, September* 17, 1852.

"DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—The sudden and unexpected death of the Duke of Wellington having placed a second Garter at the disposal of the Crown, I have thought it my duty not longer to delay advising the Queen respecting them. And it affords me very great pleasure that her Majesty has been pleased to authorise me to offer for your acceptance that which has just been vacated. I cannot more appropriately dispose of the distinction recently held by the Duke of Wellington than to one of the most distinguished of his

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ledging this flattering distinction he said, that having in the course of a long life received the highest decorations from all the countries in Europe, excepting of course France, he could assure her Majesty that he "valued the

old companions-in-arms; and it may perhaps give the distinction additional value in your eyes to think that, in accepting it, you succeed to one who has added such lustre to the order, and whose memory we must all alike so deeply revere. I remain here till Tuesday, after which my address will be Knowsley, Prescot. I ought to have added that to-day the other Garter is offered to the Duke of Northumberland.—Believe me, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours, DERBY.—*The* MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY, G.C.B."

To this letter Lord Londonderry replied in the following terms:—

"*Mount Stewart, September* 23, 1852.

"MY DEAR LORD DERBY,—If any circumstance could add to the unmixed gratification and inexpressible delight your letter of the 17th, just arrived, has occasioned me, it would arise from the peculiar taste with which you have harmonised the offer with the honour, and the far too undeserved expressions with which you have accompanied the announcement to me of the highest distinction the Crown could possibly confer on, I may say, one of the few remaining shadows of that *lustre* which in this world has vanished for ever, but which will live eternally in the records of fame, and in England's brightest page. In laying the expression of my most respectful duty and unbounded acknowledgments at her Majesty's feet, I hope I may be pardoned for humbly remarking that, by her Majesty's gracious act of favour, she has reunited again and recalled by the brother those proud names of Wellington and Londonderry to that epoch when, by their splendid and eminent services, they gave peace to Europe, and subjugated the despotic power and tyranny of France. I feel that I am indebted to her Majesty's kind consideration in the offer of this distinction of the Garter to my fortunate career in being the friend of two such men, and mixed up in all their confidence and transactions of that day, rather than any intrinsic merits of my own, beyond an ardent and energetic desire to serve her Majesty's Crown in whatever position I was placed. Though it has fallen to my lot in the course of a long life of service to receive the highest decorations of the sovereigns of all the countries in Europe, naturally excepting France, I am sure I need not entreat your Lordship to assure her Majesty I value the bestowing on me the Ribbon of Wellington as worth them all put together.—With unfeigned truth and regard, believe me, my dear Lord, sincerely yours, VANE LONDONDERRY."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

In comparison of these signal honours received from his Sovereign and the chief potenates of Europe, any demonstrations of respect and affection by inferior individuals or bodies corporate may seem insignificant. Yet they are not without their value as indicating the more private qualities, and bespeaking the regard with which Lord Londonderry was viewed by those who knew him but in private life, his personal friends and neighbours in the counties in which his estates lay. Early in life he received the following flattering testimonials from the Grand Juries of the county of Londonderry:—

"To Brigadier-General the HONOURABLE CHARLES STEWART,—

"We, the Foreman and Grand Jury of the county of Derry, assembled for the discharge of other public duties, embrace the opportunity of expressing our regard for you as our representative, and respect for you as a soldier.

"Your feelings would but ill accord with flattery, nor could our praises add

Ribbon worn by Wellington more than them all put together;" while he had the refined taste to ascribe the conferring it upon him to his good fortune in having been mixed up with the great deeds of his brother and the Duke of Wellington. He received, on the honour becoming known, the warmest congratulations from a numerous circle of the most eminent men of all parties, which proved that his personal merits, as well as the auspicious connection, had led to the bestowing of the well-deserved honour.*

to the pre-eminence of a character, exalted by your achievements to your present rank in public estimation. We therefore but solicit your acceptance of our sincere and hearty congratulations on your return, with unimpaired health, from the arduous and important services in which you bore so conspicuous a part in an army of unexampled bravery. Conscious that the warmest expressions of our sentiments fall short of the opinion of the constituents you have represented from your earliest manhood, we feel justified in offering this public testimony in approbation of your character and conduct, and remain, with unalterable attachment and sincere esteem, your obedient servants, MARCUS GAGE (for self and fellows).—*Londonderry Grand Jury Room, March* 23, 1809."

"*Londonderry, September* 28, 1812.

"We, the undersigned, gentlemen of the city and county of Londonderry, having learned with peculiar satisfaction the intention of the Honourable Major-General Charles William Stewart to visit this neighbourhood early in the ensuing month, and feeling anxious to express our admiration of his gallant and distinguished conduct in the Peninsula, during a conflict in which his personal exertions have been so eminently conspicuous, do hereby resolve that the honour of his company be requested at a public dinner on his arrival here." (112 *Signatures.*)—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

* "*Banbury, October* 7, 1852.

"DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—I have been long intending to offer to you Lady North's and my own most hearty congratulations upon your appointment as Knight of the Garter. I have waited to see the official announcement; but as I understand some time may elapse before that takes place, I have determined no longer to delay, but to express to you how truly rejoiced we are at this additional mark of her Majesty's approval of your long and distinguished services; and we most truly hope you may live to enjoy this high honour for many years to come. With best congratulations to Lady Londonderry, I remain, my dear Lord, yours truly, J. SIDNEY NORTH."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

"*St Leonards, October* 2, 1852.

"MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—I have received yours of the 24th, and beg to offer you my best congratulations on your getting the Garter, and that Garter the one so long worn by the great man we have followed to victory, now so suddenly snatched from us, to my great grief, as well as that of all who wished well to their country.—I am, yours faithfully, FITZROY SOMERSET."—*MS. Londonderry Papers.*

"*Beaudesert, October* 4, 1852.

"MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—I congratulate you and sincerely rejoice in your having received the Garter so flatteringly bestowed on you; and the value

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38. Last public act of Lord Londonderry.

The last public act of Lord Londonderry's life was strictly in harmony with his previous character and the romantic friendship which had throughout subsisted between him and his deceased brother. In a part of Moore's *Private Diary* (the poet) edited by Lord John Russell, a passage occurred which purported to be an account of a conversation which had occurred at his (Mr Moore's) table, to the effect that Sir R. Wilson had contributed to the gaining of the battle of Leipsic, but that Lord Castlereagh, in sending over the public thanks of Government to the British officers engaged in it, had sent a private letter to Sir Charles Stewart, enjoining him to avoid thanks as much as he could to Sir R. Wilson, in order not to give a triumph to his party; but that Sir Charles Stewart, by mistake, showed this private letter instead of the public one to Sir Robert Wilson, who had the forbearance never to turn it against the Government. No sooner did Lord Londonderry see this statement, which he well knew to be wholly unfounded, than he wrote to Lord John Russell, complaining of such an injurious statement having come out in a publication bearing the sanction of his Lordship's name, and requesting a public acknowledgment of the error. He accompanied this with a letter from his private secretary, Mr Bidwell, giving the most positive denial of it, and accompanied by the decisive observation, that, as Sir Robert Wilson was at that period attached to the *Austrian* staff under Lord Aberdeen, any thanks

of it is much enhanced by its being that worn by our late illustrious chief—that extraordinary man, so singularly gifted by nature, in whom were concentrated all the highest qualities of the mind, without, so far as I have been able to discover, a single drawback. Peace to his manes. We shall probably meet to assist in doing him the last honours.—Believe me, yours truly, ANGLESEA."

"*Dublin, September* 21, 1852.

"DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—I most heartily and sincerely wish you joy of the honourable distinction you have received; and it is most appropriate that the Duke's Garter should be handed over to the bravest of his companions in arms. I told Lady Londonderry that I thought you were sure to be offered the one then vacant, but it is most fortunate that the delay took place.—Very sincerely yours, EGLINTON AND WINTON."

from the Government would, as a matter of course, have been sent to his Lordship for conveyance to Sir Robert, and *not* to Sir Charles Stewart. Strictly speaking, Lord John Russell was not responsible for this statement, as the passage complained of was one in Moore's *Private Diary*, not of Lord John Russell's composition, and was given as such, and it could hardly be said that a gossiping conversation, related by a poet as having taken place at a party breakfast, would pass into one of the monuments of history. But Lord John had too candid a mind and had too much the feelings of a gentleman to shelter himself under any such subterfuge. On the thing being represented to him accordingly, in terms perhaps somewhat warm, by Lord Londonderry, he at once, in the handsomest manner, acknowledged the error, and promised to expunge the passage in question in the next edition, which was accordingly done; and on its being represented that this would not remedy the mischief, as the first edition of Moore's *Diary*, consisting of many thousand copies, would get into many hands who would never look at any subsequent edition, he agreed in an equally handsome manner to the publication of the correspondence on the subject, which will be found in the notes below.*

* "*Holdernesse House, May* 18, 1853.

"My Lord,—I regret to intrude myself on your Lordship's valuable time. It is not to congratulate you on your taste for the publication of the very trashy anecdotes and details of dinners, slip-slop conversations, and parties of Mr Thomas Moore; but it is to point out to your Lordship the dupe you have been to give any apparent authenticity—without a little previous inquiry, so easily to be obtained—to the following gross falsehood in vol. iv. p. 290, where it is written: 'Talked of Sir Robert Wilson after the battle of Leipsic, to the gaining of which he was instrumental. Lord Castlereagh, in sending over to Lord Stewart the public document containing the orders for thanks to Wilson, among others, on the occasion, accompanied it with a private one, desiring Lord Stewart to avoid thanks to Wilson as much as he could, in order not to give a triumph to his party. Lord Stewart, by mistake, showed this letter instead of the public one to Wilson, who had the forbearance never to turn it against the Government since.' I am not surprised, when I remember the scandalous personal writings of Mr Thomas Moore against my brother and myself, that, to please his spiteful political bias, he might invent and leave any falsehoods behind him; but I own I am astonished that Lord Castlereagh's fair name and fame for honour and truth throughout his great eventful

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39. His last days, and commencement of the Sunderland railway.

As the Garter was the highest honour Lord Londonderry had ever received, and the more remarkable that it was the second one bestowed for public services on the same family, so it was the last. His health, which for some time back had been sensibly declining, became infirm in the course of the succeeding year, although he still continued to take an active part both in public affairs in the House of Lords, and in the concerns of his own county, where he was engaged in fresh undertakings,

career should not have arrested you in proclaiming, from the idle scribbling of the dead, an intimation of fraudulent conduct on his part, and seducing myself, as a brother under his orders and control, to be fraudulent also.

"My duty to my great and beloved relative has called on me the moment I read this miserable twaddle, replete with invention from beginning, not alone to give my most public and peremptory denial to the whole mare's nest—bequeathed as some agreeable command, as I suppose, to your Lordship—but also to call on other evidence more satisfactory no doubt than the party accused; and, therefore, I sent instantly to my private secretary during the whole of the campaign in Germany in '13, '14, and '15, a gentleman long in the F. O., and whose character for high truth and unimpeachable integrity cannot surely, even in your Lordship's situation as Foreign Secretary, be unknown to your Lordship—I mean Mr John Bidwell, whose letter to me I here annex. Need I go further? Yes. Permit me then next to refer you, from the commencement to the end of this ridiculous and infamous tale, to my dear and excellent friend of forty years, and former diplomatic colleague, the Earl of Aberdeen, who, I have no doubt, will elucidate your Lordship *now* on Lord Castlereagh's character, if not on mine, to prevent in future any further malicious histories without shadow of foundation that may grow out of such budgets as Mr Thomas Moore left for your Lordship's editorial compilation and ability.—I have the honour to be your Lordship's obedient servant, VANE LONDONDERRY."

"P. P., *May* 16, 1853.

"MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,—I hasten to write a few lines in reply to your letter I got this morning.

"This is the first time I ever heard that Sir Robert Wilson was instrumental to the gaining of the battle of Leipsic. He did his duty there as well as the rest of us. But you will recollect he was attached to the Austrian army, under the superintendence of the Earl of Aberdeen, who was the British ambassador to the Emperor of Austria. Therefore, if any order of thanks was sent by Lord Castlereagh, it would have been addressed to Lord Aberdeen, his (Wilson's) chief.

"I never saw or heard of such order of thanks, or of the reservation. I saw and read *all* your letters and despatches from and to the F. O., for you know you kept nothing from me. But you have all the letters and papers received from the F. O., and copies of the letters you wrote to Lord Castlereagh, for they were all copied by *me*, or Frank, or James, before they were sent off, as I well remember I had to work at them late and early to get the messengers off.

"I remember that in the evening of the battle there was a report that

attended with the most important public benefit. Among these, not the least was the railway from Seaham Harbour to Sunderland, which was projected and almost carried into execution by his exertions, and has not only

Wilson had given you some packet or letter he had received from an *Austrian* general to give to Lord Aberdeen. I daresay you will recollect this.

"I write this, as I have been very unwell, and confined to the house for the month, in order to explain why I cannot call upon you.

"I am ever, my dear Lord, your very faithful and obliged JOHN BIDWELL."

"Poor Jolly is dead."

"*Chesham Place, May* 21, 1853.

"MY LORD,—I am deeply concerned that the passage to which your Lordship alludes should have been published by me. My first impulse on reading it was to strike it out, both as extremely improbable in itself and as injurious to the memory of the late Lord Londonderry. In the hurry with which the publication was conducted, for a peculiar purpose, the passage was afterwards overlooked.

"I shall, however, expunge it from a new edition which is now preparing. The anecdote itself I had entirely forgotten, nor do I know who mentioned it, in the year 1825, at Mr Rogers's breakfast table.

"It is certainly inconsistent with the bold and open character of the late Lord Londonderry.

"Your Lordship's denial that there was any foundation for it is enough to prove its falsehood; nor do I require for that purpose the additional testimony of Mr Bidwell.

"The story must be placed among those calumnies which float in the idle gossip of the day; and I must repeat to your Lordship my regret that I should have been instrumental in reviving it.—I have the honour to be, my Lord, your Lordship's most obedient servant, J. RUSSELL."

"*May* 22, 1853.

"MY LORD,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of yesterday's date, and to assure you most unfeignedly, that were my own humble character alone concerned, your honourable explanation should here close a correspondence which I opened with regret and reluctance, and which has ended in a way, I trust, not less worthy of your Lordship, than gratifying to me. But, my Lord, your Lordship, on reflection, must see that the name and fame of a great statesman and relative of mine has been traduced, and your Lordship's proposed redress of expunging the passages from a future edition would go but a short way towards repairing the injury already so extensively done; and, therefore, in justice to all parties, I think the public should be apprised of the result and truth of this affair; and I really am more decided in this course of proceeding from feeling that your Lordship's answer is, if I may presume to say so, as creditable to your candour as satisfactory to myself.—I have the honour to be your Lordship's obedient servant, VANE LONDONDERRY."

"I feel it proper to state here my intention of sending a copy of this letter and of your Lordship's to-morrow to the *Times*, &c."

"*Whitehall, May* 23, 1853.

"MY LORD,—In answer to your letter of the 22d, I have only to say that I cannot object to the publicity you propose to give to my letter of the 21st inst.—I have the honour to be your Lordship's most obedient servant, JOHN RUSSELL.—*The* MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY, K.G."

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added much to the prosperity and trade of that town, but proved a very considerable source of wealth to his family. He had the satisfaction before he died of seeing all the great works for the improvement of his estates and the benefit of the country, which he commenced at an earlier period, and carried on under accumulating difficulties with such energy and perseverance, not only in course of being completed, but attended with the most signal and, by all but himself, unhoped-for success. The progress and prosperity of Seaham Harbour had been such, that it outstripped almost anything known in this country, and resembled rather the fabled prodigies of an Eastern sultan, or the real growth of civilised industry on the Ohio or the Mississippi, than the measured progress of European society. His habits were active, and his intellect acute and vigorous to the very last; and no small interest was excited in the Parks of London, or his own forest glades at Wynyard, by his daily appearance on his favourite pony, which, though his eyesight was much impaired, he yet managed with his accustomed and perfect horsemanship.

40. His last illness and death. March 6, 1854.

Though he was evidently weakened in the course of 1853, and took his exercise chiefly on horseback, there were no alarming symptoms of decline, and his relations, by whom he was tenderly beloved, flattered themselves that he might yet be spared for several years to be the delight of his family circle, and the ornament and support of the country. But the end was approaching; and it came more rapidly and suddenly than could have been anticipated. He had been in his usual health during the early part of the spring of 1854, and took his daily rides in the Park as usual. But in the end of February he was seized with an attack of bronchitis, then very common in London, which from the first was attended by alarming symptoms. Everything which the first medical skill could do to arrest the malady was tried, but tried in vain. The complaint made rapid progress;

and as the end was evidently approaching, expresses were sent off in every direction to summon his family and most intimate friends to the scene of death. They had nearly all arrived before the struggle was over. He bore the last sufferings with the fortitude of a soldier supported by the hopes of a Christian, and breathed his last in Holdernesse House on the 6th March 1854, surrounded by the Marchioness and all the agonised members of his domestic circle. He was interred in the family vault at Wynyard Park, amidst the tears of the whole neighbouring gentry and tenantry; and a public monument has since been erected in the county to his memory.

41. His family since his death.

Fortunate in all the public events of live, Lord Londonderry was not less blessed in his domestic relations. He had won by his good sword an earldom, a viscountcy, and barony for himself; he was decorated with Wellington's Garter, and bore on his bosom the insignia of the highest military orders in Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Portugal. He had married a lady of ancient family, striking beauty, and vast possessions, of which she made a noble use in supporting her husband in all his bold but yet prudent undertakings, on which the fortunes of his family and the prosperity of the county were so dependent, and all of which her energy and her support brought to an eminently successful issue. His eldest son, by his first marriage, succeeded to the marquisate and the family estates in Ireland, and has since married the widow of Lord Powerscourt, a lady possessed of large fortune, and the most amiable manners. His second son, the eldest by his second marriage, who succeeded on his father's death to the title of Earl Vane, married, on 3d August 1846, Mary Cornelia, only daughter and heiress of Sir John Edwards, Bart., of Sansaw Hall, one of the most ancient and highly-connected of the many ancient families in Wales, and a lady of the highest attractions and the most

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charming manners. His second son, Lord Adolphus Charles William, M.P. for Durham, and Lieut.-Colonel in the Scots Fusilier Guards, after sharing in the dangers and glories of the Crimean war, married, on 23d April 1860, the Lady Susan Charlotte Catherine, only daughter of the Duke of Newcastle. His third son, Ernest Vane, was also in the Life Guards. His eldest daughter, Frances Anne Emily, married, 12th July 1843, the Marquess of Blandford, eldest son of the Duke of Marlborough, to which title he has since succeeded; his second daughter, Alexandrina Octavia Maria, married, on 2d September 1847, the Earl of Portarlington in Ireland; and his third daughter, Adelaide Emelina Caroline, married, on 11th February 1852, the Rev. T. H. Law, B.A., of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. Lady Vane has been blessed with a numerous family, and there is to all human appearance little danger of a title won in so much honour becoming extinct.* The mingled energy and judgment of Lord Londonderry's conduct in life was strikingly evinced by the circumstances in which, at his decease, he left his family. He began his career with nothing but a younger son's portion and the slender pay of

* Though the highest honours of the Londonderry family were bestowed as a mark of public gratitude for the great services, civil and military, of the two brothers who form the subject of these memoirs, yet they were an old and eminent family before those services commenced. The family had acquired large estates at different periods in the counties of Londonderry, Down, and Donegal, insomuch that the head of it, Alexander Stewart, Esq., of Ballylean Castle, in the county of Donegal, was elected in 1730 to represent the city of Londonderry. He had two sons, the eldest of whom, Robert, was elevated to the peerage on 13th November 1789, by the title of Baron Londonderry, and created Viscount Castlereagh on 6th October 1795, and Earl of Londonderry on 9th August 1796. He established his residence at Mount Stewart in the county of Down (which estate had been purchased from the Colville family). The second son, Alexander Stewart, uncle of the subject of this memoir, succeeded to the estates in the county of Londonderry, and subsequently purchased large estates in the counties of Down and Donegal, and established his residence at Ásdo, in the latter county. He and his eldest son represented the county of Londonderry for many years in the Irish Parliament. He succeeded to that honour on the elevation of Sir Charles Stewart to the peerage in 1814, and the family was advanced a step further in the peerage by the elevation of the head of the family, father to Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart, to the dignity of marquess, in consideration of Lord Castlereagh's great diplomatic services, on 22d January 1816.

his military commissions, and throughout life he was in the highest degree liberal and even munificent in money matters; at his death, independent of the vast revenues of Lady Londonderry's estates, it was with difficulty the personalty could be sworn under £300,000. His example proves that merit even in this world often meets with its deserved reward, and that though generally true, there are exceptions to the Roman maxim, "*Semper bonæ mentis soror est paupertas.*"

42. Particulars in which the two Lords Londonderry were similar in character.

Descended from the same line of ancestors, born of the same father, and inheriting the same religious and political principles, the second and third Lords Londonderry were yet essentially different from each other. Both had the firm character, the moral and physical courage, the iron will, which in civil and military life are essential to great achievements, and both directed their dispositions in their several professions to the support of the ancient constitution, the upholding of the old ideas, in Church and State. Both united with these qualities the kindliness of disposition and warmth of heart, which rendered them the idols of their families, the objects of affection and esteem to a large circle of relations and friends. Both had that high-bred and chivalrous courtesy of manner, which softens so much the asperities of national and political conflict, and which is never acquired in such perfection as by those who, like Marlborough or Sir Charles Stewart, unite military command with important diplomatic appointments. Both were for a considerable part of their lives misapprehended by their contemporaries, and rendered the objects of impassioned party and political invective, which has been extinguished by the more impartial judgment of subsequent times. So far their characters and destiny in life were similar, it might almost be said identical; but in other respects they differed widely from each other.

Lord Castlereagh's courage was more of the passive kind: his character appeared chiefly in his power of re-

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sistance. This arose, in a great degree, from his political situation, and the public duties to which, as a Cabinet Minister, he was called. With the exception of the affair of the Irish Union, in which he was the right hand of Government, and engaged in the active prosecution of a great, and, as it has turned out, most salutary political change, he was all his life stationed on the defensive. He was the warder on the tower, to descry the enemy when yet afar off, and arrange and head the garrison which was intrusted with the defence. Whether in resisting the encroachments of France at the Congress of Chatillon; or throwing the weight of England, with decisive effect, into the scale, to push up the Allied forces before the battle of Laon; or in withstanding the flood of democracy which, fed by public suffering, so violently surged up after the peace of 1815, he was always charged with the duty of resistance. His life was one continued battle with the democratic principle, whether appearing in its early stages of public discontent and seditious meetings, or in its last form of a terrific and conquering military despotism, threatening destruction to every independent Power, and prepared to stifle separate discontent in the stillness of universal dominion.

43. Points on which they differed.

44. Sir Charles Stewart's peculiar mental qualities.

Sir Charles Stewart's mind was in some respects of a different cast, and his destiny in life was peculiarly fitted to call forth its most brilliant qualities. A soldier by profession, and incessantly engaged, from early youth till the termination of the war, in military duties and dangers, he was called upon not to resist, but to attack; not to defend his own position, but to press forward and assault that of the enemy. His mental disposition and chivalrous turn of mind qualified him in a peculiar manner for the discharge of these duties. Brave, active, and enterprising, he was equally fitted to lead a headlong charge of horse, and to combine the military movements which were essential to the success of a great campaign. We know not whether to admire him most when, on the banks of the Esla, at the

head of his own regiment of hussars, he routed the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, and made their commander Lefebvre Desnouettes prisoner; when, in single combat, he disarmed the French colonel of cuirassiers on the field of Fuentes d'Onoro; when he bled alongside of the Russian Guards, on the plain of Culm; or when he overcame the scruples and conquered the irresolution of Bernadotte, and brought up the Army of the North with decisive effect on the field of Leipsic. We recognise the same energetic character and determined will, when, after the peace of Paris, he turned his sword into a ploughshare. It was the same man who had headed the onslaught on the French squadrons, who twice over reared the princely halls of Wynyard, bridled the Northern Ocean amidst the rocks of Seaham, and, midway between the mountain and the main, aloft in air, reared up the enchanted castle of Garron.

45. Causes of the hostility against both.

To these opposite, and yet in some degree identical, destinies, is to be ascribed the hostility which both experienced in the course of life. Both were successful, and eminently so, in their respective walks, and both, in consequence, experienced the jealousy and hostility which, in public and private life, is the invariable attendant on merit and good fortune, if rested on courage and independence.

> "Envy doth merit as its shade pursue,
> And, like the shade, confess the substance true."

The hostility against Lord Castlereagh was more of a public, that against Sir Charles of a private, nature. The cause of this difference is to be found in their different positions in life. The former was the last minister of England who governed the country on the old principle—that of the Government taking the lead, and ruling the State according to what it itself deems most expedient for the public weal. His lot was cast in an age of transition, when the change was going on from real rule by the Government to virtual direction by the country. The transfer took place in a few years, and they were those of

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his active administration. In 1814, when he attended the Congress of Chatillon, the former system was in full vigour, and in 1825 it had already given way in nearly every department. Thence the fierce hostility with which he was regarded by the democratic party all over the country; thence the inhuman yells of exultation which were raised at his untimely end. An unerring instinct taught the revolutionists that he was their most formidable opponent, and that, till he was taken out of the way, all attempts to vest the direction of affairs in the urban masses would prove ineffectual. They were right in their estimate of his importance. The palmy days of popular rule never were fully established till he was laid in his last resting-place in Westminster Abbey.

46. Causes of the hostility against Sir Charles Stewart.

Sir Charles Stewart was not, and could not, from his profession, be called on to take the same lead as his brother in the coercion of domestic disaffection, and therefore he was not so much the object of the envenomed shafts of the Radical or Chartist press. But his nice sense of chivalrous honour, and a certain warmth of temperament which is closely allied to the qualities which lead to military distinction, rendered him the object of a hostility of a different kind. He felt strongly and generously, and what he felt warmly he expressed fearlessly, and sometimes imprudently. He had not always the same coolness in debate, which never deserted him on the field of battle; and thence his life was checkered with many incidents which would have been probably avoided by a man of a less bold and energetic disposition. Of injustice or ingratitude, whether to himself or others, he had the keenest sense; and he seldom failed on such occasions to express himself with a warmth which sometimes, perhaps, bordered on indiscretion. To his companions-in-arms, when in adversity and treated with ingratitude by the Government, his influence was ever extended, his hand ever open; the generous interference which procured from Prince Louis Napoleon the libera-

tion of Abd-el-Kader, and wiped away the stain of breach of faith from the French Government, was one out of numberless cases when his exertions were directed to right the oppressed and procure redress of injury for the unfortunate.

47. Sir Charles Stewart's military character.

Sir Charles Stewart's talents as a general were of a very high order. To the daring intrepidity which rendered him a fit leader of a headlong charge, and enabled him to conquer the French cuirassiers in single combat, he united the still rarer qualities of coolness in direction and vigour in execution on the field of battle. No man saw more clearly where the decisive point in a combat lay, or applied his mind with more vigour to strike at it with his utmost strength; of this, his powerful agency with Bernadotte at Leipsic, already mentioned, his steady participation in the Russian resistance to superior forces at the vital point of Culm, his vigorous attack on the squares at Fère-Champenoise, under Lord Cathcart's orders, and sudden and successful charge on the Esla, afford memorable examples. The glorious termination of the war, not a little through his own and his brother's active agency, alone prevented him from rising to the highest commands, and perhaps leaving a name as distinguished in Oriental as it had already become in European fame.

48. Effects of Sir Charles Stewart's marriage and succession to his brother.

The gradual change in the direction of Sir Charles Stewart's talents after he became Marquess of Londonderry, was not a little owing to the brilliant and fortunate marriage which he had made. His alliance with the beautiful and accomplished daughter and heiress of Sir Harry Vane Tempest, a family of historic fame, and his succession to the title and estates of the Londonderry family in Ireland, opened to him a new career both of honour and usefulness, on which he speedily entered with all the characteristic ardour and energy of his disposition. He in consequence became involved both in Ireland and England in vast and gigantic undertakings, almost transcending the limits of individual enterprise, and requiring

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an incessant expenditure of capital, time, and patience. In the hands of a man of less vigour, determination, and mental resources, they would probably have failed; but, aided as he was in carrying them on by the kindred spirit, patriotic ardour, and vast resources of the Marchioness, they have all turned out at last eminently prosperous, proved of the highest benefit to his estates and the adjacent country, and left to his family a princely fortune, and noble mansions alike in town and country; as if to demonstrate by a living example that the days when a knight by his good sword carved his way to a kingdom, and won a princess, have not passed away with the manners of chivalry.

49. Diplomatic career of both brothers.

Both brothers were political characters, and long held important ministerial or diplomatic appointments. In the discharge of the duties which they involved, they were more identical in their characters than in their separate civil and military careers. Lord Castlereagh's foreign policy and diplomatic administration are traced in the records of his country, and inseparably connected with the most glorious periods in its annals. Such was the ascendancy which his talents had procured, and the weight of his native land had won for him, that at the Congress of Chatillon Great Britain was represented by *three* ministers instead of one, who appeared for each of the other Powers, although in a vote the three counted only as one; and it is not a little remarkable that of these two were brothers. Sir Charles Stewart's duties with Bernadotte in the campaign of 1813, and with the Allied sovereigns in that of 1814, were not less diplomatic than military. In his subsequent position as ambassador at Vienna, during seven years that he held that honourable office, and subsequently at Troppau and Verona, he had less important functions to perform; but he honourably upheld the honour of the country which he represented by his firmness, and extended its diplomatic influence by the high-bred courtesy of his manners.

50. Sepulchral chamber at Wynyard.

It has been mentioned that a public monument, raised by private subscription, has been determined on in the county of Durham, to the memory of Lord Londonderry, and is now in course of erection. But a far more striking and touching memorial of his services has been formed by the pious affection of the Marchioness to her deceased husband, which now constitutes the most striking of the many striking objects at Wynyard Park. At the end of its magnificent suite of public rooms, and immediately adjoining the conservatory, a mausoleum has been erected, containing all the insignia and trophies of his long and brilliant career.* There is the English Order of the Garter, which emperors and kings are proud to wear; the insignia of the Grand Cross of the Bath, and Grand Cross of Hanover, of the highest class of St George of Russia, of the Black and Red Eagles of Prussia, of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, the Sword of Sweden, the Russian medal on the capture of Paris. There is the uniform of the 18th regiment, at the head of which he so often combated, and of the 2d Life Guards, to which he was latterly promoted. The sword and cuirass of Colonel de la Motte, whom he vanquished and disarmed in single combat at the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, form not the least interesting object in the collection. But by far the most striking part if it is the simple enumeration, which is put in letters of gold, of the battles† in

* It is of considerable size, with an arched roof beautifully inlaid with marble of various colours, in the most refined Italian style.

† They are as follows:—

1. Donauwerth,	1796	14. Ciudad Rodrigo,	1812
2. Schlagenbourg,	1796	15. Lutzen,	1813
3. The Esla,	1808	16. Bautzen,	1813
4. Corunna,	1808	17. Haynau,	1813
5. The Douro,	1809	18. Dresden,	1813
6. Salamonde,	1809	19. Culm,	1813
7. Talavera,	1809	20. Mockern,	1813
8. St Olalla,	1809	21. Leipsic,	1813
9. Busaco,	1810	22. La Rothière,	1814
10. Fuentes d'Onoro,	1810	23. Arcis-sur-Aube,	1814
11. Albuera,	1811	24. Fère-Champenoise,	1814
12. Badajos,	1811	25. Paris,	1814
13. El Bodon,	1811		

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which he bore a part during the course of his long and eventful military career; they are so numerous, that it hardly seems possible that any one man could have been engaged in or survived them all. Wellington himself was hardly engaged in a greater number of equal magnitude.

51. Manner in which Lady Londonderry has carried out his designs.

This sepulchral monument attested the vast and important military services of Lord Londonderry during the war; and there are few, if any, in Europe which have more honourable testimonials to exhibit. But a still more impressive testimonial to his memory has been raised by the widowed Marchioness, in the complete development which she has given to the magnificent designs for the improvement of his estates, and the prosperity and happiness of all around him, which he had formed, and in great part put in course of execution, during his life. Left by her husband, whose confidence she has decisively proved was entirely deserved, sole executrix, with great wealth at her command, but still greater undertakings to complete, she has employed the one, and carried out the other, in a noble spirit. She has considered herself in every sense the executrix of his will, and charged with the sacred duty of vindicating his memory by carrying into complete realisation all that he intended to have done, both for the elevation of his family and the improvement of those whom Providence had committed to his charge. She has not been disappointed. Like Dido, she has raised a noble harbour on a solitary coast, and endowed it with all the institutions calculated to improve the physical well-being or elevate the moral character of its inhabitants. Several churches have been built and endowed by her munificence; a public hospital, an athenæum, and many public seminaries, have been raised by her exertions; and two thousand children in the town and surrounding districts are educated at schools maintained at her expense. When she meets, as she annually does, her tenantry and workmen at the festive board, four thousand persons partake of her hospitality. But she has not only done this

for the people, but, what is still more important, she has given them the means, by the splendid works she has completed, of making themselves prosperous by their own exertions. She has seen a numerous, happy, and grateful community supplant the waves and the sea-fowl on the most desolate part of her estates. So strongly has this patriotic conduct impressed the neighbouring people, that when a large part of the estates of her maternal family in Antrim was lately exposed to sale, the tenantry on it unanimously petitioned the Marchioness to become the purchaser, offering her every assistance in their power to assist her if required in that object. This is the answer which Lord Londonderry from the tomb has made by the hands of his representative to the numerous partisans of faction, by whom his motives had so long been misrepresented, and his services decried. Theirs it has been

> "The applause of *grateful ages* to command,
> The threats of pain and ruin to withstand,
> To scatter plenty o'er a smiling land,
> And read their history in a nation's eyes."

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Though not immediately relating to the subject of the preceding Memoir, I deem it right to give the following most important military return, relating to the progressive losses of the French army in the Moscow campaign, as it decidedly disproves the oft-repeated tale of their having been defeated, not by the Russians, but by the severity of the weather. The original is in the *Londonderry Papers*, indorsed thus:—

"State of the French Army which invaded Russia in 1812, with their losses while there and on their retreat, from the original found at Moscow in the Chancellery of Berthier, Prince of Neufchâtel, and Major-General of the whole army."

Translation from the French, of French Returns found in (Monsieur Rouaies) the French Chancellerie at Moscow.

State of the French Army at the commencement of the Campaign against Russia.

Corps.	Commanded by	No. of Men.
1.	Marshal Davoust,	80,000
2.	,, Oudinot,	45,000
3.	,, Ney,	45,000
4.	,, Viceroy of Italy— Italian Guards, 15,000 Italians, 15,000 French,	55,000
5.	Jerome Buonaparte, who was *recalled*, and Junot took the command; consisted of Westphalians and Germans,	30,000
6.	Prince Poniatowski— Polish troops,	60,000
7.	General Regnier— Saxon troops,	30,000
8.	Supposed Marshal Macdonald— 15,000 French, 35,000 Prussians, 10,000 Confederation of the Rhine,	60,000
	Carry forward,	405,000

Corps.	Commanded by		No. of Men.
		Brought forward, . .	405,000
9.	Marshal Victor—		
	French,	. . . . .	45,000
	Confederates,		
10.	Marshal Moncey, Bessières, and Mortier—		
	The Old Guards, . .	20,000	
	The New Do., . .	15,000	. . 40,000
	The Old Horse Guards, .	5,000	
11.	Marshal Augereau—		
	Reserves in Prussia—		
	1. French, . .	15,000	
	2. Confederation of the Rhine,	10,000	. . 41,000
	3. Neapolitans, .	12,000	
	4. A Swiss regiment,	4,000	
12.	Prince Schwartzenberg—		
	Austrians,	. . . . .	30,000
	Total Infantry, ...		561,000
	Cavalry under King of Naples, ...		35,000
	A park of 150 guns—400 caissons, . . .		3,000
	A park of reserve, 160 guns—800 caissons, . . .		4,000
	A battalion of pontoneers, ...		900
	Two battalions of pioneers, ...		1,800
	A detachment of miners, ...		300
	Eighteen companies of soldiers, ...		1,800
	A battalion of carpenters, ...		900
	Three battalions conductors of carriages, . . .		2,500
	A detachment of masons to build ovens, . . .		300
	Four battalions of bakers, ...		3,000
	Employed in the victualling, ...		2,000
	The suite of the Emperor, the Marshals, Generals, King of Naples, Viceroy of Italy, physicians, apothecaries, domestics, &c. &c.,		55,000
	Grand Total of the French army, . . .		671,500

Each corps had a light park of reserve of 166 guns, and 528 caissons.
Each division had 16 guns, each regiment 8.
Total regimental guns, 798.
Caissons, 1568.
The Imperial Guard had 100 guns.

The army was composed of 11 corps, commanded by the Marshals Berthier, Davoust, Ney, Augereau, Victor, Bessières, Oudinot, Macdonald, Mortier, Moncey, Lefebvre.

There were 49 divisions, and 98 regiments of the line, exclusive of the Imperial Guards.

These original states were found in the Chancellerie of the Major-General of the army, the Prince of Neufchâtel.

At the affair of Witepsk, where the Viceroy of Italy commanded, the loss was 1 general of division, 2 generals of brigade, 3 colonels, 7 superior officers, 93 subalterns, 3600 soldiers.

At the affair of Mohiloff there was only engaged the 1st corps of the army, commanded by Marshal Davoust.

Total of the affair of Mohiloff:—

Majors,	2
Chiefs of squadrons,	2
Chiefs of battalions,	7
Officers,	141
Soldiers,	3982
Total,	4134

At the affair of Smolensk, 19th August, Marshal Ney's corps (the 3d) lost:—

Generals dead and wounded,	10
Superior staff officers,	3
Colonels,	11
Lieutenant-colonels,	23
Majors,	2
Subalterns,	402
Soldiers,	13,590
Total,	14,041

At the affair of the 21st August, beyond Smolensk, towards evening, where the corps of Marshals Davoust and Ney only were engaged, the loss was:—

Generals of division,	1
Generals of brigade,	4
Officers of the staff,	8
Subaltern officers,	316
Soldiers,	8422
Total,	8751

Total of the two affairs of Smolensk of the 19th and 21st:—

Generals of division,	1
Generals of brigade,	14
Officers of the staff,	11
Colonels,	28
Lieutenant-colonels,	23
Subaltern officers,	718
Soldiers,	22,012
Total,	22,807

There is some difference here in the colonels and lieutenant-colonels, which are greater than in the particular states. The 15th August the 111th light infantry was routed by the Russians, who took 4 guns, 4 caissons, and killed and wounded 3 superior officers, 21 subalterns, and 1300 men; in all, 1324.

The loss from 21st August to 5th September is as follows:—

Generals of brigade,	1
Colonels,	2
Officers of the staff,	6
Officers of all the regiments,	45
Soldiers,	4341
Total,	4395

The following were the corps composing the French army at the battle before Mojaisk :—

The 1st Corps,	commanded by	Marshal Davoust.
,, 3d ,,	,,	Marshal Ney.
,, 4th ,, Italians,	,,	The Viceroy Beauharnais.
,, 5th ,,	,,	Marshal Junot.
,, 6th Polonesse corps,	,,	Prince Poniatowski.
The Imperial foot Guards,	,,	Duke of Castiglione and Duke of Treviso, in reserve.
The Portuguese Legion, The Spanish regt. of Joseph, Two regiments of Croats,	,,	Gen. Canveal, in reserve.
One division of chasseurs and lancers of the Guard,	,,	General Guillaume.
The dragoons of the Guard,	,,	General St Sulpice.
The light horse and gendarmes of the Guard,	,,	Marshal Bessières.
Five divisions light horse, hussars, and chasseurs,	,,	Comte Monbrun.
Three divisions dragoons,	,,	General Caulaincourt.
Four divisions cuirassiers,	,,	General Nansouty.
A brigade carbineers,	,,	General La France.
Four divisions lancers, Polish, Saxon, Westphalian, and French,	,,	General Tour-mobay.
A grand park light artillery of the Guard, 150 guns, A park of reserve, 140 guns. A battalion of marines, Imperial Guard.	,,	General Count Eblé.
,, 7th corps, Saxons,	,,	General Regnier.

Total of troops who were engaged in the battle of Mojaisk :—

Infantry,	143,000
Cavalry,	33,000
Cannoneers on horseback,	2,000
Cannoneers on foot,	2,500
Total,	180,500

N.B.—All the cavalry was commanded by the King of Naples.

Loss of the several corps of the French army in the battle of Mojaisk, 5th and 7th September 1812 :—

1st Corps,—officers and men,	10,454
3d ,, Do.	10,828
5th ,, Do.	5,727
6th ,, Do.	6,153
7th ,, Do.	5,095
Portuguese, Spaniards, and Illyrians,	1,306
Light cavalry, its chief, and	7,549
Dragoons, their chief, and	144
Cuirassiers, their chief, and	1,188
The Lanciers,	598
The three divisions reserve cavalry,	336
The artillery,	560
Total,	49,938

A general state of the total loss in officers and men at Mojaisk :—

Generals of division,	17
Generals of brigade,	29
Colonels,	57
Majors,	14
Chiefs of squadrons,	105
Officers of the general staff,	17
Subaltern officers,	1,367
Soldiers, killed, wounded, and prisoners,	50,876
Total,	52,482

Differing from the above, I imagine, from the officers being here added.

List of the most distinguished officers killed or wounded :—

General Count de Montbrun, commanding the light horse, killed.
,, de Caulincour, Governor of Napoleon's pages.
,, Gauden, killed.
,, De Sais, killed.
,, Friant, new Chief of the Grenadiers of the Guards, 1st division, killed.
,, Belloy, commanding a corps of artillery, killed.
,, Count Frederic, killed.
,, Romini, Chief of the Staff, and Major-General, killed.
,, La France.
,, Count Campaa.
,, ,, Nansouty.
,, ,, Sebastiani.
,, ,, D'Ossa.
,, ,, Le Grand.
,, ,, Barsan d'Alloi, killed.
Marshal Davoust, wounded in the leg.

Generals of division killed,	10	
Generals of brigade ,,	15	
	—	25
Generals of division wounded,	7	
Generals of brigade ,,	14	
	—	21
Generals of division and brigade, killed and wounded,		46

The battle of Mojaisk and Borodino are the same.

The Russians had only 70,000 men, commanded by Prince Kutusoff; the French, 180,000.

No. II.

M. Thiers, in his nineteenth volume, just published, p. 374, has brought forward a detailed charge of duplicity and dissimulation against Lord Castlereagh, which requires examination, as well from the respect due to that able and distinguished historian, as from the charge itself being so much at variance with the noble Lord's character and the whole tenor of his life. It relates to a speech which he made in the House of Commons on 7th April 1815, shortly after the return of Napoleon from Elba had taken place, and when the House were engaged in considering a message of the Prince Regent requesting them to take that grave event into their most serious consideration, and adopt such measures, by augmenting the forces of the empire by sea and land, and communicating with their allies, as might seem necessary for the public security. After stating that the British Cabinet were urged on the one side by the war party pressing for instant hostilities, and on the other by a more prudent one, which counselled them to temporise and await the course of events, M. Thiers proceeds thus:—

"Les ministres Anglais en étaient à peser ces raisons pour et contre, lorsqu'ils apprirent que, sans les consulter, Lord Wellington les avait engagés de nouveau dans la coalition, et la crainte de rompre l'union Européenne, la condescendance à l'égard du négociateur Britannique, le penchant de Lord Castlereagh pour la politique continentale, enfin l'esprit systématique des ministres Torys, décidèrent la question dans le sens de la guerre. Pourtant en présence d'une résistance visible de l'opinion publique, il fallait recourir à la ruse, *et Lord Castlereagh se prêta à des dissimulations qu'aujourd'hui, grâce au progrès des mœurs publiques, un ministre Anglais n'oserait pas se permettre.** On résolut donc, en apprenant tout ce qui avait été fait à Vienne, d'user de quelques restrictions pour paraître sauvegarder les principes de la Grande Bretagne, et de ne publier les engagements contractés que peu à peu, et à mesure que l'entraînement général des choses justifierait le parti pris par le Cabinet. Ainsi le traité du 25 Mars qui renouvelait l'alliance de Chaumont fut ratifié, mais avec une réserve ajoutée à l'article 8. Cet article, qui admettait Louis XVIII. à adhérer au traité, devait être entendu, disait-on, comme obligeant les souverains Européens, dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité mutuelle, à un effort commun contre la puissance de Napoléon, mais non comme obligeant sa Majesté Britannique à poursuivre la guerre dans la vue d'imposer à la France un gouvernement quelconque. Le traité, parvenu à Londres le 5 Avril, fut ratifié et renvoyé le 8 avec cette réserve, *spécieuse mais mensongère*, car en réalité on voulait très-positivement renverser Napoléon et *lui substituer les Bourbons.*

* "Ces dissimulations sont constatées par la correspondance de Lord Castlereagh récemment publiée, et par les documents non publiés que nous avons eus sous les yeux, et qui sont relatifs au Congrès de Vienne."

" En contractant de tels engagements, il n'était pas possible, dans un pays constitué comme l'Angleterre, de garder le silence envers le Parlement, qui exerce la réalité d'un pouvoir dont la couronne a surtout les honneurs. On se décida donc, le 6 Avril, c'est-à-dire le lendemain du jour où le traité du 25 Mars était parvenu à Londres, à présenter un message aux deux chambres. Ce message annonçait qu'en présence des événements survenus en France, la couronne avait cru devoir augmenter ses forces de terre et de mer, et entrer en communication avec ses alliés, afin d'établir avec eux un concert qui pût garantir la sûreté actuelle et future de l'Europe. . . . .

" On ne pouvait plus adroitement dissimuler sous des verités générales la verité matérielle de la guerre résolue et promise à Vienne. Mais l'Opposition ne se laissa point prendre au piége de ces raisonnements, et repoussa victorieusement tous les arguments des Lords Liverpool et Castlereagh.

" D'abord elle demanda si, en fait, et au moment même où l'on parlait, le Gouvernement n'avait pas signé à Vienne l'engagement positif d'entreprendre la guerre contre la France, *pour renverser Napoléon et rétablir les Bourbons.* Soupçonnant la chose sans la savoir exactement, l'Opposition avait posé la question en des termes dont Lord Castlereagh abusa, avec un défaut de franchise *qu'un ministre ne devrait jamais se permettre* dans un état libre. Comme en effet on ne s'était pas exprimé de la sorte, comme on n'avait pas dit formellement dans le traité qu'on allait faire la guerre à la France pour substituer les Bourbons aux Buonaparte, bien que ce fût au fond le but qu'on poursuivait, Lord Castlereagh, qui depuis deux jours cependant avait dans les mains le texté du traite du 25 Mars, répondit, *avec une fausseté mal déguisée*, que l'Angleterre n'avait rien signé de pareil, et tâcha de faire entendre qu'elle n'avait pris que des *engagements éventuels et de pure précaution*, conformes en unmot au message lui-même sur lequel la discussion était ouverte." *

Such is the charge of M. Thiers. The facts regarding it, so far as necessary to form an opinion on the subject, are as follows.

The clauses in the treaty, 25th March 1815, signed by the Duke of Wellington, so far as they bear on this question, are these :—

" 1. Les hautes Puissances contractantes ci-dessus denommés s'engagent solennellement à réunir les moyens de leurs Etats respectifs pour maintenir dans toute leur intégrité les conditions de traité de paix conclu à Paris le 30 Mai 1814, ainsi que les stipulations arrêtées et siguées au Congrès de Vienne dans le but de completer les dispositions de ce traité de les garantir contre les desseins de Napoléon Buonaparte. A cet effet elles s'engagent à diriger, *si le cas l'exigeait*, et dans le sens de la déclaration du 13 Mai dérnier, de concert et de commun accord tous leurs efforts contre lui, et contre tous ceux qui se seraient déjà ralliés à sa faction on se réunirait dans la suite *afin de le forcer de désister de ses projets*, et de le mettre hors d'état de *troubler à l'avenir la tranquillité de l'Europe* et la paix générale, sous la protection de laquelle le droit, la liberté, et l'independance des nations venaient d'être placées et assurées.

" 2. Quoiqu'un but aussi grand et aussi bienfaisant ne permette pas qu'on mesure les moyens destinés pour l'atteindre, et que les hautes parties contractantes soient resolues de conserver tous ceux dont d'après leur situation elles peuvent disposer, elles sont neanmoins convaincues de tenir constamment en campagne chacun 150,000 hommes au complet y compris, pour le moins la propor-

* THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, xix. 374-379.

tion d'un dixième de cavalerie, et une juste proportion d'artillerie, sans compter les garrisons et de les employés activement et de concert contre l'ennemi commun.

"3. Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à ne poser les armes que d'un commun accord, et avant que l'objet de la guerre designé dans l'article 1 du présent traité n'ait été atteint; et tant que Buonaparte ne sera pas mis absolument hors possibilité d'exciter des troubles et renouveler les tentatives pour s'emparer du pouvoir suprême en France.

"8. Le présent traité étant uniquement dirigé *dans le but de soutenir la France* ou *tout autre pays envahi* contre les entreprises de Buonaparte et de ses adherens, sa Majesté très Chrétienne sera specialement invitée a y donner son adhesion, et à faire connoître dans le cas où elle devrait requérir les forces stipulées dans l'article deuxième quels secours les circonstances lui permettront d'apporter à l'objet du présent traité. —WELLINGTON, LE PRINCE DE METTERNICH, LE BARON DE WESSENBERG."*

To this treaty, which was received in London on the 5th April, and the answer to which was despatched to Vienna on the 8th, the British Cabinet gave their formal adhesion on the 25th, under the following reservation or limitation to article 8, drawn and signed by Lord Castlereagh:—

"The undersigned, on the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of the 25th March last on the part of his Court, is hereby commanded to declare that the eighth article of the said treaty, wherein his most Christian Majesty is invited to accede under certain stipulations, is to be understood as binding the contracting parties, *upon principles of mutual security*, to a common effort against the power of Napoleon Buonaparte, in pursuance of the third article of the said treaty, *but is not to be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war with a view of imposing upon France any particular government.*

"However anxious the Prince Regent must be to see his most Christian Majesty restored to the throne, and however anxious he is, in conjunction with his allies, to contribute to so auspicious an event, he nevertheless feels himself called upon to make this declaration on the exchange of the ratifications, as well in consideration of what is due to his most Christian Majesty's interests in France, as in conformity to the principles upon which the British Government has invariably regulated its conduct. CASTLEREAGH.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *25th April* 1815."†

This reservation on the part of the British Government drew forth a corresponding disclaimer from the other Allied Powers in these words:—

"L'interprétation donnée par le Gouvernement Britannique à le 8e article est entièrement conforme aux principes d'après lesquels S. M. I. et R. A. s'est proposée à régler sa politique durant la présent guerre, irrevocablement resolu de diriger tous ses efforts contre l'usurpation de Napoléon Buonaparte ainsi que ce but est exprimé dans l'article 3e, et d'agir à cet égard dans le plus parfait accord avec ses alliés, l'Empereur est neanmoins convaincu que les devoirs que lui impose l'intérêt de ses sujets ainsi que les principes qui le guident ne lui permet-

* MARTENS, *Supplement*, vi. 114, 115. † *Ibid.*, 117.

traient pas de prendre l'engagement de poursuivre la guerre dans l'intention d'imposer un gouvernement à la France.

"Quelque que soient les vœux qui S. M. l'Empereur forme de voir S. M. T. C. replacée sur le trône, ainsi que la constante solicitude à contribuer conjointement avec ses alliés à obtenir un resultat aussi désirable, S. M. a cru cependant devoir faire répondre par cette explication à la déclaration que S. E. Lord Castlereagh a remise à l'exchange des ratifications et que le soussigné est pleinement autorisé à accepter de sa part. METTERNICH.

"VIENNA, *9th May* 1815."

The same reservation was enacted by Rasoumousky and Nesselrode on the part of Russia, and Hardenberg and Humboldt on that of Prussia.*

The declaration of the Allies, dated 13th March 1815, on the receipt of the news of the landing of Napoleon in France, referred to in the treaty of 25th March following, was in these terms:—

"Les Puissances qui ont signé le traité de Paris, rassemblées en Congrès à Vienne, ayant été informées de l'évasion de Napoléon Buonaparte, et de son entrée en France avec une force armée, doivent à leur dignité et aux intérêts de l'ordre social de faire une déclaration solennelle des sentimens que cet événement leur a inspirés.

"En violant ainsi la Convention qui l'a établi dans l'Ile d'Elbe, Buonaparte détruit le seul titre légal dont son existence dépendait; en reparaissant en France avec des projets de confusion et de désordre, il s'est mis hors de la protection de la loi, et il manifeste à l'univers qu'il ne peut y avoir ni paix ni treve avec lui.

"Les Puissances déclarent en conséquence que Napoléon Buonaparte s'est exclu des relations civiles et sociales, et que comme ennemi et perturbateur du monde, il a encouru la vindicte publique.

"Elles déclarent en même temps qu'étant fermement résolues à maintenir dans son intégrité le traité de Paris du 30 Mai 1814, et les dispositions sanctionnées par ce traité, ainsi que celles qui ont été arrêtées ou le seront par la suite, pour le completter et le consolider, elles employeront tous leurs moyens et réuniront tous leurs efforts pour que la paix générale, l'objet des vœux de l'Europe, et le but constant de leurs travaux, ne soient pas troublée de nouveau, et pour se garantir de toutes les tentatives qui menaceraient de replonger l'univers dans les désordres et les malheurs des révolutions.

"Et quoique bien persuadées que toute la France, se ralliant autour de son souverain légitime, anéantira immédiatement ce dernier effort d'un délire coupable et impuissant, tous les souverains de l'Europe, animés des mêmes sentimens et guidés par les mêmes principes, déclarent que si, contre toute attente, il résultait aucun danger réel de cet événement, ils seront prêts à donner au Roi de France et à la nation Française, ou à tout autre Gouvernement qui sera attaqué, aussitôt qu'ils en seront requis, toute l'assistance nécessaire pour rétablir la tranquillité, et à faire cause commune contre tous ceux qui tenteraient de la compromettre.

"La présente Declaration, insérée au protocole du Congrès assemblé à Vienne, le 13 Mars 1815, sera rendue publique.

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* MARTENS, *Supplement*, vi. 116-119.

" Fait et attesté par les plénipotentiaires des hautes Puissances qui ont signé le traité de Paris,—à Vienne le 13 Mars 1815.

[Suivent les signatures par ordre alphabétique des Cours.]

" *Autriche.*—LE PRINCE METTERNICH, LE BARON DE WESSENBERG.

" *Espagne.*—P. GOMEZ LABRADOR.

" *France.*—LE PRINCE TALLEYRAND, LE DUC DE DALBERG, LATOUR DU PIN, LE COMTE ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.

" *Grande Bretagne.*—WELLINGTON, CLANCARTY, CATHCART, STEWART.

" *Portugal.*—LE COMTE PALMELLA, SALDANHA, LOBO.

" *Prusse.*—LE PRINCE HARDENBERG, LE BARON HUMBOLDT.

" *Russie.*—LE COMTE RASOUMOUSKY, LE COMTE STACKELBERG, LE COMTE NESSELRODE.

" *Suede.*—LE COMTE LOEWENHIELM." *

This being the state of affairs, the Prince Regent, by the advice of Lord Castlereagh, addressed, on 6th April 1815, a message to the House of Commons, in which he stated—

" The Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, thinks it right to inform the House of Commons, that the events which have recently occurred in France in direct contravention of the engagements concluded with the Allied Powers at Paris in the course of the last year, and which threaten consequences highly dangerous to the tranquillity and independence of Europe, have induced his Royal Highness to give directions for the augmentation of his Majesty's land and sea forces.

" The Prince Regent has likewise deemed it incumbent upon him to lose no time in entering into communications with his Majesty's Allies for the purpose of forming such a concert as may most effectually provide for the general and permanent security of Europe.

" And his Royal Highness confidently relies on the support of the House of Commons in all measures which may be necessary for the accomplishment of this important object." †

On the message of the Prince Regent being received, the Earl of Liverpool said, on 7th April, in the House of Lords—

" It was evident that this country had a just cause of war against Buonaparte wielding the power of France. But he was far from wishing to say, that because a war was just, it should therefore be entered upon. The justice was but one part of the question; another part was, whether the war would be wise, prudent and politic, under the present circumstances of the country. It was impossible to conceal from themselves the dangers with which the recent event threatened this country; it was impossible to conceal from themselves the conduct and character of the person now at the head of the French Government, and the events which, during the last eighteen years, that character and conduct had produced. It was impossible to forget the invasion of so many independent countries—of Spain, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Russia, and the impossibility which seemed to have existed formerly of preserving relations of peace with the individual in question. They could not turn their eyes from the peculiar circumstances under which he had returned to France: he had returned under the protection of the

* *Parliamentary Debates*, xxx. 373. † *Ibid.*, 349.

military power, and had professed his object to be to restore the tarnished glory of the French arms. All these considerations were grounds for the most serious apprehensions. *He did not, however, wish to pledge the House to any rash, hasty, and inconsiderate declaration, but to place fairly before their minds the alternatives—armed preparation and defence, or active war.* Between those alternatives, he requested their lordships not to decide at present, and he requested it for these reasons—because it was a question that involved many circumstances which they could not then have before them. It was not a British question merely, but a European question. It was necessary that the most perfect concert should exist between the British Government and his Majesty's Allies, before any just decision could be formed. It would be therefore an act of imprudence, if at that time he called for any other decision than that which the subject of the message required. The first point was one on which there could be no difference —viz., that it was expedient that there should be the most intimate concert between this country and the Allied Powers on the Continent. Consistently with this principle it would be necessary to weigh well the interests of the other Powers of Europe, as well as the interests of this country. What his own sentiments were, as far as he was acquainted with those interests, he should think it inconsistent with his duty to state. Whatever that opinion was, he could confidently state *that there was no disposition on the part of this Government to drive the Allies into a more extensive war policy than might be consistent with their own sentiments and feelings.* After remarking that the House could feel no difficulty in agreeing to the opinion of the message, that armed preparation was necessary, and that concert with the Allies was desirable, and would be beneficial to the general interest of Europe, his Lordship concluded by moving the address, which was an echo of the message."*

And on the same message being taken into consideration in the House of Commons on 7th April, Lord Castlereagh said—

"In rising to call the attention of the House to the gracious message of the Prince Regent, now read from the Chair, I assure the House that, at no period of my political life, and under no circumstances which I can recollect, have I ever felt more deeply or more sincerely the importance of those considerations which arise from passing events, or which may be produced by the counsels growing out of those events, than I do on the present occasion. It has been my lot, during almost all the discussions which have taken place in this House, in the last and present session, to endeavour to direct the attention of Parliament to those events which were rapidly taking place, and which we might flatter ourselves, without appearing too sanguine, were likely, not only to deliver the world from those dangers which it had ultimately passed through, but to conduct it to a state of permanent pacification; and, although so desirable a state of things might not take place with all the precipitancy which ardent minds might hope for, yet that we should finally be led to that ancient social system, which had long predominated in Europe, and of the enjoyment of which we had been too long deprived. Whatever difference of opinion may have prevailed between the gentlemen who sit on the other side of the House, and those who are seated on this, with respect to certain details connected with the arrangements made for the security of the peace of Europe—yet this I may say, that a complete coincidence of opinion has existed as to the principle which was acted upon. The details might have been

* *Parliamentary Debates*, xxx. 362, 363.

more skilfully managed; but, I am sure, every individual, however he might disapprove of minor parts of the arrangement, must have been gratified at seeing a state of things likely to arise in Europe, which would again present to the world such *a mass of independent Powers*, endued with all the qualities calculated to render them secure, with reference to each other, and, at the same time, possessing that degree of control which would produce an effectual resistance against any attempt made to destroy the system, as must have tended to give permanent peace to the earth. I am sure every reflecting mind must have derived pleasure from the thought, that the world was likely again to be governed by a well-balanced system of political authority: instead of being, as was unfortunately the case for the last twenty years, *plundered, and persecuted, and oppressed by one overweening Power, which endeavoured to engulph and swallow up every other state in Europe.* This favourable prospect has been overshadowed by the events that have recently happened in France, and which, if they do not menace with destruction the result of the efforts and labours of the last twenty years—the result of the mighty exertions of this nation (an epithet which I may well apply to them, without meaning to degrade or disparage the exertions of other countries), united with the labours of the different States, which assisted in restoring Europe to its present situation—certainly cannot be contemplated without considerable apprehension. That the stability of the present situation of Europe is endangered by the late events in France, no person who seriously reflects on them can entertain a doubt. It is impossible for any individual to call the fact in question. For, if a military chief, whose only pretensions to the situation in which he now stands, are founded on the attachment of an army—and if a military system is to be again established in France—it is not difficult to conceive what the result will be. We know the effect which the late revolution in the politics of France has already had on the other Powers of Europe. If that military chief, and the French army, find the peace so contrary to their favourite views, as it evidently appears they do, can any doubt be reasonably entertained as to the course they will adopt? I am sure, Sir, the House will feel with me, that enough was done to show that this was not a revolution growing out of the sentiments of the French people. It was a revolution effected by the army—effected by artifice—and by that sort of overweening influence, which a person long at the head of a military system, and addressing himself to great military bodies, may be supposed to have possessed and exerted. If that system be again erected in France—*whether at this immediate moment or at a period more remote*—it must, both politically and morally, either inflict on Europe all those calamities from which she had escaped, by exertions the most extraordinary that were to be found in the history of the world, or we must be compelled to depart from, and turn our backs on, that ancient social system which we were anxious again to enjoy; when the military character would not be predominant, but would be merged in the general mass of the community, and take its place and order among the other ranks of society. I feel the great considerations to which this immense and awful subject leads; for we must all feel, after the arduous struggle this country has gone through—after a war of three or four-and-twenty years' continuance—that a fresh contest, commenced even under the most ordinary circumstances that could present themselves, would be an event involving the most weighty and serious points of reflection that could be entertained by the reflecting mind of Parliament. But, when we look to a question either of absolute war, or of a peace of precaution, which must be joined with the consideration of those social relations belonging to a natural or unnatural constitution of the world, I do feel that the subject is the most serious, the most

awful, that ever attracted the attention of Parliament—and that an imperative duty devolves on us to examine it in the most grave and deliberate manner. If I felt that I was calling on Parliament at this time, or that I was in a condition to call on Parliament, to discuss all those views which belong to the question—and more particularly those which, in my conscience, I believe ought to guide their decision on this subject—I should certainly proceed at greater length. But, at the present moment, I should be to blame if I precipitated any counsels of state respecting this question, without, at the same time, giving full information to the House. *As the question is not, however, in that state in which I can lay before the House the manner in which the prerogative, placed, for the benefit of the people, in the hands of the Crown, may have been used, I shall not advert to the various points which bear on the subject, and which, at another period, it will be proper to submit to Parliament.* I am rather disposed to follow the course pursued on a former evening by a right hon. gentleman (Mr Ponsonby), and to defer much that might be offered on the question, until we know whether the state of precaution in which the country is now placed, shall ultimately terminate in peace or war. With this feeling I wish to narrow the question to those points on which I think the House, in its present situation, may fairly be called to decide, rather than, by anticipation, to enter into those views, which, though they bear strongly on the subject, are more proper for future consideration.

"The Prince Regent's most gracious message states, that events have taken place in a neighbouring kingdom, in direct contravention of the engagements made in the treaty of Fontainebleau, not only with reference to that treaty, but as far as it formed the basis of the treaty of Paris; necessarily and naturally implying, as the contravention of all treaties must, a justifiable cause of war. If this Government and its Allies think, under all the circumstances, that such a state of things has arisen, as calls for every effort of precaution, I apprehend there are few persons in this House disposed to doubt the propriety of the decision. Nor do I believe that any person, either within those walls or without them, can doubt that the Executive is equally called upon to complete those measures, in conjunction with the Allies of the country by whose exertions the world was saved, which Parliament, being impelled by a series of extraordinary circumstances, demanding vigorous efforts, may be disposed to sanction. The nature of those measures, and the object to be attained, must remain subjects of ulterior consideration. *I am sure the House would not wish prematurely to draw from ministers the nature of the event contemplated—its probable operation—or the mode in which Europe is to be protected in future against the dangers with which it is now threatened.* In the present posture of public affairs I am convinced no gentleman would call for such a disclosure. In order to preserve entire the control of Parliament over the executive servants of the Crown, who know that they cannot prosecute any design, not only without the sanction, but without the assistance of the strong arm of the Legislature, I conceive that a certain extent of confidence is necessary. It is not more contrary to the prerogative of the Crown, than it is hostile to the controlling power of Parliament, for gentlemen, without due information, on narrow abstract views of important questions, to assume to themselves the premature exercise of that power which ultimately belongs to them, as possessing a final control over the acts of the Crown. It is, Sir, manifestly wrong to give a hasty and improvident opinion on transactions of the most complicated nature at a moment when the House is necessarilly ignorant of the details. The power of censuring or of approving, can only be exercised with a sound discretion, and honourably to the character of

Parliament, *when transactions have arrived at a stage where all the circumstances of the case are constitutionally laid before them.*

"Sir, with this feeling of the course that ought to be adopted, I shall narrow my view of the question to the expression of those opinions which, I think, the Message of the Prince Regent demands—namely, that the events which have taken place in France, in avowed contravention of the engagements entered into with the Allies, have created a state of things so alarming, that the British empire cannot remain in any other than an armed posture—that Parliament cannot but express their gratification at the steps which have been taken by the Government of this country, to form a union with those Powers who have been fellow-labourers with us in restoring the peace of Europe—and that, in such a juncture of affairs, the House are ready to give the Executive Government every assistance towards the promotion of this important object; at the same time reserving their opinion on ulterior measures, until they are in possession of the necessary information. I should hope, Sir, that the discussion on the present occasion would not be carried beyond these limits; but I certainly feel that I should not discharge what I owe to the subject and to the House, if I did not take this occasion to submit to it some considerations which must ultimately have great weight on both sides of this arduous question, Whether the final result be peace or war? I should also feel that I had not discharged my duty if I did not endeavour to relieve the House and the public from many misrepresentations and delusions which have prevailed with respect to the conduct of the British Government and our Allies. An impression has undoubtedly gone abroad—which, when the House examines the fact, will be found exceedingly erroneous—that the arrangements made prior to the peace of Paris were improvident and ill-advised; that no considerations of general policy could justify such arrangements; and that if the result had been, unfortunately for the world, again to place at risk and hazard, the continuance of tranquillity, the blame is alone imputable to the Allies. These untoward events, it is said, have arisen solely from their counsels, and cannot be attributed to any other cause. Almost every person with whom I have conversed has indulged in this feeling. It is, naturally enough, the custom of mankind, and I mention it not as a reproach to the general wisdom of human nature, where serious dangers threaten, on political occasions, to throw the blame on those who were furnished with responsible powers, and to accuse them with having acted improvidently and unwisely. I have heard it said that when the treaty of Fontainebleau was concluded, the Allies acted with a foolish generosity, without any reference to true policy—that they had granted to Buonaparte an asylum which he was liable to abuse—and that his power had, in consequence, been re-established. But Buonaparte has not made use of any of the apologies which have been offered for his conduct. He has unblushingly avowed the principles which have guided his conduct. Instead of complaining of any breach of the engagements entered into with him (and, if he had made such a charge, I could show the House that he had imputed to the Allies that which never had been committed), he has, in the very first instance, shown a complete contempt for all treaties and arrangements whatever. He has not concealed from the world that no control or limit shall confine his power, except what the failure of his means might impose. He has shown himself no longer to be controlled by treaties. He has shown himself, in the pursuit of his views, to be bounded only by his inability to proceed. He has set at nought every ordinary tie; and he has, if I may use the word in describing a series of conduct which does not present one particle of morality, honestly placed himself on the pedestal of power, and boldly avowed his acts. He calls himself Emperor of France, impiously, 'by the grace of God;' and he is, in no

degree, fettered in the exercise of his authority, by any of those acts which he, for the moment, and to deceive the world, agreed to. Sooner than shed one drop of French blood, he declared that he would abandon France and his family; and, in violation of this statement, he now returns to that country—not in consequence of any new request—not in consequence of a defeasance of any engagement that had been entered into with him—but in absolute defiance of the most explicit stipulations that human foresight could devise. Such is the situation under which that individual returned to power.

"Sir, I was saying that the general impression which prevailed was, that the Allies, in concluding the treaty of Fontainebleau, had done a gratuitous act, which they might have avoided. Generosity certainly was the prevailing feature which marked the policy of the Allies towards France; and whatever calamities may arise to the world from the transaction in question, I, for one, shall never lament that the Powers who marched to the gates of Paris did act on that generous principle, and thereby showed their deference to the rights and feelings of the people. That principle is one of which I am convinced a British Parliament will always express its approbation. It is the only great, and strong, and true one; and Parliament has never omitted any occasion, where it could be recognised and supported, of so doing. I am sure I shall not have to regret, on account of the display of any contrary feeling in this House, that if there was an error in the conduct of the Allies towards France, it was on the side of generosity. The exercise of that principle is due to all countries, until they do something which forbids it—until they prevent their opponents from being generous to them, without risking the imputation of being unjust and ruinous to themselves. If, therefore, Sir, any blame be imputable in this transaction, I feel confident that it is to be found on the right side; for whatever may hereafter be the relative situation of France and the rest of Europe, the former can never assert that the Allies harboured an intention of acting ungenerously by her. A peace was concluded with France, which not only secured her former extent of territory, but which granted an increase of it; nor was she visited with any of those grievous contributions which were levied by the French armies wherever they went. All the repositories of art which adorned her capital were left untouched; and the whole of that forbearance was exercised from a wish to conciliate the social feelings of the people by leaving no badge of their humiliation, no mark that might recall their disasters and defeats.

"Now, Sir, the fact is, that when the treaty of Fontainebleau was signed, Buonaparte could not be considered, in any degree, practically speaking, within the power of the Allies. I do not mean to say that a protracted war might not have led to his capture or driven him from the country. But when that treaty was signed, as will be seen from the papers on the table—and here I can speak with the more confidence, because I am not called on to say anything in my own behalf, because it was agreed to when I was not in a situation to alter it—it was sanctioned by the Emperor of Russia, under such imperious circumstances as would justify the House in considering it not merely a treaty of generosity but of policy. The fact was, that after the capital was taken by the Allies, and Napoleon had proceeded to Fontainebleau, he was at the head of a very considerable body of troops, ready to act in his support; and there was no reason to presume, but rather the contrary, that the corps outstanding in the other parts of France would not also, as they had previously done, continue to espouse his cause. There was not even a certainty that the troops whom Marshal Marmont had paralysed, on the other side, would remain faithful to the Provisional Government. In short, the question then was, whether the treaty of Fontainebleau should be

agreed to, or whether the war should be pushed to the utmost extremity? The decision which took place in favour of the former proceeding, was not that of the Emperor of Russia alone; it was also supported by the Provisional Government of France, acting for the interests of the Bourbon family, and with a view to their restoration. It was, therefore, a matter of policy and not of generosity, to agree to an arrangement which brought the contest to an end, instead of carrying on a protracted war in the heart of France.

"When I arrived in Paris, as will be seen by the papers, this question was, in fact, decided; an assurance having been given to Buonaparte with respect to the general engagement, and also with reference to the specific arrangements made at Elba. Seeing the obvious danger of placing a person who had so recently wielded the power of France so immediately in the neighbourhood of his former empire, and also in the neighbourhood of another part of Europe, which might be influenced by sentiments favourable to him, I thought it my duty to make every opposition in my power to the arrangement. But, on a further examination of the subject, the difficulty of finding a situation at once free from the dangers I apprehended, and, at the same time, answering the character which Buonaparte stipulated for in his negotiation, induced me to withdraw my opposition; making, however, some alteration in the details. Looking to the policy of settling the business amicably, instead of proceeding farther with the war, I ceased to oppose the place of retreat which had been provided; and I think the House will feel with me, that when the utmost result which could have been anticipated from a prolongation of the contest would be either the capture or the escape of Buonaparte, it would have been impolitic to continue that contest for such a purpose, and to make it determinable upon such an event. It was quite impossible for the parties to Buonaparte's abdication to have speculated on the recent conduct which he adopted, even if it were in their power effectually to have guarded against it; besides, the House must see that it was unlikely the contest would be prosecuted with the same spirit, if such a determination was avowed. The plain fact was, that the question among the Allied Powers, relative to this point, was not decided under the circumstance of Buonaparte being within their grasp; for such was not the case: he was not so situated, but was placed in a situation, and with a force immediately about his person, which was entitled to serious consideration; and when combined with other troops then scattered about the country, and his opportunities of uniting them with those of Marshal Soult and other generals in the south of France, it became a matter of plain expediency to calculate his means of prolonging the warfare, and to consider the alternative which might prevent such an event. This was the plain fact which led to his term of security.

"With respect to the residence and situation of this personage at Elba, whatever may be my own individual opinion upon the subject of the arrangement which gave to him that jurisdiction—whatever objections I may have had from the beginning to this settlement, and the opportunities its locality afforded for the realisation of what has unhappily since occurred—there can, I trust, exist but one feeling among liberal minds, and that is, that when this island was given to Buonaparte for his residence, that residence should comprise the portion of fair and free liberty, which was then due to a person in his situation. When the island was secured to him by treaty, it was of course done with as much exercise of personal liberty as became the compact: it was never in the contemplation of the parties that he should be a prisoner within that settlement; that he should be the compulsory inmate of any tower, or fortress, or citadel—they never meant that he should be so placed, or that he should be deprived of sea excursions in the

vicinity of the island, for fair purposes of recreation. In fact, if such a jealous stipulation had been made, it would have afforded him the opportunity of making that the veil of his own suspicions, and the extenuation of his own infraction. Under this cloak he would have sought the justification of his own non-fulfilment of the treaty, and would have charged it upon the menacing treatment which had been adopted towards him; he would have then stood differently in the eyes of the world from his present position, which left him without a shadow of defence, and exposed him to all Europe, as an open violator of his faith. A report has gone abroad, that if those who placed him at Elba had omitted any precautionary security which rationally suggested itself, to protect the world from the calamities consequent upon the return of this man to his former station in France, that in such a case they incurred a dreadful responsibility. Now, Sir, I have no hesitation to answer this argument. The Allied Powers who concurred in the treaty of Fontainebleau never intended to exercise a police or any system of *espionage* either within or without the residence which they had ceded to him; it was never in their contemplation to establish a naval police to hem him in, or prevent this man's committing himself, as he has done, to his fortunes; in fact, if they were so inclined they were without the means of enforcing such a system, for the best authorities were of opinion that it was absolutely and physically impossible to draw a line of circumvallation around Elba; and for this very conclusive reason, that, considering the variation of weather, and a variety of other circumstances which could not be controlled, the whole British navy would be inadequate for such a purpose. If this force had been actually there, they could not have circumscribed Buonaparte in the manner in which some persons expected he should have been, without a violation of the treaty which had been granted him. It was open to argument that this treaty was wrong, that it should not have been conceded. Points of this description were certainly fair for discussion; but having once been made, it was clear from the face of the document that any restrictions could not have been imposed without a breach of the treaty itself; by this he was invested with the entire sovereignty of the island; he was also assigned a sort of naval equipment, certainly upon a small scale, but one which allotted him a flag, and which it was not extraordinary to meet on the neighbouring sea; one of his vessels was constantly seen for ordinary purposes in several of the ports of the Mediterranean. The British officer commanding on that station had not the power of visiting these vessels whenever they were occasionally met. Had he known that Buonaparte was on board with an armed equipment, he would have exercised that right, there can be no doubt, and would have been justified in doing so; but he was not authorised, nor would it have been consistent with the treaty, to have empowered him on all occasions to use a right of visitation with a flag of this description. Elba, it is true, is an insulated position, but it has considerable commercial intercouse among other places with the different ports in the Mediterranean; and unless this search and examination could have been exercised in every instance throughout the whole range of the Elbese trade, no protection would have been insured by it; he would therefore have had means and opportunities enough of effecting his object: for it cannot be disguised that the danger did not arise from the immediate force of his equipment; this was in itself quite insignificant: the danger would have been precisely the same, had he proceeded in any disguise which he might have assumed, and personally landed in any of the ports of the Continent. I have not the least doubt, Sir, the effect would have been exactly similar. But I repeat, that our Government never undertook to establish a police at Elba. Colonel Campbell was certainly there for the purpose of occasionally communicating with

our Government upon such matters as might pass under his observation, both there and in Italy, where at that time we had no accredited agent; he was there at first merely as one of the conductors according to the treaty, and I afterwards suffered him to remain between that island and Leghorn, for the purpose I have mentioned; but nothing more was ever contemplated. It would have been out of Colonel Campbell's power to have attempted anything further: he could not have done it; for the fact was, that although at first treated with familiarity by Buonaparte, his visits were subsequently disapproved of, and it was even hinted that if they were repeated, he should withdraw from the island; latterly he found the greatest difficulty in obtaining an interview with Buonaparte, so completely did the latter surround himself with imperial etiquette. Of the inefficacy of anything which Colonel Campbell could have done, were he on the spot to have attempted the experiment, I need only mention the following fact: A number of vessels from all nations were in the habit of arriving for trading purposes in the three principal ports of this island; on the part of the English ships, a Mr Ritchie resided there as a sort of vice-consul, to see that our ships wanted nothing that was necessary for them: the moment when Buonaparte prepared to carry his plan into execution, he placed this Mr Ritchie under the *surveillance* of two *gens d'armes*. Mr Grattan, junior, who happened to be on the island, and who conveyed the earliest intelligence of the event to the nearest public agent of this country, was also taken into custody, and there can be no doubt that Colonel Campbell would have encountered a similar restraint; his presence, therefore, would have had no effect in preventing the escape of Buonaparte, or in transmitting any intelligence of that event sooner than it reached us in the ordinary course. It is also a remarkable and almost incredible circumstance, and one of the truth of which I have every reason to be satisfied, that so completely within his own bosom did Buonaparte carry the plan he meditated, that his confidential companion, Bertrand, was wholly unapprised of his intentions, until the very hour in which he received the order for his embarkation: from information which I possess, and on which I rely, Bertrand was ignorant of the plan until four o'clock in the evening when the embarkation took place, and this was effected in the course of three or four hours after, and the flotilla was clear at sea that night. It is also a fact, that no previous preparations were observable for this expedition, except the ordinary repairs of his principal vessel, which was not a matter of any particular consideration, and the other vessels containing the troops were in the harbour for private commercial purposes, and had been then seized immediately before the embarkation, when the gates of the port were ordered to be suddenly shut. I have already said, Sir, that the troops thus conveyed did not form any essential feature in the success of this enterprise, and that the individual escape of this person would have been attended with the same result; and this, under the terms of the treaty, could hardly have been prevented, consistently with that personal liberty which was manifestly secured to him—to have attempted it by blockade would have been morally impossible. France had two rigates and some smaller vessels cruising in the vicinity of Elba, Corsica, and Leghorn, for the purpose of vigilantly watching his manœuvres; our naval force was also not inattentive to this consideration, for Lord Exmouth and Admiral Hallowell had had an understanding with the Admiralty, that if they suspected Buonaparte was contemplating a descent upon the opposite shores, they should immediately adopt such measures as would frustrate the attempt, and secure him in his passage to carry it into execution. Our sloop, the Partridge, which was crossing with Colonel Campbell at the time, did, in point of fact, give chase to this flotilla; and, if it had reached Buonaparte, would have seized him as a

prisoner, for what they would have justly termed a breach of the treaty, and an act of hostility on his part, in contravention of his express stipulation.

" From a reference to the true state of the case, I trust, Sir, that the supposition which has prevailed, that the Allies were too generous, in the first instance, or too remiss in the second, will in no degree be admitted; it is entirely wrong to harbour such a notion. I think I have shown that they could not have maintained that species of police which would have been operative upon the occasion; for unless this man was actually destroyed or shut up, it was impossible by a maritime or internal precaution to stop his purpose, if he determined upon its execution. Every legitimate means of examining what was passing at Elba, had been resorted to; and among the variety of persons from different nations who had visited that island and conversed with Buonaparte, none had ever discovered any preparations for the event which has caused such a sensation throughout Europe. If any measure approaching to personal restraint was resorted to, is it at all probable he would have submitted to such an ordeal against the provisions of a treaty, behind which he would, doubtless, have fenced himself? From these statements it is evident that neither our Government nor that of our Allies are fairly responsible for any mischief that may grow out of the fortuitous event which has so unfortunately taken place; it is essential that this should be known and felt, in order to prevent those imputations and prejudices which a contrary feeling is calculated to engender, and than which there can be nothing more injurious and unfounded.

" I will now, Sir, quit this branch of the subject, and call upon the House to accede to an Address to the Prince Regent, declaratory of their determination to enable his Royal Highness to adopt such measures, in conjunction with his Allies, as the present crisis may render imperative for the general tranquillity of Europe. *I will not detain the House by any precise specification of measures which cannot at once be developed, or of plans which it may not be necessary hereafter to mature: the House must be aware that such a disclosure would at present be highly premature.* There is one point, however, which I must not overlook; I allude to the rumour which has been mentioned, as, in a certain degree, extenuating the infraction of the treaty by Buonaparte—namely, that his pension had not been faithfully remitted to him. The fact was not so—it was an annual stipend, which, of course, did not become due until the expiration of the time specified; but having heard, whilst at Vienna, that some complaints upon this head had been made, I felt it my duty to inquire of the French minister into this circumstance, and took that occasion to observe upon the unfavourable impression, which, if true, it was calculated to excite. In this opinion Prince Talleyrand fully concurred, and immediately addressed his Government on the subject. They were of opinion that Buonaparte had manifested, upon several occasions, a spirit of infringement with respect to the treaty; that this was apparent in his recruiting for his guards at Corsica and other places; and that some satisfactory explanation was due from him relative to those points, before their part of the treaty ought to be fulfilled. I subsequently heard that he was, to a certain extent, in pecuniary want for the necessary exigencies of his establishment, and that he was actually selling his provisions and some of his cannon for the maintenance of his military household. Not approving of this state of things when last in Paris, I had an interview with Louis XVIII., and held a conference with his Majesty with a view to inquire into this matter. The French Government persevered in the opinion, that the suspicious nature of some of Buonaparte's acts at Elba disentitled him from a conditional obligation, unless he previously tendered an explanation of certain acts which bore a dubious interpretation; but, at

my suggestion of the impolicy arising out of any complaint which personal want might create on his part, a person was despatched by the French Government to Elba, to give him that quantum of aid which would prevent the possibility of his incurring that species of privation, but not to give the entire stipend until a satisfactory explanation was given relative to certain points of his conduct which lay open to suspicion. So that it is evident there can be no ground for any argument in defence of his conduct, from the non-payment of a stipend which, as yet, has not become due; besides, he has never alleged any such complaint, nor was France responsible for that treaty, at least in a personal sense with him. If a complaint of infraction was to be alleged by Buonaparte, it should not have been made in the first instance to France; the Allies were the parties to the treaty, and to them alone, if it was violated, the complaint should have been carried: he never remonstrated with those with whom the compact had been formed; and it is therefore evident that he never had any notion of standing on that ground, that he never meant to urge any such plea; in grasping at all, he did not stop to arraign or discuss any particular allegation, but absorbed the whole in his arrogant and unprincipled declaration, that he was 'the sole and legitimate monarch of France.'

"The noble Lord said, that the question now before the House was not as to peace or war, but merely as to the necessity of precautionary measures at the present crisis. He believed that the House would see that the line of conduct which this country had to pursue lay between two alternatives. It must either embark in a war, in conjunction with the other Continental Powers, or it must, in conjunction with them, adopt measures of military precaution, sufficient for its protection under the present circumstances. He was sure that it would not be contended in that House that while the powers of Government in France were exercised by such a man, it would be possible, consistent with our safety, to reduce the establishments of the country to that scale which might be considered sufficient under other circumstances. However sanguine he might have been in the hope of bringing the nation back to its ancient principles and policy, yet he never did or could have supposed, like the gentlemen on the other side of the House, that there was to be no intermediate state between such a war as we had for so many years waged with France, and that peace establishment which would be sufficient for the sound health of the country, in settled times, and when the former social relations of Europe were completely re-established. The danger was now more deeply rooted, which had arisen from a state of things that had unfortunately had too long a continuance. From this state of things France had now become a military nation, and all other classes of the community had become, in that country, subordinate to the military class. It was then easy to see that France could not break loose from that unnatural state to which it had been reduced, without a great danger of what had now actually taken place, from a reaction of the army. Although, in her political situation, France might now be prostrate at the foot of her armies, yet, who would venture to say that the return of Buonaparte was the act of the French nation? Who could hesitate to allow that the late Revolution was purely the act of the military? If the authority of their own paternal monarch, to which the military, as well as the nation, had not only submitted, but had sworn to support, was now of no validity—if they had now broke loose from ties so binding in duty and in honour, to what could it be attributed, but to that overweening principle, that their interests, as military men, suffered from a state of peace? The military class, that had been accustomed to seek their fortunes by rapine and plunder, and who looked to promotion, advancement, and rewards from the blood and plunder of other nations, naturally opposed an order of things that promised peace. But after having

betrayed their king and violated their oath, he believed, if they had any of the honourable feelings of military men remaining, they must feel themselves ill at ease, and degraded in their own estimation. He did not believe that an army so degraded in their own estimation could perform those services to their new master that, under other circumstances, they might have done. He conceived that it had been proved most unequivocally, that although France might now, as a nation, be prostrate before her own army, yet that the public feeling throughout the greater part of that country was in favour of their amiable king, whose conduct had been as unimpeachable as his character. *Whatever difference of opinion there might be upon that most grave and important question—whether, in point of prudence and calculation, it was better to allow the power now in France to exist; or whether it was better to deal with that power in the very outset, and before its authority was established in full vigour by the resources of all France —still, in either case, it would be allowed that some measures of precaution would be absolutely necessary.* If Europe should not determine upon active war, still there was no alternative left, but to remain in a state of military organisation, sufficient to protect them from future dangers. If he could not now bring the whole case before the judgment of the House, he should, on a future occasion, if it should be necessary, leave the whole question to be decided on its own merits. It was the business of this country now to watch the temper and spirit of the Continental nations. He did not mean to say that any ardour of the Continental nations should precipitate this country into any war that was not just and necessary. As we had, however, already saved the world, in concurrence with the Allied Powers, it was in concurrence with them that we must preserve it from future dangers. *Notwithstanding our feelings of security from our local and insular situation, yet we should not, on that account, be forward to goad the Powers of the Continent into a war that they were not convinced was necessary for their interests.* He considered that the proper source of our political influence on the Continent was from the full conviction that our influence was exerted for the preservation of the interests of the Continental Powers, and for the general good of Europe, and not for any private or separate interest of this country. If this was admitted to be the case, he hoped the converse of the proposition would be allowed, that there was no rational security either for this country or for Europe, but in keeping together that mass of Continental force to which Europe had already owed her deliverance. He looked at the present circumstances, not as destructive of all that had been hitherto done for the peace of Europe, but as containing the seeds of future danger. *He thought that the line of conduct which this country had to pursue was to find out what was the true spirit of the Continent upon the present occasion. We should see whether the Continental nations thought their security would be better provided for by war or by precautionary preparations. We should not give them a fictitious wish for war, nor overstrain the arguments in favour of it; but if, in their deliberate consideration and conscientious judgment, they should conceive war to be the only means of permanent security to Europe, it could not be expected that this country should separate itself from the interests of the rest of Europe.* It was a gratifying and proud consideration for this country that we had already accomplished everything of territorial arrangement that appeared to be necessary to secure the balance of Europe. Those arrangements had been so fully assented to by all the great Powers of Europe, that they might now be considered as secure. The relation in which we now stood to the Continent, was not that of desiring any private objects of our own, but as ready to give what assistance we could to support the general interests. The noble Lord concluded by moving—

" 'That an humble address be presented to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to return to his Royal Highness the thanks of this House for his most gracious message.' "*

Upon this debate the House of Lords adopted the address, which was, as usual, an echo of the message, without a division; in the House of Commons, by a majority of 183—the numbers being 220 to 37.†

This speech is given at full length *verbatim* from the *Parliamentary Debates*, as containing the most complete account that is anywhere to be met with of Lord Castlereagh's policy in regard to the war with Napoleon. And what was his *pensée intime* on the subject is clearly revealed in the two following letters addressed next day to Lord Clancarty and the Duke of Wellington at Vienna:—

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

"*April* 8 [1815].

"MY DEAR C.,—I send you a copy of my private letter, with its enclosure, to the Duke of W[ellington]. You will fully appreciate the Parliamentary importance of not having imputed to us that Louis XVIII., by being made an ally against Buonaparte, has been made master of the confederacy for his own restoration. His Majesty cannot wish us to feel more decisively the importance of his restoration than we do; and most assuredly every effort will be made so to conduct the war so as to lead to this result, *but we cannot make it a sine quâ non.* Foreign Powers may justly covenant for the destruction of Buonaparte's authority as inconsistent with their own safety, *but it is another question avowedly to stipulate as to his successor.* This is a Parliamentary delicacy. By a despatch from Sir C. Stewart, it appears that the King of France perfectly enters into this distinction. I am much hurried, and can add no more. C."

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

"*Foreign Office, April* 8, 1815.

"MY DEAR LORD,—Our discussion in both Houses last night was sufficiently satisfactory. Until we can open the whole extent of our confederacy, we must have a reserve; and it is better that our friends should be brought by degrees to look at the prospect of a renewed contest.

"My despatches by this messenger to Sir C. Stewart will give you Caulaincourt's overture and my answer.

"The general intelligence from France agrees with the enclosed report, and justifies a hope that the Allies, if enabled to move early, may keep alive an important diversion in the south and west.

"You will best judge whether any and what steps can be undertaken to encourage early exertions. *If war is actually decided on, a movement into the*

* *Parliamentary Debates*, XXX. 417-434. † *Ibid.*, 463.

interior cannot be too soon made, as far as it can be pushed forward without military improvidence. Its effect must be proportionably decisive.

"I have received your renewal of the treaty of Chaumont. It will be immediately ratified, but we mean to accompany it with a declaration of the nature herewith sent. The latter branch of article 3, which you very properly endeavoured to qualify, we think may be sustained as declaratory of the object of the concert. It is an engagement, although onerous in its nature, taken between parties who have a common interest in its execution. That which arises out of article 8, stands somewhat on different grounds. In inviting the King of France, more especially when out of France, to accede to the treaty, *we deem it material to mark that the object of the alliance and concert is to destroy Buonaparte's authority, and not to impose on France any particular sovereign or form of government.* We deem this declaration not less advantageous to the King's interests in France than to the maintenance of the contest in Parliament against Buonaparte.

"The Russian note you sent us contains a most magnificent display of military strength. It is before Lord Liverpool; but I cannot authorise to admit that the Treasury can go beyond the £5,000,000 subsidy, and the £6,000,000 for our quota of 150,000 men. Out of the latter fund something may possibly be done for Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Hesse, Hanover, &c. I doubt the policy of preferring an excess of Russian force to the vigorous employment of Germans, to fight for what they are hereafter to defend.

"We must also recollect that the Austrian force is likely to be far beyond its quota, and that a similar claim on the part of that Court may be brought forward. I will talk this over further with Lord L[iverpool], but at present we must adhere to your reserve.

"Lord Bathurst writes to you about the Portuguese troops; and we rely upon your judgment for comparing the advantages of a force *somewhat British* against the delay of bringing, and the expense of supporting and keeping it complete, from so distant a point. I am not myself enabled to judge whether the Regency would take upon themselves to send men on so distant a service, without express authority from the Brazils. The Prince Regent has signified his intention of not at present coming to Europe.

"I do not write to Lord H[arrowby] or your brother, as they may be on their return. You will have the goodness to make my excuse, and communicate what I forward. Our earnest wish was to have seen you here, even for the shortest time; but conceiving your absence might be prejudicial, we made what appeared to us the best arrangement for obtaining the advantages of a full explanation.

"Whitbread did not make much, last night, of his attack upon your declaration."*

Again, on 28th April, the same subject was resumed, on the treaty of 25th March being laid on the table of the House of Commons, by Mr Whitbread:—

"He begged leave to recall the attention of the House to its own proceeding on this day three weeks, when an address was proposed by the noble lord in the blue ribbon in consequence of a message from the throne. To that address he (Mr W.) had suggested an amendment, which was rejected by the House, on a distinct understanding from the noble lord, that the die was not yet cast, and that

* *Castlereagh Correspondence*, x. 301-303.

there still remained an alternative for this country, which alternative was, whether we should avail ourselves of the abstract right of commencing war, or whether it would not be more consistent with sound policy to act merely upon a defensive system? It was not at all times easy to comprehend the meaning of the noble lord, if meaning were intended—but if anything could be collected from the words he employed, it was that there still remained that alternative. [Hear, hear!] Mr Whitbread put it to many of his right honourable and honourable friends round him, whether they would have voted against his amendment, unless they had expressly understood from the noble lord that it was unnecessary, because his Majesty's ministers had given their plighted faith that an alternative was left, and that they were undetermind on the line of policy, which, for the safety of the country, they should deem it right to pursue? [Hear, hear!] If anything could be wanting to prove that such was the language of the noble lord, and the understanding of the House, it was sufficient to quote the term applied by the noble lord to that amendment. The noble lord had called it a truism, because it called upon the Prince Regent to take such measures as would secure a peace consistent with the honour of his crown, his faith to his Allies, and the security of his dominions. He described it as a truism, because it prescribed a course which ministers had taken, and therefore that it was idle to give advice to do that which had been already determined.

"Such being the universal persuasion in the House, what must have been its astonishment when it was found that the noble lord had been deluding the House and the country?—that he had been holding forth the possibility of an alternative, and the wish to adopt a pacific resolution, when in truth it had been already decided in council that hostilities should be commenced? Such was the delusion practised upon Parliament and the country: and but for an accident we might have been plunged into all the horrors of a new war, without an opportunity of reflecting upon the consequences. Even now, Mr Whitbread said, he feared that this discussion would be too late, if what had fallen from a noble earl (Liverpool) in another place, had been correctly stated. By an accident (certainly unforeseen by ministers, or the delusion would not have been attempted) in the Vienna *Gazette* appeared an illicit publication, which must sink the fame of the noble lord from the proud height to which it had once been exalted. This publication was the treaty signed on the 25th March at Vienna; and it seldom happened that so much was disclosed by mere dates as in the present case. It was received by Government on the 5th of April, the day before the message was brought down to the House. Yet, though ministers knew the contents of that treaty and to what extent it pledged this country, they had not thought fit to alter a single word of the Royal communication. Having been brought down on the 6th of April, on the 7th the message was taken into consideration, and the answer was returned on the 8th, on which day likewise the ratification of the treaty by the Prince Regent was despatched to Vienna. In the discussion on the 7th of April, in which the gross delusion was practised upon the country, which had put an end to all further debate, the proclamation of the 13th of March, signed by the Duke of Wellington, so unhappily for himself, had been referred to, and the noble lord had attempted to gloss it over, to show that the language might have a double application—in short, to weaken and falsify the whole of its contents. He had contended that the alteration in circumstances had cancelled the obligation; and yet in the teeth of this statement was the treaty of the 25th of March, which the noble lord had just before been reading, which, in his own judgment and that of his colleagues, revived that declaration with all its horrors, called all its malignity into activity, provided for its execution, and avowed it to be the basis of the new

engagement. It remained therefore for the noble lord to reconcile the words he had uttered with the facts that had appeared, and *to show how an alternative could exist in the face of a treaty to which he had acceded, and which declared immediate and interminable hostility.* [Hear, hear!] To complete which, the only remaining step was the amount of subsidy left in the hands of Lord Clancarty, whose powers the noble lord had refused to produce.

"Under these circumstances, Mr Whitbread said, he had thought it his duty to propose an address to induce the Prince Regent to pause before he involved his people in war, on the ground that the executive government of France, whether by the choice of the people or the power of the army, was placed in the hands of an obnoxious individual. The restoration of the House of Bourbon had never before been made a ground of hostility. Mr Pitt had disavowed it, and it had frequently been denied by some of his successors; and in the declaration of the Regent annexed to the treaty of Vienna, his Royal Highness had disclaimed any intention to interfere with any particular form of government. Why was such a declaration required? What more right had the Prince Regent to interfere with the internal government of France, than the French had to interfere with the internal government of this country? Ministers concluded that it might enter into the design of the Allies to restore the family of Bourbon, and for this reason that declaration was inserted, and therefore we were now not to contend, whether the government of France should be imperial, royal, or republican; we allowed the nation to adopt for itself the government that should please itself, but it was not to be permitted that one particular man should be placed at the head of it. Was such a declaration—such a principle of war—just or politic? On the contrary, was it not the surest mode to rouse the spirit of a mighty people, and to confirm them in their resolution of supporting that man by their most strenuous efforts?"

In reply, Lord Castlereagh said:—

"He was not surprised that the hon. member, whose opinions on the subject of peace were so well known, should have brought forward the present motion; but he should be indeed astonished, if the House, after the opinions it had expressed, and with a knowledge of the sentiments entertained by the country, should agree to such an address. The nature and effect of the proposition before them could not be disguised, if they concurred with the hon. gentleman. It was impossible for any one to concur with the hon. gentleman, who did not so completely see his way through all the arduous circumstances of the present state of things, as to have made up his mind, not merely that armed preparation was better than open war, but that it would be wise and proper to adopt that course of policy at variance with the other Allied Powers. He did not think that the safety of the world was to be sought (whatever was the policy we adopted) in an alienation from those Powers of the Continent, by whose assistance we brought the former contest to a happy issue; though the honourable gentleman who made the present motion, on this as on other occasions, might be disposed rather to look to peace than to exertion for security, and might draw discouraging pictures of future results, which were only to be found in his prophecies. Parliament had a long experience of the consequences which would have resulted, if they had attended to the counsels which the hon. gentleman had, from year to year, impressed on the House. Napoleon would not only have been left in possession of the most fertile parts of Europe, of which the possession was so pregnant with danger to us; but independent Powers, now in a state of the most vigorous exertion against him, would have remained completely subservient to his will. It would have been unfortunate indeed if those counsels had biassed the House.

"The noble lord said, he should first consider whether his Majesty's Government had acted correctly in a constitutional point of view, or whether it was subject to the animadversions which the hon. member had cast upon it in the course of his speech. "He distinctly admitted that Parliament had not given any pledge to the Executive Government on war or peace, but that under the circumstances of the case they approved of the measures which had been taken for augmenting his Majesty's forces by sea and land; but how this force was to be used they had not decided. The hon. gentleman had found out a principle unknown to the Constitution—namely, that when the House was called upon to approve of a precautionary principle, it was the duty of the Government to acquaint them with all existing circumstances. It had been also said by the hon. member, that the treaty of the 25th of March being known on the 7th of April, when the message was discussed, *he (Lord C.) was not justified in saying that there was an alternative.* Now on this subject he differed from the hon. gentleman, because, *as he had said, on the discussion of the Prince Regent's message, that the change of circumstances might have changed the determination of the Allies, so he said as to the treaty of the 25th of March; and he was with reason unwilling by a premature disclosure of a treaty, of which the ratifications had not been exchanged, to prevent a reconsideration of the policy to be pursued towards France under the circumstances which had recently occurred.* He begged leave to remind the House of the chronology of the transaction. The declaration of the 13th of March had been drawn up at a time when it was only known at Vienna that Buonaparte had landed in France as an individual opposing the established government. It was not known that he had been successful; but though it was directed against an individual, he protested against any such meaning being annexed to it as that which had been ascribed to it by the hon. gentleman. An hon. and learned gentleman (Sir James Mackintosh) had given notice of a specific motion on that paper, and he should be ready to argue it in detail. *It had not been the wish, nor was it now the wish, of the British Government, to lead the Allied Powers into war against their opinion, but rather to invite them to consider all the difficulties of the case—to be deliberate as well as determined;* because the Government was persuaded, that it was only to a common feeling of interest in the whole Continent that they could look for success. *The course to be pursued, therefore, was, if anything occurred which had been, at the time when the Allies agreed to any treaty, unknown, that we,* though we should go hand in hand with them if they continued firmly resolved to persist in a warlike policy, *should not cut off the retreat if they were appalled by the difficulties and hesitated.* A material circumstance in the late events had occurred since the treaty had been signed. At that time the revolt of Ney was known, and the disaffection of the troops at Melun was suspected; but it was not known nor supposed that Louis XVIII. would be obliged to quit his capital, much less that he would be obliged to quit his dominions. *There were peculiar important stages in the whole transaction, each of which it was wise to make so many touchstones of the feeling of the Allied Powers. Their opinion had been taken,* and so far from hesitating on account of the extensive success of Napoleon, it had but added to their sober conviction, that *it was not possible to avail themselves of the blessings of tranquillity,* and that Buonaparte was a person with whom it was impossible to live in relations of peace and amity.

"But the noble lord contended, that the principle was not new in this country, as the hon. member appeared to argue, that the British Government should decline to treat with persons or Powers deemed incapable of preserving the relations of peace and amity. For it would be recollected that when Mr Sheridan submitted a motion to that House, that a particular government of France was capable of

maintaining the relations of peace and amity, the motion was decidedly negatived, and the ministers of the country declined to treat with the government alluded to. But what was the character of that government compared to that of the present ruler of France, who had violated every treaty he had concluded, and who, in his return to France, had manifested an utter contempt for the most sacred obligation? Never, indeed, was good faith and probity set so completely at defiance. Never did any individual in the records of history so ostentatiously glory in the breach of all those bonds which are held sacred in moral and social life. But still the hon. member would maintain, that notwithstanding the crimes which marked his career, his character was not such as should preclude us from relying upon the engagements of this man—that his personal character was truly no objection to our treating with him. The only rational question, however, was, Whether we should place any reliance upon this man, and by that reliance afford that time which he required in order to recover and organise his means? Whether we should delay until he was enabled to act with more effect in prosecution of those schemes, against which it was the peculiar interest of this country and its Allies to guard?

"But it seemed that the hon. member's disposition to rely upon Buonaparte was strengthened by the constitution which he had recently promulgated, as if that constitution were likely to subject the temper and character of that person to any degree of control. If, however, constitutions were to afford any pledge for the good faith of this person, how many such pledges had he offered!—all of which, by the by, he had violated and set aside just as it suited his purpose. Then, how could the hon. member imagine that the last constitution would be observed more than any of those previously framed under the auspices of this man? But if it even were possible for this constitution to be more respected by Buonaparte than any of the preceding ones, or that the party with which he was at present connected had more control over him than any with whom he had heretofore co-operated, how could it be imagined that this constitution or party would be allowed for a moment to stand in his way, or dispose him to a pacific and honest policy, where he had the means of gratifying his own views, and especially when seconded by the desire of an army notoriously panting for war and plunder? Did the hon. mover, did any rational being suppose, that Buonaparte would find any difficulty in setting aside Fouché or Carnot, or even Lucien Buonaparte, as he had heretofore done other men, whenever their counsels opposed his views? If any one thought so, let him look to the conduct of this person towards M. Laisne, when he addressed him as the president of an assembly, quite as respectable as any likely to be formed under the new constitution; and what said Buonaparte in reply to that address? Why, he desired M. Laisne and his colleagues to go about their business, telling them that they were presumptuous, in directing him how to conduct public affairs—that he, truly, was born to govern, and that he knew the duties of his situation. But, according to the hon. mover's motion, this person's character had undergone a material change from his residence at Elba; and in support of this idea of a change, the order for abolishing the slave trade was much dwelt upon. He (Lord C.), however, could state from his own experience, that in the last year this person was most tenacious upon that subject; insisting that the abolition of the slave trade would be utterly inconsistent with the honour and interest of France. Upon that ground, indeed, Buonaparte most strongly resisted this abolition. But the policy which dictated his recent conduct was easily intelligible. His object was to conciliate, with a view to impose upon those whom he knew to be friendly to that abolition. But was it possible that any one could be imposed upon by such a man, or indulge a

speculation that he would long continue to act in the spirit of justice or peace, or attend to any constitution that limited his military authority, and thus decline to consult the wishes or conciliate the favour of that army, upon whose support he mainly depended for the sustenance of his power? No; the idea was preposterous, for Buonaparte must attend to the will of the army, which repined at inactivity; and particularly to the will of those numerous officers, who, being placed on half-pay, loudly murmured at that peace which excluded them from the opportunities of promotion which a state of war was calculated to afford. To those men Buonaparte must and would attend, and the more so because their wishes were most congenial to his own character. The notoriety of that character was, indeed, the principal cause which served to render Buonaparte popular with the French army, and to indispose that army towards the Bourbons, in consequence of their known aversion to war and pillage, and their attachment to peace and justice. Thus the character which was calculated to attach all other classes of the community to the Bourbons, inclined the army towards him who promised to restore to them the profits arising out of universal calamity.

"But the honourable mover asked, why we should decline to treat with Buonaparte now, as we had treated with him before? Was there, however, to be no end to this policy? Was there no degree of guilt which should restrain us from treating with or placing any confidence in such a man? Were there no existing circumstances which should rather dispose us at once to enter into open hostility with this man than to negotiate any treaty with him, upon the observance of which it would be quite impossible to rely? It was one of the fortunate circumstances of the present occasion, that Buonaparte had been forced to make an effort to recover the throne of France at a time when, instead of meeting the Allied Powers reduced to a peace establishment, he found them in full strength. The French nation, too, he must observe, was bound to the treaty which Buonaparte had violated; and so the Allies justly felt. For that nation was a party to this treaty; and never had any nation obtained such terms—never had a nation been so mildly treated, especially after the crimes it had committed, after the evils it had inflicted upon the world. The Powers, in fact, who had taken possession of the capital of France as conquerors, had acted towards the French people as friends. These Powers were, therefore, justified in calling upon the French people to fulfil their contract by expelling Buonaparte and his dynasty from the throne of France. Nay, he would say further, that if the French nation would consent to become a party to the gross fraud practised by Buonaparte in violating this contract, that nation must be prepared for the consequences of such conduct; and Europe would have to contend, not merely with Buonaparte, but with France, for the security of its freedom and independence. [Hear! Hear!] France, then, must expect the visitation of war with all its calamities, if it rejected the means of preserving its own tranquillity and that of the world, by declining to discharge its duties; and that country must not be allowed to choose its field of action. No; instead of suffering the French to carry on war in Austria and Prussia, as heretofore, if they would not ally themselves with those troops which sought the deliverance of Europe and of France also, they must expect to experience in France itself the fruits of their own duplicity and imbecility. [Hear! Hear! on the Opposition benches.] If the French would gratify those who benefit by war—if Europe should find that people so fond of war, they should have it, and on their own soil—they should enjoy the object of their preference, but they must be made to feel the consequences. [Hear! Hear!] Europe had listened too long to such counsels as those of the hon. mover, which had too often paralysed its efforts at various stages, but especially at the early part of the Revolution, when different

Powers had been persuaded to believe that by quietly standing out of the way of the evil, they might enjoy separate peace and individual security. But the infatuated policy of the hon. mover, and of others who dictated such counsels, had happily ceased to have any influence; and Europe combined, upon a system of truly statesman-like policy, sought its common safety. Thus, whatever faults might have belonged to former policy, none could fairly be attributed to the policy which produced the treaty of Paris, and which had since governed the conduct of the Allies, as he was prepared to maintain, notwithstanding the spirit of defamation in which the hon. mover had indulged with respect to the proceedings of Congress. But that hon. member, who had always manifested a disposition to lower the character of his own country, and who usually attacked with most bitterness those among our Allies who were most intimately connected with it, had, as he (Lord C.) should on a proper occasion fully prove, rested his statements upon the most imperfect information, and promulgated the most groundless abuse. [Hear! Hear!]

"As to the declaration of Frankfort, and the negotiations which followed, the Allies were obviously governed in these proceedings by the wisest policy; for it was desirable to show to France, as well as to the world, that if peace were refused, and war persisted in, the evil was not attributable to the Allies. This, indeed, was rendered evident. As to the statement of the hon. mover, that a proposition was made by the Allies at Chatillon to grant much better terms to Buonaparte than were afterwards granted to the Bourbons at Paris, he could not conceive where the hon. member had obtained his information; but he could assure the House that no such proposition was ever made. Buonaparte, however, had made a proposition on the occasion alluded to, which proposition was withdrawn within three days afterwards, when he had obtained a victory that appeared to promise some improvement in his fortune. So much as to the information of the hon. mover, and the faith of the man with whom he would recommend this country to treat! For his part he (Lord C.) always preferred a treaty with the Bourbons to one with Buonaparte, because, among other considerations, the latter could not be consistently suffered to join in any consideration of the general arrangement of the affairs of Europe, to which the former was perfectly admissible. It was impossible, indeed, to admit a man to share in the councils of those whose object was to settle those territories which it had been the effort of his life to unsettle. But although we had treated with this man previous to the treaty of Paris, it did not follow that we should treat with him now. For a feature in his character had since transpired which proved that he was totally unworthy of confidence, presenting as it did an instance of treachery and bad faith certainly not to be paralleled in the annals of civilised nations. This man, when he made his movement upon Bar-sur-Aube on the rear of the Allies, the success of which was problematical, sent instructions to his minister at Chatillon, which instructions happened to come into his (Lord C.'s) possession, directing him to accede to the terms proposed by the Allies, but to contrive, by keeping certain points suspended and delayed, to afford him (Buonaparte) an opportunity, if circumstances should enable him, to prevent the fulfilment of the treaty. These instructions, which were signed by the Duke of Bassano, Caulaincourt was directed to burn and destroy. Such a proceeding was, he believed, wholly without precedent in the history of diplomacy. Some instances were to be found of a breach of treaty upon various considerations, perhaps satisfactory to the mind of those with whom the breach originated, although quite unsatisfactory to others; but to direct that a treaty should be concluded with a premeditated design to break it, was, he apprehended, never before heard of. The House, however, would be still better en-

abled to judge of the character of Buonaparte, when informed of the points which he expressed his anxiety to retain, in this meditated violation of treaty. This man wished to retain, as these instructions declared, what he, forsooth, called the three great keys of France; and what were these keys? *Why, Antwerp, which was not the key of France, but of Great Britain; Mayence, which was the key of Germany; and Alexandria, which was the key of Italy. Could any rational man doubt the views of Buonaparte after this communication?* He was anxious to retain possession of these points, which might enable him, when circumstances favoured his design, again to deluge the world, by facilitating his attacks upon those nations whom he most dreaded and detested. Could the hon. mover, after this disclosure, again disgust the House with the repetition of his opinion, that it would be safe to treat with Buonaparte—that any confidence could be reposed in the faith of such a man—or that the peace of the world could be secure while power remained in the hands of a man so thoroughly indifferent to every consideration of moral principle or political rectitude? *To put an end to the power of that man was the declared object of the war;* and it was no doubt desirable for the happiness of the world, and especially of France, to restore the Bourbons; *but that restoration was not to be understood as the sine qua non of peace.* While, however, the Allies persevered in their endeavours to attain the real object of the war—namely, to take power out of the hands of Buonaparte—he could entertain no doubt that the British nation would steadily adhere to them. For such a system of spoliation as that man was notoriously anxious to pursue, it was the common interest of mankind to resist. He, therefore, deprecated the adoption of an address, which was calculated to damp the spirit of this country and its Allies, and to give satisfaction only to the worst men in France. As to the expression of an anxiety for peace, he could not conceive the House disposed to think such an expression necessary; for he could assure the House that no set of men in the country could be more anxious for peace than his Majesty's Ministers, if peace could be preserved with honour. But he trusted that Parliament and the country would be ready to co-operate with the Government in pursuing those measures which were necessary to the attainment of honourable and solid peace—of that peace which should secure ourselves and Europe from disturbance and desolation. With a view to those measures, he should, at no distant day, propose an arrangement to the House, which it might rest assured should in no degree pledge the country to afford more aid of a pecuniary nature to the Allies than would be necessary to enable them to move to the contest with energy, but that the great burden of the expense should be borne by themselves. The noble lord concluded with expressing his confident hope of a glorious result, and that the exertions of the confederacy, actuated, as all its members were, by a strong sense of the necessity of the case, would succeed in producing the complete establishment of solid peace, and the security of general freedom and independence."

Upon this debate Ministers were supported by a majority of 201, the numbers being 72 to 273.

No possible doubt, it is thought, can exist in any candid mind as to the import of these documents, and the unfounded nature of the charge of dissimulation and deceit brought by M. Thiers against Lord Castlereagh for his conduct on this occasion. There was no discrepancy whatever between the treaty of 25th March, as modified and adopted by him, and either his or Lord Liverpool's speeches

in Parliament, or his private views, as revealed in his secret despatches to Lord Clancarty and the Duke of Wellington at the time. It was clearly understood and expressly stated in *both*, that the return of Napoleon from Elba, and his dethronement of Louis XVIII., was a direct violation of the treaty of Fontainebleau of 30th March 1814, which he had signed, and put the peace of Europe and the independence of nations in the most imminent hazard, and that it was indispensable, by further alliances and an increase of the national forces by sea and land, to guard against this threatening and most serious danger. But any intention to coerce France in the choice of its government was expressly disclaimed; the alliance and measures were defensive, and directed against Napoleon as the common enemy alone. It was necessary *to disarm him*, but *not to arm Louis XVIII.*, or convert the war into one for his restoration; and such an intention was expressly disclaimed in Lord Castlereagh's memorandum on the treaty adopted *verbatim* by all the Powers. Further than this was not revealed to Parliament, nor would it have been consistent with settled usage or the rights of the Crown to lay before Parliament pending and yet incomplete negotiations. But it was distinctly intimated that though the British Government would not goad the Allies on by giving them "a fictitious wish for war, nor overstrain the arguments in favour of it," yet that if "in their deliberate consideration and conscientious judgment they should conceive war to be the only means of *permanent security to Europe*, it could not be expected that this country could separate itself from the interests of the rest of Europe." The qualification to article 8, though agreed on by the British Cabinet on 7th April, was not signed till the 25th. The scheme of peace, therefore, was not lost when the debate on 7th April took place, and Lord Castlereagh would have been wrong had he shut them out by stating the terms of that unratified treaty. The war was now continued, and *stated to be continued*, on the same footing on which it had always stood, ever since Lord Granville's declaration on 29th December 1792—viz., for the *sake of security only;* not to coerce France in the choice of its government, but to prevent it, under a military chief whose exertions depended on such a policy, from destroying the independence and oppressing the subjects of the other European states.

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